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Recent years have opened debates amongst academics, practitioners and regulators on how 
the financial industry’s risk resiliency depends on its ability to handle risk holistically. The 
financial industry is found to be motivated not only by protection purposes or assurance but 
also by its interest in gaining more return on investment, compliance and effectiveness. It is 
noticeable that in recent years there has been considerable interest in organisational risk 
resiliency, but there are still unanswered questions as to why organisations are unsuccessful 
in applying effective security practice at all levels. Having a robust mechanism to deal with 
a variety of risks efficiently and in alignment with the organisational strategy has always 
been something that organisations struggle to accomplish. Changes in internal and external 
pressures have required organisations to turn their attention from silo operational and 
managerial risk controls to strategic approaches that can ensure the optimal achievement of 
the organisation’s mission, strategy and objectives. 
This research was intended to investigate possible approaches for enabling a more enhanced 
strategic approach to respond to the extended exposure to all types of risks: to move towards 
an approach that combines enterprise-wide risk governance with anticipation (proactive 
response). On the basis that the two types of organisational risk functions cannot be 
addressed in isolation, this research explored whether the realignment of risk control and 
risk oversight of the Cybersecurity Management (CsM) and Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) support the establishment of enterprise-wide risk governance. This research responds 
to the need for harmonised risk handling, reporting, analysis, mitigation and resiliency across 
an entire organisation. Alignment, in the form of interconnectivity and partnership, can place 
an entire organisation in a more enhanced state of security through a unified perspective of 
control, accountability and decision-making. While debates in this subject area have been 
centred on separate disciplines of ERM, this research posits that CsM and alignment together 
can further sustain an organisational risk strategy, as together they execute all capabilities in 
an integrative manner rather than using siloed controls. 
The nature of this research is mainly qualitative, as it seeks to explore and interpret the 
qualitative aspects of the problem. The research was undertaken by considering secondary 
(literature review, systematic literature evaluation) and primary qualitative data (semi-
structured interviews). Weighing up the evidence, it was found that an enterprise-wide 
alignment of CsM with ERM can enhance risk reporting, analysis, mitigation and resiliency. 
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However, incorporating both strategies in a unique mechanism appears to be an infrequent 
approach in the industry. To facilitate a more enhanced strategic approach, this research has 
examined the effectiveness and sustainability of an integrated CsM-ERM Strategic 
Alignment Framework to support financial organisations in managing their exposure to risks 
in a strategic manner that employs all efforts towards a single end: to protect and to sustain 
comprehensive capabilities for the achievement of organisational goals. 
Keywords: cybersecurity management; enterprise risk management; financial organisations; 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter acts as a guide that structures the overall research. It starts by 
stating the research rationale by defining the problem, scope and limitations and examining 
the research aims, objectives and questions that propose to fill the research gap by 
encompassing the need for alignment between Cybersecurity Management (CsM) and 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Moreover, the research background demonstrates the 
research gaps and thus the significance of this study, particularly in view of financial 
organisations encountering drawbacks in implementing risk control and risk oversight 
practices. In this early stage, the internal cohesion between the three elements (CsM, ERM, 
and alignment) is emphasised to augment the rationale of the research. While the 
investigation initially focuses on general aspects, it aims to articulate the current state of the 
research problem in order to offer an understanding of the correlation and position of current 
research, whilst considering prior research and articulating the research gap.  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into six sections: Section 1.2 explains the research 
scope and its projected results; Section 1.3 outlines the rationale of the research, problem 
definition and problem solution; Section 1.4 presents the aims, objectives and research 
questions; Section 1.5 explains the research relevance and contribution; Section 1.6 explains 
the research design and methodology; and Section 1.7 provides a snapshot of the overall 
structure to outline how CsM alignment with the ERM research problem is going to be 
explored and validated. Thus, this chapter’s propositions are to indicate the setting and 
direction of the research, in balance with prior contributions within the field (Paltridge and 
Starfield, 2007). 
1.2 Research background 
Recent years have opened debates amongst academics, practitioners, and regulators on how 
financial industry risk resiliency depends upon its ability to handle risk holistically. The 
reason for outlining enterprise-wide risk governance is because prior research has 
demonstrated that it represents a core competency for sustainability and efficiency as well 
as avoiding ripple effects across other interrelated industries (Mikes, 2009; PwC, 2014; 
Alcaraz and Zeadally, 2015; Verizon, 2018).  
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Having a robust mechanism to deal efficiently with a variety of risks and in alignment with 
organisational strategy has always been something that organisations strive to achieve 
(Webb et al., 2016; Kauspadiene et al., 2017). Consequently, changes in internal and 
external pressure have forced organisations to turn their attention from silo operational and 
managerial risk controls (i.e. risks dealt at department level) to strategic approaches (i.e. 
enterprise-wide risk oversight) to maximise the achievement of the organisation’s mission, 
strategy and objectives (Soomro, Shah and Ahmed, 2016; Maynard et al., 2018; Selamat and 
Ibrahim, 2018). Besides, migration to the cyberspace of businesses has made changes in 
terms of risk exposure. Also, in addition to enterprise risks, cybersecurity risk is an additional 
risk to any organisational risk portfolio. Due to the velocity of cyber risk and dynamic, recent 
years have raised concerns regarding how organisations should defend themselves when 
deploying commercial online activities and/or online operations. The Internet created an 
unprecedented way of doing business yet regardless of business opportunities gained, the 
cyberspace environment also allows exposure to a threatening landscape (Cavusoglu et al., 
2015; Craig, 2018). Therefore, several authors believe that even though security has evolved, 
its maximum efficiency is yet to be attained (Webb et al., 2016; Kauspadiene et al., 2017). 
Hence developments of the Internet have led to the creation of a ‘cyber [space] ecosystem’, 
where multiple elements interact (Ernst and Young, 2016) such perspective delimitates the 
types of perimeters (settings). In this regards, previous studies have indicated that the 
Internet has captivated users and organisations since its early beginnings due to its 
remarkable capabilities to interconnect and carry out a significant number of tasks. Seen as 
the invention of the Twentieth Century, the Internet succeeds to expand globally. As a result, 
information technology (IT) has emerged, becoming a significant area of interest for 
various sectors. Consequently, the extended capabilities of the cyberspace world in terms of 
connecting, integrating, and communicating have also created cyber-dependency (COSO, 
2015). Despite economic growth, innovation, and creation of opportunities, it appears that 
cyberspace also has a darker side. Regardless of vast research in securing the digital 
footprint of organisations in cyberspace, the highly publicised security breaches and cases 
of organisational failures have reaffirmed that challenges of cybersecurity exposure remain 
a severe problem and one that deserves thoughtful consideration (de Bruijn and Janssen, 
2017). Since security breaches are becoming more prevalent, it is likely assumed that 
cyberspace appears to be transformed into a prospective domain for cybercriminals (Craig, 
2018). Therefore, a solution is required to safeguard organisations when deploying 
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activities/operations online. Even though considerable research has been carried out 
regarding risk exposure for organisations, past incidents confirm that more research is 
required to respond appropriately to increased sophistication and occurrence of threats.  
Despite vast research, rethinking organisations’ strategic risk resiliency has been limited 
because organisations tend to mirror past siloed approaches of IT security, Information 
Security, or siloed risk management. Consequently, some organisations’ lack of preparation 
regarding risk exposure has revealed the need for more integrated strategies for managing 
and controlling risks (Jorion, 2009; Yaraghi and Langhe, 2011; Calandro, 2015). Despite 
vast research in securing organisations, highly publicised security breaches (corporate 
scandals) and ERM organisational failures post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 have 
reaffirmed that challenges in risk exposure continue to be serious problems that deserve 
consideration (de Bruijn and Janssen, 2017; Bohnert et al., 2019; Rubino, 2018; Oliveira et 
al. (2018).  
1.3 Research problem 
Recent years have shown that financial organisations are more and more concerned about 
finding a catalyst for risk foresight due to higher exposure to risks, hyper-competition, 
increased demand for compliance and governance, thus exerting higher pressure to create 
holistic risk governance. Intrinsically desirable, it points towards a transition to re-evaluating 
business models, reiterating changing organisational behaviours towards threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks, adapting business strategies and optimising risk governance and 
resiliency capabilities; hence, the stakes and risk-return for critical national infrastructures 
such as financial organisations are considerably higher and broader in scope.  
Attaining enterprise-wide risk governance is a complex issue requiring the alignment of 
multiple risk functions and the ramification of an organisation. The problem is that the 
relational mechanism that manages risks and aligns with the business is missing or is 
partially applied/decentralised, and thus the risk is managed reactively, randomly, and most 
often it omits to correlate all functions, technology, infrastructures, mechanisms, processes, 
culture and people. Even though risk governance efficiency has been improved in recent 
years, in many financial organisations’ cases, the benefits derived from Cybersecurity 
Management (CsM) and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) are not fully gained, which 
represents a mismanagement of risk,  siloed approach, duplication of risk management 
outlay, misuse of resources, duplication of efforts, time, and/or inefficient capital allocation. 
4 
 
In response to this concern, alignment has become an organisational imperative for 
unlocking enterprise-wide risk management, value, risk resiliency, effectiveness, 
compliance, sustainability, risk foresight, shared responsibility and competitive advantage 
(Coltman et al., 2015; Bohnert et al., 2019). The problem statement (inability to achieve 
holistic management of risks across an organisation) prescribes the adoption of an integrative 
risk function that has the capability to proactively drive a unified risk oversight able to deal 
with the increasing multi-dimensional spectrum of risks, sophistication and velocity (Amin, 
2019; Mayer et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019). Meaning that without alignment, risk governance 
for both CsM and ERM is mostly useless; risks remain unaligned and siloed across an 
organisation hence, previous approaches facilitated the management of risk up to a certain 
level. 
Accordingly, this research responds to the need for harmonised risk handling, reporting, 
analysis, mitigation, respectively, resiliency across a whole organisation. Thus, it proposes 
a ‘common mechanism’ that is driven by the tenets of alignment (strategic interconnectivity, 
communication and partnership). It shall ensure maximisation in achieving organisational 
strategy, vision, and mission as well as helping to reduce/prevent the deficiencies of siloed 
controls, strengthening an organisation’s security posture and building enterprise-wide risk 
resiliency and  foresight of risks; i.e. meaning that it recommends an approach to increase 
the effectiveness of an organisation to foresee, adapt and plan against unexpected risks and 
equally identify signs, reduce the potential impact, recover and seek opportunities with 
future-oriented strategies (Iden, Methlie and Cristsinsen, 2016; Amin, 2019). Thus, 
alignment shall orchestrate the disjointed risk protection layers through lenses of various 
dimensions: strategic, structural, social, cultural and operational. 
Much progress has been made in managing risk, however, intervention to date only 
moderated the siloed and reactive practice of managing risks and draws fundamental 
criticism. In the same vein, previous literature indicated limitations, such as examining only 
two traditional elements for alignment (e.g. IT security with business strategy; IS with 
business strategy; RM with business strategy; ERM with IS strategy). Whilst holistic risk 
governance has roots in two traditional approaches, namely IT Governance and/or traditional 
view of IT integration (Ramalingam, Arun and Anbazhagan, 2018; Mandani and Ramirez, 
2019), and Risk Management (Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017; Farrell and 
Gallagher, 2019; Silva, da Silva and Chan, 2019), the current research recommends the 
convergence of two types of modern approaches to managing risk: CsM and ERM, with 
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strategic alignment (third element) and organisational strategy (fourth element). By 
concentrating ERM capabilities to strengthen CsM capabilities, this research explored 
whether the realignment of risk control and risk oversight support the establishment of 
centralised enterprise-wide risk governance capable of addressing ever-increasing 
challenges (Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017).  
In conclusion, this research contributes by shedding a contemporary light on the current state 
of the literature and practice while suggesting an update to the body of knowledge on all 
three domains: CsM, ERM and alignment. It presents evidence on research gap 
implementation and highlights the positive effects of an integrated risk governance 
framework drawing attention towards the value of a paradigm shift in organisational risk 
governance driven by alignment (heavily grounded on contingency and institutional theory). 
Therefore, this research presents convincing arguments and contributes to the understanding 
of why a strategic alignment of CsM and ERM can sustain a financial business in the long 
term. Besides, it helps to identify key issues that impede the alignment process and thus 
extends the current literature domain that seems insufficient. 
1.4 Rationale of the research  
As previously mentioned, in a global and digital economy cyber risks have become a central 
issue for many stakeholders and shareholders. Evidence suggests that cyber risks in the 
online environment are among the most important factors considered by academics, 
practitioners and regulators. Given that security has a pivotal role in online activities, 
cybersecurity risks are perhaps the most important factors considered by organisations 
(Calder and Watkins, 2012; Nazareth and Choi, 2014; Chartered Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2018). Literature recognising the importance of CsM in every organisation is 
growing. On the other hand, considerable research has been carried out with regard to Risk 
Management (RM), and in particular, its relationship with IT functions. Despite open 
conversation about the advantages and risks regarding the use of cyberspace, Hopkin (2014; 
2018) states that cyber threats are merely a part of life, even without our consent. 
Furthermore, enterprise governance structures such as RM are responsible for guiding 
organisations in dealing with risks and responding to uncertainties. While RM is methodical 
and manages a broad range of risks that can affect organisations, the present research is 
focused on cyberspace threats that may influence or constrain the aims and outcomes of an 
organisation. Although traditional IT management has subscribed to the belief that it is 
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responsible for the technical part, there is evidence that supports a more innovative 
approach: respectively CsM.  
It is noticeable that the interest in organisational risk resiliency has registered significant 
considerations, but there are still unanswered questions as to why organisations are 
unsuccessful in implementing effective security at all levels. For this reason, this research 
investigates possible methods for facilitating a more enhanced strategic approach to respond 
to the extended exposure to enterprise-wide risks and cyber risks altogether; to move towards 
an approach of secure by design, in context of strategy, to establish an enterprise-wide risk 
governance with anticipation (proactive). In short, the Researcher advocates that the two 
types of organisational risks cannot be carried out in isolation. Correspondingly, the 
Researcher advocates realignment of risk control and risk oversight (directing) under CsM 
and ERM alignment, to establish enterprise-wide risk governance. Such an approach would 
yield harmonised risk reporting, analysis, mitigation, and resiliency. Henceforth the 
alignment (interconnectivity and partnership) can place the entire organisation in a more 
enhanced state of security through a unified perspective of control, accountability, and 
decision making (Atoum, Otoom and Abu Ali, 2014, 2017). While much attention has been 
centered on separate disciplines of ERM, CSM and Alignment together can further sustain 
organisational risk strategy as it conveys all capabilities in an integrative manner. 
The key aspect of this argument is that organisations’ ability to maintain trajectory towards 
their vision, mission, and successful operation, it prescribes the adoption of an integrative 
risk function. ERM has been recognised as an integrative mechanism that drives a unified 
risk oversight approach that aids understanding of how organisations deal with a multi-
dimensional spectrum of risks. ERM has a long history stemming from its capability to align 
various organisational functions in a multi-strategy approach that provides a holistic view of 
risks relating to precautionary maps displaying interrelated effects. (Majdalawieh and 
Gammack, 2017). It is also commonly known that successful ERM is driven by the 
alignment of risk oversight with strategic planning, respectively organisational strategy 
(Althonayan, Keith, and Misiura, 2011; Viscelli et al., 2017). While adoption of risk 
oversight is made to lower risks and help to exploit opportunities, practice shows that a 
universal approach is not available or feasible for organisations (Agarwal and Ansell, 2016). 
Risks continually evolve, and the consequences of these changes have increased 
organisations’ interest in shifting from a traditional silo perspective that comes with 
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conventional RM towards a holistic approach of ERM in order to deal with risk in a more 
all-encompassing way (Althonayan, Keith and Misiura; 2011; Mensah and Gottwald, 2016). 
Of more concern is that there are many examples of ERM’s failure (e.g. Goldman Sachs, 
Bear Stearns, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland, UBS), and thus the 
Researcher considers that the problem is not entirely solved. Furthermore, the existence of 
the best practices does not necessarily promise to eradicate current problems faced by ERM 
completely. Research has shown that implementation and, more specifically, abiding to 
ERM framework alignment have proven a hard task for boards (Reynolds and Yetton, 2015; 
Wu, Straub and Liang, 2015). One of the main obstacles appears to be the strategic approach 
because nowadays some organisations see risk accountability as something unique to each 
department of their organisation. This leads to weaknesses in organisational defence (due to 
the silo approach) and may cause serious issues (e.g. duplication, lack of transparency of 
organisational risk profile, misalignment, immature risk control function, and lack of holistic 
RM). Given the variety of risks, silo security is a risk for organisations, and thus alignment 
of CsM with ERM governance, (e.g. strategies, planning, structure, processes, skills, 
competencies, and culture alignment) must be acknowledged and embedded at all levels as 
a strategic risk governance baseline. By achieving alignment, an organisation is less 
vulnerable to external changes or internal inefficiency because the alignment creates a 
standard and centric/unified solution (Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard, 2004). 
On the other hand, the cost of cyber incidents has increased losses for the global economy 
even though it is hard to quantify the overall cost (COSO, 2015). There can thus only be 
possible biases involved (i.e., the source of information, specific interest if security vendor; 
specific interest for organisations to retain information internally), and thus the scale, costs, 
and complexity of incidents for organisations seems difficult to calculate. The precise effect 
of cyber incidents and costs is a much-debated topic, and it often prevails that year-by-year 
the cost has increased significantly (Maynard et al., 2018; McAfee, 2013; Websense Security 
Labs, 2015; McAfee, 2018; Verizon, 2018). As financial institutions are the earliest adopters 
of ERM, there has been increasing concern that the failures experienced by the financial 
industry in the course of the financial crisis have been due to a false sense of security 
(Thakor, 2015). As a response to various factors faced by organisations (i.e. GFC of 2008, 
corporate scandals, new business environment requirements, new regulatory requirements, 
and higher expectations from collaborators and insurers), the last two decades have shown 
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changes in business risk behaviour and in strategy risk formulation (both CsM and ERM) 
(Lyons, 2015; Rubino, 2018). However, previous research has failed to address such issues, 
and a gap has persisted; a gap that this current research aims to fulfil. Accordingly, a new 
governance framework, which aligns CsM with ERM, is proposed in order to optimise 
benefits, address new challenges, and link together individual risks of traditional silos. 
Among advantages such as the alignment of two risk control functions with overall strategy 
and a prompt response holistically understood and governed, it builds risk maturity 
preparedness and thus a strong reputation worthy of achieving (Taylor, 2014). This research 
proposes to utilise previous literature focused on aligning IT management to business 
strategy in order to exploit lessons learnt when organisations failed. Thus, for achieving an 
understanding of the current state, this research proposes to leverage a more complex study 
by analysing the impact of CsM alignment with ERM from a broader perspective. 
Overall, this research proposes to merge strategies of CsM and ERM and align the finished 
product with organisational strategy in order to employ all forces in one single scope so as 
to protect the organisation and to offer comprehensive capabilities to achieve its goal. Since 
the previous studies failed to incorporate principles of CsM and ERM, their alignment with a 
wider strategy will create a single path.  
Therefore, this research proposes to generate a framework able to support the alignment of 
strategies and practices through an integrated approach in order to yield enhanced 
preparedness in forthcoming risk events. By concentrating ERM capabilities and CsM 
capabilities in the same scope and not separating them as done in the past (i.e. technical silo, 
silo security at departmental levels), the alignment will increase the potential of achieving 
strategic objectives and strategic planning, optimised processes, balanced alignment of risk 
appetite with exposure, tolerance, communications, and risk prioritisation, to name but a few 
aspects; all of which will enhance an organisation’s overalls security. In reaching the above, 
this research puts forth aims, objectives, and research questions. 
1.5 Research aims, objectives, and questions  
To address the research problem, this research is driven by aims, objectives, and questions. 
While the research aims to evidence the main goal (general), scope and intent of research, 
defining limitations, on the other hand the research objectives are more specific in explaining 
the processes of how the aims shall be achieved (Thomas and Hodges, 2010; Stokes and 
Wall, 2014; Saunders and Lewis, 2018). Lastly, the research questions facilitate, point by 
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point, what exactly is addressed, thus ensuring that the research is consistent with the 
research aims. Therefore, research questions are most often seen as a continuation of 
research objectives (Stokes and Wall, 2014). To employ the aforementioned, the sections 
below delineate statements of the research’s main goal, direction, and limitations. 
1.5.1 Research aims 
1) To investigate the alignment of CsM with ERM within the financial industry.  
2) To develop a framework that assists CsM with ERM alignment within the financial 
industry, supported by practical guidance for the implementation of the proposed 
framework. 
1.5.2 Research objectives 
1) To identify, analyse and critically evaluate academic, industry-based and 
regulatory literature regarding CsM, ERM and their alignment and explore the 
current state of the topic. 
2) To analyse the financial industry’s environment and current practices regarding 
alignment. 
3) To review and evaluate the effectiveness of current CsM and ERM frameworks. 
4) To evaluate the potential and limitations of CsM with ERM alignment within the 
financial industry, supported by practical guidance. 
1.5.3 Research questions 
The main purpose of the questions is to secure as follows the emphasis of aims and objectives 
throughout the content of the research:   
1) Why does a strategic alignment of CsM and ERM sustain a financial business in the 
long-term?  
2) What are the key issues that impede the alignment process in the financial industry 
regarding CsM and ERM?  
3) How are theory, practice, and regulation direction applied regarding the current 
alignment of CsM and ERM within the financial industry? 
4) What effects have the implementation of the new framework? 
1.6 Research relevance and contribution 
This research is relevant for academics and practitioners when dealing with risk 
strategically and holistically. This research has two main contributions: a theoretical one 
and a practical one.  A first contribution is the theoretical contribution, and it contributes 
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to literature by providing an understanding of a three-dimensional view of academics, 
industry (both organisations’ approaches and industry standards), and regulatory 
requirements. Prior research focusing on how to protect organisations varies and focuses 
on certain types of risks. Even though prior literature has strengthened the approach and 
lead to better understanding, what is needed is to respond to risks because prior research 
has proven pervasive and fragmented (Imenda, 2014; McShane, 2018; Althonayan and 
Andronache, 2018). Moreover, it has failed in addressing the demand for performing 
holistic risk governance (e.g. regulatory pressure, stakeholders’ pressure, and market 
pressure). Despite initiatives to establish good security practices, the underlying remark is 
that in practice organisations still fail to establish strategic alignment across their 
organisation despite considerable investments. Therefore, this research contributes 
theoretically by validating and articulating literature legacy, available practitioners’ 
guidance, and effects of regulatory implication. 
There is significant literature to support good practices. However, in most cases it only 
partially addresses views and is thus incomplete (limited). Such limitation renders it 
necessary to leverage additional solutions. Following the gap identification, the 
distinctiveness of present research lies in the fact that it aims to research in-depth in order 
to analyse and explore how the association of CsM and ERM, in the context of strategic 
alignment, can collectively align risk control and oversight and result in enhanced risk 
governance. A key aspect of this contribution is that it validates the progress/maturity of 
each paradigm. Thus, it outlines how each element can complement the other when striving 
towards a common goal, extracting the value of each and understanding potential inhibitors. 
It brings together three elements (CsM, ERM and alignment) to ensure maximisation of 
achieving organisational strategy. It thus establishes that capabilities of ERM, CsM and 
Alignment a must be integrative if to sustain organisational strategically.  
On a practical note, it presents risk governance maturity, and in turn, determines flaws and 
justifies the value of the holistic approach. In addition to proving guidance for adopting a 
new direction in dealing with risk, this research shall contribute to the understanding of 
real-world practice. This research articulates the gaps in each paradigm (ERM, CsM, and 
strategic alignment) and proposes an approach to overcome drawbacks, but a second 
contribution of this research is made through the development of an inclusive conceptual 
framework. Another relevant point is that the research maps principles of strategic 
alignment and also gives consideration to operational, structural, and cultural alignment. 
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This research demonstrates that priority of security decision is still driven from a silo 
perspective, resulting in a mismanagement of risks (unaligned). In contrast, this research 
provides evidence that a common governance infrastructure can create a ‘common 
mechanism’ that would prioritise risks,  support initiatives, unify planning, and prioritise 
investments as a security enabler based on current organisational needs; consequently the 
alignment  proposal shall support identification of overall necessity on a multi-layered 
security basis that orchestrates alignment of risk governance, strategies, objectives, 
appetite, planning, structure, processes, capabilities, competencies, and risk culture for the 
purpose of serving organisational mission and vision in a unified manner; along with the 
preservation of resiliency that advocates the idea of rejecting the ‘organisational 
dissociation’. In other words, the framework embodies a representation of how strategic 
organisational statement (strategy) is to achieve its main mission. Therefore, through the 
implementation of the Framework, an organisation can lessen over-investment efforts to 
adapt to internal and external changes (Miles et al., 1978), overlapping of functions, and 
much more. 
The Framework proposes to support organisations’ risk governance procedures by 
emphasising strategic responsibility, leadership, accountability, and governance with the 
intention to seize opportunities, make risk-informed decisions, and contribute to the 
achievement of the resilience against enterprise risks and cyber risks. 
1.7 Research design summary 
Referring to Bryman’s view, which reasoned that a “research design provides a framework 
for collection and analyses of data” (Bryman 2012, p. 46), the Researcher concludes that the 
original purpose of a research design lies in the fact that it proposes to outline a structure 
that guides the development and execution of the entire research. Moreover, a research 
design reiterates and outlines the researcher’s priorities when answering the specific research 
problem. The structure of current research incorporates techniques of collecting data 
(research methods) and instruments (interviews) that help in the exploration of the 
phenomenon. This research adopted an interpretivist philosophy in order to provide a 
practical and theoretical perspective of the phenomenology through an inductive approach. 
The methods for conducting the research represent the tools proposed for identifying, 
defining, interpreting, and analysing the problem under examination (Bazeley, 2013). In 
undertaking the research, the exploration and analysis of primary and secondary data is made 
through an interpretive research paradigm. Likewise, the research methodology and methods 
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selected are subjected to the research aims, objectives, and research questions. In addition, 
the research field (financial industry) was another determinant yet simultaneously a 
delimitation of research boundaries. Furthermore, in determining the research methodology, 
the theoretical inheritage of previous contributors has been taken into consideration, and 
thus, previous questions unaddressed in the past have now been acknowledged. Thus, the 
Researcher adapted and reformed her questions to current business context (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). Demonstrating this, the research questions represent the map for literature 
review, which is a determining factor for the selection and analysis of the literature. 
Additionally, research questions are the driver for the Discussion Chapter. Moreover, the 
methodological approach of this research is defined by a cross-sectional time horizon 
because it seeks to explore how this phenomenon occurred in the past and its effects. To 
support the investigation, the research design indicates how the research method and analysis 
shall be applied (Bryman and Bell, 2011). As a result, to investigate the above mentioned, 
qualitative data analysis is used.  
1.7.1 Secondary data from the literature  
The first stage of the investigation starts with a literature review, serving as a basis for the 
following chapters. The research intends to adopt a practical approach, the exploration 
of secondary data begins with an electronic database search based on keywords suggested 
by internet search engines and/or hard copies of research from the university library. Based 
on these techniques and field notes, a preliminary literature evaluation is formed. Through 
field notes, the researcher registers descriptions to support further the exploration of the 
research problem investigated, and additional meanings are extracted on these grounds 
(Zikmund et al., 2013). The triage of prior research is nominated from three dimensions: 
academic literature, practitioner literature, and regulatory literature, with inclusion and 
exclusion criteria defined by Chapter One.  
1.7.2 Collecting primary data from interviews 
With the intention of also incurring knowledge from applied knowledge, the interview 
method is addressed to senior executives from different financial organisations. At this stage, 
interviews are elaborated based on preliminary results of literature review and systematic 
literature review. The realisation of this approach was based on three motivations. Firstly, 
an efficient interaction with the industry respondents; secondly a collection of primary data 
that points out the current trends providing a means of comparison with previous data results; 
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and thirdly, a possible identification of the missing piece that completes the whole picture of 
the research gap through a qualitative and accountable perspective. 
In this regard, the interview type selected is semi-standardised because the Researcher 
wishes to take the opportunity to gain insightful information (tacit knowledge); as opposed 
to structured interviews where possible answers might be predisposed by the Researcher due 
to the open-ended nature of the questions. Although interviews are time-consuming, the 
format gains detailed feedback through questioning experts. Both face-to-face and 
telephonic interviews were considered as potential alternatives as the Researcher’s intention 
was to address inquiries to professionals from various geographical area. Using telephonic 
communication for interviews made the research unconditioned geographically and gained 
a larger sample of respondents (Flick, 2014). The data is analysed and compared with NVivo 
software (a digital tool, especially for the analysis of qualitative data). Having chosen this 
methodology, it can be concluded that the research is based on a mono method.  
1.8 Research Outline 
This research compounds eight chapters. Summaries of each chapter are outlined below. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides a snapshot of the overall structure of this research. This serves as a 
starting point to present the background, context, current status, and understanding of the 
research problem. Thus, this chapter is to indicate the setting and direction of the research in 
conjunction to prior contributions within the field. It states the rationale, scope, and 
limitations of the topic, presenting the challenges encountered by financial organisations in 
implementing risk control and risk oversight practices. The chapter represents a synthesis 
that highlights the gap and necessity of alignment between CsM and ERM to deploy holistic 
risk governance.  In this stage, the aims, objectives and questions define the structure 
planning of this research. Also, the content of the chapter proposes to determine if the 
alignment has a sustainable strategic prospect. While the investigation initially focuses on 
general aspects, it aims to articulate the current state of the research problem, to withstand 
an understanding of the correlation and position of research with the prior research, and 
articulate the research gap to justify the significance of research problem solution and 
framework. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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This chapter examines a variety of resources and perspectives (ERM, CsM, alignment) 
focusing on the financial industry in particular. It presents key aspects of theories and leading 
practices in a concise format, separating the chapter into three-dimensional perspectives. 
First view, the academics’ literature comprises reviewal of scholars’ literature which 
represents an initial frame. Second view, the practitioners’ literature adds a practical 
understanding of the need to elucidate inadvertencies, pointing out the current state of CsM 
strategy without the effect of ERM strategic alignment. Third view, the regulators’ 
literature examines the rules for organisations in the financial industry based on 
requirements, guidelines, or stringent regulations. Based on these three initial steps, the 
literature examination is synthesised in a multi-dimensional literature taxonomy, gaining a 
retrospective view of theory and practices to currently identify information what generates 
holistic risk governance that supports organisations overall strategy. Providing 
a snapshot view of the current and past approaches (contributions), the researcher uses this 
derivate as a basis for demonstrating the research gap and to justify the rationale of the 
research framework. In short, the content of the chapter proposes to determine if alignment 
has a sustainable strategic prospect in both dimensions. 
Chapter 3: Systematic Literature Evaluation 
Overall, this third chapter represents a second phase of the literature examination, to 
systematically evaluate and organise the literature. This chapter proposes to move beyond 
the descriptive exploration of the phenomenon and explore further possible answers to the 
questions raised in this research. Key contributors, main approaches, key factors, key 
benefits, and the key problems are explored at this stage of the research. In this context, it 
clarifies the role of academics, practitioners, and regulators on how it influences the 
governance of risks. This chapter represents the second conceptual constructor (after 
literature review) for the conceptual framework that follows in Chapter 4. Thus, this chapter 
explores why alignment is necessary, how it is sustained, what the key debates within all 
three domains are, and, lastly, how theory, practice, and regulatory frameworks interrelate. 
Therefore, apart from addressing the objectives of this research, this chapter aims to identify 
the current maturity state of the research problem, analysing practices and evaluating 
limitations, all of which have the scope to validate the research gap and sustain the validity 
of the proposed research framework. In short, this chapter provides an overview of ERM, 
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CsM, and alignment literature contribution based on a systematic literature review in order 
to illustrate how literature has progressed in terms of this research problem.  
Chapter 4: Development of Strategic Alignment Framework of CsM with ERM 
While the previous chapter is guided by the fulfilment of questions and objectives, this 
chapter is governed by attaining the second aim:  
‘To develop a framework that assists CsM with ERM alignment within the financial 
industry, supported by practical guidance for the implementation of the proposed 
framework.’ 
This chapter derives from the initial findings of the literature review in Chapter Two (first 
derivate/contribution) and the systematic literature evaluation extracted from Chapter Three 
(second derivate), which fostered the identification of the research gap (third derivate). 
Based on these derivates, the structure of the chapter further contributes to compounding the 
CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment Framework, and thus this chapter contains an additional two 
derivations: supporting theories (fourth derivate) and supporting frameworks and gaps (fifth 
derivate). On these settings, this chapter compounds all five derivations (as constituents’ 
part) with the purpose of justifying and endorsing the CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment 
Framework. 
Chapter 5: Research Design 
The format of the research methodology chapter justifies the structure of this research in 
terms of how the research objectives are addressed, and it explains how they correlate to the 
research questions (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Bryman, 2012; Saunders and Lewis, 2018). 
Consequently, this chapter states and justifies how the research is carried out and why, as 
well as outlining the design and tools selected to undertake the analysis. Thus, this chapter 
introduces justification for steps taken in the development and execution of the entire 
research. As a starting point, it contains a theoretical discussion regarding what a research 
methodology represents and how it consequently sets the researcher’s priorities when 
identifying the research answers (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). Given the purpose 
of the research, data collection is gathered from primary and secondary sources. Since the 
collection of a theoretical background requires investigation of both past and current 
approaches in organisations, the use of secondary data is an appropriate preliminary method. 
The second step that follows is the collection of primary data based on semi-structured 
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interviews. Considering retrospective data and analysis of practical approaches, it seeks to 
clarify how the objectives of this research are accomplished. 
Chapter 6: Collection and Analysis of Primary Data 
This chapter focuses on the collection, organisation and analysis of data gathered from 
interviews with respondents involved in CsM, ERM, or both. To collect and analyse data, 
the research methodology presented in the previous chapter is used. Specifically, for this 
chapter, the research methodology guidance has the purpose of driving the research 
objectives and determining the extent of fulfilment. As a result, this chapter introduces the 
account of research findings from interviews aiming to contextualise the validity of CsM-
ERM Strategic Alignment Framework. In seeking to investigate the effectiveness and 
sustainability of CsM and ERM alignment in the context of the financial industry, this 
chapter employs qualitative content analysis of research findings. 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
While the results of Chapter Six are assessed against the research objectives, this chapter’s 
goal is to address the research questions and explore how academic, industry, and regulators’ 
views revolve in aggregating answers. Therefore, implications of research findings identified 
in Chapter Six (content analysis) are further analysed with an additional technique of 
thematic analysis and are then compared against literature. By employing a thematic 
technique, the focus of discussion moves from ‘description’ to ‘interpretation’ of research 
findings (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). This relies on a qualitative analysis that seeks to 
understand the phenomenon’s antecedents, determinants, barriers, readiness (maturity), and 
capacity so as to sustain risk governance as a core competency for sustainability and 
efficiency as well as to avoid ripple effects (internally and externally on other industries) 
(Verizon, 2018). Specifically, this chapter uses the rigour of thematic analysis to explore if 
CsM and ERM alignment (interconnectivity and partnership) can place an entire 
organisation in a more enhanced state of security through a unified approach to risk control, 
accountability, and strategic decision-making. In this phase, the research framework takes 
final shape, incorporating the legacy of ERM, CsM and Alignment theory, approaches, gap, 




Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter forms a synthesis of findings to provide evidence of how the aims, objectives, 
and questions of this research are fulfilled. Linking each chapter’s contribution, this final 
chapter concludes the implication of findings in order to validate the framework for the 
alignment of CsM with ERM in the financial industry. Therefore, conclusions and 
recommendations are based on all seven chapters of the research to demonstrate well-
supported investigation throughout all chapters, contribution, strengths, and limitations. 
To visualise the above stated, Figure 1-1 synthesise the structure of this research on various 
stances. 
 
Figure 1-1 Developmental research phases 
Source: The Researcher 
As can be observed in Figure 1-1, the first phase of the research begins with Chapter One, 
where an overview of the research is presented from an exploratory stance. In phase two, 
Chapter Two presents the literature review, investigating and analysing prior contribution of 
scholars, practitioners, and regulators in order to explain and comprehend the current state 
of knowledge through different perspectives. Continuing, phase three continues to explore 
the research problem and identifies and explains the limitations of prior research. Based on 
this phase, further exploration takes place (phase 4) in order to identify and confirm gaps in 
applied approaches. Stemming from identified theoretical legacy, further steps of planning 
data collection are considered for a more in-depth analysis of primary data. Therefore, the 
methodology (phase five) organises and demonstrates how the research is been undertaken. 
In phase six, empirical results are provided. Phase 7 interprets and substantiates the findings 

















































reiterates the implication of the proposed Framework. It concludes by validating the 
contributions and limitations of the research.  
The chapter that follows reviews literature related to the research problem and does so 
through a three-dimensional perspective of academics, practitioners, and regulators.
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2. Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
As traditional businesses have evolved, society’s reliance on IT has increased significantly. 
Organisations are framing their structures and behaviours to prevent risks resulting from the 
cyber environment. In the past, Risk Management (RM) could counteract threats from the 
physical environment. Nowadays, the diversity of activities has led organisations to adopt 
the more comprehensive approach of ERM. Therefore, the first component of this literature 
chapter focuses on the evolution from RM to ERM. A second essential element is the 
alignment between CsM and ERM. As previous literature examining the issue is scant, this 
chapter focuses on the emerging problem of CsM alignment in organisations by focusing on 
its strategic nature and whether the alignment has a sustainable strategic prospect in both 
dimensions. 
While the investigation initially focuses on general aspects, it later moves from general to 
specific exploration of the financial industry. As the financial industry is under explicit 
regulation, the efficiency of the proposed alignment can be determined. This chapter 
examines a variety of resources and perspectives focusing on the financial industry in 
particular, drawing on academic peer-reviewed journals and practitioners and regulatory 
perspectives to explore different facets, insights of research, typologies and evolution. This 
allows identification of the current state of research, an understanding of the position of the 
current research and recognition of the research gap. Such an approach is particularly useful 
to complement literature and add a three-dimensional perspective, and thus assure a more 
complete and informed research contribution. This approach has also been adopted to 
overcome the arguments such as theory often omitting some aspects of the field of reality. 
Such a three-dimensional perspective aims to ensure the validity of correlations in a real 
context. 
2.2 Risk landscape 
Academics’ viewpoint: The concept of risk is familiar for most researchers as it 
encompasses a variety of research areas. However, the etymology of the word seems to be 
unknown, even though the term was initially identified in medieval documents. Some 
findings suggest that the spread of the term was due to the printing press development 
(Luhman, 1991). Other authors believe that the term is of Arabic origin, demonstrating that 
risk concerns have always existed (Klüppelberg, Straub and Welpe, 2014). From analysing 
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pre-modern societies, there is a clear illustration that risk was experienced in different forms 
since uncertainties have exposed humankind from early beginning to natural changes, 
disasters, premature deaths, epidemics, wars, violent politics and many other unexpected 
events. Although in the past the meanings of risk were apprehended, a multi-faceted focus 
on risk response appeared late in modern society and through a multidisciplinary approach 
(Klüppelberg, Straub and Welpe, 2014). 
Additionally, whilst its origin is unknown and unclear, the word “risk” appears to have 
remained fragmented in different connotations. For instance, in Arabic, the word “risq” 
describes a favourable outcome depending on the actions required. However, in Latin, the 
word “riscum” represents a challenge. Furthermore, in French, the word “risqué” also means 
a challenge but usually, one that leads to a negative result and almost never with a positive 
outcome. In English, the word “risqué” also exists; however, it is used in the context of 
society and should not be used interchangeably with the English word “risk” as it has an 
entirely different meaning. The word “risk” is closely related to danger, yet unlike its French 
counterpart, the outcome is not necessarily expected to be negative; it could be either. In the 
recent years, the word “risk” has been applied in the context of business’ assets (Merna and 
Thani, 2008). Accordingly, Hopkin (2014) considers that risk in an organisation’s 
environment is something that could hinder the fulfilment of objectives. Nonetheless, Merna 
and Thani (2008) simply define risk as the likelihood (probability) of something negative or 
positive occurring at a given time. Furthermore, authors such as Aitchison and Guerin 
(2014) consider that nowadays the risk semantic has gradually moved from an adventure 
concept to a more specialised interpretation of RM. Klüppelberg, Straub and Welpe (2014) 
define risk paradigm shift as being determined by a move from traditional to modern society, 
and thus it is believed that the term’s etymological roots have been forgotten. While 
organisations are exposed to a broad array of emerging risks such as the global financial 
crisis, extreme weather, terrorism, or cyber threats, based on this exposure, organisations 
seek to mitigate and manage risks and embrace possible opportunities that appear in 
organisational processes. Authors such as Web et al. (2014a) offer a modern perspective of 
risk. They consider that innovation conveyed by the development of the Internet, mobile 
computing, big data, cloud computing technologies and/or the Internet of Things (IoT) have 
all driven the trend towards the acknowledgement of risk as an opportunity providing it 
includes adequate oversight. Accordingly, Web et al.’s research reflects upon RM 
approaches for increasing the capability of identifying, prioritising, and controlling an 
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organisation’s vulnerabilities and risks (Web et al., 2014a). Following the same trend, Miller 
(1992) provides a more strategic description of risk encountered by organisations, as 
it refers risk as a variation in an organisation’s outcome. Thus, the shift from pure risk 
(traditional view) to opportunity risk (current view) is later viewed by Rosenberg and 
Schuermann (2006) as an adverse deviation. Moreover, risk perception and evolution from 
risk adversity to risk opportunity have registered a need for quantification and categorisation. 
Therefore, authors such as Burnaby and Hass (2009) categorise risks based on their potential 
as minor, damaging or catastrophic.  
Practitioners’ viewpoint: In the business context, risk is seen as a vital force for yielding 
success due to its financial, operational or strategic implications (PwC, 2012). Likewise, 
Lloyd (2010) is of the opinion that in a global economy, organisations have to adapt and 
prepare for risk implications on an ongoing basis. Another simplistic viewpoint regarding 
risk is briefly described by the British Standards Institution (BSI) in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
(BSI, 2011a) as a deviating effect on objectives that reveal the downside and opportunistic 
aspects in a business environment (BSI, 2011a; BSI, 2018). To portray the risk issue, some 
organisations have categorised and addressed them by type as hazard risks, financial risks, 
operational risks or strategic risks, and consider that these kinds of risks should be the 
principal consideration of organisations (Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003; PwC, 2012). 
Given the implication of risk for organisations and global economy, there is a need to adapt 
and prepare for risk implications on an ongoing basis. Thus, risk categorisation represents 
an initial examination of additional steps that should be taken to mitigate, transfer, or avoid 
or risk (NIST, 2014). This means that organisations can choose to handle risk directly; for 
example, to identify a means to manage, reduce, avoid it (preventive) or transfer it to a third-
party and share responsibility (e.g. insurance, suppliers). Which option would depend on the 
organisation’s strategic, operational, financial, ethical and/or technical capability. 
Regulators’ viewpoint: Although risks may be defined from different perspectives, 
historically the value of meaning differs within periods and issuers. Likewise, Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HM Treasury, 2004) defines business risk from a general and modern point of 
view, where risk truly represents an uncertainty of outcome that could turn into a 
convenience or a real danger: “risk is defined as this uncertainty of outcome, whether 
positive opportunity or negative threat, of actions and events” HM Treasury, 2004, p. 9). 
Hence, the balance represents the likelihood of the event to come about, through an upward 
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or downward course. Similarly, the Committee of Sponsoring Organisation (COSO, 2004) 
and HM Treasury (2004) take into consideration the advent of both effects; a fact still 
omitted by some. The fact that the term ‘risk’ has numerous definitions confirms that over 
time, the meanings of the word have shifted and accordingly several perspectives have been 
adopted. However, all focus on the result of an action, positive or negative.  
Additionally, definitions agree that risk resides in two or more components; the action and 
what the action entails offsetting the expected result of that action. In other words, there are 
two aspects to consider - action and the probable consequence. 
2.3 Risk Management development 
Academics’ viewpoint: Organisations encounter risks every day on a variety of levels 
(Servaes, Tamayo and Tufano, 2009; COSO, 2012) but their ability to manage them dictates 
the consequence the risk has on business activity. As the business environment is uncertain 
and volatile, the enhancement of RM carries many challenges and benefits (such as the 
reduction of organisational overinvestment, an increase in the organisation’s debt capacity, 
good internal communication, and cost) (Castro et al., 2008). 
Literature has emphasised the appearance of the concept of RM in the early 1950s 
(Crockford 1982; Dionne, 2013) due to several factors. Firstly, insurance policies became 
expensive and partially liable. Secondly, changes in the economic environment and market 
competition led to the introduction of in-house risk procedures (self-insurance) as an 
alternative precautionary approach to risk mitigation. Lastly, organisational risk culture, 
triggered additional strategic changes, (Verbano and Venturini, 2011; Schroeder, 2014). 
Although the interest in applying the RM approach was mostly a business trend during 
1950s-1960s (Crockford, 1982), there was a lack of theoretical and practical literature. 
Crockford revealed that in 1956, some academics informed that during that period, 
theoretical background and expertise in the field were missing (a lack of textbooks, a lack of 
academic courses and a lack of trained specialists) and consequently some decisions were 
taken instinctively. Following this, RM academic articles settled the basics of the theoretical 
background that aggregated changes in business approaches. In the course of the 1960s, 
various risk self-protection approaches were adopted and applied across organisations. 
However, it must not be forgotten that for many years the pure RM approach focused mainly 
on the insurance market (Dionne, 2013). Formerly, RM was concerned with risk perspective 
purely as a negative output (loss, harm, accidents, or consequences). To summarise, in the 
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past, the basic concept of risk failed to take into consideration the opportunities which arose 
from risk exposure. Likewise, Crockford (1982) explains that for an extended period of time, 
risk was limited to a single perspective. By this approach, RM had focused on negative risk 
(pure risk) and did not address the opportunities arising from a risk-taking approach.  
Additionally, in 1965 the Insurance Institute of America recognised and developed 
additional expertise by investing in professional education (Crockford, 1982), a fact that 
encouraged extension and development of RM. By 1970s, the concept of RM was 
modernised by the expansion of financial risk management (FRM) due to its innovative 
approach to risk and opportunities. Continuing the trend, in the 1980s international 
regulation appeared and many organisations shifted to the new, modern form of RM 
(Dionne, 2013). Furthermore, the insurance market crisis that followed in the 1980s 
(Verbano and Venturini, 2011) reinforced the initial 1960s movement towards RM 
applicability and internal risk frameworks. Moreover, in this phase, the shift was encouraged 
significantly by risk guidelines, regulation and the new business standards that stimulated 
the innovative perspective of upside risk (e.g. Turnbul Report, 1992).  However, despite the 
significant changes in RM approaches, organisations continued to rely on insurance services 
but as a secondary protection practice (Hillson, 2002). Clearly, the move from risk 
philosophy to a strategic one was the result of the learning that success is not based on luck, 
but on RM approaches (Clarke and Varma, 1999). In the ensuing years, the principles of the 
new, modern approach of RM extended globally and subsequently determined the release of 
new guidelines, regulations, and standards specifically optimised to meet regional 
prerequisites (Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010). 
In the early 1990s, RM activity emerged as a policy whose main responsibility was to 
determine the risk value of investments in business lines (Tilman, 2001). During this period, 
Schmit and Roth (1990) defined the basic concept of RM as a performant activity able to 
minimise losses through the accountability of risk and cost. 
In the late 1990s, RM started to be viewed as a business discipline (Schmit and Roth, 1990), 
while a few years later, the empirical evidence of Stulz (1996) criticised the inappropriate 
practices of RM due to its imperfect correlation between theory and applicability. In 
conclusion, available evidence seems to suggest that regrettably RM at its beginning was 
adopted as a risk silo-based concept (risk treated in isolation), a fact that increased cost and 
resources implied (Servaes, Tamayo and Tufano, 2009). 
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By 2000, the focus of most studies shifted to the concept of integrated RM that proposed to 
align organisational strategy, processes, people, technology, and knowledge (Verbano and 
Venturini, 2011). In recent years, there has been increasing interest in RM, something that 
has led to the development of the various paths such as strategic risk management, financial 
risk management, enterprise risk management, insurance risk management, project risk 
management, engineering risk management, supply chain management, disaster risk 
management, clinical risk management and product development management, among 
others. The literature of RM is essential for a broad range of fields, as it represents their 
roots. The paths mentioned above differentiate themselves through risk considerations, 
techniques and methodologies applied to the specific discipline (Verbano and Venturini, 
2011; Wu, Chen and Olson, 2014). Clearly, RM development has implied different 
determinants and stages depending on the era; a fact that has led to changes in RM 
applicability in organisations. Therefore, the launch of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002 was another challenge that facilitated additional improvements in RM. 
RM has its roots in multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, management, marketing, 
sociology, and as a result, the disciplines have become fragmented (Clarke and Varma, 
1999). As risk is part of organisations’ everyday activity, the approach to risk shifted to 
effective-taking strategies that imply the development of internal business philosophies, as 
is the case of ERM (Wu, Chen and Olson, 2014). Aven and Aven (2015) describe RM as a 
need to explore opportunities and to avoid losses, accidents and disasters through methods 
such as identification, assessment, evaluation, control and treatment. According to the 
authors, the main challenge faced by RM is to establish a balance between organisational 
appetite for seizing opportunities and risk. Additionally, Clarke and Varma (1999) outline 
that poor RM can destabilise an organisation in many ways or even destroy it. However, an 
opposite approach might enhance a positive management of risk. 
As a result, the consensus view registered over recent years defines RM as a strategy of 
identification, assessment and prioritisation of risks (Coyle, 2014; Calandro, 2015). By 
reframing strategy in an organisational context, it relies on an intention to use its vision and 
core values for its mission - objective attainment (COSO, 2016). Accordingly, RM should 
include a business continuity process incorporated into an incident response plan (Kouns 
and Minoli, 2010). Nag, Hambrick and Chen (2007) suggest that strategic risk management 
continues to be fragmented, hence multiple perspectives have been adopted. As a result, its 
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definition in the field has varied and been re-conceptualised over the time. Apparently, the 
clear evidence of global financial failures of 2007-2008 shows that losses can hit even 
experienced organisations, which have RM strategies fully implemented (e.g. Goldman 
Sachs, Bear Stearns, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland, and UBS, to 
name but a few). 
In consideration of the above, some contributing factors to global financial failures might be 
a lack of common language, a lack of common practices, a lack of preparation, a lack of 
stress tests, a lack of correlation between theory and practice, unethical practices, 
overconfidence in the system and/or inappropriate implementation of risk oversight or 
governance (Jorion, 2009). However, in recent years, there have been many assumptions 
claiming that the financial crisis was an unpredictable event (Servaes, Tamayo and Tufano, 
2009). Others believe that many organisations failed to have a strategic RM in place and for 
this reason were unprepared (Calandro, 2015). In addition, in conjunction to these reasons, 
market expansion, RM silo approach practices, the lack of a commonly accepted standard 
and guidance in implementing the RM have all contributed to organisational failures (Clune 
and Hermanson, 2005; Yaraghi and Langhe, 2011).  
Building on from this idea of past failures, RM has extended to become more integrated, 
respectively ERM. The year 2000 saw the starting point where the need for an integrated 
strategy changed RM practices again (Viscelli, Hermanson, and Beasley, 2017). Results 
from earlier studies demonstrate a consistent and robust association between integration and 
the rigorous method of implementation of RM across organisations (Beasley, Clune and 
Hermanson, 2005). Thus, working collaboratively with other departments/units assures 
transparency of processes (as opposed to a traditional RM silo approach), where actions are 
undertaken by individual departments/units, one by one (subjective prioritisation of risks) 
and with possible links not being shared and communicated (Grace et al., 2015; Viscelli, 
Hermanson, and Beasley, 2017). 
Practitioners’ viewpoint: In addition to theoretical views, the practitioners’ view on RM is 
that RM has been determined by global expansion because globalisation determines business 
expansion and partnerships around the world, leveraging economic growth and 
technological innovation along with the creation of a common marketplace, which has also 
rendered fierce competition (Aon, 2015; Deloitte, 2015; PwC, 2015). For this reason, it is 
believed that a key driving force for yielding and maintaining success is a strategic RM 
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approach (Aon, 2015; McKinsey and Company, 2016) whereby a lack of RM or partial 
practices might determine incapacity to innovate and recover after a crisis, financial loss, 
disruption of business operation, reputation damage, property damage, and many more. The 
strength of such an approach was determined over time by external and internal factors (e.g. 
economic volatility, customers’, suppliers’, vendors’ or investor’s pressure) and also by 
substantial losses (Aon, 2015).   
The focus of past research shows that along with market challenges, regulations of RM 
affecting the practices and gradual changes were made based on regulatory requirements 
(Deloitte, 2015a). Over recent years, the increased regulatory requirements have placed 
pressure on organisation governance, risk appetite, stress test, operational risk, technology 
risk, culture risk, and much more. However, the study of Deloitte (2015b) reveals that 
organisations often struggle to comply with multiple regulatory authorities dispersed 
globally (in the case of the financial industry, compliance to Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, Bank of England (BoE), Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA)). The modern organisation adopts RM as it fosters analytical capabilities 
and develops an ethical business culture along with good practices regarding risk appetite 
(Deloitte, 2015a). As a result, RM had been reformed, elaborated and scrutinised during 
these times but, in general, lines RM proposes to ‘direct and control’ risks (identify, analyse, 
reduce, eliminate if possible and/or transfer risk (Aon, 2015; BSI, 2018). Nonetheless, the 
industry literature emphasises that the traditional approach of siloed risks of RM is 
insufficient and an ‘extension’ is a forwarding step (RIMS, 2014). 
RM through the perspective of regulators seems to be embedded within reactive approaches 
(AICPA, 2017). Consequently, RM failures have recently registered large organisations 
demonstrating that risk-taking is deficient and decisions are made post-event. Accordingly, 
such events have facilitated and readjusted the mandatory organisational strategy with 
regards risk (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2014).  
Regulators propose to highlight the exponential aspects of risk and determine appropriate 
governance for a suitable preparation (safeguards) rather than reaction based on due 
diligence (minimum countermeasure). One example is the Basel Committee on Banking and 
Supervision (2015), which sees RM as a process that guarantees the identification, 
measurement, limitation, control, mitigation, and report of risks. For instance, Basel III 
regulation of the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision requires an enterprise-wide 
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RM. Therefore, through the implementation of RM, an organisation quantifies its risks and 
creates appropriate adjustments to examine risks through mitigation, transfer, avoidance, or 
acceptance (NIST, 2014). Whilst RM practices provide a useful approach, further studies 
present arguments in terms of a paradigm extension and its opportunistic use under the 
enterprise risk management (ERM) umbrella.   
2.4 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
Academics’ viewpoint:  Given the increase in the number of organisational failures, 
previous studies have reported that managing risks has become essential for organisations 
(Dabari, Kwaji and Ghazali, 2017; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017). Additionally, 
uncertainties in the business environment, competition within industries, political risks, 
regulatory changes, and stakeholders’ expectations articulated the necessity for 
strengthening a cross-functional risk function (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017; 
Shad, 2018).  Accordingly, RM upgraded to a more holistic approach (respectively, ERM) 
as a new, modern way to manage risks strategically (Calder and Watkins, 2012; Andrén and 
Lundqvist 2017). Above all, ERM has the capability to take advantage of upside risk 
(opportunities) and the resiliently to cope with downside risk (Agarwal and Ansell, 2016). In 
general, this demonstrates that the traditional approach of RM seems outdated as it used to 
focusing mainly on risk minimisation as well as minimising the validity of return on 
investment (Stoll, 2015; Andrén and Lundqvist, 2017; Bogodistov and Wohlgemuth, 2017). 
The management of risks in silos (divided into finance, marketing, human resources, IT, 
distribution systems, audit, and global supply chains) seems an inappropriate and inefficient 
method to adopt. Prior research evidenced that traditional RM fragmented organisations into 
departments that were used to dealing directly with all ranges of risks (Hardy and Runnels, 
2014; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017). Consequently, risks were considered 
unique, with each in isolation to the other. This led to a lack of departmental communication 
that in turn, resulted in reduced identification of organisational risk exposures; in other 
words, a siloed approach. Over time, this matter evolved significantly, leading to a more 
integrated need to address issues of risks more holistically across an organisation. Overall, 
the paradigm shift towards ERM supports a change from tactical to strategic emphasis 
(Dabari, Kwaji and Ghazali, 2017). Moreover, it provides organisational effectiveness and 
preserves shareholder value on a continuous basis (Dabari, Kwaji and Ghazali, 2017; 
Majdalawieh and Gammack, 2017). 
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On a practical side, the first sign of change started to transform partly due to the launch of 
the COSO report in 1992 and was subsequently enhanced over the years by other guidances 
and frameworks (Rubino and Vitolla, 2014). Literature emphasises the importance 
of the transitions of RM to ERM through numerous investigations that have considered the 
effects of a paradigm shift (Beasley, Clune and Hermanson, 2005; Gordon, Loeb and Tseng, 
2009; Eckles, Hoyt and Miller, 2014; Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010; Farrel and 
Gallagher, 2019). Thus, the previous research investigated ERM through many perspectives: 
accounting, financial, marketing and management; facts that broadened ERM literature. 
Other authors questioned the literature of ERM implementation based on analysis of 
organisations that appoint a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), considered to be a first external sign 
that an organisation adopts a holistic approach to risks (Lienberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley, 
Pagach and Warr, 2008; Pagach and War, 2011). Furthermore, McShane, Nair, and 
Rustambekov (2011) described ERM as a coordinated process that manages the portfolio of 
risks addressed to different departments.  
Furthermore, regarding its applicability, Nair et al. (2014) perceive ERM as a dynamic 
capability for organisations since its ability to foresee, avoid, respond, and manage risks 
promises a much faster recovery (should a crisis emerge) compared to organisations that 
choose a silo approach. Lin, Wen and Yu (2012) refer to ERM as a fundamental shift of risk 
practice that adapts and determines a complete picture of the risk portfolio.  
 Moreover, the allocation of resources, cost-saving, and operational efficiency are just a few 
more determinants that encourage organisations to change their approaches in managing 
risks. In support of this view, there are indicators that the benefits represented another 
important factor that encouraged the shift to ERM (Lin, Wen and Yu, 2012). 
The early adopters of ERM, for example, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited (ANZ), Goldman Sachs and Barclays, are positive examples that reconfirm its 
applicability among industries. However, most likely negative examples such as the 
American International Group (AIG) demonstrate and reflect that ERM implementation does 
not adequately assure complete organisational success (Lin, Wen, and Yu, 2012). 
Nonetheless, determinants such as industry-specific standards, internal control, 
organisational culture, board implications, and regulators or shareholders influence the 
further adoption of ERM (Kleffner, Lee and McGannon, 2003). Additionally, there was an 
open dialogue during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.  On this basis, the 
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failures of organisations revealed the inefficiencies of RM and led to the direct implication 
of the government, regulators, and practitioners in the promulgation of ERM as a long-term 
investment (Nair and Rustambekov, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017; 
McShane; McShane, 2018). As a result, ERM adoption was triggered by multilateral 
pressure on regulators, standard setters, executive boards, rating agencies, competitors, and 
auditing organisations that in turn encouraged a more effective management of risks in order 
to cope with the volatile market and become more resilient (Lundqvist, 2015; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017; Bogodistov and Wohlgemuth, 2017; Bohnert et al., 
2019). Another consensus among researchers is that RM also changed due to SOX 2002.  In 
support of SOX, Arnold et al. (2011) later argued that organisations that had implemented 
ERM before SOX’s release occurred low levels of impediments from applying the new 
requirements. For instance, one of the first adopters of ERM was the financial industry 
(McShane, Nair and Rustambekov, 2011). The financial industry’s specific regulations 
posed a higher pressure and encouraged the early adoption of risk management safe practices 
compared to other industries (Mikes, 2009).  
Henceforth, regulatory and industry scrutiny (i.e. rating agencies as Standard and Poor, 
Moody’s, Fitch) provided a similar trend for other industries (non-financial) to implement 
ERM (Lundqvist, 2014). Rating agencies have proposed to sustain the regulatory compliance 
since their primary role is to evaluate the quality of ERM through a credit rating analysis 
that assesses whether the RM culture, risks controls, or strategic management are at 
acceptable levels (Bohnert et al., 2017). In addition, Schiller and Prpich (2013) reconfirm 
that ERM has strong roots in finance and the insurance sector. Correspondingly, the benefits 
registered have been transferred to other business sectors and governments.  
Beyond its benefits and wide applicability to other sectors, such variations determine a 
fragmented and uncorrelated ERM literature and practice over the years (McShane, 2018). 
Academic literature evidence suggests that the first paper that used ERM terminology was by 
Dickinson (2001), a fact outlined by Bromiley et al. (2015). As scholars and practitioners 
disagree on ERM’s definition, COSO’s definition appears to be largely used as a point of 
reference in academic investigation (Beasley, Clune and Hermanson; 2005; Arena, 
Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010; Tekathen and Dechow, 2013; Hopkin, 2014; Taylor, 2014; 
Hayne and Free, 2014; Tricker, 2015). Since 2002, the attention paid to ERM has increased 
(Lundqvist, 2014) and multiple frameworks have been launched in order to guide, support, 
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and sustain its implementation.  Although there are various sources of frameworks 
developing the consistency of ERM, the Researcher of this paper has identified a lack of 
consensus regarding its implementation. Some authors, such as Hayne and Free (2014), 
suggest that the COSO framework bears the most substantial influence on business 
practice.  Although the findings of Paape and Spekle (2012) sustain that COSO framework 
is just an initial approach in dealing with risk in a holistic way (it provides a brief guidance 
and principle), the responsibility of developing and adapting the framework remains an 
ongoing task for organisations. 
Further research in this area demonstrates that despite onerous regulations and barriers, 
organisations have also registered positive effects post-implementation (increased 
shareholder value, improved risk-return, enhanced decision making, and a holistic approach 
to all risks) (Farrel and Gallagher, 2014, 2019; Dabari, Kwaji and Ghazali, 2017). Despite 
these benefits, organisations have had differing results since each organisation has its 
industry-specific culture, internal factors and ownership, and its performance is correlated 
with all factors and the ability to adapt a framework to its individual needs (Gordon, Loeb 
and Tseng, 2009; Paape and Spekle, 2012). Consequently, the study of Lundqvist (2014) 
outlines that organisations rely on more than one framework, suggesting that the use of a 
unique framework is an inappropriate approach.  
Alternatively, overseeing organisational needs can lead to the creation and implementation 
of an internal framework based on organisation-specific requirements and practical issues 
(Kleffner, Lee and McGannon, 2003). Based on these determinants, ERM frameworks share 
common features, acknowledging that the implementation of the frameworks differs among 
organisations’ practices due to unique particularities. In addition, that despite the fact that 
good practices are adopted, this does not mean that the best practices are generated. Taking 
into consideration that in theory, organisations know how to deal with risks (due to 
guidelines, frameworks, scholarly literature, and legislation) whereas the reality of the last 
decade confirms that this may not be a reality as issues are only partly resolved. 




Table 2-1 ERM determinants and implications 
Source: The Researcher 
As shown in Table 2-1, ERM practices have significant economic results and thus its 
application can be an introductory guide for organisations and could yield benefits such as 
defining risk setting and business response (Taylor, 2014). Unfortunately, it seems that it 
still needs development as it is considered immature by some (Paape and Spakle, 
2012; Eckles, Hoyt and Miller, 2014; Grace et al., 2015; Andrén and Lundqvist, 2017). The 
implementation might be seen by some authors as a “tick-box approach”. Further evidence 
of Unger (2015) claims that literature has developed findings which suggest that taking 
measures to protect assets is not an option for organisations. Therefore, the present 
organisational strategies are proving to be susceptible to vulnerabilities and barriers. Thus, 
the Researcher believes that planning risk control and oversight through the governance of 
ERM would ensure minimisation of potential loss. whilst aligning ‘governance, integration, 
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Optimised risk appetite; Bureaucracy; Integration variables; 
Determine a common language; Ongoing activity; Unethical practices; 
Reduce costs by mitigating losses; 
Proactive strategy versus reactive strategy; 
Regulatory mandate; 
Needs to be tailored; 
Documentation deficiencies; 
Employees skills deficiencies; 
Stability and continuity assurance (resiliency); Accountability of pitfalls; Unappropriated governance; 
Assure response and recovery adjustment; Supplementary resources; Stress test unpreparedness; 
Assure holistic governance to risks; Residual risk (variations). Dispersed compliance settings; 
Gain competitive advantage/performance;  Plethora of guidance’s/practices; 
Avoids duplications (resource allocation);  Silo approach /overlap of functions; 
Determine in-house expertise development;  Heightened regulatory expectations; 
Reduce costs by reducing overlapping processes;  Unclear policy and risk statements; 
Determine an increased ability for value protection;  Organisational cultural deficiencies; 
Increase firm value (rating credit);  Uncorrelated theory with applicability; 
Increase the quality of decisions (by information);                Inappropriate alignment/low maturity; 
Consider threats and opportunities;  Preparedness to overcome deficiencies; 
Governance applied enterprise-wide;  Uncoordinated efforts of staff involved; 
Increase accountability, transparency and agility;  Overconfidence in systems and procedures; 
Creates value (optimised risk for shareholder return); 
Links strategy and organisational objectives; 




Returning to the applicability of the research problem, the financial industry is a complex 
mechanism that most often encompasses multiple structures, labelled by Oldfield and 
Santomero (1997) and Simeon (2012) as: 
• depository institutions (e.g. retail banks, commercial banks, private banks, savings 
banks, postal saving banks, building societies, community banks, credit unions); 
• insurance and pension fund institutions (e.g. insurance organisations, pension fund 
management organisations); 
• brokers and investments institutions (e.g. asset management, investments banks, 
corporate finance, mutual funds, hedge funds, mortgage brokers, clearinghouses, 
finance organisations, investment organisations) and more (Oldfield and Santomero, 
1997; Simeon, 2012).  
Although the industry involves a diversity of players, it is indisputable that they all encounter 
similar risks. The risk associated is underpinned with the organisation’s size, main activity, 
and time established. While risk is specific, the financial industry is exposed to additional 
risks such as systematic risk, credit risk, counterparty risk, operational risk and legal risk 
(Oldfield and Santomero, 1997). The financial industry is a major component of 
the global economy and plays a vital role in sustaining society (Lenssen, Dentchev and 
Roger, 2014). 
For this reason, organisational responsibility in this sector is strictly regulated due to its 
sustainable role. For example, in the USA, it is mandatory for financial and governmental 
organisations to adhere to ERM practices (Whitman, 2015). A fact, that reminds the official 
implication and acknowledgement of ERM as a baseline to ensure deployment of deterrent 
practices. Thus, past failures (e.g. Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of 2008, Countrywide 
Mortgage of 2008) reiterate the strong need for prudence and holistic RM. They also raise 
an intriguing question as to why organisations still fail to employ good risk practices. 
As a matter of fact, banks were one of the first sectors to adopt ERM (based on global 
regulations of Basel). There is an ongoing discussion among some critics that suggests ERM 
efficacy had a low capacity during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Hopkin, 2014; 
Bromiley et al., 2015). Some argue that it might be due to possible ill-implementation of 
ERM, aggressive risk-taking, lack of knowledge, and unfair business practice. The 
Researcher argues that ERM was not ill-implemented because evidence suggests how ethical 
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organisational responsibility towards good ERM practices is particularly influential; 
particularly in terms of following known practices. 
Such failures are considered sensitive for global economy (Alcaraz and Zeadally, 2015) due 
to the interdependent nature of the financial industry. Critical infrastructures (e.g. water, 
food and agriculture, transportation systems, chemical industry, nuclear industry, energy 
industry, information technology, financial systems, and many others are at the heart of 
today’s economy and a problem one could trigger a “cascading effect” due to their 
interrelated and inter-dependent functions (Kauspadiene et al., 2017). Henceforth, a 
potential financial catastrophe might affect customers’ or an entire country’s financial 
system since society and business activity depend on monetary flow on a global scale. The 
post-reality of the financial crisis 2007-2008 exposed key faults in business practice that 
reiterated changing organisational behaviours towards threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 
(Crouhy, Galai and Mark, 2014; Oliveira et al., 2018). Cases such as HBO bank or British 
Northern Rock bank were among a few examples of over-exposure to risks (Tricker, 2015) 
and thus organisations should move towards a new approach, rethinking, and safeguarding 
their stratagems in regard to unanticipated and unknown risks in order to ensure the 
protection of tangible and intangible assets in a responsible way. In addressing the issue of 
security, organisations from the financial industry must take into consideration new ways to 
meet consumer demands in addition to the new trends in the banking sector such as Internet 
banking or mobile banking which increases new fraud patterns (Schiavone, Garg and 
Summers, 2014). 
Practitioners’ viewpoint: When referring to practitioners’ views, two types of literature 
categories are included: (1) advisory entities, which include reports, white papers and 
guidance for industry vendors, and (2) industry recognised entities (non-profit), which 
promote good practices through specific frameworks and standards. 
It can be observed that a shift of approach is occurring when studying research problem. 
There is a change from a micro approach (i.e. existent in the silo approach) to a macro 
approach, whereby risks are considered from a wider perspective (i.e. collective versus 
individual strategy) of strategic, operational, and financial hazards (Casualty Actuarial 
Society, 2003; Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), 2011).  ERM is predominantly 
seen as a discipline (Accenture, 2013; Risk Management Society (RIMS), 2015; Thomson 
Reuters, 2015), as a programme (Tower Watson, 2014, PwC, 2015; McKinsey and 
Company, 2016), as a process (KPMG, 2009; EY, 2016) and also as an approach (Deloitte, 
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2009; EY, 2015), yet within all views, it is seen with the purpose of sustaining the common 
achievement of organisational objectives. As an example, Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) 
define ERM as “…the discipline by which an organisation in any industries assesses, 
controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing 
the organisations’ short and long-term value [benefits] to its stakeholders” Casualty 
Actuarial Society, 2003, p.6) The approach outlined by Casualty Actuarial Society is based 
on ERM intentions to create value and to mitigate risks, but there seems to be no compelling 
reason to argue that organisations understood the potential of ERM.  
Additionally, in a more simplistic manner, ERM presumably should be able to anticipate an 
event, likelihood of risks, and assure minimal disruption or loss in accordance to proposed 
organisational objectives, risk appetite, and risk tolerance (KPMG, 2009; EY, 2016). In 
addition, ERM shall improve the prospects of success for organisations hence they stand 
more prepared, informed, and resilient in dealing with the occurrence of risk and its impact 
(RIMS, 2011; RIMS, 2014). As a result of strategic internal control, risks are aggregated and 
reported holistically in order to support business decisions (KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2017a). 
Thus, in contrast to RM, ERM proposes a unified management that acts holistically (i.e. it 
grasps the concept that risks are inter-related) without overlapping or duplicating a risk 
control function of another managerial department (compartmentalised) (RIMS, 2015) and 
with the aim to create better value, sustainability (COSO, 2016), and value protection (Grant 
Thornton, 2006) and measurement. Moreover, ERM seeks to anticipate possible events 
before they occur and in turn prevent or at the very least minimise their effects through a 
plethora of strategic alternatives to counteract the exposure to risks (COSO, 2016). As ERM 
is seen by practitioners in various perspectives, for the purpose of this research, the 
‘approach’ terminology seems to complement and align itself with the terminology used by 
academic contributors. 
Apart from classification variations, there are many prescribed behaviours for organisations 
and implementation recommendations for ERM, but the evidence indicates that 
organisations struggle to cope with such variations (Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003; 
Ponemon Institute, 2011). The most compelling evidence of ERM frameworks is the COSO, 
Risk Management Society Standard, the Institute of Risk Management Standard (IRM 
Standard), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO standard), Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), British Standard, Joint 
Australia/New Zealand 4360:2004 Standard (AS/NZS, 2004), the Turnbull Guidance, the 
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Casualty Actuarial Society Framework, among others. Per total, the promulgation and 
utilisation of ERM good practices and baselines (COSO, 2016) is at the basis of all these 
frameworks and standards of risk oversight.  
In addition to the industry-recognised entities’ viewpoint, advisory organisations sustain that 
the best approach to tackle risk is to adopt a strategic, holistic, and proactive approach 
(McKinsey and Company, 2013a; McKinsey and Company, 2016). However, there might 
be subjective interest due to the incentives involved. Whatever type of support it is, it is clear 
that organisations need to adopt and sustain ERM practices in order to demonstrate to parties 
(e.g. regulators, customers, collaborators, and shareholders) that risk detection, mitigation, 
and prevention are of primary concern for the organisation and as such the organisation is 
duly prepared.   
The study of PwC (2013) supports the same line and accordingly confirms that previously 
ERM capabilities were developed and tested across multiple industries and seemed to have 
a low maturity in their implementation. The foregoing discussion implies that inhibitors and 
emerging risk challenges to ERM can be lessened if organisations accelerate their 
capabilities from reactive to proactive risk practices in order to assure appropriate measures 
that safeguard organisations from potential risk in advance (PwC, 2009, RIMS, 2014). The 
landscape of risk is more profound in the financial industry because losses in this sector 
could have ripple effects on national or even international economics and politics (PwC, 
2014; Verizon, 2018). Moreover, in the light of evidence from 2015, the third most affected 
sector appears to be the financial industry. The financial industry seems to be ahead of many 
industries due to its attractive characteristics as a high-reward area. Cases such as JP Morgan, 
Fidelity, HSBC, Bank of America, Citigroup, PNC Bank, US Corp, Well Fargo, and 
Citi Bank are just a few examples that highlight the threat’s maturity (Verizon, 2015; 
Websense Security Labs, 2015). 
In regards to Table 2-1 (above), Accenture (2009) explain that due to the increased 
organisational risks, an effective risk oversight implies a higher cost. Despite the fact that 
ERM reduces cost, its maintenance and applicability is affected by increased regulatory and 
market constraints. To summarise the main focus of practitioners, Table 2-2 below 
articulates the fragmented practices of the industry that varies between a top-down (strategy, 
objectives, appetite, leadership, value creation, strategic risk oversight and compliance) and 
bottom-up approach (infrastructure, processes and culture). 
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Table 2-2 Literature variations among consultancies organisations 
Focus Key considerations Entity/year 
   
Strategy ERM is a strategic capability.  
ERM is still immature developed. 
Grant Thornton (2013); McKinsey and 
Company (2013a); Tower Watson (2014). 
Objectives The objectives are aligned with risk appetite, tolerance and 
organisation strategy. 
Thomson Reuters (2015) 
Appetite Risk appetite is aligned with organisational objectives and 
exposure. 
Risk appetite determines the strategic directions. 
Risk appetite represents the acceptable risk parameters. 
A risk appetite statement it considers organisation risk 
profile, capacity, tolerance and oversight. 
Risk appetite statement needs to be acknowledged by all.  
Manigent (2009); Deloitte (2009); 
Manigent (2011); COSO, 2012; Protivity 
(2012); Deloitte (2014a). 
Leadership Embedding ERM relies on leadership, culture, risk appetite, 
risk strategy, communication and education. 
RM efficiency is strengthened by leadership and its alignment 
to business functions. 
Tower Watson (2010); PwC (2015). 
Value ERM enhance and optimise organisations. 
ERM add value to an organisation. 
Return from RM is significant. 
KPMG (2009); RIMS (2014); Accenture 
(2015); McKinsey and Company (2016). 
Performance RM main purpose should be performance attainment. Accenture (2009) 
Risk oversight RM capabilities needs supported improvements KPMG (2013b) 
Compliance Internal framework as compliance to regulatory demands. 
A heightened regulator demand has reshaped RM. 
The effectiveness of an organisation RM is intensively 
challenged. 
Ponemon Institute (2011); Deloitte (2015); 
AON (2015). 
Risk culture ERM is effective based on an integrative approach. Ernst and Young (2014) 
Structure/Architecture ERM implies a top-down and bottom-up approach. McKinsey (2010) 
   
Source: The Researcher 
Table 2-2 above shows that practitioners’ literature significantly emphasises the importance 
of the alignment of risk oversight to business strategy due to the fact that such practice 
assures organisational achievement of ‘mission’ and ‘vision’ (COSO, 2016). However, risk 
alignment, although identified in literature as being necessary, omits to specify how it should 
be accomplished. In other words, it is necessary, but through what mechanisms should it be 
applied (Tower Watson, 2014).  
Although in academic literature ERM is defined as an ‘approach’, by many industry experts 
it is considered a ‘programme’ (KPMG, 2009; Accenture, 2009; KPMG, 2013a; Deloitte, 
2015). Furthermore, as a programme, it is believed to determine value through its ability to 
provide stability due to its determination of informed business decisions and appropriate risk 
oversight aligned with risk appetite and thus assures a reduction in cost. Moreover, ERM 
helps to anticipate and mitigate risks together with an increased ability to overtake 
opportunities (informed decisions), therefore leading to an increased organisational 
performance (PwC, 2015). 
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Manigent (2009) highlights that at the basis of every strategy, risk appetite should be defined 
and aligned with organisational objectives and exposure. Accordingly, the organisation 
would expose itself to consequences proportionate to achieving its objectives (Manigent, 
2009). Moreover, Deloitte (2009) argues that a risk appetite statement (documentation) is 
often used as a strategic direction since it provides a formal standpoint which articulates, 
clarifies and communicates the maximum acceptable ‘parameters’ regarding risks. 
Additionally, it offers provision for decisions due to the acknowledgement of risk actually 
existing, and it assures that risk remains within an acceptable limit (Protivity, 2012; Deloitte, 
2014a). A risk appetite limit (parameters) should be in harmony specifically with risk profile 
(exposure) as well as risk universe (all risks), governance, RM, culture, and infrastructure 
(Manigent, 2011; Deloitte, 2014a). It should also ensure that as long as limits are 
acknowledged and maintained, the pursuit of value is ensured (Tower Watson, 2010). 
Unfortunately, few organisations develop an appetite framework and embed it across their 
internal environment (PwC, 2015); something that reinforces the actuality of the concept of 
mismanagement and lack of preparation regarding risk oversight. 
Organisational culture is certainly a significant component of ERM (COSO, 2016) and in 
turn, the organisational strategy, mission, and vision involve interaction with a human 
component. Thus, the Researcher believes that human impact needs to be considered and 
promoted across organisational divisions to assure comprehension of organisation 
objectives. Therefore, considerations of the need for an improved risk oversight and 
management suggest that these actions should have a top-bottom approach, where executives 
deploy further imperatives. Moreover, its integrative approach should incorporate board 
oversight, organisational culture, risk appetite, risk ownership, risk transparency oversight, 
infrastructure, and operation in one main strategy (Grant Thornton, 2013, KPMG, 2013b; 
Ernst and Young, 2015). Thus, the ERM expected effectiveness depends on its ability to 
align its risk strategy with its objectives, appetite, risk tolerance (Thomson Reuters, 2015), 
and objectives/strategy communication across the organisation. 
Regulators’ viewpoint: Although the adoption of RM industry practices has various 
voluntary determinants (e.g. organisation’s decisions, the use of sound practices of security, 
shareholders’ pressure, to name but a few), there are also some imposed and mandatory 
aspects that empower the use of ERM. Given the sensitive dimensions of the financial 
industry, the regulator’s viewpoint section refers to written and peremptory norms of 
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organisational practices. Since economic stability works in close relationship with the 
financial industry, correct management, in turn, influences other industries. For this reason, 
financial industry practices were strengthened by regulators (e.g. Financial Stability Board, 
2010) to balance exposure and possible influence. As the financial industry is continuously 
exposed (due to its incentives, participants, and channels), ongoing compliance is 
prescriptive and mandatory. Through the process of identification and measurement of 
practices, the financial industry maintains its status (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). The post-crisis regulatory reforms (e.g. Basel II, Basel II.5, and 
Basel III) illustrate implications of supervisory effectiveness and provide sound advice 
for the financial industry (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014).  
In addition to its strategy, the financial industry encourages the development of an 
organisational culture that needs to constantly reinforce ethical 
and efficient risk appetite. Expanding rules pre-supposes the recommendation of best 
approach; i.e. that risk should be identified, monitored, and controlled 
continuously. Moreover, an organisation must comply with law and regulations but it must 
also adjust the external requirement to its internal policies (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). 
While the issues stated have a potential to be addressed globally, organisations are currently 
advised to comply with minimum standards of country-specific security regulations.  Since 
early 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (a primary financial regulatory agency 
for national banks, USA) has been drawing attention to the fact that financial 
industries are registering weaknesses when adopting minimum standards of RM practices 
yet at the same time are compelled to “heightened expectation” (USA Department of 
Treasury, 2014). Examples such as Barclays Bank, Zurich Insurance, Global Payment, 
MasterCard, and Visa continue to prove that managing information systems is more 
complicated than ever.  A clear illustration of the issue is also the case of JP Morgan 
and Chase, who were considered to have the highest RM culture in the banking sector. The 
events from 2014 proved that challenges are more complex than expected. 
Moreover, financial failure has reiterated the need for strict rules such as those of SOX, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), all of which 
set new security parameters for publicly rated organisations. For instance, the Corporate 
Governance Guide of NYSE expects organisations to embed risk governance practices 
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across the whole organisation through mechanisms such as culture, communication, 
leadership, and RM (NYSE, 2014). Such an approach promotes awareness and 
acknowledgement of organisational risk exposure and fosters individual responsibility for 
mutual welfare. Therefore, compliance with rules and proactively taking steps to meet the 
security requirements of the competitive market is enforced via the pressure of 
governmental regulatory demands (e.g. SOX’s Section 404, 2002, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 
Fair Rating Reporting (FCRA)). For example, the Combined Code of the Committee on 
Corporate Governance (also known as Turnbull Guidance) reinforces the value of internal 
control in organisations to assure quality, compliance, and efficient operations (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2005). Its content emphasises the accountability and monitoring 
responsibility of management (typically, boards of directors) in order to assure, improve and 
promote good practices regarding risk. 
Consequently, it can be seen that each Act focuses on something different. It can, therefore, 
be concluded that the actual points covered by an Act affect how risk control is dealt with. 
In other words, one Act cannot be followed without the other as they each cover different 
aspects and in turn, yield different results.  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (1999) introduces baseline and safeguarding rules 
for the financial industry with regards to customer data protection as well as advancing risk 
documentation and staff training. On the other hand, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
introduces the internal audit requirements and quality controls and adds ethics for 
organisations based on the initial Security Exchange Act of 1934 (SOX, 2002). From the 
outcome of disclosure of proper organisational governance, this Act enforces responsibilities 
and punishments for those that fail to comply. This Act can be considered as an originator 
of current practice among organisations.  
Apart from focusing on the financial industry, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protect Act of 2010 suggests that non-financial organisations should also be 
prudent about risk oversight in order to assure overall economic stability (Dodd-Frank Act, 
2010). The prominent requirement of the Act is to identify accountability and any 
transparency of internal procedures. The general obligation for organisations entails official 
statements of financial results as well as risk oversight procedure and results so as to assure 
applicability of prudential measures. Likewise, the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2016 
addresses similar lines and initiates formal planning for the long-term. Similar to the Dodd-
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Frank Act’s principles of accountability and transparency, the guide goes further and 
facilitates an understanding of current organisational challenges. Apart from initial 
principles, it promotes leadership for effectiveness, remuneration, and mutual 
understanding. Thus, this guide is based on the belief that to improve the risk oversight, 
maintenance and control, executive involvement is essential (Financial Reporting Council, 
2016). 
The middle-ground position, which states that the adoption of ERM is a sign of an 
organisation’s compliance with the regulatory demand (Standard and Poor, 2008), is worthy 
of consideration. Adoption and implementation of ERM is a starting point that requires 
ongoing personalisation, optimised to a specific sector and the organisation’s specific risk 
appetite, specific risk profile and specific business model. However, it should be noted that 
mandatory compliance for the industry can sometimes limit the business model; for example, 
implementation of privacy policies for customers based on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or 
the Dodd-Frank Act. 
2.5 Cyber exposure 
2.5.1 Cyberspace 
Although many studies have attempted to explain the terminology and the definition of the 
word ‘cyberspace’, over recent years the term has yielded limited consensus regarding 
its etymology and meanings. Consequently, the term is facing an undefined explanation of 
what exactly it semantically represents. It seems that over time, the terms have been 
associated or confused with ‘virtual world’, ‘virtual environment’, ‘cyber environment’, 
‘cyber domain’, ‘online world’, ‘online domain’, ‘online realm’, ‘cyber ecosystem’, 
‘electronic space’, ‘digital world’ or ‘wired world’, among others. Often, these terms have 
been used interchangeably and as equivalents to ‘cyberspace’. However, they are not 
necessarily similar in all cases and can imply multiple meanings (Cicognani,1998; Min, Chai 
and Han, 2015). For example, ‘virtual world’ refers to the electronic environment, as a three-
dimensional reality, where people can interact/experience (e.g. video games, interactive 
learning) with an artificial environment based on human-computer-interaction. It is similar 
to real-life experience, although intangible (Bainbridge, 2007; Gartner, 2016). Thus, 
‘cyberspace’ is an impartial term to define and represents only some aspects of it. 
41 
 
Henceforth, Internet developments have led to the creation of ‘cyber ecosystem’ where 
multiple elements interact (EY, 2014). Such perspective outlines that the perimeters and the 
volume of interaction divide the term into two: cyber and space. 
Figure 2-1 Ambiguity of cyberspace terminology 
Source: The Researcher 
While cyber terminology and its etymology are an open discussion, the evidence of 
definitions supplements a deeper understanding of variations and Figure 2-1 above illustrates 
some of its derivations, which are often used mistakenly in an interchangeable manner. On 
the whole, Figure 2-1 briefly summarises an etymology analysis that shows how the term 
has been emphasised within the literature under the form of an ‘etymological map’ (Hart, 
2014). While ‘space’ can clearly be defined as a setting/place, the word ‘cyber’ describes 
the type of setting/place (namely that it is an online place). Consequently, the word ‘cyber’, 
incorporates the principles of cybernetics (i.e. human-computer-interaction), where 
interconnected computer systems embrace extensive technologies that are capable of 
facilitating, reshaping, and exchanging electronic information and communication by 
connecting to an “imaginary world” (Mindell, 2000; Mitra and Schwartz, 2006) and relying 
on “the principle [of] governing or directing a technology or system” (Mindell, 2000, p.3). 
In most cases, ‘cyber’ forms part of a compound word, as do the words ‘online’, ‘digital’, 
‘virtual’ or ‘electronic’ and the word ‘space’ has equivalents: ‘world’, ‘realm’, ‘reality’, 
‘domain’, ‘ecosystem’ and ‘environment’. 
In short, ’cyber’ and ‘space’ refer to perimeters/boundaries and the type of technology 
involved, and this technology is handled on the whole (Henderson, 2009). In particular, 



















interaction with the Internet, computers or even robots as machine learning (Henderson, 
2009; Burgess, 2010; DeFranco, 2013). Consequently, it relies on feedback, control and 
communication (Mindell, 2000; Henderson, 2009).  
Table 2-3 Alternative meanings of cybersecurity 
Terminology Definitions 
cyber world “… the cyber world is an amalgamation of the Internet, other physical networks, digital 
services and virtual reality: it is a multi-user virtual environment.” (Lehto and Neittaanmäki, 
2015, p. 7). 
“Cyber-world is the network of computers is simple definition.” (Gavrilova, Tan, and 






“…is a global domain within the info environment whose distinctive and unique character 
is framed by use of electronics and electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, 
exchange, and exploit via interdependent and interconnected networks using information 
communication technologies.” (Tyagy, 2014, p. 11). 
“…cyberspace can then be defined as the diverse experiences of space associated with 
computing and related technologies” (Strate, 1999, p. 383). 
“…cyberspace describes the human-made domain for action that exists as a consequence of 
an interconnected and interdependent global communications and computing 
infrastructure.” (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010, p. 16). 
“The Cyberspace is a complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, 
software and services on the Internet by means of technology devices and networks 
connected to it, which does not exist in any physical form.” (BSI, 2012, p. 4). 
“A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” (Committee on 
National Security Systems, 2010, p. 25). 
“Cyber space encompasses all forms of networked, digital activities; this includes the 
content of and actions conducted through digital networks.” (UK Cabinet Office, 2009, p. 
7). 
“Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment whose distinctive and 
unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to 
create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and 
interconnected networks using information-communication technologies.” (Kuehl, 2009, p. 
4). 
“A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.” (USA Department of Defence, 2016, p. 69). 
cyber 
ecosystem 
“Cyber ecosystem: a complex community of interacting devices, networks, people and 
organisations, and the environment of processes and technologies supporting these 
interactions.” (EY, 2014, p. 1). 
“Like natural ecosystems, the cyber ecosystem comprises a variety of diverse participants – 
private firms, non‐profits, governments, individuals, processes, and cyber devices 
(computers, software, and communications technologies) – that interact for multiple 
purposes.” (USA Department of Homeland Security, 2011, p. 2). 
Source: The Researcher 
Table 2-3 above emphasises some terms while also identifying commonalities. It must be 
noted that all definitions reiterate that cyberspace greatly relies on computers and 
technologies. It encompasses various spectrums of technology, devices and networks to 
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facilitate interaction among many stakeholders for various purposes. As the term 
‘cyberspace’ corresponds to this research problem, the Researcher adopts this term 
throughout.  
2.5.2 Cybersecurity challenges 
Academics’ viewpoint:  In the early period of the Internet, computer security was 
considered a particular technical risk. Due to the Internet’s lack of built-in security 
regarding information protection, most organisations had to develop their own strategy to 
counteract risks. In this trend, Singh et al. (2014) believe that despite numerous technical 
solutions, information security (IS) is complete when in combination with management 
directions. Nonetheless, over the years, this mentality has changed dramatically and shifted 
to a non-technical perspective where strategic solutions are considered (Maynard et al., 
2018).  
While the term is known under numerous appellations, a common definition of 
“cybersecurity” fails to be adopted. Nevertheless, the term is being employed more 
frequently, and thus this research adopts the same terminology. Additionally, 
authors such as Von Solms and Van Niekerk (2013) indicate that the shift of 
names represents, in fact, an evolution of change. Von Solms and Van Niekerk justify their 
claims through assessing the developments in the field.  In the past, IS has referred to 
information protection, whereas nowadays cybersecurity operates beyond these limits and 
intends to protect humans and various assets. In short, it has become a more complex 
mechanism, implying multiple aspects of the cyber and traditional environment. 
Whereas in the 1980s computer crimes were represented by viruses transmitted through 
floppy disks (Blyth, 2008), cybersecurity is currently perceived in a multifaceted 
perspective. For instance, Singer and Friedman (2014) have predicted a negative scenario of 
Internet-based attacks and their research suggests that mankind is inclined to react (to 
defend) rather than act and install vital preventative in advance (offensive). For example, 
measures taken after an unprecedented disastrous attack occur is a reactive approach, 
respectively a countermeasure post-event; whereas a proactive approach is a prior 
approximation of an event and thus an earlier preparation; it is a safeguard that aims to assure 
that organisational losses are capped to minimum levels. 
Hence, cybercrime has not only had the opportunity to increase in 
sophistication and frequency but has indeed done so.  One merely needs to look at cases 
44 
 
such as Stuxnet, Flame, Gaus, Sony Pictures or Saudi Arabian Oil, all indicating that 
cybercrime, industrial espionage, “black swan” (unpredictable events) and cyber 
sabotage are more prevalent in today’s society.   
To sum up, Figure 2-2 below briefly covers some generalised risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities in the form of criminal acts, basic motivation, and impact with the purpose to 
demonstrate that the intersection of them can be a potential risk for organisations. Ranging 
from business, financial, military, thrill or grudge attack (Stewart, Chapple and Gibson, 
2015) there are many potential risks addressed in the direction of organisations. 











Figure 2-2 Cyber-criminal categorisations 
Source: The Researcher 
The bottom line of Figure 2-2 is the general pattern of threats actors, threatening acts, 
intentions, and consequences. Taken together, the synthesis of Figure 2-1 highlights the risk 
dimension for organisations and the importance of implementing safeguards instead of 
countermeasures (reactive) as post-event response which presumably might be overpriced; 
the latter being overvalued. 
Practitioners’ viewpoint: The literature of academics and practitioners abounds with 
examples of terminology used interchangeably. However, the fragmented state of 
terminology fluctuates between the domains of information security and cybersecurity (BS 
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with different objectives. Whether terms are synonymous is clarified by their scope, hence 
IS aims to protect confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information (BS ISO 
27032:2012, BSI, 2012) while the domain of cybersecurity considers protection of people, 
assets, process and technology. 
As cybercrime represents an illegal digital activity/action with potential damage, financial 
loss, and/or operational disruptions, KPMG (2013a) suggests that the current reliance on the 
Internet for businesses, governments, and consumers will also continue to yield a negative 
return. Similarly, the McAfee report (2014) outlines that cybercrime has become an 
‘industry’ since losses encountered in 2014 were around $400 billion. McAfee estimated in 
2014 that losses would continue in this trend because prognoses about further business 
movements to the digital environment are expected. Cybercrime becoming a more 
sophisticated entity/force was reconfirmed in 2018 when the report showed an increased 
cost, reaching almost $600 billion (McAfee, 2018). The trend in cybercrimes varies from 
technical breaches in 2016 to social attacks in 2017 and 2018. What is clear is that there are 
losses that need to be considered and as much as possible reduced. Though real and potential 
damages to the global economy owing to cybercrime are calculated/estimated, McAfee 
considers that it is an incomplete picture because there is a belief that significant numbers of 
incidents remain unreported. Furthermore, Verizon reports in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 
provide compelling evidence that cyber incidents have increased, thus creating challenges 
for organisations (Verizon, 2015; 2016; 2017). The reports show that financial motivation 
remains one of the main drivers for cybercriminals and/or threat agent (89% in 2016; 76% 
in 2018). 
The research of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has reiterated 
from early 2014 that cybersecurity is such an enormous challenge that combating it has 
almost become a business for organisations and governmental bodies (ICAEW, 2014). 
Although cybersecurity appears to be a new risk, in reality, it is a modification and a shift 
from previous information security to a more complex one. In other words, it is an old risk 
existing in a new and more complex way. Types of risks have evolved as the landscape of 
threats has migrated from simple viruses spread with unauthorised access and social 
deception (social engineering, social attacks) to substantial financial losses, disruption of 
business operations, loss of reputation, intellectual property loss, and loss of clients, among 
many other ramifications. While awareness campaigns are conducted by different 
organisations and governmental bodies (e.g. UK National Strategy, US Homeland Security, 
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT), Europol, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cyber threats still 
continue to be addressed by individuals, organised crime networks, competitors, nation-
states, hackers, and, in some exceptional cases, from employees or contractors (ICAEW, 
2014). 
Likewise, a report from the Georgia Tech Information Security Center (2013) emphasises 
the fact that cybercriminals develop new strategies according to innovations in the field. As 
can be expected, practitioners have released different definitions on the topic, mainly 
because the subject is interrelated with various stakeholders and shareholders. For instance, 
KPMG (2014a) considers that cybersecurity represents an attitude towards cybercrime. 
Capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to different illegal digital activities are essential. 
Similarly, Ernst and Young’s study found that cybersecurity requires a ‘multi-tiered 
approach’ (Ernst and Young, 2014b). Later on, in 2018, Ernst and Young recommended a 
‘de-novo approach’, meaning that due to an increase in volume and sophistication of cyber-
attacks, organisations should adopt an integrated approach of strategy and culture, and they 
should advance towards an approach that combines the capabilities of IT and IS (Ernst and 
Young, 2018a). 
Although cyberspace has changed the attitude of users, organisations, and governments in 
regard to protection, recent highly publicised online incidents confirm that more preparation 
against cyber threats is needed. Therefore, a continuous and active cybersecurity strategy is 
imperative for organisations because it would clearly draw the line between success and 
failure regarding the protection of both tangible and intangible assets.  
Additionally, active cybersecurity management encourages boards to make riskier but more 
informed decisions, and accordingly, opportunities are not lost. In short, cybersecurity’s role 
is to protect an organisation from various threats, both from the inside and outside. As has 
been noted in PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) report, cybersecurity represents a capability 
to protect the “crown jewels”, which embodies the revenue streams, business processes, 
resources, facilities, trademarks, and reputation (PwC, 2014; PwC, 2017). Proposing to 
minimise potential damages, organisations are advised to organise security activities in 
an economically effective manner (PwC, 2014).  Additionally, PwC (2013a) outlines the 
fact that the diverse background of organisations could impede the adoption of standards/ 
guidance because the selection process represents a test in itself due to compatibility issues. 
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Regulators’ view:  The dynamic of cyberspace implies the involvement of participants 
from many sectors. Accordingly, cyberspace is a wired environment that attracts criminals, 
terrorists, hackers, and foreign intelligence, among other threats. As a response to such 
threats, organisations and governments have developed cyber strategies.  For example, 
through its National Cyber Security Program, the UK government demonstrated from early 
2011 its ability to foresee the upcoming developments of the threat landscape (UK 
Government, 2011).  Similarly, the USA proposed to assure a safe place for online 
businesses and accordingly recommended the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) framework as a minimum strategy for critical infrastructures (NIST, 
2014). 
Since UK National Security, USA Defense, Europol, and NATO are developing diverse 
strategies in dealing with the threats, such approaches are an explicit declaration that cyber 
risks are emerging in a negative dimension. The current literature abounds 
with debates about the volume of the development of the Internet-based attacks.  
Table 2-3 below illustrates the available institutional and regulatory support among various 




Afghanistan – no regulation, no national strategy 
Albania - no national strategy 
Czech Republic - no regulation 
Korea - no regulation 
 





CERT -Bund (Germania) 
CERT -EE (Estonia) 












European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 
G8 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (Interpol) 
European Cyber Crime Center 
USA - Electronic Crimes TaskForces 
       Cybercom 
Australia - The Australian Cyber Security Centre 
Australia -Cyber Security Operation Centre 
Canada - The Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence Tallinn, Estonia (CCDCOE) 
Germany National Cyber defense Centre 
Japan - Nation Information Security Center  
Lithuania - National Cyber Security Centre 
Qatar – National Information Security Center 
Romania -National Cyber Crime Center 
UK: Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
     Communication-Electronics Security Group (CESG) 
     Cyber Security Operation Centre (CSOC) 
     National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Centre (NCCIC) 
     Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) 
     Police Central e-crime Unit  
     Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) 
     Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 
N/A 
Figure 2-3 Regulatory support for cybersecurity 
Source: The Researcher 
 
N/A-not applicable, lack of regulations 
2013 - Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership 
(CISP), UK 
Cyber Essentials Scheme, UK 
Cyber Growth Partnership, UK 
Cybersecurity awareness campaign, UK 
International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber 
Threats (IMPACT)  
 
Albania -Law on Protection of Personal Data  
Algeria - Law to prevent and combat ICT crime 
Andorra - Data Protection Electronic Signature 
Australia - Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
Australia - Mauritius - Computer Misuse and Cybercrime Act 2003, 
Data Protection Act 2004 
Austria - The Federal Act on the Protection of Personal Data 
Bangladesh -Information Technology Act 
Belgium-Electronic Communication Act  
Bulgaria - Electronic Communication Act 
Crime Convention 2006, (international) 
Cyber Graham Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) 
Tallinn Manual (international) 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) 
Europe: European Directive of Data Protection 
     European Union’s Data Protection Regulations 
Finland- Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic 
German Federal Protection Act 2009 
Mauritius - Computer Misuse and Cybercrime Act 2003; Data 
Protection Act 2004 
US: Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)-amended 2008 
     Cybersecurity Act, 2010 
     Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 
     Cyberspace Review Policy, 2009 
     Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) 
     Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
     Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 2014 (NIST) 
     Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) 
UK: Computer Misuse Act (CMA), 1990 
     Data Protection Act (DPA), 1998, 2008  
     Freedom of Information 2000 












As can be seen in Figure 2-3, legislation has evolved over recent years, and some national 
laws have been upgraded to multilateral treaties. For example, in the USA, a majority of 
states have adopted cybersecurity laws. The Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico and 
South Dakota states are exceptions since, at the time of writing this research, regulations are 
still missing (Mohamed, 2015). Additionally, few more countries failed to adopt clear 
cybersecurity law (e.g. Afghanistan, Czech Republic, Korea), as can be seen in Table 2-3 
above.  In general, organisations must comply with different regulations and the lack of 
international laws that countries would have in common is an additional hindrance for 
organisations with international activities.  
2.6 Cybersecurity Management 
Academics’ viewpoint: Recent years have shown that sophisticated technologies, Internet 
dependency, and cyberspace have extended perimeter for organisations and have made the 
handling of cyber risks a considerable challenge (Korovessis et al., 2017; Armenia et al., 
2018; Marotta and McShane, 2018). Despite significant research, there are still siloed 
practices in managing risk (e.g. technical silo, information security silo, departmental silos). 
Therefore, literature is separated into a various school of thought regarding the definition of 
cybersecurity.  
For instance, a significant part of literature refers to cybersecurity through the lenses of 
information security while another part is still grounded on a technical view of IT. The view 
is that information is a valuable asset and must, therefore, be handled and protected 
appropriately. While such an asset brings advantages, it can expose organisations to various 
risks (Borek et al., 2013).). To focus only on the protection of information and information 
systems might also be explained by the publicised security failures of organisations that 
mainly referred to the assurance of information security (e.g. loss/compromise of key 
business data, loss of customer and employees data, loss of intellectual property, among 
others) (Calder and Watkins, 2012; Korovessis et al., 2017). Whilst some academics even 
advance the view that actually cybersecurity is a ‘sub-set’ of Information Security, 
respectively cybersecurity should sit under the IS umbrella (Von Solms and Von Solms, 
2018). 
Accordingly, some prior literature defines cybersecurity through lenses of information 
security and rests on assumptions made under the CIA triad (Calder and Watkins, 2012; 
Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011; Web et al., 2014). While the additional viewpoint of Tashi and 
50 
 
Ghergnouti-Hélie (2009) emphasises a more complex definition of CsM. Given the 
increasing velocity, diversity, and volume of cybercrimes over recent years, securing 
information has shifted from being an IT security problem regarding the protection of 
information assets to a strategic challenge and respectively advancing towards Cybersecurity 
Management (CsM). Tashi and Ghergnouti-Hélie define information security from a more 
wide-ranging perspective: to achieve and maintain confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
accountability, authenticity and reliability of planning, organising, commanding, 
coordinating, and controlling through an on-going process.  Hence, this continuity 
contributes to the identification of risks and assesses their consequences in the light of 
occurrences. Accordingly, businesses would be able to establish risk priorities, leading to an 
organised model able to reduce exposure by undertaking certain actions. Similarly, existing 
research of Nazareth and Choi (2014) confirms that online risks are a real issue for 
organisations and could render detrimental losses. The 2012 case of Saudi Aramco, a 
national oil producer of Saudi Arabia, is clearly an example where a lack of cybersecurity 
strategies disrupted all organisational activity due to the wipeout of 30,000 computers 
(Nazareth and Choi, 2014); RM and mitigation measures for Internet-based attacks were 
omitted in this case. They succeeded to prove that a close relationship between RM and 
CsM is required for survival. Internal coherence appears to be a hard task, and the option to 
stop fighting against attacks is simply unacceptable. The hypothetical scenario 
of consciously leaving doors open and letting attackers run free would be like writing a 
declaration of surrender (Reuvid, 2014). Therefore, CsM appears to be more comprehensive, 
inclusive, and thus far more preferable for the protection and handling of risk oversight. In 
this manner, the possible vulnerabilities of software, hardware, networks, and processes are 
acknowledged and addressed as a whole (Calder and Watkins, 2012). 
Although extensive research has been carried out on cybersecurity management, many 
analyses were addressed under the numerous appellation as Information Security, 
Information Security Risk Management, Information Security, IT management, IT 
governance, Information Computer Technology Security, Information Technology 
Governance or Cyber Risk Management (Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič, 2008; Calder and 
Watkins, 2010; Laudon and Laudon, 2010; Turban and Volonina, 2010; Kouns and Minoli, 
2010; Web et al., 2014a; Fenz et al., 2014; Rubino and Vitolla, 2014; Gupta and Oija, 2014; 
Nazareth and Choi, 2015), among others.   
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 Figure 2-4 below offers some examples of the interchangeable use of terminology and its 
variation between technical and strategic reference; in some cases, the terminology differs. 
 
Figure 2-4 Terminology fluctuation of cybersecurity term 
Source: The Researcher 
Figure 2-4 above shows that the domain registers significant fluctuation in its terminology 
semantic and scope. This also involves an unclear definition and even conflicting and 
uncorrelated perspectives. Henceforth, many of them have only similarities and still seem to 
be used for the same purpose or context despite being different domains. Their apparent 
identical meanings express a partial perspective (e.g. information security, security of 
computers). Nevertheless, a precise definition of each term would be beyond the purpose of 
this research and the illustration is intended merely to outline the abundant diversity.  
However, some evidence (as already discussed in Subsection 2.5.1) demonstrates that in the 
digital age the term cyber, respectively cybersecurity, is more appropriate (Hampton, 2015). 
Gaining cyber resilience contributes to identification of reaction to, and recovery from cyber 
risks with a proactive strategic mindset (Raban and Hauptman, 2018). For this reason, the 
Researcher will analyse the issues under the ‘cybersecurity’ umbrella, 
respectively cybersecurity management, even though in the literature examined the term is 
used interchangeably and could cause confusion. Apart from terminology confusion, another 
problem is that it has been suggested that despite the wider practice of specific guidelines 
and standards, in reality their implementation does not necessarily guarantee that they are 
the best solutions tailored to the environment and operations (Siponeh and Willinson, 2009; 


































Practitioners’ viewpoint: Cybersecurity threats are increasing, and organisations are 
concerned about resolving these challenges (Cisco, 2014; Oliver Wyman, 2018b) due to 
potential of disruptions, damage, and cost caused by cybercrimes. The nature and large scale 
of cybercrimes have become more intrusive, sophisticated, complex and severe concluding 
that it is a “convenient” business for cybercriminals  and/or a threat agent (McAfee, 2013; 
CISCO, 2014; Deloitte, 2018; PwC, 2018b), and unbeneficial for the global economy.  
Hence, the value of information has changed together with intensification of threats and 
vulnerabilities (multiple cases of failures), attackers have become more skilled and more 
organised, and thus strategic and technical approaches must be considered altogether. 
Organisations are found to be dependent on IT and Internet, and thus, risk exposure of 
organisations has increased (PwC, 2016; PwC, 2018b). The need for an optimised approach 
for risk control and risk oversight might be due to organisations’ increased risk appetite. 
Furthermore, customer expectations (public mandate) regarding security and cyber 
resiliency are higher due to the increase in sophistication of technologies (Accenture, 2016; 
Deloitte, 2018; Accenture, 2018a). Competition is another contributor to the necessity of 
security. Technology evolution (velocity) as mobile technology (as new means and vectors 
for weaknesses) triggers increased surface of attack and multiple layers for attackers 
(Deloitte, 2015f; Accenture, 2018a). Moreover, the complexity of the financial system and 
its interconnectivity expose organisations more (Oliver Wyman, 2018b). 
Subsequent studies (Ernst and Young, 2014; Marsh, 2015; Thomson Reuters Accelus, 2014; 
KPMG, 2014a; Websense Security Labs, 2015) re-confirm that the duty of care for 
cybercrime advanced together with innovations in mobile devices, the web and mobile 
applications, social media, web browsers, home computers, cloud computing, and the 
Internet of Things (IoT). In short, the viability and profitability of organisations is in 
strict connection to the ability to tackle and update protection on an ongoing basis (Cisco, 
2014). Similarly, other practitioners expressed concerns regarding the way in which IT 
issues are handled. Cyber risks remain a complex challenge for organisations, and it is 
believed that the engagement of executive management can foster a more resilient position 
(PwC, 2014; Accenture, 2018b). Recommending a top-down strategy appears to be the first 
step when advising how to assure holistic protection against malicious cyber activities (IT 
Governance, 2015; KPMG, 2015). However, not all organisations show that they are 
adhering to holistic management of cyber risks (Ernst and Young, 2018). Some evidence 
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agrees that half of organisations fail to integrate cybersecurity in strategic planning, 
respectively organisational strategy (Ernst and Young, 2018b). 
As the threat spectrum has changed over the years, likewise the global business environment 
has tried to respond adequately. For example, Ernst and Young’s report of 2014 looked 
at multiple sectors in regards to the current state of cybersecurity and concluded the effects 
of aligning cybersecurity departments as not fulfilling the organisation’s function; the study 
proposes that a managerial approach might fortify its functions (Ernst and Young, 
2014a).  In particular, for financial organisations the reality of risk has always existed, 
ranging from robberies, fraud, theft, and many other criminal activities. However, emerging 
technologies have brought new challenges, and the reality of cybersecurity threats impose 
additional actions failing to protect revenue, business activity, assets, and reputation. 
Nonetheless, such an issue requires long-term investments of money, resources, and 
employees (Thomson Reuters Accelus, 2014). 
Although a lot of guidance and regulations have been released, the silo approach seems to 
continue (Marsh, 2015).  On these grounds, an organisation manages risks in a variety of 
ways, depending on a silo or holistic approach regarding probable losses (e.g. intellectual 
property, business interruption, reputation, customer trust, loss of sensitive information, 
financial loss, etc.). The issue of global cybersecurity losses is almost incalculable due to the 
fact that estimation/prediction often relies on surveys (McAfee, 2013; Websense Security 
Labs, 2015). Losses were estimated in 2014 to approximately $400 billion and later on in 
2018 to be $600 billion (McAfee, 2014, 2018). Nonetheless, it seems that ‘biased’ surveys 
and unreported cyber malicious incidents (i.e. events that were maybe not realised in full yet 
had criminal intention) contribute to the inability to understand the implications of cyber 
threats at a global level (Marsh, 2015).  
Over time practitioners’ efforts have expanded to knowledge orientated towards various 
aspects of CsM, fluctuating among strategy, value creation, risk oversight, maturity 






Table 2-4 CsM literature focus fluctuations amongst practitioners’ reports 
Focus Key considerations                    Entity/year 
Strategy • Cybersecurity should be tackled strategically; 
• Cybersecurity strategy should be aligned with 
organisation strategy; 
• An organisation should comply with the 
security of industry standards guidelines. 
KPMG (2013a); PwC, 2013a); 
PwC (2014); KPMG (2014d). 
Value • Management, RM and audit are responsible 
for value creation and its measurement. 
Deloitte (2015e); McKinsey 
(2015); BSI (2018a). 
Performance • Strategic alignment sustains business 
performance. 
Ernst and Young (2014b); BSI 
(2018a). 
Risk oversight • Risk oversight is significantly challenged; 
• Cybercrimes losses are significant across 
globe; 
• Cyber resilience is increasingly difficult to 
achieve; 
• Cybersecurity needs a top-bottom approach. 
KPMG (2013b); Ponemon 
Institute (2013); CISCO (2014); 
PwC (2014); KPMG (2014b); 
McAfee (2014); Thomson 
Reuters Accelus (2014); Verizon 
(2015); Websense Security Labs 
(2015); Oliver Wyman (2018).  
Maturity • Organisation cybersecurity maturity needs to 
be identified. 
Deloitte (2012); KPMG (2015); 
Deloitte (2018).  
Risk culture • The culture should assimilate the CsM 
framework. 
KMPG (2014a). 
Source: The Researcher 
As can be observed in Table 2-4 the practitioners’ reports focus on top-down and bottom-up 
approaches (strategic and operational) as well as the enumeration of key considerations, 
demonstrating that multiple factors (e.g. strategy, value, performance, risk oversight, 
maturity, risk culture, resources and capabilities, objectives and finally, planning) compound 
together. Thus, all of the elements are dependent on reaching a business overall strategy, 
resiliency and effectiveness. 
Regulators’ viewpoint: 
The financial industry has unique challenges and interrelated implications within national 
economies, thus the regulators’ scope is to determine and shape the financial sector’s 
behaviour in minimising losses due to cyber risks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2018). Of much more concern is that the type of risk broadened as well as 
sophistication and severity (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2018). Despite 
various benefits brought by innovations in technology, it also determines rises in 
vulnerabilities (Financial Stability Board, 2017; Financial Conduct Authority, 2018). 
Specific to the financial industry is that apart from cyberspace exposure and technology use, 
interconnections between financial institutions and related third parties represent another 
avenue of risk exposure (Financial Stability Board, 2017). Besides, factors as changing 
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consumer behaviour. The complexity of technology or exposure to a different type of threat 
(treat intelligence), place more pressure on the financial industry to prepare proactively and 
provide risk resiliency (Bank of England, 2018). Another particularity is that instability or 
even outage of financial organisations affect the financial system, other organisations, 
market participants and even consumers through ripple effects (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2018; Bank of England, 2018). 
Looking beyond the trend of poor adoption of cybersecurity principles as seen in academic 
papers and similarly in business practices, the regulators’ viewpoints alternate 
correspondingly. The most significant limitation within the industry is that cyber is managed 
through the lenses of IT or operational risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2018), thus failing to address the CsM strategically. For instance, some legislation refers 
only to security/assurance of information (e.g. Data Protection Act 1998; Federal 
Information Security and Management Act of 2002; EU General Data Protection Regulation, 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2016)) versus regulation that refers to a more 
inclusive security of assets, people, information, practices, processes, and technology (e.g. 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012). Such discrepancies in terminologies and meanings are present 
in various industry standards and guidelines (i.e. NIST used the term cybersecurity while BS 
ISO 27000 and its series refers to it as Information Security). The question of variation in 
terminology and semantics need to be addressed urgently as it affects theoretical legacy and 
industry practices as well as regulatory applicability along with organisational behaviours.  
Adhering to the applicability of regulatory recommended good business practices typically 
specifies baseline practices for assuring a minimum level of cybersecurity to avoid careless 
practices. For instance, in the UK as a proof of due diligence and preventative practices, 
organisations are required to evaluate partners’ collaborators, and/or third-parties’ cyber-
risk good practice (HM Government, 2015a). This is due to the fact that in the past many 
incidents were identified to have been caused by a third-party’s lack of cyber risk controls. 
In a report of 2015, HM Government evidenced that less than 50% of organisations have 
adopted legal and practical measures for cyber risks (for example, contract clauses, third-
party audit, pre-contract due diligence, third-party self-assessment) (HM Government, 
2015a). Additionally, it was found that few organisations require endorsement and 
certifications from third-parties (e.g. Cyber Essential Scheme, Innovation Voucher Scheme).  
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As these arguments suggest, safeguarding the financial industry is pivotal. In the 2018 
Financial Conduct Authority report, it was concluded that challenges are much higher—a 
significant increase of 138% in the number of cyber incidents (Financial Conduct Authority, 
2018) was concluded. Consensus amongst regulators is that to counteract challenges of cyber 
risks, a closer relationship between industry, academia, and government should be formed. 
An example is Cyber Security Information Security Partnerships (CiSP) available to bring 
implied mutual benefits to all parties (CERT-UK, 2015). Additionally, regulatory 
requirements are in most cases in line with industry standards/practices (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2018).  
Moreover, such initiative was also considered by the UK London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry back in 2014, which outlines that the expansion of the Internet over the last few 
years has succeeded to unveil new security challenges for organisations (UK London 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2014). It is estimated that every 
year organisations spend millions of pounds on counteracting this issue (UK London 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2014). While cybercriminals continue to target 
organisations due to their valuable trade secrets, intellectual property, credentials or 
customer financial data, regulations are unable to stop this trend and only propose worthy 
practices to lessen damages to organisations as well as indirectly to society.  
It is becoming increasingly difficult for organisations to comply and to assure transparency, 
hence increased regulatory demands tend to change from voluntary to prescriptive, and 
mandatory standards are centred and generally accepted rules within organisations. 
Conversely, there is a general belief that to apply past lessons and to move from a stationary 
to a more dynamic approach encompass challenges in practice, information confirmed by 
many exposed organisational resiliency failures (i.e. the case of Bangladesh Bank, 2016). 
2.7 Alignment paradigm 
Academic’s viewpoint: Alignment is considered a process worth achieving due to 
implications of effectiveness and efficiency on integrating managerial and administrative 
internal controls (Luftman, Papp and Brier, 1999). After years of research, the alignment is 
currently criticised as being a fragmented paradigm, separated in various streams (Volk and 
Zerfass, 2018). For instance, some authors, outline the process of alignment through the 
lense of strategic fit. Others such as Salaheddine and Ilias (2017) emphasise alignment as 
being a continuous strategic process of integration based on the well-known PDCA (plan-
do-check-act) circle and it is thus believed that culture and leadership are critical (a top to 
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bottom approach). Likewise, other academics focused on alignment benefits. Jevtić et al. 
(2018) concentrate on performance, measuring internal alignment. For that reason, there are 
clear indications demonstrating that interest in achieving alignment has been continuously 
maintained over time. The research of Smaczny (2001) explicitly indicates that a possible 
explanation for alignment benefits and determination is the fact that organisations have 
acknowledged the importance of integration and any adverse outcome of un-aligned business 
strategies (for example, low returns).  
Some research studies suggest that by achieving alignment, an organisation is less vulnerable 
to market changes and internal inefficiency because the alignment creates a standard and 
centric/unified solution (Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard, 2004) in handling risks with all 
available resources and capabilities. Such an approach is similar to the initial research of 
Henderson and Venkatraman (1990), who outline the value of a unified approach towards 
the achievement of organisational goals and missions (i.e. alignment is driven to prioritise 
decisions in correlation to organisational goals and missions instead of CsM or ERM 
priorities). Noticeably key literature validates the fact that Henderson and Venkatram were 
the initiators of strategic alignment research and created the platform for subsequent work 
(Henderson and Oldach 1993; Campbell, Kay and Avison, 2005; Gutierrez, Orozco and 
Serrano, 2009; Preston and Karahanna, 2009; Mekawy, AlSabbagh and Kowalsky, 2014; 
Reynolds and Yetton, 2015; Hinkelman et al., 2015). 
Another stream of alignment is the one that focuses on the challenges of alignment. A 
significant body of research indicates that the achievement of the alignment is one of the 
biggest concerns and challenges of IT/IS executives and boards since early 2000 (Reich and 
Benbasat, 2000; Avison et al., 2004; Chan and Reich, 2007; Chen, 2010; Corsaru and 
Snehota, 2011; Reynolds and Yetton, 2015; Preston and Karahama, 2009; Wu, Straub and 
Liang, 2015; Yarifard, Taheri and Zafarzadeh, 2016); but one worth striving for due to its 
benefits. For instance, Volk and Zerfass (2018) study outline communication as a critical 
element for achieving alignment. However, Baets (1992) formally confirmed that the theory 
applied has faced significant challenges over the last years. Additionally, other studies 
provide evidence about constant challenges in alignment. 
Furthermore, some investigations have focused mainly on alignment dimensions whereas 
other studies have concluded that strategic alignment could be accomplished from the 
following perspectives: IT-business alignment, IT-RM alignment, or CsM alignment with 
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ERM. Conversely, another stream of research is the cultural alignment that has been 
researched by authors such as Shao (2018), who argues that culture is a moderator for 
effective implementation. Shao’s research findings emphasise that culture should be a 
controlling mechanism that moderates potential internal misalignment. 
Research regarding the antecedents and consequences of non-alignment is of 
constant interest (Hung and Hu, 2007; Taradfar and Qrunfleh, 2009; Walter et al., 2013; 
Coltman et al., 2015; Volk and Zerfass, 2018) hence alignment ensures proactive and 
continuous practices in the direction of the strategic alignment. Although variations of terms 
appear in literature, in general, the meanings are common and might be defined as a fusion 
of strategies to achieve effectiveness and efficiency across an organisation (Luftman, 2000). 
Based on the review of preceding literature, the term aligned appears to be hidden under 
different terminology such as ‘fit’, ‘co-aligned’, ‘linked’, ‘congruent’, ‘contingent’, 
‘matched’, ‘harmony’, ‘fusion’, ‘synchronisation’, ‘integration’, ‘synergy’, to name but a 
few terms.  Furthermore, alignment has been investigated from distinctive 
social, strategic, structural, technical and intellectual perspectives (Reich and Benbasat, 
1996; Yarifard, Taheri and Zafarzadeh, 2016), whereas the strategic alignment has registered 
a more significant number of studies by scholars and practitioners.  
However, Cragg, King and Hussin (2002) point out that most authors have been discussing 
alignment without a clear indication as to how it can be achieved. Many other authors have 
consequently reviewed this issue, and Table 2-5 below summarises some of the 
research that has enabled the development of the paradigm through a three-dimensional 
perspective – adoption, implementation, and assessment. 
Table 2-5 Three-dimensional perspective of the alignment literature 
Fluctuation of alignment 
literature focus         
Authors 
Alignment adoption Baets (1996); Luftman (2000); Cragg, King and Hussin (2002); Avison et al. 
(2004); Sledgianowsky and Luftman (2005); Huang and Hu (2007); Preston 
and Karahanna (2009); Johnson and Lederer (2010); Rahman and Donahue 
(2010); Saleh and Alfantookh (2011); Volk and Zerfass (2018). 
Alignment implementation Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999); Kearns and Lederer (2000); De Haes and 
Van Grembergen (2009); Shao (2018); Volk and Zerfass (2018). 
Alignment assessment Luftman (2000); Burn and Szeto (2000); Reich and Benbasat (2000); Chan, 
Sabherwal and Thatcher (2006); Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano (2009); 
Yarifard, Taheri and Zafarzadeh (2016); Salaheddine and Ilias (2017); Jevtić 
et al. (2018); Joshi et al. (2018). 
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Source: The Researcher  
Compiling this evidence demonstrates that literature consists of different phases of 
alignment yet multiple studies addressing all phase are scarce. 
Practitioners’ viewpoint: The alignment of IT with ERM is a common practice among 
organisations, and although it considers the alignment in a traditional silo approach, it is part 
of the legacy. Often the organisational effectiveness is measured by key risk indicators 
(KRI), which assure that necessary measures are yielding results as anticipated. Thus, it 
comprises of a three-dimensional perspective: align, integrate and measure (KPMG, 2014; 
Grant Thornton, 2016). Even so aligning organisational strategy, with RM and culture 
currently remains a current challenge (PwC, 2018). 
2.8 Literature key findings  
From its early beginning, alignment has been identified as necessary, but literature is scarce 
regarding methods that could achieve and sustain it (Sledgianowsky and Luftman 
(2005). The Strategic Alignment Maturity (SAM) of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) is 
viewed by several academics (Smaczny, 2001); Avison et al., 2004; DeHaes and Van 
Grembergen, 2009; Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano, 2009) to be an initial framework for 
identifying, sustaining, achieving, and maintaining alignment. However, organisations are 
still none the wiser how to achieve alignment in practice (Preston and Karahanna, 2009). 
Therefore, impediments of alignment such as culture gaps (e.g. between IT and business 
boardrooms, IT and business departments), the lack of communication, inadequate 
knowledge sharing, and many other reasons maintain a miss-alignment among industries 
(Huang and Hu, 2007). Although in practice some organisations seek to align their RM with 
ERM, others indirectly discourage the action due to their own organisational culture that 
encourages (in some cases) departmental competition (Cambell, Kay and Avison, 2005). 
Additional evidence outlines that despite extensive research, alignment remains a top 
issue; a fact confirmed by other authors such as Cragg, King and Hussin, 2002; Avison et 
al., 2004; Preston and Karahanna, 2009; Johnson and Lederer, 2010; Chen, 2010; Rahman 
and Donahue, 2010; Reynolds and Yetton, 2015. Alignment has become a more challenging 
issue in the view of emerging technology developments, regulatory demands, market 
volatility, and competition in comparison to its early beginnings. Chen (2010) suggests 
that there are many organisations that fail to align their strategies due to their size (large 
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organisations versus multinational organisations), yet a broader strategy would most likely 
yield success. While most authors have focused on strategic alignment and discussing 
internal strategic alignment, some other studies (Siponen and Willinson, 2009; Walter et 
al., 2013) propose an alignment that also considers the external environment. As such, the 
environment and the strategy could ‘co-align’ and lead to a consensus on strategies that 
would prevent possible failures of alignment. 
In early stages, past literature that investigated alignment (Raymond and Rivard, 2004) 
proposed to focus on IT/IS alignment without specific interest paid to information 
security. This demonstrates that the literature related to alignment is scarce when researching 
the CsM alignment to ERM and is more oriented to IT. It is not surprising that some authors 
believe that alignment represents a complete picture of maturity exposure since it unifies 
all the organisation’s risks and in particular management activities to build common goals 
for business and IT (Huang and Hu, 2007).  
Figure 2-5 below outlines the findings mentioned above 
 
Figure 2-5 Progression of alignment literature across domains  
Source: The Researcher 
As can be seen in Figure 2-5, previous studies relating to alignment do not represent a new 
area. Although scholars and practitioners have investigated the topic, it seems that research 
is insufficient and concentrates specifically on the alignment of CsM with ERM. Based on 
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focused on IT alignment with business strategies (42 journals) rather than other alignment 
domains, which were left on the side as suboptimal research. 
Seeing that alignment entails various types (neutral, IT strategy alignment with business 
strategy, IS wit RM, IS with ERM), the research problem is justified hence CsM alignment 
with ERM is scarce, if not non-existent. Additionally, following the research background, 
Table 2-5 acknowledges the importance of shifting from the traditional management of IT 
to a more complex strategy of CsM.  
In view of that, Table 2-6 illustrates the actual focus and the prospect of cybersecurity among 
academics, practitioners and regulators. Accordingly, the structure is separated into four 
quadrants so as to explain various empirical and conceptual literature. 
Table 2-6 Paradigm shifts (transitions) of cybersecurity literature 
  
Key literature paradigm 
shifts 
Key authors 
Cybersecurity neutral state 
 
Siponen and Willison (2009); Von Solms and Van Niekerk (2013); 
Robinson, Jones and Janicke (2015); Min, Chai and Han  (2015); PwC 
(2013a); Oxford Economics (2014); Thomson Reuters Accelus (2014); 
McAfee (2014); Ponemon Institute (2015); World Economic Forum and 
Deloitte (2015); Verizon (2015); Bank of England (2013); Conference of 
State Bank Supervisors (2014); Ponemon Institute (2013); Department of 
Homeland Security (2002); UK Cabinet Office (2011); European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (2012); Europol (2014); UK 
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2014); CESG (2015a,b); 
CCDCOE (2015); USA Department of Treasury (2015). 
 
Cybersecurity from IT 
perspective 
Singh, Gupta and Oija (2014); Nazareth and Choi (2015); Websense 
Security Labs (2015); Oliver Wyman (2018); Rubino (2018). 
Cybersecurity from RM 
perspective 
 
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008); Saleh and Alfantookh (2011); KPMG 
(2014d); Ernst and Young (2014b); ICAEW (2014); Fenz et al. (2014); 
Webb et al. (2014a); Reuvid (2014); Marsh (2015); HM Government 
(2015b); Mohammed (2015). 
Cybersecurity from ERM 
perspective 
PwC (2012); Rubino and Vitolla (2014); Stoll (2015). 
  
Source: The Researcher  
Additionally, following the research background variations identified in Table 2-6, the 
following table, Table 2-7, acknowledges the importance of shifting from the traditional 
management of IT to a more complex strategy of CsM. Thus, alignment of CsM with ERM 
yields an elimination of risk siloed approaches and reduces organisational exposure owing 
to a single, unified mechanism (Deloitte, 2014b) that can deal with all risk portfolio (RIMS, 
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2014). Table 2-7 provides more detail regarding traditional and recommended approaches 
of collaborative departments and functions. 
























Source: The Researcher 
It can be seen from the data presented in Table 2-7 that indeed, the advantages yielded by 
the traditional approach are noticeable but limited to responsibilities relating to software and 
hardware issues. On the other hand, an alignment with ERM provides support and guidance 
for the whole organisation and risks are mainly undertaken in accordance to business 
performance goals (Grant Thornton, 2016). In conjunction with technical responsibilities, 
the new approach widely improves the efficiency of organisational security. Hence, ERM 




















Cybersecurity with ERM 
Disadvantages 
Disconnected databases; 
Double supervisory functions; 
Duplication of resources and infrastructure; 
Focus on technical aspects (hardware software); 
Focus on vulnerabilities, not opportunity. 
Fragmented governance; 
Lack of accountability (how effective is); 
Lack of common language; 
Lack of communication; 
Lack of consensus in IT strategy and ERM strategy; 
Lack of security awareness among organization; 
Lack of strategic use of IT; 
Late risk identification; 
Misalignment to organizational strategy; 
Silo strategies (double effort, cost, and time consuming); 
Uncertain return on spending; 




Compliance to standards; 
Cost (balance of investment and return); 
Difficulties in adjusting IT strategies to ERM strategies; 
Difficulties in implementation (barriers); 
Focus on opportunity rather than risks; 
Hard to quantify risks; 
Increased budgets; 
Management based on assumptions; 
One size fit (unspecialized focus on departments); 
On-going alignment; 
Outsourcing certifications; 
Personalisation of standardized approaches; 
Prioritization of risk; 
Undermined IT managerial capabilities (under ERM 
management). 
 








Derive value from IT (strategic use); 
Effective strategic prioritization (operational efficiency); 
Increase in business performance; 
Increased resiliency; 
Integrating governnace; 
Lowering costs/reduce the double effort; 
Maintenance of shareholders and stakeholders trust (strategic); 
Minimization of loss; 
Organizational awareness; 
Pro-active, continuous; 
Real-time visibility in business performance; 
Shared communication; 
Support business strategy and objectives; 
Sustained alignment. 
Advantages 
Ability to propose technical solutions; 
Control on software and hardware; 
Departmental level of control; 
Independence of decisions; 
Informed cybercrime trends; 
IT-centric to security; 
Technical risk prediction. 
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Additionally, the following table outlines the literature review (312 documents), which is 
related to the research problem. 
















Crockford (1982);  Schmit and Roth (1990);  Smith (1995); Stulz (1996); Oldfield and Santomero 
(1997); Clarke and Varma (1999); Tilman (2001); Hillson (2002); Raz and Hillson (2005); Nag, 
Hambrick and Chen (2007); Jorion (2009); Servaes, Tomayo and Tufano (2009); Borison and Hamm 
(2010); Verbano and Venturini (2011); Yaraghi and Langhe (2011); Pirson and Turnbull (2011); 
Chang et al. (2011); Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012); Dionne (2013); Lenssen, Dentchev and Roger 
(2014); Schroeder (2014); Calandro (2015); Falkner and Hielb (2015). 
Practitioners’ 6 reports 
 
Australian/New Zeeland Standard (2004); Aon (2015); IRM (2002); Ponemon Institute (2011); PwC 
(2012); AICPA (2018). 
Regulators’ 8 reports FERMA (2003); HM Treasury (2004); Financial Reporting Council (2005); HM Treasury (2009); 
OECD (2014); USA Department of Treasury (2014); Basel (2014); Basel (2015). 





Miller (1992); Dickinson (2001); Kleffner, Lee and McGannon (2003); Ward (2003); Liebenberg and 
Hoyt (2003); Beasley Clune and Hermanson (2005); Drew and Kendrick (2005); Nocco and Stulz 
(2006); Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006); Beasley,Pagach and Warr (2008); Castro et al. (2008); 
Fraser, Schoening-Thiessen and Simkins (2008); Francis and Paladino (2008); Burnaby and Hass 
(2009); Mikes (2009); Power (2009); Gordon, Loeb and Tseng (2009); Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone 
(2010); Arnold et al. (2011); Eckles, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011); Pagach and War (2011); Lindberg 
and Seifert (2011); McShane, Nair and Rustambekov (2011); Paape and Spekle (2012); Lin, Wen and 
Yu (2012);  Schiller and Prpich (2013); Baxter et al. (2013); Tekathen and Dechow (2013); Hoyt and 
Miller (2014); Farrel and Gallagher (2014); Hayne and Free (2014); Lundqvist (2014); Ching and 
Colombo (2014); Nair et al. (2014); Rubino and Vitolla (2014); Aven and Aven (2015); Beasley, 
Branson and Pagach (2015); Bromiley et al. (2015); Grace et al. (2015); Shad and Woon (2015); 
Lundqvist (2015); Lalitha (2015); Lyons (2015); Gatzer and Martin (2015);  Zéghal and El Aoun 
(2016); Andrén and Lundqvist (2017); Bogodistov and Wohlgemuth (2017); Viscelli, Hermanson, and 
Beasley (2017); Aguilera, Judge, and Terjesen (2018); Farrel and Gallagher (2019); McShane (2018); 
Oliveira et al. (2018); McShane (2018). 
Practitioners’ 
 
43 reports COSO (1992); The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1999); Casualty 
Actuarial Society (2003); COSO (2004); AS/NZS (2004);  Standard and Poor’s (2008); Accenture 
(2009); British Standard (2009); Deloitte (2009); PwC (2009); OCEG (2009); Manigent (2009); 
McKinsey and Company (2010); Tower Watson (2010); BSI (2011b); BSI (2011c); RIMS (2011); 
Manigent (2011); Protivity (2012); COSO (2012); COSO (2013); McKinsey and Company (2013a); 
PwC (2013b); KPMG (2013b); Grant Thornton (2013);  McKinsey and Company (2014); Tower 
Watson (2014); Deloitte (2015a); Deloitte (2015b); Deloitte (2015c); Deloitte (2015d); PwC (2015); 
COSO (2015a); Ernst and Young (2015); RIMS (2015); CGMA (2015); OCEG (2015); Thomson 
Reuters (2015); COSO (2016); McKinsey and Company (2016); American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (2017); KPMG (2017b); COSO (2017). 
Regulators’ 4 reports SOX (2002); Dodd-Frank Act (2010); NYSE (2014); Financial Reporting Council (2016).  




41 journals Cicognani (1998); Strate (1999); Hong et al.(2003); Kotulic and Clark (2004); Peppard and Ward 
(2004); Posthumus and Von Solms (2004); Von Solms and Von Solms (2004); Gerber and Von Solms 
(2005); Chang and Ho (2006); Caralli et al. (2007); Da Veiga and Eloff  (2007); Bojanc and Jerman-
Blažič (2008); Humphreys (2008); Ma, Schmidt and Pearson (2009);  Siponen and Willison (2009); 
Tashi and Ghernouti-Hélie (2009); Deibert and Rohozinski (2010); Von Solms and Van Niekerk 
(2013); Julich (2013); Atoum, Otoom and Abu Ali  (2014); Fenz et al. (2014); Schiavone,Garg and 
Summers (2014); Singh,Gupta and Ojha (2014); Craigen,Diakun-Thibault and Purse (2014); Web et 
al. (2014a); Web et al. (2014b); Stoll (2014); Tyagy (2014);  Robinson, Jones and Janicke (2015); 
Lehto and Neittaanmäki (2015); Min, Chai and Han (2015); Mohammed (2015); Nazareth and Choi 
(2015); Soomro, Shah and Ahmed (2016); Korovessis et al. (2017); Armenia et al. (2018); Raban and 
Hauptman (2018); Marotta and McShane (2018); Gordon et al. (2018); Von Solms and Von Solms 





ISSA (2004); British Standard Institution (2009);  Lloyds (2010); Information Security Forum 
(2011); British Standard institution (2011a); British Standard Institution (2012); Deloitte (2012); 
KPMG (2013a); Ponemon Institute (2013); British Standard (2013a); British Standard Institution 
(2013b); British Standard Institution (2013c); PwC (2013a); McAfee (2013); CISCO (2014); Ernst 
and Young (2014);  PwC (2014); Thomson Reuters Accelus (2014); McAfee (2014); KPMG 
(2014b);  KPMG (2014c); KPMG (2014d); KPMG (2014e); CSIS (2015); KPMG (2015); Marsh 
(2015); Ponemon Institute (2015);  IT Governance (2015); Verizon (2015); Websense Security Labs 
(2015); Deloitte (2014); World Economic Forum and Deloitte (2015); Deloitte (2015e); Deloitte 
(2015f); Accenture (2016); British Standard Institution (2016); Gartner (2016); Oliver Wyman 





39 reports OECD (2002); USA, Department of Homeland Security (2002); UK Cabinet Office (2009); UK 
Cabinet Office (2011); ISO (2011); NIST (2011); USA Department of Homeland Security (2011); 
ISACA (2012); ISO (2012); ENISA (2012); CESG, Cabinet Office, CPNI and Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (2012); CESG (2012); Bank of England (2013); ISACA (2013); NIST 
(2013a); NIST (2013b); ICAEW (2014); USA Department of Financial Services (2014); EUROPOL 
(2014); NIST (2014); UK London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2014); CSBS (2014); Oxford 
Economics (2014); HM Government (2014); USA Department of Treasury (2015); Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (2015); NATO CCDCOE (2015); HM Government (2015a); HM Government 
(2015b); HM Government (2015c); CERT-UK (2015); CESG (2015 a, b); USA Office of Management 
and Budget (2015); BSI (2016a); ENISA (2017); Financial Stability Board (2017); Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2018); Financial Conduct Authority (2018); Bank of England (2018). 
Alignment   
Academics’ 
 
52 journals Henderson and Venkatraman (1989); Henderson and Venkatraman (1990); Baets (1992); Powell 
(1992); Broadbent and Weill (1993); Henderson and Venkatraman (1993); Venkatraman, Henderson 
and Oldach (1993); Baets (1996); Ciborra (1997); Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999); Papp (1999); Burn 
and Szeto (2000); Kearns and Lederer (2000); Reich and Benbasat (2000); Luftman (2000); Smaczny 
(2001); Chan (2002); Cragg, King and Hussin (2002); Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard (2004); Avison 
et al.(2004); Campbell, Kay and Avison (2005); Sledgianovsky and Luftman (2005); Chan, Sabherwal 
and Thatcher (2006); Chan and Reich (2007); Huang and Hu (2007); Luftman and Kempaiah (2007); 
De Haes and Van Grembergen (2009); Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano (2009); Preston and Karahanna 
(2009); Taradfar and Qrunfleh (2009); Chen (2010); Johnson and Lederer (2010); Rahman and 
Donahue (2010); Corsaru and Snehota (2011); Saleh and Alfantookh (2011); Walter et al. (2013); 
Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang (2014); Mekawy, AlSabbagh and Kowalsky (2014); 
Fakhri,Fahiman and Ibrahim (2015); Coltman et al. (2015); Gerow, Thatcher and Grover (2015); 
Reynolds and Yetton (2015); Wu,Straub and Liang (2015); Hinkelman et al. (2015); Karpovsky and 
Galliers (2015); Luftman, Lyytinen and Zvi (2015); Yarifard, Taheri and Zafarzadeh (2016); 
Salaheddine and Ilias (2017); Volk and Zerfass (2018); Jevtić et al. (2018); Joshi et al. (2018); Shao 
(2018). 
Practitioners’ 3 reports KPMG (2014a); Grant Thornton (2016); PwC (2018a). 
Regulators’ 0 reports none 
TOTAL 312 Documents 
 169 academics research papers 91 practitioner’s documents 51 regulators documents 
Source: The Researcher 
Table 2-8 represents the key contributors who have written corresponding literature 
regarding some aspects of the research topic: RM field. While, the primary foundation of the 
topic is separated into three key related concepts: CsM, ERM and Alignment, it has been 
identified that in the case of CsM and ERM alignment there is scarce academic literature and 
for this reason other congruent research from IT and RM fields has been considered. The 
academic literature proposed consists of 169 documents, along with 91 practitioners’ 
documents and 51 regulatory documents. Journals have been compared against the 
Academic Journal Guide 2015 (a consultative guide to measure journals rankings) of 
Association of Business Schools (2015) and thus might be subject to some limitation. 
The systematic examination identified that apart from domain focus, the selected literature 
has been significantly extracted from the fields of finance and information management with 
predominant three stars’ journals. Moreover, undertaking this approach validates that over 
recent years CsM and ERM have been hardly researched. ERM registers a similar situation, 
even though there are some journals related to traditional RM. Although 312 documents 
have been considered for this research, additional documents have also been used to extend 




Table 2-9 Key academics’ contributors 













Hong et al. (2003) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Managerial effectiveness of IS 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. IS management theory 
5. Predict organisational behaviour  
Peppard and Ward (2004) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. IT/IS management performance 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. IS/IT and delivering business value 
5. Strategic management of IT/IS 
Posthumus and von Solms (2004) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Effective information security strategy 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. Propose a framework 
5. Information security governance 
Kotulic and Clark (2004) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. Effectiveness of an IS programme 
3. E (mixed: surveys, interviews)  
4. IS domain being sensitive 
5. Guidelines for managing IS 
Gerber and Von Solms (2005) 
1. Implementation challenges  
2. Integrated approach to risks 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. Guidance for integrated approach of IS 
5. Alternative to holistic IS 
Chang and Ho (2006) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Influences in implementation IS  
3. E (quantitative: surveys) 
4. Real impact of organisational factors 
5. IS management adoption and practice 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) 
1. Adoption challenges 
2. Organisational culture towards IS 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. IS framework 
5. IS culture measurement 
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Problems associated with investments 
3. E (quantitative research methods) 
4. Standardised approach recommended 
5. Standards determining the financial risk 
Siponen and Willison (2009) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Complying with guidelines  
3. E (qualitative research methods) 
4. Generic practice of IS 
5. Optimisation of practices 
Solms and Van Niekerk (2013) 
1. Adoption challenges 
2. Cybersecurity defined 
3. T (qualitative research: scenario) 
4. Expanded the theoretical concept 






1. Implementation challenges 
2. Top-down process of ERM 
3. E: (quantitative: 123 surveys) 
4. Part of organisation agenda 
5. ERM and planning process 
Kleffner, Lee and McGannon (2003) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Obstacles to implementation  
3. E (mixed: survey and interview) 
4. Guidelines are influencing RM  
5. Common definition and standard  
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) 
1. Adoption challenges 
2. Firm value and CRO 
3. E (quantitative research methods) 
4. CRO’s contribution to ERM 
5. Determinants of ERM 
Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005) 
1. Implementation of ERM 
2. Embracing ERM 
3. E (Quantitative: 123 surveys) 
4. Factors of ERM implementation 
5. ERM effectiveness 
Beasley, Pagach and Warr (2008) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Appointment of a CRO 
3. T (Qualitative:120 observations) 
4. Various determinants factors 
5. ERM adoption 
Gordon et al. (2009) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. ERM and firm performance 
3. E (quantitative research methods) 
4. ERM and performance dependency 
5. Contextual variables and ERM 
Arena et al. (2010) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. ERM performance management 
3. E (Qualitative: interview/case 
study)  
4. Explanations of RM practice. 
5. Contamination with other 
disciplines 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. Firm value /the appointment of a CRO 
3. E (quantitative research methods) 
4. Measurement of ERM 
5. ERM contributes to organisational value 
McShane and Rustambekov (2011) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. ERM and firm performance 
3. E (quantitative: statistics) 
4. Pressure to implement ERM  
5. ERM, culture and firm performance 
Paape and Spekle (2011) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Factors associated with 
3. E (quantitative: 825 surveys)  
4. No evidence for COSO effectiveness 










1. Adoption challenges 
2. Alignment - competitive advantage 
3. E (quantitative methods) 
4. Confirmatory result on alignment  
5. Organisational factors  
Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) 
1. Adoption of alignment 
2. Dynamic model of alignment 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. Strategic Alignment Model 
5. Challenges in digital 
transformation 
Reich and Benbasat (2000) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Social dimension of alignment 
3. E (qualitative: interviews) 
4. Shared domain knowledge 
5. Creation of IT vision 
Luftman (2000) 
1. Strategic alignment maturity 
2. Achieving and sustaining alignment 
3. E (Qualitative: 6 case study) 
4. Difficulties in achieving alignment 
5. Further research on alignment 
Kearns and Lederer (2000) 
1. Measurement of alignment 
2. Alignment competitive advantage 
3. E (quantitative: survey) 
4. Common plan (business and IS) 
5. Shared understanding 
Burn and Szeto (2000) 
1. Implementation challenges 
2. Business strategy driver 
3. E (quantitative: survey, case study) 
4. Competitive potential  
5. Industry-specific guidelines 
Smaczny (2001) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. IT strategy aligned 
3. T (qualitative research methods) 
4. Business and IT strategies aligned 
5. Test practicality of alignment 
Bergeron et al. (2004) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. Alignment-business performance 
3. E (quantitative: survey) 
4. Ideal patterns of alignment 
5. Longitudinal study of alignment 
Sledgianowsky and Luftman (2005) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. Achieve and sustain alignment 
3. E (Qualitative: case study) 
4. Methods of implementation 
5. Improve IT-business alignment 
Preston and Karahanna (2009) 
1. Measurement challenges 
2. Social dimension of alignment 
3. E (quantitative: survey) 
4. Shared understanding of social alignment 
5. Explore shared understanding 
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Table 2-9 outlines research limitations by emphasising the main ten contributors identified 
on each paradigm, respectively CsM, ERM, and Alignment. Points 1, 2 and 5 (gap, key focus 
and projected future research) are closely linked as they are the determinants of the research 
questions. Point 4 (contribution) represents the intellectual heritage based on the current 
research development. Additionally, point 4 defines and outlines the position of the research 
by demonstrating the foundation of knowledge and focus, and its limitations. Furthermore, 
the methodological inheritage of point 3 clarifies how the original problem has been 
investigated and defines its limitation. It represents the research methods that have been 
applied in order to identify key concepts and theories. It also represents the initial guidance 
underpinning the research design. Although the initial questions addressed by the key 
contributors have contributed to the research topic, unaddressed questions still remain (CsM 
aligned with ERM). The remainder of unsolved issues within the literature are synthesised 
in point 5 of Table 2-9. 
The initial research gap identified in the literature is: (1) Scarce strategic alignment literature 
that focuses on CsM and ERM alignment, (2) low level of maturity in the implementation 
of the alignment, (3) lack of bottom-up consideration of the concept, (4) lack of common 
terminology, (5) lack of common  guidance for implementation, (6) low level of cyber risk 
awareness inside organisations, and (7) lack of coherent theory. Thus, the expected 
contribution of research confirms that the problem subject to investigation deserves serious 
consideration and the aspect of research credibility is sustained.  
2.9 Conclusion 
The challenges encountered by organisations and the way they respond to cyber threats serve 
as a starting point to demonstrate that alignment of CsM with ERM encounters numerous 
challenges in theory and practice. Moreover, the relatively scarce literature focusing 
specifically on the topic demonstrates confusion and unclear direction at some points. How 
theory and practice link together has been considered for identifying, analysing and outlining 
the current state-of-art research problem. Thus, the exploration of the phenomenon considers 
key literature in order to recognise the literature legacy related to the research’ topic and uses 
a three-fold approach analysis based on academics’, practitioners’ and regulators’ 
viewpoints. Henceforth, the main objective of the research is to create a Framework that 
comprises of CsM with ERM alignment for the financial industry and identification of key 
literature is one of the steps that determines and outlines the gap.  Over the years, the 
taxonomy of risk dimension in the business context has changed dramatically from a 
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traditional view (negative) to opportunistic. Moreover, along with organisations’ shift to the 
cyber environment, the risk profile has upgraded accordingly. Likewise, literature that 
focused on ERM has expanded across multiple industries over the years. This is true even if 
some critics have argued that it has not reached a maturity level since failures of 
organisations have been registered. The review of the literature regarding CsM has revealed 
that although this discipline appears to be new, its roots confirm that it previously 
existed under different terminology. For instance, alignment literature transitioned from a 
strategic alignment in general, IT alignment with business strategy and alignment of CsM 
with RM. The evidence of the literature review outlines that the strategic alignment of CsM 
with ERM is scarce in academic literature and thus transformation is to some extent 
theoretically sustained, but more research is necessary. Without an appropriate strategy for 
enterprise risks and cyber risks, it appears to be a foregone failure for organisations. 
Identifying how to handle risk is imperative for the reason that it has broader long-term 
implications. Specifically, organisations need to move from a subjective perspective (i.e. 
based on return-on-investment) to incorporate and assure value creation for others (economy 
and society). While the findings demonstrate that alignment benefits are significant in the 
long-term, achieving alignment can be a milestone for many organisations unless they are 
well prepared beforehand. Alignment processes that focus on CsM and ERM alignment 
within the financial organisations register a low level of maturity, and a silo approach is 
often applied. In addition to immaturity, a misguidance of terminology, definitions and 
various frameworks lead to confusion and an unclear path for organisations. Alongside 
inconsistencies in practice, academics lack a coherent theory that specifically addresses the 
alignment of CsM and ERM. Thus, the legacy is constructed on partial approaches to this 
research’ problem. 
In conclusion, evidence has shown that more research is required in order to accomplish the 
alignment of CsM with ERM and that choosing a single view of academics would perhaps 
not have tapped into the same outcome. Therefore, the literature shows that despite various 
efforts to increase resiliency, the approaches prove to be partially (silo) addressed. This 
confirms that the organisational risk oversight is under-researched and the alignment of CsM 
with ERM is a joint effort that contributes to a holistic internal control of risks. 
The following chapter (Chapter 3) further explores the literature through a systematic 
literature evaluation in order to identify a more specific literature gap. The results act as a 
second basis (derivate) for the proposed Framework that follows later in Chapter 4. 
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3. Chapter Three: Systematic Literature Evaluation 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter Three moves beyond the exploration of the phenomenon to consider further possible 
answers to the research questions. It examines why alignment is necessary, how it is 
sustained, what the key debates regarding all three domains are, and how theory, practice 
and regulatory framework interrelate. It assesses the literature to identify the current 
situation, analyse practices and evaluate potential limitations, all of which validate the 
proposed Framework. It provides an overview of ERM, CsM and alignment literature 
through a systematic literature review to illustrate how published research has progressed in 
connection to the research problem. 
This stage explores the key contributing factors related to the research topic and objectives 
and clarifies the role of academics, practitioners and regulators that influence the governance 
of risk. Identifying the gap in the literature and establishing its importance are the main 
driving forces of this chapter, forming the baseline for the conceptual framework that follows 
in Chapter Four. 
Despite significant research over the past few years regarding risk resiliency, there are still 
unanswered questions as to why organisations are unsuccessful when implementing 
effective security at all levels. This chapter represents an additional understanding of the 
research problem and undertakes a more specific exploration. While Chapter Two adopted 
a traditional and more general approach, this chapter narrows the investigation specifically 
to the financial industry, addressing the relational analysis between concepts, themes and 
variables (Sekran and Bougie, 2013). Hence it more deeply explores the associations among 
the three domains through a qualitative literature systematic evaluation which is a more 
comprehensive and detailed analysis than the traditional approach (Robson, 2011), using 
coding and categorisation of data (Sekran and Bougie, 2013). This second phase of the 
literature review uses a Four-Quadrant Framework to synthesise and organise data into 
grouped classifications (Althonayan, 2003), with the purpose of understanding the 
relationships of contributors and their determinations. A thematic literature evaluation has 




By adopting the qualitative literature systematic evaluation, the researcher aims to 
demonstrate the rigour, transparency, clarity and validity of methods (Robson, 2011; Booth, 
Papaioannou and Sutton, 2011). A qualitative systematic literature evaluation represents a:  
‘…method for integrating or comparing the findings from qualitative 
studies. It looks for “themes” or “constructs” that lie in or across 
individual qualitative studies’ (Grant and Booth, 2009, p. 94). 
The first section explores the ERM literature, the second the CsM literature, and the third 
explores the alignment contributor correlations, typology and evolution. 
3.2 Research model to explore the typology of contributors 
For the purpose of identifying literature maturity trends, the literature is analysed based on 
the initial model developed by Althonayan (2003), which suggests an evaluation based on 
quadrants, limited by four criteria. Therefore, the following Table (Table 3-1) defines the 
criteria that help to categorise the gradual literature focus, along with industry proportions 
and global settings. The research model adopted from Althonayan (2003) applies as a 
direction in investigating all three domains: CsM, ERM and alignment. 
Table 3-1 Research model to explore the typology of contributors 
Quadrant phases                    Focus                    Arguments 
Quadrant 1 Adoption 
Proposes adoption. 
Theoretically oriented (benefits) 
without applicability based on 
strategic discussion with the 
implementation purpose. 
Theoretical focus 
-descriptive (based on past 
theoretical evidence); 
-subject to factors. 
• Identifies the purpose of 
alignment; 
• Analyses and evaluate the role of 
alignment; 
• Illustrates the outcomes of 
alignment. 
Quadrant 2 Implementation 
Process building (validation) pre-
operational, analyses the problem 
and test its applicability. 
 





-subjective to plans. 
• Identifies the risks and effects of 
Implementation; 
• Determines the theory’s 
applicability; 
• Evaluates whether the intended 
action can function; 
• Forecasts the implementation 
results; 
• Identifies preconditions of 
alignment; 
• Explores the practice. 
Quadrant 3 Maturity 
assessment 
Establishes guidelines and assess 
them.  
Strategic risk oversight and 
implementation (tactical because it 
proposes to overcome challenges). 
Implementation maturity 
focus 
-prescriptive (considers other 
factors based on practice); 
- process focused. 
• It is based on a strategic 
approach; 
• Defines, measures and 
determines the enablers and 
impediments; 
• Establishes, implements and 
maintains the alignment; 
• Determines optimisation. 
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Quadrant 4 Assesses compliance 
Dynamic evaluation (strategic 
practice). 
 
Valuation (assessment) focus 
-prescriptive; 
-consolidation focused. 
• Debates the value of 
implementation; 
• Challenges the options available; 
• Tests and assesses the 
implementation; 
• Compiles and compares the 
results for validation. 
Source: Adapted from Althonayan (2003) 
• Quadrant 1 Adoption - includes studies that considered adoption and explored its 
benefits, determinants, and challenges. This section is characterised by its descriptive 
aspects (foundation) and incorporates strategic discussions regarding ERM 
implementation (design). Thus, this quadrant should respond to what and why 
questions; 
• Quadrant 2 Implementation – integrates some theoretical aspects of alignment, 
being initially a descriptive quadrant and later grounded on the applicability of theory 
in practice. In short, this quadrant represents the movement from guidance towards 
actions. As it is the second phase, its key features are low maturity and it is 
characterised by convincing arguments to incorporate the strategic alignment in 
organisational governance. The strength of this quadrant is that it set bounds to the 
theory and offers practical aspects of its support role, based on cost-benefit analysis 
and confirmatory purposes (i.e. factors, value, profitability, performance). 
Additionally, it circulates positive and negative aspects, putting the theory into 
practice. Therefore, it has prescriptive aspects and intends to assess the pre and post 
implementation operational variables. This section should offer answers to how and 
when questions; 
• Quadrant 3 Maturity Assessment - is related to Q1 and Q2 but with an additional 
purpose. The studies categorised in this quadrant evaluate the implementational 
design based on strategic risk oversight by testing its tactics and performance. 
Additionally, this quadrant provides a movement from guidance theory to 
applicability in practice (actions) and answers questions about where the organisation 
stands; 
• Quadrant 4 Compliance – is a hybrid, hence it includes the adoption theories (Q1), 
implementation state (Q2) and maturity (Q3) and regulatory compliance (Q4). It 
responds to questions regarding how much compliance. 
As a result of this direction, further analysis begins on each domain. 
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3.3 Enterprise Risk Management 
3.3.1 Overview of academics’ literature contribution to ERM 
As every organisation has a duty of care to safeguard itself against various threats, ERM has 
become the provision for protecting assets, people, processes and organisational 
architectures. Based on the quadrants mentioned above (see Table 3-1) the initial exploration 
of literature evaluation starts by focusing on RM evolution and its impact on various 
industries. This enables an understanding of past approaches, and it provides some 
explanations for current challenges. 
























































Crockford (1982) T general generic A descriptive study that focused on the RM evolution and its impact 
on businesses. 
Q1 
Schmit and Roth (1990) E USA combined An early study that analysed RM through a quantitative evaluation 
by looking at cost-effectiveness with the aim to justify further 
investment and research. 
Q1 
Smith (1995) E USA combined Investigated the practice of RM and available supportive 
instruments (e.g. hedge and derivates) to govern organisations.  
Q1 
Stulz (1996) E general combined Questioned the discrepancies between theory and practice, hence 
considering literature and case studies for comparison. 
Q1 
Oldfield and Santomero 
(1997) 
E general financial Undertook an investigation to analyse the general risk governance 
within the financial industry. 
Q1 
Clarke and Varna (1999) T general generic Emphasises the strategic role of RM implementing in organisations. Q1 
Tilman (2001) T general generic Reflected on RM´s roots and its probabilistic evolution in 
organisation governance. 
Q1 
Hillson (2002) T general generic Extended the literature legacy with its recommendation to perceive 
risk as an opportunity opposite to negative risk. 
Q1 
Raz and Hillson (2005) T general general A comparative review that focused on the analysis of RM standard 
practices across the globe. 
Q1 
Nag, Hambrick and Chen 
(2007) 
T USA education It explores multiple perspectives of academics on strategic 
management by looking at the definition, discussions and 
implications. 
Q1 
Jorion (2009) T general generic The study concluded that past Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
lessons (2007-2008) failed to be learned as industry register 
discordant risk controls. 
Q1 
Servaes, Tamayo and Tufano 
(2009) 
E general combined The study concerns the balance of theory-practice regarding RM 
and undertakes an empirical study to evaluate factors that determine 
such situation. 
Q1 
Borison and Hamm (2010) T general generic It highlights the fragility of RM practices implemented by 
organisations and encourages a mindset change that starts with 
executives (top-down approach). 
Q1 
Chang et al. (2011) E general banking Provides a useful approach to Basel II Accord application in pre and 
post GFC. 
Q2 
Pirson and Turnbull (2011) T general financial Review the organisation governance state before and after the GRC 
and based on findings recommends a unitary network governance 
to diminish the effects of unforeseen risks. 
Q1 
Yaraghi and Langhe (2011) T general generic Emphasised the importance of identifying the critical success 
factors for RM. 
Q1 
Verbano and Venturini (2011) T general generic Reanalysed the RM development path to portray its evolution in a 
compelling framework. 
Q2 
Aebi, Sabato and Schmid 
(2012) 
E general banking This ongoing discussion presumes that employing a CRO is highly 




Dionne (2013) T general generic The study compiles of evidence of evolution from pure RM (except 
financial risks) to strategic RM. 
Q1 
Lenssen, Dentchov and Roger 
(2014) 
T general generic It discusses the post-GFC requirement for sustainable governance 
to consolidate the organisational risk capacity (tolerance) through 
five levels: individual, sectorial, national and supranational. 
Q1 
Falkner and Hiebl (2014) T general generic It is an explorative and systematic review of the RM literature that 
focuses on SME. 
Q1 
Calandro (2015) T general generic The author addresses a controversial belief among academics and 
practitioners that proper risk preparation can transform 
unpredictable risks to predictable and thus preventable risks. 
Q1 
Source: The Researcher 
 
Key for table 3-2: 
Combined – refers to studies that use more than two industries to gather empirical data. 
General – refers to studies that omit to refer to a specific setting. 
Generic – relates to the industry context of studies where this aspect is omitted or has broad 
applicability. The attribute is generated based on the content specification, not on author/s 
residence. 
As seen above in Table 3-2, the risk at its origins has negative connotations in perspective 
of RM. However, it has evolved in modern ERM by contributing to organisations’ risk; in 
other words, by understanding in a meaningful way the risk and opportunities as a 
performance enhancer to support informed decisions through the lens on enterprise-wide 
security. Although ERM is still immature (Agarwal and Ansell, 2016; AICPA, 2018; 
Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018), it provides a new strategic way to tackle various 
challenges and serves as a provision in commencing opportunistic risks (i.e. upside risks 
versus downside risks). In contrast, RM paid attention mainly to downside risks, and thus, 
such approach faces challenges (Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018). Accordingly, the 
following table further investigates RM evolution to ERM based on quadrants specifications. 
It follows a similar analysis used previously in RM literature. 

















Miller (1992) E general generic Developed a risk framework to categorise risks and acknowledge the 
further implications of strategic decisions. 
Q1 
Dickinson (2001) T general generic Outline the relevance of planning process in ERM implementation. Q1 
Lienberg and Hoyt 
(2003) 
E USA combined Conducted an analysis to establish if there are any connections between 
the appointment of a CRO and successful implementation of ERM. 
Q1 
Drew and Kendrick 
(2005) 
E general generic Developed a five-pillar framework based on culture, leadership, 
alignment, structure and systems as a baseline for further 
implementation of ERM.  
Q1 
Nocco and Stulz 
(2006) 
E general generic Clarified the purpose and role of ERM and gave options on how 
implementation should be managed. 
Q1 
Beasley, Pagach and 
Warr (2008) 
E USA combined Sought to illustrate the cost and benefits of ERM adoption. Q1 
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Castro et al. (2008) T general generic Recommended the inclusion of a software system (ARMISTICE) to 
increase the capabilities and performance of RM. 
Q1 
Fraser, Schoening-




combined Provided a practical perspective of ERM theory applicability by 
exploring the perspectives of executives in regard to ERM baseline. 
Q1 
Francis and Paladino 
(2008) 
E USA combined The authors proposed to identify support practices for ERM. Q1 
Power (2009) T general generic Reiterated the failures of GFC and recommended a reformation of RM 
in order to avoid repetition of similar events. 
Q1 
Lin, Wen and Yu 
(2012) 





T general financial The main role of this study was to outline the risk and return when 
undertaking decisions and recommended organisation-specific 
optimisation measures. 
Q1 






Analysed the way organisations seek to apply alignment compared with 
the initial COSO model. 
Q1 
Hayne and Free (2014) E USA: 
Canada 
combined Outlined the contribution of COSO framework, how it is perceived, and 
scrutinised the adoption scale. 
Q1 
Gatzer and Martin 
(2015) 
T general generic Evaluated the literature to identify what are the main determinants and 
impact of ERM implementation. 
Q1 
Rubino and Vitolla 
(2014) 
T general generic Reflected on IT and ERM common governance integration by referring 
to COSO, ERM and COBIT framework. 
Q2 
Kleffner, Lee and 
McGannon (2003) 
E Canada insurance Offered a descriptive account of ERM state-of-the-art in a single 
industry. 
Q2 
Ward (2003) T general generic Addressed the issue of integrated risk management through a multi-
dimensional framework by looking at six components: risk, decisions, 
purpose, processes, responsibilities and resources. 
Q2 
Beasley, Clune and 
Hermanson (2005) 
E USA audit Focused its analysis on ERM implementation and the factors associated. Q2 
Burnabi and Hass 
(2009) 
T general generic Reanalysed the COSO model applicability and viability. Q2 
Gordon, Loebs and 
Tseng (2009) 
E USA combined Questioned the relationship between ERM and performance and 
provided confirmatory evidence. 
Q2 
Arena, Arnaboldi and 
Azzone (2010) 
E Italy combined Explored the evolution of RM into ERM and analysed its 
implementation in practice. 
Q2 
Wu and Olson (2010) E USA banking Demonstrated the use of scorecards validity to support organisation. Q2 




combined A European perspective on potential implementation factors. Q2 
Baxter et al. (2013) E USA financial  Paid specific attention to ERM determinants and impediments and tested 
whether implementation leads to organisation’s goals achievement. 
Q2 
Lundquist (2014) E Nordic 
countri
es 
combined Focused on identifying which frameworks are effectively applied and 
implications in deploying an organisation’s internal framework. 
Q2 
Ching and Colombo 
(2014) 
E Brazil combined Based on multiple case studies, with an output of a conceptual 
framework developed to describe the RM cycle. 
Q2 
Grace et al. (2015) E USA insurance Analysed efficiency regarding financial performance post 
implementation. 
Q2 
Lyons (2015) T general generic Maintained the trend within the security research and based on an 
oversight model of three lines of defence recommended a strategy that 
involves a board of directors (executives, internal assurance, tactics 




T general banking Accentuated the integration of risk management approach within the 
banking sector. 
Q2 
Mikes (2009) E USA banking Compared and evaluated the risk-based controls that are considered by 
the banking sector. 
Q3 
Hoyt and Lienberg 
(2011) 
E USA insurance Examined the value and determinants of prosperous ERM through 
economic lenses. 
Q3 
McShane, Nair and 
Rustambekov (2011) 
E USA financial Evaluated whether ERM underpins value. Q3 
Pagach and War 
(2011) 
T USA education It explores prior research to examine if the appointment of a CRO is 
among the determinants of adoption and implementing an ERM. 
Q3 
Eckles, Hoyt and 
Miller (2014) 
E USA insurance Circulated the positive financial aspects of ERM implementation based 
on a quantitative analysis of operating profits. 
 
Farrel and Gallagher 
(2014; 2019) 
E general combined Attempted to offer guidance on how ERM maturity should be assessed, 
analysing the relationship between limitations and challenges between 




Hayne and Free (2014) E USA: 
Canada 
combined Assessed the COSO’s ERM impact on practices across organisations and 
indicated a three-dimensional dimension of the framework: disruptor, 
creator, and maintainer. 
Q3 
Nair et al. (2014) E USA insurance Developed a model of dynamic capabilities that sought to outline the 
capacity and patterns applied in the implementation phase of ERM. 
Q3 
Schiller and Prpich 
(2014) 
T general generic Challenged the maturity of ERM and explored its weaknesses based on 
conceptual and empirical evidence of prior authors. 
Q3 
Aven and Aven (2015) T general generic Suggested that performance and risk balance are interrelated hence the 
return is the organisation’s goal achievement. 
Q3 
Beasley, Branson and 
Pagach (2015) 
E USA combined Provided valuable insight regarding the board of directors and senior 
management internal processes that seem associated with more mature 
ERM programs and the usefulness of ERM as a strategic tool for 
competitive advantage. 
Q3 
Bromiley et al. (2015) T general generic Suggested that more research is needed hence theoretical review 
indicates that advances in this area could enhance proper risk 
governance. 
Q3 
Lalitha and Nandini 
(2015) 
E India IT  Analysed and evaluated the effectiveness of the relationship between 
ERM and businesses; considering aspects such as culture, processes, 
structure, training, risk governance, and performance. 
Q3 
Shad and Woon (2015) T Malays
ia 
generic Formed a conceptual framework for performance measurement by 
considering organisational structure, governance and processes. 
Q3 
Zéghal and El Aoun 
(2016) 
E USA banking  A content analysis study that focused on analysing annual reports to 
assess the effects post GRC and to identify the reactive measures. 
Q3 
Arnold et al. (2011) E general combined Accentuated the purpose of compliance during and after ERM 
implementation. 
Q4 
Lindberg and Seifert 
(2011) 
 general insurance Describes the assisting role of ERM for insurance industry based on 
Dodd-Frank Act and Data Protection Act (DPA) pre-requisites to 
compliance. 
Q4 
Source: The Researcher 
Key for Table 3-3: Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Finland)  
Based on the above-identified key contributing authors in Table 3-3, it can be observed that 
focus goes further, and the quadrant categorisation enhances other aspects. Consequently, 
many authors have undertaken their research by firstly addressing benefits; adaptation, 
effectiveness, and performance being the most significantly considered (Nocco and Stulz, 
2006; Nair et al., 2014; McShane, Nair and Rustambekov, 2011; Gordon, Loeb and Tseng, 
2009; Grace et al., 2015; Zéghal and El Aoun, 2016). Secondly, the determinants of ERM 
implementation (value delivery, culture, appointment of a CRO, organisational strategy) are 
considered by Smith, 1995; Lienberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley, 2008; Yaraghi and Langhe, 
2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Gatzer and Martin, 2015; Lyons, 2015; Farrel and Gallagher, 2014). 
Thirdly, challenges were also considered. Therefore, their analysis may have overcome the 
reproduction of a suboptimal level of leadership, cost, culture, alignment or adequate 
structure (Drew and Kendrick, 2005; Schiller and Prpich, 2014; Eckles, Hoyt and Miller, 
2014). Lastly, other authors have considered exploring the ERM design choices made by 
organisations beyond post-implementation results (Paape and Spekle, 2012; Hayne and Free, 
2014) to extract the value of implementation on long-term. 
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3.3.2 Overview of practitioners’ contribution to ERM 
The results of failures in organisations have determined an increase in interest regarding the 
identification of a general practice that guarantees ‘security’. In turn, the purpose of 
standards is defined as good practice that helps to protect the organisation’s objectives and 
add value (FERMA, 2003). The consensus appears to be that the standards aim to define 
unique terminology, sequences of processes and organisational structure to enhance good 
practices against which an organisation can guide itself. 

























2003  Federation of European Risk 
Management Association 
(FERMA) 
UK Incorporated a sequence of recommended processes 
and structure to implement and maintain RM with the 





British Standard ISO 
31000:2009     
UK: widely 
applied 
Provides foundation guidance on how to develop, 


















Created and defined a conceptual framework that 
considers four types of risks: hazards, financial, 
operational and strategic risks. The value of the 
framework resides in the fact that it prescribes an 













An internal strategic framework that developed a 
systematic approach to risk control to assure the 









A standard that includes methods, processes and 
practices to evaluate the ERM maturity. The purpose 
of this framework was to support organisations to 
identify their maturity level and to upgrade to a future 
state of business resilience. 
Q3 
Source: The Researcher 
As can be seen from the above Table 3-4, the main standards differentiate themselves into 
two categories: RM and ERM. In the RM category, the standards/frameworks place 
themselves in the same quadrant (Q2) hence the fact they offer support for the steps required 
for an implementation process, which considers the initial analysis, identification, analysis, 
evaluation, and treatment of challenging and demanding risk. FERMA RM framework 
follows a similar structure of AS/NZS 4360:2004 (AS/NZS, 2004) and therefore reflects on 
risk through the classification perspective. Moreover, both of them have a similar structure 
to Casualty Actuarial Framework, which considers ERM. 
To limit the analysis and avoid redundant results, similar standards to ISO 31000 as AS/NZS 
ISO 31000: 2009 and 2018 and its initial form AS/NZS 4360: 2004 are excluded, and thus 
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their main content is similar. In the case of AS/NZS 4360:2004, the standard was replaced 
in 2009 with AS/NZS ISO 31000, which in turn was based on ISO 31000 (British Standard 
Institution (BSI), 2009). 
The ERM category incorporates the Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) conceptual 
framework that designs processes, tools, and procedures required to undertake an ERM 
implementation and maintenance. The framework provided a basic structure and as 
previously mentioned, shows similarities to AS /NZS 4360:2004 structure. Accordingly, the 
first three steps of the framework are identical: establish the context, identify risks and 
analyse risk. The AS/NZS 4360:2004 used for the fourth, fifth and sixth steps employs a 
different terminology but with similar responsibilities. The framework differentiates from 
Casualty Actuarial Framework because it considers communication and consultation as an 
additional yet essential approach. Nonetheless, these similarities suggest that RM and ERM 
standards use similar principles. 
Forming part of the same category (ERM) is the Risk Management Society (RIMS) Risk 
Maturity Model, which is an additional tool for measuring the organisational maturity of 
ERM by looking at its effectiveness and efficiency (RIMS, 2015). The view that ERM 
maturity needs assessment it is in line with the initial conceptual framework of Luftman 
(2000), who offers insights into ERM maturity processes. Similarly, it is also based on five 
steps. Apart from creating value, the RIMS model intends to yield an understanding of 
organisational development against a spectrum of criteria. 
Additionally, the Open Compliance and Ethics Group (OCEG, 2015) developed a GRC 
(Governance, RM and Compliance) Capability Model known as the “Red Book to Guide 
Organisations”. This model outlines basic principles concerning effective risk governance. 
As it strives to increase the performance and transparency based on best practices, it 
recommends the use of a unified vocabulary, standardised procedures, and ongoing 
communication. 
3.3.3 Overview of regulators’ contribution to ERM 
The regulatory contribution is essential for understanding the origins of the discipline and 
its advancement in relation to regulatory assistance. For example, Turnbull Guidance 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2005) stipulates internal control basis and assists in 
facilitating guidance to monitor and maintain organisational effectiveness. Likewise, the 
Orange Book (HM Treasury, 2004) represents one of many examples of RM regulatory 
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guidelines (for the public sector) with the purpose of being supportive in improving the 
organisation’s resilient capacity. Moreover, the emphasis of management responsibility 
fostered by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 clarifies that decision-making executives must 
directly involve assuring protection of investors possessions. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
reassures deployment of calculated decisions with regard to internal controls and encourages 
accountability for decision-making that preserves financial investments of shareholders by 
its continual emphasis on performance (Bloem, van Doorn and Mittal, 2005). 
More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
mandate prudential practices driven by past incidents failing to sustain economic stability 
and as such it requires mandatory disclosure of practices. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act 
(2010) represents an acknowledgement of scarce prudential practices, and it, therefore, 
requires increased measures to supervise organisations’ resiliency risk practices in order to 
assure the financial stability of the economic system. 
While most countries have industry-specific regulation, usually the Acts mentioned above 
influence and foster ethical behaviour, ethical organisational practices, and appropriate 
internal controls (processes) to safeguard loss limitations. 
3.4 Cybersecurity Management  
3.4.1 Overview of academics’ literature contribution to CsM 
The concept of cybersecurity fails to be clearly defined, and for this reason, its meanings 
fluctuate from covering the control of unauthorised access (Bayuk et al., 2012) to 
management function designed to protect an organisation (Kaplan, Bailey, and Rezek, 2015). 
Failure to identify a common definition leads to a discussion regarding the real role of 
cybersecurity: strategic function, operational function or technological function. 
Accordingly, some authors consider cybersecurity a continuing prevention, detection, and 
recovery (Humphreys, 2008). Although others (Gerber and Von Solms, 2001; Posthumus 
and Von Solms, 2004) define cybersecurity through the perspective of confidentiality, 
integrity and/or availability of information assets. The researcher of this paper believes the 
latter definition incomplete and only partially true (foundation). Even though the previous 
description refers to information, Bayuk et al. (2012) and Von Solms and Niekerk (2013) 
are among few authors who have identified and outlined that CsM is more than information 
and data security. The information represents an asset, and correspondingly cybersecurity is 
more than the protection of information, as it involves other assets, technology, processes 
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and people (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; Von Solms and Niekerk, 2013). On account of these 
three determinants (assets such as information, processes, and people), cybersecurity 
prompts one to re-think the traditional view of IT and incorporate tools, policies, procedures, 
safeguards, guidelines, certifications or technology software (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; 
Solm and Niekerk, 2013), and many other safeguards designed to mitigate risks in an 
integrative manner.  
As a consequence, a variety of terminology and definitions in literature continue to generate 
confusion. The most significant confusion lies between CsM and information security (IS). 
Although appearing similar, they are distinct and IS refers to protection in a silo of 
information. This confusion leads to fragmented literature, with common definitions 
including confidentiality, integrity, and availability (e.g. Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011). 
Frequently, the terms are employed interchangeably, with identical meanings, a 
phenomenon described by Thompson et al. (2018) as being ‘conflating’. As a result, 
clarification on what IS represents are scarce, and among the little clarification there is, the 
BS ISO/IEC 27000: 2016 states that IS embodies “preservation of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information” (BSI, 2016, p. 6).  There may be a continuous sustenance 
of the traditional approach which believes that “Information Security encompasses 
technology, processes, and people” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 361). However, this 
approach is misguided, subjective and uninformative (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, and Purse, 
2014), with a fluctuation in its focus (e.g. information, IT or systems). Likewise, Von Solms’ 
and Von Niekerk’s (2013) study explains that literature often misguidingly uses the 
meanings of CsM. IS is based on data-driven security strategy while CsM incorporates IS, 
thereby presenting the compelling argument is that it is distinctive because it considers the 
management security of assets, processes and people (Von Solms and Von Niekerk, 2013). 
Therefore, the cybersecurity subdivisions were initially well-known due to their technical 
focus (IT-centric) as frontline solutions for security. As nowadays cybersecurity has become 
more complex, for the purpose of this study, IT security, information security, and 
cybersecurity literature are reviewed based on academic resources and adopt the following 
definition of cybersecurity:  
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security 
safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, 
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and 
organisation and users’ assets” (Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 2013, p. 97). 
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The Researcher concludes that cybersecurity management (CsM) is a multi-faceted strategic 
mechanism that proactively makes use of risk controls and risk oversight functions 
(technical, cultural, and operational components) ingrained at all levels in order to ensure 
both value protection and value enhancement across an organisation; it is driven by 
organisational strategy and is dependent on variables such as cyberspace, people, practices, 
processes, assets, technology, and information. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Contrast of IS Principles with Cybersecurity Principles and its Components 
Adapted from Althonayan and Andronache (2018) 
Overall, Figure 3-1 highlights the contrast between IS and CsM, emphasising the 
commonality of the CIA triad and differences amongst each other’s components. Despite 
debates regarding information security being the same as cybersecurity, there has been little 
agreement on what constitutes cybersecurity. Perhaps of more concern is that many 
organisations use a variety of terminologies, each directly effecting cybersecurity scope, 
derivations, meanings, and implementation. As can be seen in Figure 3-1, cybersecurity 
incorporates many more components for protecting an organisation. In contrast to the 
information security perspective, cybersecurity moves beyond internal control to incorporate 
the protection of IS components plus additional components such as cyberspace, people, 
practices, processes, and assets. Nonetheless, CsM and IS are different in scope despite being 
complementary and equally important. 
Accordingly, the following phases have been identified as main categories based on the 
direction taken by literature: type 1: neutral, type 2: information security and type 3: 
cybersecurity inclusive. A synthesis of the cybersecurity fluctuation is highlighted below in 
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Deibert and Rohozinski 
(2010) 
T general generic Reiterated the need for security in the realm of 
cyberspace along with risk dimension perception. 
Q1 
Craigen, Diakun-Thibault 
and Purse (2014) 
T general generic Attempted to provide a new definition of cybersecurity 











Hong et al. (2003) T general generic The study advocated the unified theory of ISM with 
extended focus on several theories such as security 
theory, RM theory, control and auditing theory and 
contingency theory. 
Q1 
Kotulic and Clark (2004) T USA generic Outlined the Information Security Management (ISM) 
effectiveness and drew attention to aspects of 
undertaking an empirical investigation that attempted to 
tackle sensitive aspects of organisation governance. 
Q3 
Peppard and Ward (2004) T general generic It restates the role of IS within the business sector and 
discusses its main drivers. 
Q1 
Posthumus and Von Solms 
(2004) 
T general generic The authors suggested the need for a model that 
integrates IS with organisational governance. 
Q2 
Von Solms and Von 
Solms (2004) 
T general generic The authors identified ten main rules regarding IS 
governance plan, ideal for a successful implementation. 
Q2 
Gerber and Von Solms 
(2005) 
T general generic Studied the spectrum risk evolution from RM 
perspectives. 
Q1 
Chang and Ho (2006) E Taiwan generic Proposed to examine BS7799 (UK standard) 
effectiveness and determining factors that influence the 
completeness of implementation. 
Q3 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) T general generic An updated ISM framework based on the analysis of 
previous frameworks that focus on IS culture. 
Q1 
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič 
(2008) 
E general generic Exemplified a practical and quantitative analysis to 
justify further investments to incorporate RM and IS. 
Q3 
Humphreys (2008) T general generic Presents arguments for IS standards contribution in 
maintaining organisational security. 
Q3 
Ma et al. (2009) T general generic Justifies the value of internal and external 
acknowledgement in control development. 
Q1,2 
Siponen and Willison 
(2009) 
T general generic Highlighted that most guidelines and standards are 
generic and universal and in turn do not address specific 
organisational and security requirements. 
Q1 
Tashi and Ghernouti-Hélie 
(2009) 
T general generic An overview of ISM theory that considered RM and 
security management as components. 
Q1 
Fenz et al. (2013) E general generic Summarised challenges with the field of ISM. Q1 
Singh, Gupta and Oija 
(2013) 
E general combined An exploratory study that proposed to identify the main 
internal factors that may impede the ISM. 
Q1 
Schiavone, Garg and 
Summers (2014) 
T general generic Highlighted the adoption of organisational security based 
on an ontology that pertains prevention as a predictive 
tool. 
Q1 
Web et al.(2014a) T USA generic Assessed the deficiencies and practice of IS using a 
model based on situation awareness. 
Q3 
Web et al.(2014b) T USA generic Re-analysed the deficiencies and practices of IS based on 
the previous models and identifies inappropriate 
assessment, overestimation, and routine practices. 
Q3 
Nazareth and Choi (2015) T general combined Analysed the potential of using detection tools to aid 
managers in undertaking security decisions. 
Q1 
Soomro, Shah and Ahmed 
(2016) 
T general generic The authors believe that ISM should embed the holistic 
approach. The study, therefore, analysed possible factors 
(management participation, awareness, training, policy 
development) that can determine realisation. 
Q1 
Julich (2012) T general generic Focused on four anti-patterns (intuition, lack of 
foundational security, knowledge and weak security 
governance) that the author claims to be the impediments 
of an effective CsM. 
Q3 
T y p e
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: C y b er se c u
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 Von Solms and Van 
Niekerk (2013) 
T general generic A comparison study between IS and cybersecurity 




demonstrate that the interchangeable use of terminology 
is incorrectly used. 
Atoum, Otoom and Abu 
Ali (2014) 
T general generic Proposed a conceptual framework that recommends a 
cybersecurity implementation based on a holistic cyber 
security implementation framework (HCS-IF). 
Q2 
Mohamed (2015) T USA financial  Tackled the regulatory aspects of CsM and analysed 
repercussions on the financial industry. 
Q3 
Min, Chai and Han (2015) T USA, EU 
and Japan 
generic Covered comparative aspects of public-private 
collaboration regarding CsM strategies. 
Q1 
Source: The Researcher 
Apart from focusing on a specific domain (silo) or aligning with another domain, some 
authors have considered an analysis of internal and external factors (Ma et al., 2009; Singh, 
Gupta and Oija, 2013; Chang and Ho, 2006; Fenz et al., 2013). They have addressed the 
importance of internal factors (e.g. training, awareness, culture, audit, use of best practices, 
knowledge sharing or value assignment) and external factors (e.g. regulations, competitors, 
customers’ expectations, suppliers’ requirements) as necessities for developing risk control 
function (Ma et al., 2009). 
Based on the literature evaluation, trends are as follows:  
• phase one – neutral - refers to papers with a generic content;  
• phase two – refers to an IS based perspective (an elementary view based on a silo 
approach to secure information); 
• phase three – refers to papers that considered cybersecurity as an inclusive domain 
In phase two, Gerber and Von Solms (2005) are among the first academics to analyse the 
shifting complexity of the risk realm. The authors suggest that risk exposure achieves 
another level of development, and thus consider risk exposure of intangible assets 
(information). As a result, the section incorporates studies that have explored the impact of 
cyber risks by analysing information, information systems and safeguards with strict 
reference. However, it must be noted that this viewpoint fails to define cybersecurity on its 
own since the study mainly makes direct references to information and information systems. 
While their research attempts to address the issue of cyber-attacks, the definition provided 
by the authors misleads the reader as it refers to a silo approach. The content directly refers 
to cybersecurity, yet it is indirectly related because it discusses a subdivision of cybersecurity 
(IS) and omits certain aspects such as people, assets, and processes security. 
The related literature shows a variety of approaches and Da Vega’s and Eloff’s (2007) 
research is an example of a different approach (showing the value of culture) through the 
interaction of information, technology, processes and people. 
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Finally, the third phase virtually represents the complete picture of what cybersecurity 
underpins and indicates a pronounced significance and holistic applicability. Taking into 
account Julisch’s (2012) research, which recognises the critical role played by cybersecurity 
failures, this section echoes the protection of organisations based on holistic strategy, not 
intuition. Overall, foundational security controls are considered and perceived as integrated. 
3.4.2 Overview of practitioners’ contribution to CsM 
The practitioners’ viewpoint is open to debate and controversial but represents the true 
applicability of cybersecurity, paying attention to guidelines, policies and standards yielded 
from past lessons. It also portrays the state of cybersecurity based on a general practitioner’s 
perspective (Ponemon Institute, 2013). 
Standards are present predominantly in order to provide assurance and protection, as well as 
an organisational structure, resilience, and a continuity and recovery plan in case of an 
incident (BS ISO 27003:2010). Guidance is not mandatory but usually represents the 
expected practices in regard to risk oversight. 
Cybersecurity’s insecurity for organisations is challenging, and a report from the Ponemon 
Institute (2013) confirms that cybersecurity needs serious consideration as its occurrence 
and sophistication have increased. Another contribution of this report is that it cites a low 
adoption of cybersecurity management (31%) in 2013. This suggests that the remaining 
percentage can be divided into two possible categories: 1) some of the organisations created 
in-house capabilities (perhaps due to premium fees if such service was contracted) and 2) 
some organisations denied the cybersecurity threats. 
Likewise, Ernst and Young’s (2014a) report recognised the critical role of cybersecurity and 
updated the initial hypothesis that some organisations deny its challenges. By adding up-to-
date information that showed an increased level of awareness (79%) of respondents 
acknowledged an increased level of threats), the survey confirmed a general knowledge of 
the threat. However, clear rates of adopted preventative measures were not addressed. 
Recognising that a cybersecurity incident has an unforeseen aspect because it is based on an 
opportunistic criminal mindset, the Ernst and Young survey’s contribution lies in the fact 
that it emphasises aspects as the importance of executive awareness in dealing with 
cybersecurity attacks, organisational preparation as well as adequate investments to sustain 
achievement of cybersecurity maturity. 
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Furthermore, the data generated by literature evaluation regarding industry practice is 
reported in Table 3-6. 






















































IT 2012 COBIT 5 for IS 
 
Widely used Emphasised a strategic integration of IT and 
organisation security by focusing on the 
governance and management of risks. 
Q2 
IS 2004 ISSA Generally Accepted Information 
Security Principles and (GAISP) and IT 
Security RM Framework 
USA This initiative had the purpose of developing 
a common practice for IS and ingrain 






1999 Octave USA Facilitated a continuous measurement, 





Q3 2003 Octave -S USA Developed a methodology addressed to small 
organisations to help them to address risks. 
2007 Octave Allegro USA It focused mainly of information assets and 
developed a method to assess operational 
risks. 
2013 IASME UK The standard is in line with ISO 27001 and 
aims to support certification for information 















ISO/IEC 27000 Widely used Informative guidance in regard to vocabulary 






ISO 27001 Widely used It illustrates the requirement for a security 




ISO 27002 Widely used An operational standard that refers to the 




ISO 27003 Widely used It sustains the initial actions of the previous 
series (27000, 27001 and 27002) and 
provides guidance on establishing the 




ISO 27004 Widely used It introduces the concept of measuring the 





ISO/IEC 27005 (BSI, 2011a) Widely used It concentrates on the control by using IS 
management techniques and introduce the 
RM techniques. 
Q2 
2012 ISO/IEC 27015 Widely used A supplement that is meant to guide financial 
services and insurance organisation to 
implement and adapt to ISO/IEC 27001 and 
27002. 
Q2 
2012 ISO/IEC 27032 Widely used The standard represents a technical guidance 
for information sharing, coordination and 
incident handling. 
Q2 
2011 ISF Standard of Good Practice Widely used A security model that recommends good 
practice in IS to enhance alignment between 









2011 SP800-39 (manage)  USA based: 
widely use 
It ensures integration of IS in RM practices to 
manage organisational risks. 
Q2 
2013 SP800-53 (select) USA based: 
widely use 
Assisted IS to support selection and 
implementation of security controls to protect 
operations. 
Q2 
2010 SP 800-53a (assess) USA based: 
widely use 
It verifies the implementation of RMF and is 
a guide to identify if the organisation 




2011 ICAS Information Security Framework UK Assessment of security controls for data 
protection. It also ensures organisation 




KPMG’s Global Cyber Maturity 
framework 
Widely used Promotes a proactive approach of executives’ 
involvement. Mainly focused on maturity 
assessment in the context of information 
security and RM. 
Q3 
2014 EY’ Cyber program management (CPM) 
framework 




2016 Grant Thornton’s Cyber Risk Management 
Program 
Widely used It proposes a cyber risk strategy alignment 




2013 PAS 555 UK It incorporates governance, and management 
principles to recommend baseline security by 
using the strategic and operational approach. 
Q2 






Proposed to guide organisations in related 
cyberspace activities, emphasising 
cybersecurity governance. Its objective is to 
align CsM with RM (operational and 
strategic). 
Q2 
Source: The Researcher 
Based on the above structure, the following section outlines and formulates an overview of 
the standards. However, benefits of applicability are discussed further in Subsection 4.3.3, 
Chapter Four. 
3.4.2.1 Stage trends in the practice of CsM 
• Phase 1: Information security and business focus 
The structure of Operationally Critical Threat, Assets, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
Framework (OCTAVE) is based on technical aspects of IS risks and was released by the 
Software Engineering Institute (Caralli et al., 2007). The framework was initially published 
in 1999, but it has subsequently undergone five more updates. The basics of the framework 
are structured in three steps: profile assessment, measurement, and mitigation. It 
encompasses asset identification (their critical value) and vulnerabilities measurement to 
determine potential losses. 
The downside of the framework is that it addressed and underpinned operational and 
technical control perspectives to generate resilience and assess information security risk 
through a silo perspective (information) even though it considered the security implication 
of people, facilities, and technology. The approach of this framework predominantly 
depends on the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) principles. 
Standard of Good Practices for Information Security (ISF, 2011) is another security model 
that considers the alignment of security with organisational strategy. It accentuates an 
enhancement of controls and a means of developing alignment to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the process. Moreover, it focuses on coordinating activities, supporting their achievement 
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and finally measuring output. Drafted in 2011 by Information Security Forum, the content 
of the framework defines good practices and foundation of information security. This 
international standard is aligned with many practitioners and regulatory practices as ISO 
series, Cobit, Basel and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002, USA), among many others. 
Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) represents an initiative of 
Information Systems Security Association (2004) that proposed to compile a unifying 
principle to motivate an increased control of risk. In addition to its initial recommendation, 
the GAISP gave rise to an IT Security RM Framework that highlights basic practices as asset 
identification, threat identification, vulnerability identification, impact assessment, and 
safeguarding and risk mitigation principles. Accordingly, the guideline disseminates these 
processes as a means of defining boundaries of analysis and the rationale for transparency 
of processes. 
• Phase 2: Information Security and RM focus  
A key limitation of this approach is that it considers the security of information assets and 
omits to consider all parts involved holistically. It also discusses the alignment from the 
perspective of RM and does not address the problem of the silo approach to risk oversight. 
One of the main standards that are part of this category is Cobit 5, which was released by 
ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control Association). It was initially developed as 
an IT and business-centric framework and saw updates in 2003 regarding cybersecurity and 
RM uniform governance. Besides being viewed as a strategy that enhances the movement 
from micro governance to the macro governance of risks, the merit of the framework lies in 
the fact that it supports compliance and facilitates a holistic management. 
However, it must be argued that a downside of this framework is the IT-centric approach 
under RM. In particular, an enterprise-wide strategic approach is not forthcoming since its 
focus is technical, operational, and managerial control instead of strategic. 
Given these points, another component is the ISO series, which was initially published as 
BS7799 in 1999, subsequently transformed into ISO series in 2002, and incorporates many 
other versions. ISO/IEC 27000:2016, 2017 (BSI, 2016a; BSI, 2017b) defines its strategy as 
an information security management system (ISMS) and assesses risk, applies risk treatment, 




ISO/IEC 27000 standard contains an approach for risk treatment. The recommended action 
to risk exposure is its identification and treatment through modification, retention, avoidance 
and/or sharing techniques (BSI, 2016a; BSI, 2017b). 
BS ISO/IEC 27001 define the requirement for establishment and maintenance being a 
starting action point. As such, further steps are addressed by BS ISO/IEC 27002, providing 
details on how security control tools as policies (management directions), processes, 
procedures, organisational structure, and software and hardware functions can all contribute 
to successful implementation. 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011, 2018 (BSI, 2011a; BSI, 2018c) is another framework with a strategic 
approach under the RM umbrella, and its main function is to identify, analyse and evaluate 
risk. Likewise, ISO/IEC27032:2012 (BSI, 2012) is a technical guidance on how to react to 
cyber risks and considers other standards. Although this standard has a low rate of 
implementation in comparison to ISO/IEC 27000, its merit is that it guides the organisation 
on how to technically prepare itself (BSI, 2012). 
ISO framework series is complex and in general starts by defining terminologies in order to 
avoid misinterpretations. Although its series has registered fluctuation from technical to 
strategic approaches, it is one of the most recognised standards in the UK. In contrast, its 
disadvantage is that its main function is to secure information and systems, but it fails to 
address other aspects of cybersecurity such as protection of cyberspace, people, practices, 
processes, assets, technology and information. It can, therefore, be considered a traditional 
approach to information security. 
Further research on CsM and RM is continued by the ICAS Information Security framework 
published by The International Association of Accountants and Technology Consultants 
(IAAITC) and encompasses the recommendations of Data Protection Act, UK (DPA). 
Generally, this risk framework appears to be voluntary. However, in reality, it represents a 
legal responsibility addressed to all businesses and such omissions constitute a lack of due 
care (IAAITC, 2012). The framework ICAS Information Security provides a useful approach 
for small organisations (less than 500 employees) to assess IS risks. It covers just one of 
DPA’s requirements, respectively the assessment. Hence, the framework is specific, and its 
purpose is to verify and ensure that organisations comply with DPA requirements. The 
framework represents an initial step to deploy a risk control mechanism. Thus, one of the 
most significant contributions of this framework is that it emphasises risk profiling and asset 
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identification before moving on to security controls and policies. The downturn is that it has 
a silo perspective and despite acknowledging the security implication of assets, it only 
considers information security risks. The framework claims to be compatible with other 
industry frameworks, and its theory is based on OCTAVE2 principles. Although essential, 
the assessment step is insufficient and incomplete as a comprehensive strategy hence it only 
addresses the assessment. Therefore, many other aspects need to be considered in order to 
deploy better security. As a result, the framework omits the adoption of a holistic approach 
to risk, and this method requires additional framework mixture. 
Additionally, IASME Standard for Information Assurance intends to provide support for 
organisations, which due to their size and financial constraints are unable to implement 
standards that are more appropriate for large organisations (e.g. ISO, NIST, Cobit). Apart 
from focusing on ensuring the confidentiality, availability and authenticity of information, a 
differentiated point of this framework is that it considers physical security. Apart from 
supporting an organisation in becoming compliant, it also suggests methods that can be used 
to measure the security maturity of an organisation. 
• Phase 3: CsM and RM 
The previous sections have shown that some standards addressability is incomplete. 
Although this section adopts a similar approach, its merits lie in the fact that it addresses a 
partial solution (CsM). Even if it refers to RM domain, it omits to discuss alignment and thus 
responds only partially to the aims of this research.  
Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2014) has been developed based on an official stance 
to cyber risk (USA Government) and incorporates industry and governmental collaboration. 
Therefore, it has been constructed on the premises of global research, standards, guidelines 
and practices (NIST, 2014). Its main purpose is to offer guidance for the protection of critical 
infrastructures. The solution proposed by this standard is based on documented terminology 
and on five functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The advantage of this 
framework is that even though it appears to be voluntary, it sets the tone for organisations 
and prevails as the basic principle of cyber hygiene in the USA (maintain a safe environment) 
also continued in other NIST 800 series. The negative feature of this framework is firstly, 
the omission to evaluate the current state of an organisation as it moves straight to risk, 
threats, and vulnerabilities identification. Secondly, it focuses on predictable risks and fails 
to consider hazards or ‘black swans’ (unpredictable events). Lastly, despite underpinning the 
RM perspective, it appears to be more concerned with operational aspects. Formulating the 
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benefits of CsM and RM applicability provides the overview of security governance and 
management specifications and thus PAS 555: 2013 (BIS, 2013); it proposes to provide a 
framework with these considerations. Although the initiative was sponsored by industry 
organisations, the standard is under the license of the British Standard Institution (BSI). The 
holistic approach takes into consideration internal and external factors (i.e. third-party 
strategy regarding security). Moreover, it incorporates the strategic, operational and 
technical approach. The drawback, however, is that although it should clearly define the 
implementation of the standards, the structure of the standard leaves decisions up to 
organisations, hence offering a multitude of options to respond to risks might mislead 
organisations. 
• Phase 4: CsM and ERM (scarce evidence) 
The analysis of documents regarding CsM and ERM indicates a scarcity of documents that 
consider both domains in an in-depth way. Consequently, similar approaches are considered 
(phase 1, 2 and 3) in order to address this issue and to identify insights and recommendations 
for completing the objectives of this research. Further research is desirable to develop 
existing knowledge and as thus Grant Thornton’s (2016) Cyber Risk Management 
Framework is designated to organising the various factors and considers business enabler as 
strategy, leadership, regulations, resources, and ERM as a whole. Nonetheless, it fails to 
grasp separation on internal and external variables. It also offers a descriptive account of 
elements involved in governance (assets, processes and technology). Despite the fact that it 
claims to refer to cybersecurity, it promotes good practices for alignment in IT security. 
Another gap identified is that while it proposes to be a strategic framework with some 
technical reference (IT-centric), it omits stipulating how it should be leveraged. In bridging 
the framework’s gap, this particular framework is used to outline that the industry partially 
understands the research problem. It proposes a better preparation and alignment of IT (even 
if it claims to be cybersecurity) and ERM practices. This framework prompts a re-think about 
alignment and suggests effects of a holistic approach yet does not provide ample support for 
the assertion of cybersecurity alignment to ERM. The researcher argues that it represents a 
good starting point to address the benefits and value creation while value protection requests 
additional research.  
3.4.3 Overview of regulators’ contribution to CsM 
Legal and regulatory requirements require diligent compliance with legislation. As 
mentioned previously, the financial industry has additional requirements with regards risk 
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oversight. Although fulfilling legal requirements is sometimes less supervised in other 
industries (often supervised on a voluntary basis), in the case of financial industry 
compliance it is double-sighted, and consequently, both ERM and CsM are mandatory even 
though they often overlap (i.e. mandatory ERM requirements, Whitman, 2015). In the case 
of CsM, the recent new regulation of New York State Department of Financial Services 
(2017) demands financial organisations implement a cybersecurity program and to report 
findings annually. This reporting is thought to contribute towards an understanding of 
organisation risk oversight maturity within the financial industry. 
Given the fact that the cornerstone of risk oversight is based on the CIA triad (FISMA, 2002) 
and shaped by expected characteristics (ISSA, 2004), it is generally accepted that regulatory 
constraints are based on the accountability of compliance and litigations. Accountability is 
based upon an accepted responsibility among all parties and in turn an actively preventative 
action regarding insecurity (e.g. responsibility for access and usage of organisational 
premises and systems), as opposed to a reactive action that takes place after an event has 
happened (ISSA, 2004). This is a basic ethical principle that, along with the duty of care, 
should form part of an organisation’s strategy. Organisations tend to exploit the potential of 
technological opportunities thus a more pragmatic approach to effectively mitigating risks 
has become more necessary. To reach their goal, regulators are empowered with increased 
capabilities and intend to equip organisations with minimum preparation, although 
accountable in actions (voluntary or imposed). 
Awareness principle (standards, conventions, mechanisms) - assists achievement and 
education. It is the expected acknowledgement of baselines, procedures, guidelines, policies 
and responsibilities among all relevant parties. Awareness might include, for instance, the 
skills for understanding the techniques, tactics and tools necessary to comprehend threats; 
for example, employees qualification might include mandatory competencies and 
recommended training to enhance better preparation (ISSA, 2004). 
Improved security strategies such as ‘10 Steps to Cyber Security’ from CESG, Cabinet 
Office, CPNI and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (UK 2012) are required to 
provide basic support to organisations so they can protect themselves in cyberspace 
interaction. Since its publication, the guidance has reinforced the effects of cybersecurity 
accountability (organisation duty of care). Hence, it encourages vigilance and awareness. 
To emphasise CsM accountability and compliance requirements, it should be noted that the 
safeguard measures and awareness (due diligence) of an organisation are a legal 
90 
 
responsibility and any misalignment could result in liability disputes (fines, penalties, cyber 
costs) should negligence be proven. Most experts believe that the problem of cybersecurity 
has not been addressed appropriately due to the velocity of technology development whereas 
others believe that before analysing the options available, serious consideration should 
evaluate regulators’ recommendations and duty of care assessment results. Accordingly, 
innovation in security practices in collaboration with the industry is encouraged (e.g. UK 
cybersecurity strategy). 
A lack of common regulation for the financial industry underpins multiple challenges such 
as USA regulation tends to transform from voluntary self-regulation to enforced self-
regulation (Min, Chai, and Han, 2015), a fact that contradicts an organisation’s policies; for 
instance, a financial institution from the USA that follows a policy under the strict 
perspective recommended by the government (i.e. NIST recommended by the USA 
Government). Whereas, a financial institution from the EU uses regulatory guidance more 
as a consultative paper. The trend in cybersecurity regulation from different countries 
requires an additional effort for organisations. Thus, liability and responsibility may have 
various levels if dispersed geographically in jurisdictions (Mohammed, 2015); a fact that 
leads to poor enforcement, confusion, and overlaps in the efforts made by organisations with 
global operations. As a result, risk-taking deficiencies have different layers according to each 
country, and this affects residual risk (the risk that remains after implementing safeguards); 
while inherent risk, it mainly refers to a situation where organisations take no action towards 
risk (Antonucci, 2017). Cybercrime does not recognise countries’ borders and frontiers, and 
accordingly Acts, guidance and any preventative measure should not. Denoting such 
perspective, an initiative such as those provided by Table 3-7 synthesis, brings insights of 
mandatory and voluntary aspects. 



























































2015 CESG Cyber Security Model UK It provides a common framework to enable and assess 
Information Assurance (IA) maturity. 
Q4 IA 
2014 HMG Security Policy Framework UK Represents an official statement of general security 
policies and procedures undertaken by HM Government 
that can be used as a point of reference for organisations 
to develop their policies. 
Q2 IS 
Source: The Researcher 
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Table 3-7 illustrates the scarcity of regulatory frameworks. HMG Security Policy 
Framework represents an example of security policies related to IS and its implementation. 
A more satisfying approach seems to be in CESG Cyber Security Model that incorporates 
Information Assurance Maturity Model (IAMM) and Information Assurance Framework 
(IAAF) and addresses the expected measures required to assure the security of information 
and assess the level of measures undertaken. The CESG Cyber Security Model has almost 
identical criteria for measuring the organisational maturity to that provided in the initial 
model developed by Luftman (2000). To ensure its validity, the model is aligned with RM 
practices of BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005. Additionally, CESG makes an indirect recognition by 
aligning to BS ISO/IEC 27001, which in turn refers to IS and respectively information 
assurance. Firstly, it employs two models, which each focus on information assurance. 
Secondly, it uses cybersecurity terminology for its frameworks. Both these features 
demonstrate that the industry is using terminology without clear correlation and in an 
inappropriate way, and thus confusing IS/IA (data assurance/security) with cybersecurity 
(security of people, processes, and assets). Overall, the findings suggest that these two 
frameworks demonstrate that the regulatory literature of CsM is dominated by informative 
(rather than practical) guidance. 
3.5 Strategic alignment 
Studies focusing on alignment are prominent in literature and have been researched from 
many different perspectives (IT, RM, CsM), focusing on a variety of dimensions (e.g. social, 
strategic, structural or cultural dimension). For the purpose of this research, the main 
dimension considered is strategic. However, some aspects of the remaining dimensions are 
discussed because they represent a contribution to the alignment theory and in turn interrelate 
with strategic alignment dimension. 
Alignment concerns the establishment of a common structure for processes that involves all 
resources for the common objective of achieving the organisation’s mission, strategy, 
objectives, and plans. In short, Pitt and Koufopoulos describe alignment as a “…pattern or 
plan that integrates an organisation’s major goals, policies and actions sequences into a 
cohesive whole” (Pitt and Koufopoulos, 2012, pp. 6). Nonetheless, alignment literature 
abounds with examples that significantly focus on IT and Information Security (IS). This 
suggests that cybersecurity (for example, IS) is still seen as a part of IT. For example, Saleh 
and Alfantookh (2011) are among some authors that demonstrate the benefits of IT/IS 
alignment with RM but fail to acknowledge that is alignment.  
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Regarding the focus of prior research, it can be observed that abundant studies were 
investigating how to achieve alignment in general terms, by looking at advantages and 
unique factors regarding specific cases (e.g. communication, competence, governance, 
partnership, capabilities, planning, industry, size, culture, skills) (Huang and Hu, 2007; 
Avison et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006; Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Wu et al., 2015). While 
the advantages and factors represent the theoretical argument (descriptive) for achieving the 
alignment, other authors undertook a deep analysis and scrutinised the cost-benefit (Womer 
et al., 2006), consequence of performance of alignment, its impact on organisational 
governance, and possible means to maintain and develop alignment maturity (practical). 
The next section comprises of a synthesis of alignment literature separated in four domains: 
neutral, IT and business, IS and RM, and IS and ERM, and the categorisation have the 
purpose of exemplifying the domains consideration of academics along the years. 










































   
Powell (1992) T USA generic Outlined that alignment is enhanced by the 
organisational factors that lead to competitive 
advantages. 
Q1 
Walter et al. (2013) E USA education Examined and validated the performance 










Baets (1992) E Europe banking Analysed the practical perspective of 
successful alignment and developed a 
Strategic Alignment Process Model. 
Q1 
Broadbent and Weill (1993) E Australia generic Explored practices regarding alignment. Q1 
Henderson and Venkatraman 
(1993) 
T USA generic Delimited the benefits of alignment through 
the SAM model. 
Q1 
Venkatraman, Henderson and 
Oldach (1993) 
T USA Insurance and 
manufacturing 
Evaluated the management implications of 
alignment and developed the Continuous 
Strategic Model. 
Q2 
Baets (1996) E USA: 
Europe 
banking Identified a discrepancy between theory and 
practice and developed a Strategic Alignment 
Model. 
Q1 
Ciborra (1997) E USA manufacturing It investigates the alignment evolution. Q1 
Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999) E USA combined Examined the enablers and inhibitors in 
aligning the IT plans and business plans. 
Q2 
Papp (1999) E USA combined Analysed whether alignment could improve 
productivity. 
Q4 




Quantitatively analyse on IT and business 
alignment perspective. 
Q3 
Kearns and Lederer (2000) E USA combined Addressed the issue of reciprocal plan 
alignment. 
Q2 
Reich and Benbasat (2000) E Canada insurance Examined the social dimension of alignment 
and developed: Social Dimension Model. 
Q2 
Luftman (2000) E USA combined Discussed how alignment could be achieved 
and measured its maturity through SAMM. 
Q3 
Smaczny (2001) T Australia combined Validated the applicability of SAM model. Q1 
Chan (2002) E USA combined Assessed the alignment preconditions. Q2 
Cragg, King and Hussin (2002) E UK manufacturing Explored how alignment can be measured. Q3 
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Source: The Researcher 
Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard 
(2004) 
E Canada manufacturing Evaluated the co-alignment patterns to 
identify the performance rate. The strategic 
alignment is limited to strategy and structure, 
without security considerations. 
Q2 
Avison et al. (2004) E Australia finance Developed an alignment assessment tool. Q2 
Campbell, Kay and Avison 
(2005) 
E Australia generic Considered the social and strategic 
(intellectual) dimension of alignment and 
developed the alignment diagram. 
Q1 
Sledgianovsky and Luftman 
(2005) 
E USA chemical Validated the SAM model in the chemical 
industry. 
Q2 




combined Examined strategic impediments in 
alignment. 
Q2 
Chan and Reich (2007) T Canada hospitality Examined antecedents of alignment. Q1 
Huang and Hu (2007) E USA biopharmaceuti
cal 
Explored alignment through balanced 
scorecards tool. 
Q3 
De Haes and Van Grembergen 
(2009) 
T Belgium combined Developed a basic model to implement the 
alignment. 
Q2 
Luftman and Kempaiah (2007) E general combined Updated and validated the initial SAMM. Q3 
Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano 
(2009) 
E general combined Validated SAM alignment model can be 
applied to SME. 
Q3 
Preston and Karahanna (2009) E USA healthcare Illustrated the role of shared understanding in 
strategic alignment through a shared 
understanding model. 
Q1 
Taradfar and Qrunfleh (2009) E USA combined Explored the tactical aspects of alignment. Q1 
Chen (2010) E China combined Developed a tool to measure the alignment 
maturity in China. 
Q3 
Johnson and Lederer (2010) E USA combined Demonstrated that mutual understanding 
plays a significant role in alignment. 
Q2 
Corsaru and Snehota (2011) E Switzerla
nd 
ICT Evaluated alignment evolution and 
implementation. 
Q2 
Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and 
Khang (2014) 
E Thailand hospitality Extended Henderson’s and Venkatraman’s 
model by analysing the strategic and 
operational alignment. It developed Business 
Information Technology Alignment model. 
Q3 





insurance Analysed the potential of business-IT 
alignment with a strategic, tactical and 
operational focus. 
Q3 
Coltman et al. (2015) T general  generic Outlined antecedents and consequences of 
alignment between business and IT - empirical 
evidence that reveals positive effects of 
alignment on business performance. 
Q1 
Gerow, Thatcher and Grover 
(2015) 
E USA generic Developed an analysis based on prior work 
and identified six dimensions of alignment. 
Q3 
Hinkelman et al. (2015) T general generic Increasing demands for optimisation for 
sustainability purposes. 
Q3 
Reynolds and Yetton (2015) E USA banking Carried out analysis based on functional, 
structural and dynamic alignment. 
Q3 
Wu, Straub and Liang (2015) E Taiwan generic Examined the effectiveness of alignment on 
IT governance. 
Q2 
Lutman, Lyytinen and ben Zvi 
(2015) 
E general generic Updated and validated the SAM model. Q3 







 Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) T general generic It considers a structural and operational 
dimension to support the IS management 
functions, together with RM guidelines to 








 Rahman and Donahue (2010) T general generic This study makes a recommendation on 
applying the convergent strategy. 
Q1 
Fakhri, Fahiman and Ibrahim 
(2015) 
T general generic Explored the strategic governance role. Q1 
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Table 3-8 provides an overview of the research interest in the paradigm of alignment which 
is prevalently considered by academics at the detriment of practitioners or regulators. 
Beyond this aspect, the literature ought to consider the alignment of CsM with ERM hence 
it is often seen only as a partial side of the issue through silo perspective of IT, RM or ERM 
in the detriment of compiling an enterprise-wide approach.  
Moreover, the literature identified is scarce within the context of the financial industry, a 
fact the reiterates once more the value of this research.  
3.5.1 Trends in the literature of alignment 
The identified literature is thematically categorised by its focus on neutral alignment, IT 
business alignment, IS and RM alignment and IS and ERM alignment (similar to ERM and 
CsM literature analysis). 
• Neutral alignment 
 Powel (1992) undertakes his investigation based on business standpoints and refers to the 
alignment of departments for scope, competencies and governance. As an isolated approach, 
it evaluates competitive advantages and performance.  
• IT: Business alignment 
The work of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) indicates the role of aligning the strategy, 
organisation infrastructure and processes to increase capabilities through the SAM model 
(Strategic Alignment Model). Many other researchers later applied this model’s contribution 
and further developed it to analyse the alignment implementation. 
Some researchers like Burn and Szeto (2000) and Johnson and Lederer (2010) analysed the 
alignment based on primary data, investigating whether the mutual consideration of CEO 
and CIO (organisational executives) could underpin an adequate alignment between IT and 
enterprise. Their results suggest that mutual understanding can contribute towards some 
dimensions of alignment. Although their results represent a conceptual and initial validation 
of alignment importance, some studies have further advanced this investigation and shown 
the benefits of applying the alignment to SME (small, medium enterprises). Additionally, 
the research of Campbell, Kay, and Avison (2005) emphasises the IT practitioner’s 
perspective, which provides a useful appraisal of alignment challenges through a social and 
intellectual dimension. Likewise, Chan (2002), advances the hypothesis that in practice the 
alignment implementation is preconditioned by the social interaction of staff due to the 
informal structure of some organisations. Accordingly, the author sustains that despite the 
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theoretical framework, a significant role in implementation is how the human side perform 
due to flexibility and informal procedures. 
Additionally, the values, attitudes and beliefs delimitate the cultural dimension. Chan and 
Reich (2007) carried out their investigation and reported that alignment could have many 
levels of implementation; for example, organisational, project level or individual level. The 
IT business alignment seems to be the most considered strategy hence this research has 
identified most journals dedicated to this section whereas other sections were scarce. 
• IS and RM alignment 
Subsequent studies of Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) constructed a framework through 
STOPE perspective (strategy, technology, organisation, people, and environment) based on 
IS and RM theory. A key aspect of this framework is that although it does not make use of 
alignment terminology, it takes into consideration an integration of both theories (IS and 
RM) in order to establish a favourable and safe environment for business. The framework 
provides a useful account regarding how RM perspective together with IS can enhance better 
governance. The main disadvantage of the framework is that the framework focuses more 
on IT infrastructure and physical threat. However, despite its initial focus on IS, the 
framework fails to respond to cyber risks as its falls short of being directed to another aspect 
of the structural and procedural dimension of physical security. Along with RM perspective 
contribution, the framework indicates that a combination/integration of two-silo governance 
can have a significant impact on risk reduction.  
On these grounds, Fakhri, Fahimah and Ibrahim (2015) indicate that alignment continues to 
be a challenge. One of the most distinguished aspects of this research is that it highlights the 
benefits of the alignment. While the study proposed achieving an alignment between IS and 
business strategy, the content omits the cyber aspects and similarly with Saleh and 
Alfantookh (2011) redirects its focus on physical security incidents, physical security, or 
employee’s security. The study’s findings demonstrate that the proposed study aims were 
not met. However, the authors do succeed in identifying some possible advantages 
associated with alignment. Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) tackle the safeness of organisations 
and propose a unified process based on common processes and tools. 
• IS and ERM alignment 
Furthermore, Rahman and Donahue (2010) are among few authors who debate that 
information security represents the security of data, information or metadata (a large amount 
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of data) and the information systems involved. Moreover, the authors evaluate the challenges 
and benefits of alignment and understand their wide applicability among organisations. 
The basic premises of this level are also evidenced by Campbell, Kay and Avison (2005) 
who analyse the practitioners’ approach in regard to alignment, and their findings outline 
that the organisation’s culture plays a major role in the process. 
3.5.2 Typology trends of alignment 
Moving from literature levels evolution, the literature shows another categorisation based on 
typology. Based on the initial quadrant categorisation (Althonayan, 2003) as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the section that follows explain in detail the typology 
categorisation of alignment: 
• Quadrant 1 (Adoption) refers to studies that champion alignment adoption. For 
example, the theoretical contribution of Powel’s (1992) study lies in the fact that it 
supports alignment definitions, offers insight into how this can be achieved and 
prompts a reconsideration of achieving and maintaining an initial maturity level. The 
studies that are classified in this quadrant thrive in motivating the adoption of 
alignment and question why this step should be taken. It also raises the argument that 
an organisation can gain benefits (Powel, 1992) as a competitive advantage 
(performance or cost), which reflect in strategy change. 
• Quadrant 2 (Implementation) refers to studies that discuss alignment 
implementation. As an example of Quadrant 2, Reich and Benbasat (2000) analysed 
the determinants of alignment based on certain factors (enablers and inhibitors). 
Other authors have focused explicitly on individual determinants such as 
communication, value (Venkatraman, Henderson, and Oldach,1993) governance, 
partnerships architecture, skills, and/or performance (Baets, 1999; Chan, 2002; 
Bergeron, Raymond, and Rivard, 2004). 
• Quadrant 3 (Maturity Assessment) incorporates studies that explored the 
implementation dimension of alignment. One clear example is the study of 
Hinkelman et al. (2015), which demonstrates how past approaches can be optimised 
(tailored) and applied to the current challenges in order to increase capabilities and 
reaction (agility). 
• Quadrant 4 (Compliance) comprises of an in-depth focus on alignment assessment 
and analyses its role, impact, and discrepancies. This category even took into 
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consideration some aspects of quantitative methods to measure alignment while the 
main studies are based on qualitative analysis and thus address the theoretical legacy 
and develop new models that assess the maturity based on criteria. 
Baets (1996) argues the impact of alignment can also be measured by a quantitative method. 
Findings indicate that there are many discrepancies in practice for applying the theory. 
Consequently, the human factor and lack of awareness play a significant role in the 
alignment process (Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 2014). The study of Luftman (2000) 
illustrates how alignment can be achieved and assessed using level maturity criteria. 
Smaczny (2001) used the SAM model of Henderson and Venkatraman (1991) to test its 
veracity and validity and found that its model is applicable even though alignment proved to 
be at a conceptual stage. 
3.6 Limitations overview and research problem (gap) 
Based on the literature assessment, the first section illustrates an overview of findings, 
materialised in a quadrant categorisation of the literature review. Thus, the preliminary 
results indicate that there are four domains which register fluctuations. The findings from 
quadrants categorisation have a number of possible limitations. Namely, for analysis only, 
169 from a total of 312 documents are considered (see Table 2-9, Chapter 2) because only 
academics’ papers were considered. This method was carried out due to the relevance of 
papers. For a visual representation, the following (Figure 3-2) shows the evolution of focus 
in the academic literature. 
 
Figure 3-2 Quadrant categorisation of academics’ literature 
Source: The Researcher 
As Figure 3-2 shows, there is a significant difference among research evolution of 
academics. The most predominant domain is RM with an extended focus on Q1 (adoption) 
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domains are the most significant of the three quadrants (Q1, Q2 and Q3). This denotes that 
literature on RM/ERM is predominant in view of adoption and is almost equal regarding the 
focus on implementation and measurement. Though, it is almost non-existent regarding 
research on compliance. 
Based on the results, it can be determined that RM literature pays particular attention to 
adoption (determinants, enablers and inhibitor) (Q1), whereas a small proportion focuses on 
exploring the aspects of implementation (Q2) or maturity measurement or compliance. This 
gap is expected to be completed by ERM. Thus, this evidence helps to confirm that literature 
on ERM adoption, implementation, measurement, and compliance is expanding. 
In the case of CsM, the implementation quadrant suggests that literature focusing on 
implementation is sub-optimal, yet prior literature on cybersecurity has registered 
considerable focus on adoption and measurement. Lastly, the alignment registers significant 
considerations in academic papers. Regarding the alignment, Table 3-2 shows that 
academics significantly question the strategic alignment. The initial analysis of alignment 
displays that considerable research is carried out on IT and business alignment strategies. 
This evidence matters for current research even if the focus differs slightly from the purpose 
of this research. Consequently, alignment research remains invalidated in practice and non-
existent regarding CsM alignment with ERM. 
The following section focuses on identifying the proportion of industries considered across 
all four domains. For instance, Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999) consider that strategic 
alignment was examined, focusing on specific sectors, and the results might be 
inappropriate. Luftman, Lyytinen and Ben Zvi (2015) agree that the analysis and its outcome 
are inappropriate for general applicability since many models are developed across different 
industries and a model developed primarily for a particular industry cannot be applied to 
another without taking into consideration the internal and external context or organisations’ 
characteristics. Authors such as Baets (1992, 1996), Broadbent and Weill (1993), Avison et 
al. (2004) and De Haes and Van Grembergen (2009) are among few who have focused their 
research exclusively on banking and financial services. 
Further findings are synthesised in Figure 3-3, which outlines the prominence and variability 




Figure 3-3 Research focus across industries 
Source: The Researcher 
Similar to the previous table, only 169 papers from 312 are considered appropriate in terms 
of performing the analysis of industry proportion. It was found that the financial industry 
registers only 35 from selected papers.  
Continuing with analysis, the next section illustrates the demographical propensity of each 
domains.  
 
Figure 3-4 Geographical dispersion of research  
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As shown, a significant percentage of papers reference unspecified focus on a country 
practice, being generally applicable. The option to classify the paper based on the author’s 
location is rejected by the researcher hence analysis is focused in identifying papers scope 
(e.g. country-specific practice). It is evident from data gathered that prior studies have 
considered a global and general perspective, followed by studies considering USA settings. 
Most likely, a generically geographical dispersion can omit region-specific requirements and 
thus affect the applicability. It has been emphasised that geographical dispersion has become 
a current challenge for organisations (Oliver Wyman, 2018b). 
Finally, warranting particular emphasis is the coincidental evolution of all four domains over 
time. As can be viewed in the below table, the years 2008-2009 saw an expanded interest. 
This might be related to the period post-global financial crisis. The trend continued until 
2010 which, one can assume, was when the effects of the crisis were absorbed /accepted by 
organisations.  
 
Figure 3-5 Focus of selected literature across the years (1982-2018) 
Source: The Researcher 
The data obtained shows a consistent fluctuation regarding alignment, which in turn 
demonstrates that between 2010 and 2015 its applicability in organisational context yielded 
benefits. Likewise, years 2017-2018 show consideration for alignment and CsM. Earlier 
research explored alignment generically, and thus current research proposes to reanalyse 
certain contexts in order to apprehend its applicability to the financial industry (aspects 
discussed in Section 3.1, Chapter 3). Previous research deployed detailed analysis on 
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RM. This research aims to consider prior research and to expand CsM alignment with ERM. 
The evidence compiled in this synthesis points towards the idea that there is scarce alignment 
literature that considers the integration of CsM and ERM. It also confirms that alignment is 
at an undeveloped phase (i.e. scarce consideration of regulatory bodies demonstrates that the 
problem was formally ignored).  
Table 3-9 Summary of literature gap (1982-2018) 
Literature dimensions 















Lack of coherent terminology and theory 
 
Craigen, Diakun-Thibault and Purse 
(2014); Hong et al. (2003); Von Solms 
and Van Niekerk (2013). 







Deficient silo approach of security 
strategy and business strategy. 
Ineffective identification for internal 
challenges. 
Scarce practices of enterprise-wide risk 
culture.  
Role culpability transparency (silo 
departments). 
Lack of shared risk spectrum oversight 
(unified capabilities of reporting, 
analysis and mitigation). 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007); Singh, 
Gupta and Oija (2013); KPMG 
(2014d); PwC (2014); Schiavone, 
Garg and Summers (2014); Web et 
al.(2014b); Nazareth and Choi (2015); 
Mohamed (2015); Von Solms and Von 
Solms (2018). 
 










UK Cabinet Office 
(2009); UK Cabinet 











Embedded silo practices. 
Fragmented practices for 
implementation. 
Optimisation required to organisational 
needs. 
Granular holistic implementation. 
Fragmented practices of implementation. 
Lack of organisational risk awareness. 
Lack of effective organisational risk 
governance: boardroom involvement. 
Von Solms and Von Solms (2004); 
Peppard and Ward (2004); Kotulic and 
Clark (2004); Gerber and Von Solms 
(2005); Chang and Ho (2006); Bojanc 
and Jerman-Blažič (2008); Humphreys 
(2008); Tashi and Ghernouti-Hélie 
(2009); Siponen and Willison (2009); 
Deibert and Rohozinski (2010); Julich 
(2012); Fenz et al.(2013); Min, Chai 
and Han (2015); Soomro, Shah and 
Ahmed (2016); Korovessis (2017); 
Armenia et al. (2018); Gordon et al. 
(2018); Rubino (2018); Nasir et al. 
(2019). 





















Difficulties in measuring maturity 
compliance with regulators and industry 
demands (submission failures). 
Reactive versus proactive-difficulty in 
achieving resiliency-increased cost. 
Web et al.(2014b); Raban and 









OECD (2002); Bank 
of England (2013); 
USA Department of 
Financial Services 
(2014); ENISA 

















Effectiveness and performance. 
Determinants and impact of ERM 
implementation. 
Maturity-performance relationship. 
Internal framework benefits.  
Return on investment (ROI). 
McShane, Nair and Rustambekov 
(2011); Griffin and Boomgaard 
(2013); Eckles, Hoyt and Miller 
(2014); Lundquist (2014); Gatzer and 
Martin (2015); Dabari, Kwaji and 
Ghazali (2017); Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2017); 
Bogodistov and Wohlgemuth (2017). 




Incomplete understanding of 
implementation benefits. 
Granular literature on implementation. 
Unclarified determinants of successful 
ERM. 
Partial understanding of organisational 
factors. 
Research focus path variations 
Scarce proofs of lessons learnt. 
 
Dickinson (2001); Nocco and Stulz 
(2006); Rosenberg and Shuermann 
(2006); Schoening-Thiessen and 
Simkins (2008); Beasley, Pagach and  
Warr (2008); Francis and Paladino 
(2008); Power (2009); Pagach and War 
(2011); Hoyt and Lienberg (2011); 
Paape and Speklé (2012); Baxter et al. 
(2013); Ching and Colombo (2014); 
Rubino and Vitolla (2014); Beasley, 
Branson and Pagach (2015); Lyons 
(2015); Bromiley et al. (2015); Andrén 
and Lundqvist (2017); Majdalawieh 
and Gammack (2017);Viscelli, 
Hermanson, and Beasley (2017); 
McShane (2018); Rubino (2018). 
The Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants in 
England and Wales 
(1999); (PwC, 
2009); McKinsey 
(2010); PwC (2015); 
Ernst and Young 
(2016); Deloitte 
(2015c); American 
Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 





External and internal variables. 
Shortcomings to embed implementation. 
Granular governance: lack of proactive 
practices (reactive). 
Organisational culture interaction with 
risk oversight. 
Scarce applicability of the holistic 
approach. 
Misaligned risk strategy with business 
strategy. 
Misalignment of risk appetite with 
objectives and risk exposure. 
Unclear implication of silo risk 
oversight. 
Un-continuous lifecycle of risk 
oversight. 
Fragmented integrative approach. 
Unclear accountability of risk. 
Highly embedded in IT practices. 
Top-down internal control (leadership 
led). 
Miller (1992); Ward (2003); Kleffner, 
Lee and McGannon (2003); Lienberg 
and Hoyt (2003); Drew and Kendrick 
(2005); Beasley, Clune and 
Hermanson (2005); Castro et al. 
(2008); Burnabi and Hass (2009); 
Mikes (2009); Gordon, Loebs and 
Tseng (2009); Wu and Olson (2010); 
Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone (2010); 
Lin, Wen and Yu (2012); Tekathen and 
Dechow (2013); Farrel and Gallagher 
(2014); Hayne and Free (2014); Hayne 
and Free (2014) Grace et al. (2015); 
Aven and Aven (2015); Lalitha and 
Nandini (2015); Shad and Woon 
(2015); Zéghal and El Aoun (2016); 
Farrel and Gallagher (2019); Oliveira 














DUE CARE FOR COMPLIANCE 
Difficulties in measuring maturity-
compliance reporting. 
Lack of transparent decisions. 
Compliance pressure to ensure risk 
baseline under necessity not desire. 
Arnold et al. (2011); Lindberg and 
Seifert (2011); Nair et al. (2014); 
Schiller and Prpich (2014). 



















Immature alignment (objectives and 
strategies). 
A lack of practical alignment literature 
guidance. 
Lack of operational flow within 
organisational departments. 
Henderson and Venkatraman (1993); 
Smaczny (2001);  Baets (1996); Chan 
(2002); Bergeron and Rivard (2004); 
Campbell, Kay and Avison (2005); 
Sledgianovsky and Luftman (2005); 
Luftman and Kempaiah (2007); De 
Haes and Grembergen (2009); 
Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano (2009); 
Preston and Karahanna (2009); 
Johnson and Lederer (2010); Chen 
(2010); Charoensuk, Wongsurawat 
and Khang (2014); Mekawy, 
AlSabbagh and Kowalsky (2014); 
Reynolds and Yetton (2015); Lutman, 
Lyytinen and ben Zvi (2015); Gerow, 
Thatcher and Grover (2015); Fakhri, 





Scarce of leveraged communications 
amongst departments. 
Holistic immersion of employees. 
 
Powel (1992); Luftman, Papp and 
Brier (1999); Papp (1999); Kearns and 
Lederer (2000); Luftman (2000); 
Cragg, King and Hussin (2002); Chan 
(2002); Avison et al. (2004); Chan, 
Sabherwal and Thatcher (2006); 
Huang and Hu (2007); Taradfar and 
Qrunfleh (2009); Rahman and 
Donahue (2010); Wu, Straub and 






Inadequate structural collaboration. 
Restrained organisational change 
behaviour. 
Burn and Szeto (2000); Chan and 




Immature organizational culture 
 








Antecedents pointers and consequences 
of misalignment 
Inadequate attention for internal and 
external variables. 
Partial understanding of factors, 
challenges and inhibitors. 
Immature strategic and structural 
operational alignment. 
A lack of practical alignment literature 
guidance. 
Powel (1992); Broadbent and Weill 
(1993);Venkatraman,Henderson and 
Oldach (1993); Ciborra (1997); 
Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999); Papp 
(1999); Kearns and Lederer (2000); 
Luftman (2000); Smacny (2001); Chan 
(2002); Cragg, King and Hussin 
(2002); Avison et al.(2004); Chan, 
Sabherwal and Thatcher (2006); 
Huang and Hu (2007); Taradfar and 
Qrunfleh (2009); Rahman and 
Donahue (2010); Walter et al.(2013); 
Hinkelman et al.(2015); Karpovsky 
and Galliers (2015); Wu, Straub and 
Liang (2015). 
PwC (2018a) none 
MATURITY ASSESSMENT 
Flaws in alignment effectiveness  
Yarifard, Taheri and Zafarzadeh 






Source: The Researcher 
Based on the systematic review of the secondary data, the following gaps have been 
identified:  
(1) A lack of clear terminology and definitions in all three domains - initially identified in 
Chapter 2 and validated subsequently by the findings of this chapter. 
There is considerable ambiguity with regards terminology across all three domains, 
maintain a lack of consensus among academics, practitioners, and regulators (i.e. 
terminology and semantic applicability) alike. Confusion regarding terminology and 
definitions raises many ambiguities such as security responsibilities having come 
initially from Loss Prevention plans before evolving to become the responsibility of 
a Chief Security Officer and finally that of a Chief Information Security Officer. 
Such evolution proves the need to redefine CsM as it is still seen as a fragmented 
function of securing information. 
Such discrepancies are also present in various terminologies used by standards, 
guidelines and governmental reports (i.e. NIST used terminology CsM where ISO 
UK refers to it as Information Security). The question of variation in terminology 
needs to be addressed urgently as it affects industry practices as well as professional 
qualification developments. 
(2) A lack of practical alignment literature guidance (academics, practitioners and 
regulators) -a significant amount of literature is focused on the adoption aspects (Q1). 
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In the case of alignment, research tends to have been carried by academics rather 
than practitioners or regulators. Although in the case of CsM and ERM some 
contributors have addressed this problem and over recent years’ alignment has 
received attention, it has unfortunately been applied in isolation (e.g. IT-centric, RM-
business centric). 
A growing body of literature demonstrates that there is a lack of correlation between 
the practices of academics’ and practitioners. Hence, the first category has considered 
the value (benefits) of implementation while practitioners have considered the 
operational aspects regarding how it can be implemented and how value can be 
created. 
(3) A lack of common governance practices across all three domains (various guidance). 
(4) Scarce alignment literature that considers the integration of CsM.  
(5) Scarce industry-specific focus – namely the financial industry (ERM has a more 
significant consideration, while CsM and alignment address generically). 
(6) Scarce consideration of regulatory bodies regarding the alignment processes. 
(7) A lack of clear practices towards ERM, CsM, and alignment implementation. 
(8) The literature of CsM is fragmented among different domains (e.g. Information Security, 
Information Assurance). 
(9) Granularity of CsM terminology encouraged by various professional accreditations. 
(10) Geographical dispersion of industry practices and procedure significantly influenced by 
two main players: the UK and the USA (for example ISO series for ERM and CsM are 
reproduced by other countries). Not only is there a lack of uniformity among all the anti-
cybercrime measures (some are preventative, and some are curative), but there is a lack of 
uniformity regarding which country adopts which measures and the vocabulary used in the 
measures. 
(11) A discontinuous temporal attention in the literature (e.g.  main focus is between 2008-
2009 and 2015-2016) – although a possible explanation of this could be the effects post-
financial crisis. 
(12) Criteria considered by the literature of ERM varies between value, performance, 
appetite, culture, and governance, and each of them is addressed in isolation. 
(13) CsM is still seen as an IT problem, problems treated in isolation. 




The evidence compiled in this synthesis points towards the idea that there is scarce literature 
on alignment and the integration of CsM and ERM. It also confirms that alignment is in an 
undeveloped phase because scarce consideration from regulatory bodies demonstrates that 
the problem had been previously ignored.  
3.7 Conclusion  
In the development of the findings stated in the previous chapter, this chapter has more 
thoroughly explored how imperative alignment is. This has been achieved by exploring and 
comprehending the current state of literature related to the research problem. Although the 
alignment of CsM and ERM within the financial industry is identified as having been only 
partially addressed in prior studies, it has nonetheless concentrated on diverse topics, diverse 
types of approaches, and varied viewpoints. 
The findings of this chapter articulated gaps in theory, practice and regulatory terminology, 
definitions, approach or strategy. As the construction of this chapter has been developed on 
the research question and its derivations, the relevant sources of literature. The effects of 
implementing the new framework shall be discussed later in this research. Prior efforts have 
been made to understand the research problem and undertake literature examination (the first 
research aim of this research – ‘to investigate the alignment of CsM with ERM within the 
financial industry’) to support justification of the research basis. 
The contribution of relevant references that have contributed to CsM alignment with ERM 
legacy in terms of long-term sustainability has been discussed. The findings demonstrate 
that recent developments of risk practices are fragmented and focus significantly on silo 
approaches. However, a significant number of proposed strategies have been applied, albeit 
in a fragmented manner (e.g. IT aligned to business strategy, IS aligned to RM, CsM aligned 
to RM). The analyses of literature reveal that alignment of CsM with ERM can enhance a 
superior risk assessment, mitigation, and resilience in organization, and thus a reduced risk 
profile. Transferring the whole organisation into an enhanced state of cybersecurity has been 
demonstrated through the interconnectivity of CsM and ERM. On the contrary, a lack of 
integrated approaches amplifies work required and the cost. 
Based on the identified results, it has been determined that literature trends have varied 
between domains. Due to limited literature on alignment, this chapter has examined an 
exploration of prior literature based on separate domains and through the inclusion 
perspective (alignment). In the case of exploration as a separate domain, it is particularly 
106 
 
important that it provides an understanding of how it has been perceived independently (e.g. 
RM, ERM, CsM or alignment). To evaluate literature maturity, the literature has been 
categorised into four types of quadrant: adoption, implementation, maturity assessment, and 
compliance. The literature has been categorised to understand its transitions and how it is 
concentrated. 
It has been identified that RM literature pays particular attention to adoption (determinants, 
enablers and inhibitor) (Q1), whereas a small proportion focuses on exploring the aspects of 
implementation (Q2) or maturity measurement or compliance. This gap is expected to be 
completed by ERM, which contributes equally in all four quadrants. Thus, this evidence 
helps to confirm that literature on ERM adoption, implementation, measurement and 
compliance denotes the innovative and integrative aspects of it. Although the 
implementation quadrant has suggested that the application is sub-optimal and researched in 
academic papers, in contrast, the practitioners’ cybersecurity legacy has registered 
considerable evidence for adoption and measurement. On the other hand, alignment 
literature has indicated only significant considerations in academic papers and non-existent 
consideration of practitioners or regulators. Consequently, the researcher is of the opinion 
that the evidence demonstrates that alignment research remains invalidated in practice and 
scarce regarding CsM alignment with ERM. Consequently, the ambiguous evidence 
identified (e.g. terminology, definitions) along with immature adoption within the financial 
industry demonstrate that often a holistic strategic approach is scattered in silo approaches, 
most often as a tick box approach for compliance purposes rather than enterprise-wide 
embedded. 
In conclusion, the different types of evidence prove that further work needs to be done to 
manage risk and effectively sustain organisations in the long-term. Moreover, the findings 
of this chapter highlight main contributors, attitudes towards risk mitigation, and literature’s 
current limitation. It has also demonstrated that capabilities of ERM, CsM and Alignment 
work in an integrative manner to sustain an organisation strategically. 
To further the research, Chapter Four considers a derivation of literature along with a further 
summary of prior frameworks for gap identification purposes, which along with theoretical 
supporting theories serve as a platform for the CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment Framework.
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4. Chapter Four: Development of CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment 
Framework  
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four draws on the initial findings of the literature reviews in Chapters Two (first 
derivate) and Chapter Three (second derivate), which allowed identification of the research 
gap (third derivate). It examines supporting theories (fourth derivate) and supporting 
frameworks and gaps (fifth derivate), and combines them with the previous information to 
identify the CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment Framework. 
The first section considers theoretical premises of modern management theories 
(contingency and institutional), along with some components of organisational theory to 
inform the basic premises on which this research is constructed. The second shows a more 
practical perspective from all three domains (CsM, ERM and alignment) to explore current 
practices and study how the identified gaps correlate with the Framework purposes. The key 
concepts and key practices are incorporated in the third section, which provisionally informs 
the proposed solution. 
4.2 Supporting theories 
A theory represents an ‘explanation’ of a specific phenomenon (Nilsen, 2015), and the 
correlation between supporting theories and the research problem is grounded on the 
premises of concepts and principles (e.g. management, governance, alignment and 
coordination of interdepartmental control function) so as to understand the phenomenon 
(Olum, 2004; Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013) within its systematic construction and its specific 
boundaries (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Thus, in supporting the Framework, Contingency Theory 
and Institutional Theory have been selected to offer an explanation to the research problem 
because they reflect on contingencies and dependent factors within an internal and external 
environment along with their causal relationship (Sutton and Staw, 1995) and with 
institutional norms. 
As the considered theoretical premises respond to the research problem in isolation, 
accordingly each philosophical perspective partially reflects an answer to the research 
problem. Nonetheless, each one is beneficial in its own right because this approach 
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highlights inclusivity and legacy support for a coordination mechanism that is reflected in 
alignment (Pupke, 2008).  
4.2.1 Contingency theory 
It is recognised that Contingency Theory is a modern organisational theory that sustains 
organisations’ effectiveness, conformance and performance (Donaldson, 2001; Ghofar and 
Islam, 2015) by matching capabilities between organisational characteristics (structure) with 
environment pressure (Donaldson, 2001). 
With its roots in Organisational Theory (Chenhall, 2003), the Contingency Theory was 
initially presented by Adam Smith in 1776 (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013). Hence it cultivated 
a baseline for organisational sustainability. Over time, it has been considered in many 
circumstances and disciplines. It has been evolved into various types of approaches, each 
broken down into prehistory, modern, symbolic and postmodern (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013). 
The current modern Contingency Theory observes behaviour patterns in order to identify 
and solve organisation issues in an optimised manner, ensuring organisational efficiency (i.e. 
objectives achievement with limited resources) rather than general efficiency (merely 
objectives achievement), and with the intention of yielding profitability, competitive 
advantage (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013), and sustainability. To achieve this, it is necessary to 
be able to handle internal and external pressure. Henceforth, Hatch and Cunliffe argued that: 
“…effective organisations are those in which multiple subsystems are aligned to maximise 
performance in a particular situation” (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013, p. 32). Referring to 
Contingency Theory in relation to the research problem, it is centric for an organisation to 
fit its organisational characteristics with external pressure. This case is firstly about marrying 
CsM and ERM with organisation strategy and objectives. Secondly, it is to respond to any 
external pressure. 
To simplify, Fry and Smith (1987) define Contingency Theory as an intact system, along 
with congruency relationships between variables such as organisational components. 
Contingency terms such as fit, congruency, match or alignment are used to refer to the 
relationship/link between two or more variables (i.e. environment pressure and strategy) in 
order to identify an additional variable (e.g. performance or effectiveness) (Schoonhoven, 
1981). This is often defined as ‘laws of relationship’, as stated by Fry and Smith (1987). 
Consequently, a vast variety of terminology is used for the same thing, sometimes leading 
to confusion (Fry and Smith, 1978). As an example, Fisher (1998) describes the same process 
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as a match to enable performance. Thus, the environment is the one upon which the 
organisation’s design and control functions are adapted. 
Particular to the contingency theory is that it implies the identification of contingencies for 
each situation with the intention of deriving the ideal fit amongst them (Hatch and Cunliffe, 
2013). Fit perspective or contingency refers to “variables fit” (Weill and Olson, 1989). In 
turn, it has been demonstrated that Contingency Theory is a situational theory that refers to 
management decisions in a given situation and in accordance to internal and external 
variables (e.g. resources, management, environmental) (Luthans and Stewart, 1977; Otum, 
2004; Weill and Olson, 1989).  
As a result, a misfit between environment and organisational variables (contingencies, 
dependencies, factors, conditions) leads to low performance and inefficiency (Gresov, 
1989). An important implication of previous contributions is that contingency factors have 
been considered in a granulated manner by academics. Some academics have considered the 
following contingency variables individually: technology, strategy, governance, leadership, 
organisational age, size, organisational characteristics, structure, processes, competitive 
conditions, environment complexity, task, and individual person and/or culture (Mintzber, 
1979; Zeithaml, Veeradarajan and Zeithaml, 1988; Weill and Olson, 1989; Donaldson, 2001; 
Hopkins, 2005; Bets, 2011).  
So far, it has been identified that contingency represents a successful relationship between 
two or more variables (Blau, 1970) with the purpose of increasing organisational 
performance or effectiveness. In the case of the environment, Mintzberg (1979) articulates 
that it challenges the match between organisational design and environment. Accordingly, 
based on the above facts, organisations’ design is formed and dependent on its contingencies 
(Donaldson, 2001). Additionally, variables such as uncertainty and the organisational 
capacity to cope with are detrimental (Hickson and Hining, 1971). In this context, it is worth 
considering that “a strategy is a plan for interacting with the competitive environment to 
achieve organisational goals” (Daft, 2012, p. 62). More specifically, Contingency Theory 
strategically provides consensus to align CsM with ERM management functions such as 
strategy alignment, objectives alignment, planning alignment, structural and operational 
organisation with social systems, and leading and control—all intended to better cope with 
external pressure.  
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Over time, subsequent studies that have focused on Contingency Theory have been 
interested in a variety of components: between internal (e.g. organisational integration/fit 
(Lawrence and Lorch, 1967), organisational structure, subunits/departments power (Hickson 
et al., 1971) as well as a variable external environment and specific situations/conditions 
(Dzimbire, 2009). Thus, the theory has rejected a prescribed universal approach and in turn, 
recommended an optimised and unique response corresponding to the situation as 
determined by events and circumstance. This tends to suggest that literature prompts further 
attention to be paid to organisational alignment implications and dependency of internal and 
external variables (Hanson, 1979; Jaffe, 2001) for organisational sustainability and 
efficiency. 
Thus, these arguments support key arguments that organisations are unique, with their own 
personalised practices that trigger multiple results. So, the solution varies, and the 
organisation, in turn, needs to adapt itself (Hanson, 1979; Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Rubino 
(2018). For example, Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty (1994) define contingency from a 
perspective of control and coordination because it involves a structural organisation of tasks.  
There are various definitions of Contingency Theory. In addition to the aforementioned 
perspective, other authors define it as a contingency shift to a security perspective, where 
prevention and detection help organisations to react and respond (Hong et al., 2003). Others 
consider it from the viewpoint of interrelationship and the sequence of the elements acting 
together (Beckford, 2009). The differentiation is that every action implies a unique situation 
(Lorsh, 2013) and thus yields different and unique results. This school of thought is followed 
by Vorbeda et al. (2012), who discuss various means to achieve performance (more than one 
option) triggered by organisational setting but also by context setting. 
Therefore, one can conclude that generally, contingency refers to the performance of fit of 
organisational design regardless of whether it is about structure, people, technology, 
strategy, culture, organisational structure, security, or management. This suggests the need 
for a dynamic management within the environment (Bets, 2011) to align its characteristics 
in a given situation, triggering organisation contingencies fit, performance and structural 
interrelationship (Weill and Olson, 1989; Ghofar and Islam, 2015). 
Environment variables refer to internal and external criteria and represent the boundaries of 
a theory (Fry and Smith, 1987). The environment is a constraint upon which the organisation 
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structures its direction (Child, 1972). Hence, ‘variability’, ‘complexity’ and ‘iliberality’ 
(velocity of threats) affect the performance of an organisation (Child, 1972). 
Consequently, environmental variables are one of the pillars of Contingency Theory. 
Supporting this statement, the following section discusses variables and relationships, as 
considered by academics. 
• Internal variables - can include but are not limited to organisational size, task, 
architectural level, environment, technology, people, management, structure, culture, 
performance, processes, communication, effectiveness, fit, strategy, business 
units/departments, and support functions; 
• External environmental variables - when undertaking an analysis of contingencies, 
external environmental variables are related to the external environment. It is 
common practice to consider PESTLE (political, economic, social, technological, 
environmental and legal) analysis. Furthermore, other studies refer to external 
environmental variables through VUCA concept (volatility, uncertainty, complexity 
and ambiguity) such analysis might illustrate variables’ dependencies and 
interdependencies on which organisational performance lies (Luthans and Stewart, 
1977; Olum, 2004; Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 2014). So, the effectiveness of an 
organisation depends on a range of abilities to adapt to a situation or change in 
connection with variables (COSO, 2017). In turn, Contingency Theory rejects the 
use of a approach (Zeithaml, Veeradarajan and Zeithaml, 1988; Cole, 2004). For 
example, the national culture involves efforts for an organisation because different 
countries have many cultural characteristics to which they need to adapt and comply 
(Chenhall, 2003). Within the internal context, beliefs, attitudes, experiences, 
communication or informal norms, a specific response and behaviour towards risks 
can be determined. 
Although having witnessed some key variables such as effectiveness, environment, and 
congruency, contributors’ focus has varied within multiple variables over time (Tosi and 
Slocum, 1984). It is assumed that the Structural Contingency Theory supports organisations 
selecting the structures that aid the selection of further structures with a common goal of 
improved overall company performance (Evans, 2007). For example, in practice, 
Contingency Theory can represent the stance of managers in undertaking decisions based on 
organisational characteristics and internal variables in the interaction with the external 
environment. Based on this, decisions can be made (Vorbeda et al., 2011) for further 
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enterprise-wide deployment of risk oversight practices. This can be illustrated by internal 
variables such as: 
• Strategy and management – these variables are dependent on three main structural 
contingencies: environment, organisation, and strategy (impacts unit structure) 
(Donaldson, 2001). Burns and Stalker in Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013 (managing 
individuals and organisation) support evaluation of the impact of management style 
and how it affects organisational effectiveness and performance through a stable 
(mechanistic) and unstable (organic) internal structure (Jaffe, 2001). Along with 
strategy and management style, Fiedler proposes a psychological subsystem that 
looks at organisational behaviour to pose as an internal variable that takes place when 
leadership style is contingent with various situations (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973). 
Therefore, on this basis, Contingency Theory suggests that before a decision is taken, 
all aspects, variables, and interdependencies of an organisation must be 
acknowledged. Moreover, Fredrickson (1984) outlines that a strategic capability 
balance internal capability with the external environments pressure. Hambrick and 
Lei (1985) also outline the importance of strategy regarding business performance 
and reiterate the fact that all depend on the variables (e.g. technological, 
environmental, product lifecycle). Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985) analyse the 
effect of strategy by considering same variable (environment), and additionally the 
organisation and its performance. 
• Structure ─ a contingency variable that refers to organisational structure concerning 
the organisation of processes and employment roles. An administrative mechanism 
of how systems are structured (Chenhall, 2003) depends on situational variables 
(Child, 1972) of internal and external pressures (Lawrence and Lorch, 1969 
(structure and environment). Some authors believe that structural contingencies are 
more successful by interacting with technology (Woodward, 1967; Perrow, 1979). 
Contingency examined through the perspective of structural sub-systems (structure) is also 
known as Structural Contingency Theory (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1984). This is because it 
explores the fit between the organisational context and its structure in order to understand 
how performance can be fostered. Van de Ven and Drazin (1984) indicate that Contingency 
Theory can be defined through the perspective of fit, interaction, and system approach 
because an organisation’s ability to identify and adapt to fit in the context of its dependencies 
represents its ability to fit within a system through interaction and respond to internal and 
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external variables (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1984). It is therefore considered an Organisation 
Change Theory (Donaldson, 2001), which relies on fit-performance rapport. 
Moreover, in a more simplistic manner, Perrow describes the structure of the organisation 
as a complete interaction defined through the system, where the interconnection of systems 
is essential in order to achieve the task. 
In 1969, Lawrence and Lorch considered the internal structure and external demands on an 
organisation’s management (Jaffe, 2001). Jaffe (2001) has reiterated the findings of 
Lawrence and Lorch and outlined that a rigid and formalised internal structure assures 
stability while an unstructured internal structure requires complementary efforts in cases of 
increased external pressure and demands (Jaffe, 2001). Additionally, the structure (form) of 
an organisation is interrelated and dependent and thus has impact on its construction 
(Lawrence and Lorch; Burns and Stalker in Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013). 
While some contributors reflect only on environment and structure, Penning (1975) 
emphasises that effectiveness depends on the organisation’s ability to adapt to environmental 
uncertainty variables such as technology and competition. A fit between environment and 
structure might assure organisational effectiveness in the long-term. 
• The Size of an organisation is considered closely connected to the need for specialisation 
and expansion through the development of additional divisions and administrative 
actions (Chenhall, 2003). Although organisational size can trigger opportunities (Child, 
1972), it also implies a need for increased administration dimensions (Blau, 1970). 
• Technology is seen as a significant variable in designing organisational structure (Child, 
1972).  
• Cultural variables can interfere with the organisational design or structure due to their 
interrelationship with other variables (Tosi and Slocum, 1984). For example, cultural 
differences are variables which can affect managerial control as well as individual 
evolution and input. Additionally, they put pressure on strategic decisions as all of these 
variables are interrelated to some degree (Tosi and Slocum, 1984). 
In conclusion, contingency theory avoids recommending a specific manner to organise 
contingencies, as it is believed that what is appropriate in one situation might fail in another. 
Due to the Contingency Theory’s recognition of every organisation and every organisation’s 
situation being unique, it can be adapted and tailored (Schoonhoen, 1981). Thus, 
Contingency Theory can be effective or ineffective depending upon how it is tailored to meet 
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ever-changing and ever unique variables. If it is not tailored correctly, it will be ineffective. 
For example, an organisation’s internal norms, traditions or philosophy might prompt the 
way risks are perceived, communicated, and understood (RIMS, 2014).  
4.2.2 Institutional theory of organisation 
The essence of Institutional Theory originates in how institutions are perceived in a social 
realm (Hodgson, 2006). An abstract view of institutions is a format of systems or structures 
taken for granted that constrain behaviour in the form of rules, norms (e.g. communication, 
sovereignty), values, or beliefs pertaining to social interaction (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; 
Hodgson, 2006). Such a view of institutions defines the appropriate relationship of social 
actors based on shared rules (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
In the same way, this theory applies to organisational context to establish command and 
assign responsibilities. Thus, Institutional Theory refers to an organisation structure’s ability 
to reflect institutional pressure/requirements towards a maximisation of institutional 
conformity (also referred as legitimacy) and effectiveness (Donadson, 2008; Hsu, Lee and 
Straub, 2012).  
In short, it represents the organisational behaviour as a reaction of how it adapts, based on 
well-known informal and formal norms, to an action (Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007; Hsu, Lee 
and Straub, 2012). It also represents the organisational homogeneity (expectation vs. 
organisational response) towards mimetic, normative, and coercive pressure (Daft, Murphy 
and Willmott, 2014). Institutional Theory is an organisation theory which was initially 
researched in the 1957’s by Selznick, who was interested in exploring and understanding 
how processes shape organisations (Vorberda et al., 2011; Greenwood, Hining and Wheten, 
2014) and vice versa (Greenwood, Hining and Wheten, 2014). 
Although the Institutional Theory of the 1950s does not closely relate to cybersecurity 
management and ERM, it is the predecessor of the modern Institutional Theory, which does 
indeed bare great significance on the topic of this research. 
The Modern Institutional theory  
Known also as Neo-Institutional Theory, the Modern Institutional Theory supersedes the old 
“definitional” approach of Selznick and moves towards interaction with social phenomena 
within organisations for “explanatory purposes” (Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007). The theory 
addresses what sets the condition of an action (e.g. rules, norms, practices, structures, 
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processes, obligations) (Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008; Suddabi, 2010). The theory has come 
to be used as a way to understand how and why institutions interact under internal and 
external environmental pressures (Zucker, 1987; Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007), and how they 
adapt, evolve, or dissolve (Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008). 
Some authors believe that organisational environment seems to shape an institution’s goals, 
ways of functioning (Scott, 1987), structure, management, and coordination (Meyer and 
Höllerer, 2014). In short, the Institutional Theory appears to portray the issue in terms of 
boundaries, grounded on the assumption that the relationship between structures, resources, 
processes, or governance of an organisation depends on environmental pressure (Casson and 
Rose, 2014).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) introduce the value of formal organisations, paying considerable 
attention to coordination and control of activities through a formal structure. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) articulate that institutionalisation refers to ‘structuration’, ‘bureaucratisation’, 
and ‘rationalisation’ for the purpose of efficiency. 
Lawrence and Shadnam (2008) highlight that institutional context is a major constituent 
towards isomorphism (i.e. institutions identity is alike ─ form, structure, processes). 
Henceforth, organisations defined through isomorphism refer to a single legitimate form, the 
tendency to deviate from the expected pattern and expose the organisation to be illegitimate. 
Consequently, external rules, also known as ‘rationalised myths’ (traditional conformity) 
can influence an institution, and isomorphism has been associated with three forms: 
coercive, mimetic, and normative (Jaffe, 2001; Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008). 
• Coercive isomorphism refers to the informal and formal pressures on organisations 
from various sources and their effect on organisational behaviour (Daft, Murphy and 
Willmott, 2014). For example, regulatory compliance represents a significant factor 
in undertaking decisions (Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008). Essentially, coercive 
pressure refers to external pressure exerted on an organisation in order to render the 
adoption of specific behaviour (similar to other organisations) recognised as a 
professional expectation in the form of a norm, obligation, moral, standard or duty 
(Daft, Murphy and Willmott, 2014). This can include, for example, the effect of peer 
organisations, competitors, regulatory bodies (Teo, Wei and Benbasat, 2003), 
political influence or influence from supervisory authorities, economic factors (Hsu, 
Lee and Straub, 2012), among many others. Undeniably, regulatory pressure 
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(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Data Protection Act, as previously discussed in Subsection 
3.3.3) for security practices is validated in a practical way through studies (Hsu, Lee 
and Straub, 2012). This ‘rationalised myth’ of coercive isomorphism is highly related 
to the research problem because it aims to understand the exercise of control and 
dependence of regulatory tools along with practitioners’ and academics’ views.  
• Normative isomorphism addresses the collective influence of professionalisation 
(Hsu, Lee and Straub, 2012) and focuses on normative social expectations to control 
specialist positions categorisations (Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008) that delegates 
responsibilities. Some examples of normative influences are professional 
interactions at events (e.g. conferences, professional associations meetings) within 
specialists (Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007). It can also refer to the managers’ capability 
to champion risk awareness campaigns to sustain the value of CsM alignment with 
ERM.  
• Mimetic isomorphism questions the cognitive influence to imitate successful 
organisations as taken for granted a solution to thrive and be recognised as legitimate 
(Jaffe, 2001; Hsu, Lee and Straub, 2012). It analyses what leads to specific 
organisational decisions taken in specific practices (Lawrence and Shadnam, 2008) 
mechanism or structures (Daft, Murphy and Willmott, 2014). 
This approach (institutional) is similar to Contingency theory except it refers to homogeneity 
while contingency relates to the influence of variation. There are various interpretations 
regarding institutional views, hence the response of academics focusing on various aspects. 
Institutional Theory posits to explain how mimetic, coercive, and normative pressures affect 
the interdepartmental linkage compliance on daily work practices (Teo, Wei and Benbasat, 
2003).  
4.2.3 Mixing the Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory  
While Institutional Theory regards how institutional constraints (i.e. known as isomorphism) 
shape organisations’ behaviour (Vorberda et al., 2011; Greenwood, Hining and Wheten, 
2014), the Contingency Theory focuses on how organisations can be managed and 
coordinated as a whole, marrying organisational structures, systems, and external 
environments (Greenwood, Hining and Wheten, 2014). 
Referring to the association of theories, literature has considered conflicting aspects that 
might appear between the theories. Even though these issues have been suggested, many 
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authors (Donaldson, 2008; Vorbeda et al., 2011) have succeeded to empirically test the 
validity of mixing the two theories as complementary and co-dependent. Furthermore, 
associating the theories may be appropriate (Evans, 2007; Greenwoood, Hining and Wheten, 
2014) as both of them have roots in Organisational Theory and are related to organisation 
design/structure (Donadson, 2008). 
However, the difference lies in the fact that each of them focuses on a different perspective 
or ‘fit’ and offers a different outcome. For example, Contingency Theory concentrates on 
achieving an internal fit with an external environment, whereas Institutional Theory 
concentrates on achieving an external fit (e.g. recognition of conformity, external support) 
by adapting its internal environment; this leads to a ‘meta-fit’ (Donaldson, 2008) as well as 
performance and effectiveness (Chorn, 1991; Vorberda et al., 2011). It has been found that 
both theories are influenced by factors and variables. In the case of Contingency Theory, it 
strives to adjust to variables, while Institutional Theory is under the authority of 
institutional ‘norms’ pressure/conformance (Vorberda et al., 2011), in other words, an 
‘institutional template’ (Greenwood and Hining, 1996). 
Although the terminology of alignment registers various terminologies in strategic 
management (i.e. both the Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory use the term ‘fit’) 
it is clear that it refers to the aspects of alignment (previously discussed in Section 2.7, 
Chapter Two). Along with the important implications stemming from the findings presented 
in Section 2.7 from Chapter Two, reviewing the literature has also demonstrated that scholars 
have used the concept of alignment by using ‘fit’ terminology. Some examples of varying 
terminology can be found in the studies carried out by Donaldson (1987), Tosi and Slocum, 
1984), Prescot (1990), Roth and Morrison (1992), Zajac et al. (2000), Hitt et al. (2001), 
Birknshaw et al. (2002); all of which referred to the contingency fit instead of alignment. 
Not adopting a uniform terminology, renders confusion regarding what alignment is. As 
previously discussed, in both theories the term ‘fit’ refers to alignment. However, it must be 
acknowledged that some authors such as Vorberda et al. stipulate that ‘fit’ originates from 
Contingency Theory (Vorberda et al., 2011).  
Researching deeper, one can read contingency and institutional fit approaches are both co-
alignment approaches that focus on different types of synergy between the organisation and 
its environment” (Vorberda et al., 2011, p. 1044). This is relevant when proving the theories’ 
commonality and appropriateness. Although this theoretical framework of the dimension of 
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alignment depends on the Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory, it strives towards 
the same purpose; i.e. attaining organisational goals (Semler, 1997) along with achieving 
legitimacy and sustainability. By referring to the dependable, Figure 4-1 illustrates the 
various internal dependable (contingencies) of each theory in terms of its interaction with 
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Figure 4-1 Theoretical derivations of research Framework 
Source: The Researcher 
Figure 4-1 compares any intercorrelations among the theories in order to determine its 
suitability within a CsM and ERM context. As an example of industry applicability of mixing 
theories, the COSO 2016 framework for ERM acknowledges both internal and external 
variables, even if its main focus is internal governance. Although it does not specifically 
mention using theories, the spectrum of variables to which it refers relates to Contingency 
Theory (i.e. it uses the PESTLE model a macro-environmental analysis towards examining 
the Political, Economic, Sociocultural, Technological, Environmental and Legal factors) 
along with internal variables. Moreover, the Institutional Theory is embedded in the COSO 
framework as it forms its core values based on: “the entity’s beliefs and ideas about what is 
good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, which influence the behaviour of the organisation” 
(COSO, 2016, p. 104). As organisations are unique, a combination of Contingency and 
Institutional Theories is advocated by the Researcher with the purpose to explore and explain 
how a correlation of them can ensure performance, sustainability and effective strategic 
alignment between CsM with ERM. 
4.3 Preceding related frameworks 
With reference to the previously identified Framework derivates— (1) literature review 
Chapter Two, (2) literature evaluation Chapter Three, (3) research gap Sections 2.8 and 3.5, 
(4) supporting theories - Section 4.2—this section encompasses a critical synthesis of 
frameworks (5th derivate) that aim to demonstrate the validity and necessity of the CsM - 
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ERM Strategic Alignment Framework for organisations. Moreover, this section is driven by 
Research Objective 3: To review and evaluate the effectiveness of current CsM and ERM 
frameworks. 
More specifically, the first subsection gives a comprehensive account of specific frameworks 
for ERM, CsM and Alignment. However, because the frameworks have often been 
individualistically investigated by previous research, the appraisal and comparisons have 
been made in isolation for each domain and in some cases, even the terminology for 
‘framework’ (model, standard) varies. Lastly, based on the initial evaluation of the preceding 
supportive frameworks made in Chapter Three, the Framework derivations are emphasised, 
along with a synthesis of framework research gaps. 
4.3.1 Enterprise Risk Management frameworks 
This subsection will discuss the ERM frameworks’ value with reference to their contribution 
and limitations, in context of the proposed research Framework, evaluated through the use 
of maturity quadrants tool, (Quadrant 1 Adoption, Quadrant 2 Implementation, Quadrant 3 
Maturity assessment and Quadrant 4 Assesses compliance) and as discussed previously in 
Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
4.3.1.1 ERM academics’ frameworks  
The nature of this subsection is conceptual, hence the theoretical dimension being a 
characteristic of academic frameworks. Numerous authors have shown interest in developing 
ERM frameworks. However, only five are specifically considered and explored, despite 
others being considered for substantiation. Table 4-1 exemplifies them accordingly. 
Table 4-1 ERM frameworks conceptual-specific  
Issuer/year Framework Industry 
focus 
Domain Key function 
Miller (1992) Integrated RM framework in international business generic RM Q1 
Ward (2003) Integrated RM: a multi-dimensional framework generic RM Q2 
Drew and Kendrick (2005) CLASS framework generic ERM Q1 
Ching and Colombo (2014) Conceptual ERM framework combined ERM Q2 
Shad and Woon (2015) ERM implementation framework generic ERM Q3 
     
     
Source: The Researcher 
Table 4-1 brings to attention various insights regarding ERM and they are further explored 
in below paragraphs. 
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Integrated RM framework in international business 
One of the early ERM frameworks is that of Miller (1992), who proposed to integrate RM 
in accordance to managerial decisions. One implication of this framework is that it 
incorporates procedures needed to classify risks in the industry and firm up specific variable 
uncertainties. Accordingly, it considers internal and external risks that might derail an 
organisation from achieving its objectives. This derivation of the framework is integrated 
into the assessment phase of the research Framework. Whilst valuable in terms of theoretical 
contribution, the Miller’s framework represents an initiation towards an integrated and 
mature ERM framework. Being conceptual in its nature, it is characterised by pre-
implementation aspects (e.g. benefits, barriers, uncertainties) addressed within international 
context. Thus, it represents a partial perspective (Q2) that has an industry-generic 
addressability through the lens of strategic management—a siloed approach of strategy is 
therefore lacking in cybersecurity considerations.  
Integrated RM: A Multi-dimensional Framework 
Another contributor is Ward (2003), whose framework has a multi-dimensional approach 
(six dimensions) to transform merely hypothetical strategy into one that is actually applied. 
Based on a sequence of steps, the framework emphasises an understanding of risks illustrated 
in the form of classification to help the achievement of informed treatment measures and 
investment. Acknowledgement of classification aspect deploys further decisions based on 
clear purpose, processes, and responsibilities. While this framework contributes to the 
literature, its lack of detail and practical validity seems to suggest that more complex 
procedures are required to establish an ERM framework. Even though the framework 
endorses the implication of achieving organisational governance, this Researcher argues that 
its structure seems to be that of a general overview without providing a practical approach. 
For instance, in the first pillar, culture is acknowledged as a meaningful way to establish 
norms, values, attitudes, and a framework of ethical behaviour. In addition, the remaining 
pillars are generically described. In short, they are considered but their role in establishing 
the vision, strategies, collaboration, leadership, alignment, or organisational structure is 
briefly discussed. 
CLASS Framework 
Similar to the previous framework of Ward, the framework of Drew and Kendrick (2005) 
questions organisational governance from the viewpoint of five pillars: culture, leadership, 
alignment, structure, and systems (CLASS framework). The importance of RM is explored 
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in the context of organisational strategy and context. Therefore, most considerations are 
focused on highlighting the value of an internal and external environment fit. Moreover, a 
clear understanding of risk profile in the interaction with organisational risk exposure leads 
to appropriate control and more specifically towards an RM aligned with organisational 
governance. However, the CLASS framework lacks clarity regarding how alignment should 
be achieved in practice. In short, it stretches the objectives but omits to indicate the plan of 
implementation as it only focuses on adoption (Q1). 
Conceptual ERM Framework 
Ching and Colombo (2014) provide a framework with a more practical structure of internal 
control. Based on an ERM cycle, the conceptual ERM framework recommends 
consideration for internal factors to enhance assessment, followed by implementation, 
analysis, monitoring, review and lastly, a continuous improvement. Mainly, restricted to 
findings extracted from the practices of organisations, Ching and Colombo’s frameworks 
are descriptive in nature, limited to implementation aspects, and show scarce consideration 
for all potential factors (external). 
ERM implementation framework 
Given the orientation of previous frameworks, the following framework of Shad and Woon 
(2015) is grounded in a practical approach and covers ERM implementation, looking at 
structure, governance, processes, and a method to measure the approach through an 
economic value added (EVA). Within governance, the impact of objectives, use of standards, 
and use of tools to measure performance (KPI) and risk indicator (KRI) are examined. This 
framework address ERM implementation based on identification, analysis, assessment, 
mitigation, and the monitoring of risks; a process that aims to prevent a deviation from 
objectives. 
In response to the aforementioned framework, this research argues that when synthesising 
the frameworks’ focus, their contribution represents a descriptive approach (lack of 
empirical evidence). Therefore, the applicable procedures for establishing an ERM 




4.3.1.2 ERM practitioners’ frameworks 
Practical industry insights are introduced through ERM mandatory-specific frameworks 
(known as standards) and ERM advisory-specific frameworks, the former being more 
voluntary specific due to their commercial nature. 
4.3.1.2.1 ERM mandatory-specific frameworks 
This subsection summarises the main ERM mandatory-specific frameworks.  
Table 4-2 ERM frameworks of mandatory-specific organisations 
Issuer/year Framework Industry 
focus 
Domain Key function 
FERMA (2003) FERMA’s Risk Management standard financial RM Q2 
Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) Casualty Actuarial Society ERM framework generic ERM Q2 
BSI (2009a; 2018a) British Standard ISO 31000:2009, 2018     generic ERM Q2 
COSO (1992, 2004, 2013, 2017) COSO Internal Control-Integrated framework   generic ERM Q2 
RIMS (2006, 2015) RIMS Risk Maturity model generic ERM Q3 
     
     
Source: The Researcher 
Figure 4-2 depict some of standards that have considered ERM applicability. The academic 
literature indicates that the most used are FERMA, ISO, COSO, RIMS and Casualty 
Actuarial Society standards. This subsection it represents an evaluation in terms of relational 
aspects with the proposed framework, where an initial evaluation has been made previously 
in Subsection 3.3.2, Chapter Two. 
FERMA’s Risk Management Standard 
The Federation of European Risk Management Association (FERMA) standard uses basic 
principles of RM processes (e.g. internal and internal factors) in order to establish an 
implementation. Along with a monitoring process of any given modification, it extends its 
structure in contrast to other standards and emphasises the value of formal audit. 
Nonetheless, its dependency on ISO terminology (ISO Guide 73) demonstrates the 
dependency on an additional source and thus is improbable to implement exclusively. Whilst 
incomplete due to its dependency and partial focus (Q2), FERMA’s Risk Management 
Standard is valuable in terms of a simplified process guided by strategic direction and 
internal control. However, it yet seems too focused on the operational dimension of 
processes and risk reporting. 
Casualty Actuarial Society ERM Framework 
Casualty Actuarial Society ERM Framework is conceptual in its nature and incorporates 
processes, tools, and procedures for the purpose of creating value (CAS, 2003). The 
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framework is characterised by a preventative attitude towards risks and recommends prior 
investigation and identification of risks types. Conversely, the downside of the framework 
is that it only addresses the alignment of RM with organisational strategy and is therefore a 
partial framework focusing on implementation (Q2). 
BS ISO series family 
Seeking to extract new derivates for the research Framework, two versions of BS ISO 
Standard 31000 are considered as derivates. Initially, ISO 31000: 2009 builds its structure 
focusing on processual aspects of implementation (purpose: strategic and operational). 
Although withdrawn/superseded in 2018, it incorporated basic principles of RM and served 
as the basis for the updated version: ISO 31000:2018 (Institute of Risk Management, 2018). 
As do other standards, ISO 31000: 2009 makes reference to context, assessment, treatment, 
and monitoring. The superseded version of ISO 31000:2018 highlights importance of risk 
oversight and emphasises accountability, continuous communication, and monitoring. Thus, 
the version of 2009 adds merit. Additionally, ISO 31000: 2009’s consideration in an early 
phase for appraisal of internal and external context represents another valid point of this 
standard. 
Furthermore, the standard’s effectiveness was supported by additional guidance such as BS 
ISO Guide 73:2009 vocabulary (BSI, 2009b), BS ISO 31010 assessment (BSI, 2011b), and 
BS 31100 implementation (BSI, 2011c); a fact that provides convincing evidence that its 
application fosters performance. For example, BS ISO 31100:2011 incorporates additional 
guidance in the form of principles and recommendations for the ISO 31000. Apart from its 
focus on RM processes and correlation with ISO 31000, it pays careful attention to details 
in the monitoring and reviewing processes, so capabilities, effectiveness, and optimised 
processes can be developed to counteract deficiencies in practice. 
The updated version of BS ISO 31000:2018 keeps the initial principles and also expands 
upon the strategic approach to risks as it proposes to serve organisations’ objectives 
achievement and performance (BSI, 2018a). For simplicity purposes, the 2018 version 
focuses on the importance of leadership and commitment and the value of implementing 
effective RM principles (adds a new perspective on value protection). It also reframes 
internal controls in processes (communication, scope, risk assessment, risk treatment, 




Figure 4-2 illustrate in more detail the above discussed. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 ISO Standard 31000:2018 
Source: BSI (2018a) 
Figure 4-2 presents the updated version of ISO Standard 31000:2018. For instance, RM 
principles are changed in the 2018 version. It also diverts focus from internal controls to 
value creation and protection (Institute of Risk Management, 2018). Moreover, the updated 
version shows consideration for RM integration with governance and emphasises the role of 
leadership in achieving RM maturity, both of which are valuable for current research 
Framework as a basic principle for achieving alignment of risk control, oversight and 
governance.   
Process (clause 6) 
Principles (clause 4) 
Framework (clause 5) 
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COSO Internal Control-Integrated Framework 
In an effort to sustain organisations dealing with risk, the initial COSO (2004) Internal 
Control-Integrated Framework has been gaining importance over recent years as it strives to 
achieve an organisation’s objectives based on strategy (direction) and the establishment of 
processes (instruction, assessment, control, communicate, monitor). Figure 4-3 below 
illustrates the COSO framework, which has evolved from basic control functions (in 1992) 
to a complex flow of risk control activities. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 COSO framework evolution 
Source: Keith (2015) cited in COSO (1992; 2004; 2013) 
To compare the COSO framework evolution, Figure 4-3 illustrates its progress from 1992. 
Compared to ISO 31000, there are similarities regarding process deployment. In terms of 
complexity, the COSO framework represents a distinctive document; hence, all 
recommendation in its implementation is incorporated into one single document. In contrast, 
ISO series triggers the use of multiple supporting guidance and standards. Another 
distinction is that it only considerers the internal environment as a basis for implementation 
(e.g. risk appetite, organisational culture and philosophy) and considers external events only 
in light of internal events (incident). As well as ISO 31000, communication and monitoring 
are considered sustainable mechanisms. 
There is most definitely a connection between standards. Therefore, the similarities that exist 
between them validate the applicability of processes; for example, regarding the Casualty 
Actuarial Society ERM Framework, a processual step is directly related to AS/NZS 4360. 
Based on a sequence of steps, the Casualty Actuarial Society Framework understands the 
value of creating a baseline before action is taken (e.g. assessment of context). 
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Relating to the evolution of COSO frameworks (as discussed in Section 2.4 and Subsection 
3.3.2), the recent framework of 2017 raises an idealistic assumption of performance through 
the alignment of strategy mission, vision, and values. 
 
Figure 4-4 COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management Framework 2017  
Source: COSO (2016) 
Figure 4-4 provides an overview of core framework functions in terms of risk oversight. The 
COSO 2017 reduces its components from eight initial components to five. Risk governance 
proposes a top-bottom approach, strategically managed to pertain the desired outcome. With 
a key focus on performance, the Enterprise Risk Management framework incorporates 
human aspects that can hinder in aligning strategy through a cultural component. Thus, it 
proposes an alignment of culture, ethics, and individual behaviour along with strategy 
alignment (COSO, 2016). Thus, it has been acknowledged that culture influences 
organisational alignment and performance. Compared to the 2013 framework, it has 
maintained the same components despite having slightly changed regarding terminology and 
having developed a focus in governance and performance. 
However, the downside of the COSO framework is that while it considers technology for 
administrative purposes, it broadly omits to aggregate. Despite considerable contribution, 
COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management Framework it is incomplete if contextualised in 
setting of research problem. 
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RIMS Risk Maturity Model  
RIMS Risk Maturity Model (RMM) is a tool that helps to understand expectations 
(requirements) and to determine the status of an organisation’s ERM maturity with the 
purpose of further forming developments and actions. Based on a five-level sequence, the 
model compares the results of ERM assessment against criteria for measuring the maturity. 
While RMM provides a perspective on organisational maturity, it also proposes continuous 
improvement plans for risk and control processes. Nevertheless, the purpose of the standard 
is mainly limited to the implementation phase (Q2) and measurement of the risk control 
processes. 
4.3.1.2.2 ERM Advisory-specific frameworks (voluntarily) 
In addition to the ERM standards mentioned above, advisory-specific organisations are 
additional players in developing strategic behaviour to sustain organisational performance. 
Table 4-3 illustrates the main ERM advisory-specific frameworks.  
Table 4-3 ERM frameworks of advisory-specific organisations 




KPMG (2009, 2017a) KPMG’s ERM framework Financial  ERM Q1 
Grant Thornton (2013, 2016) Holistic Enterprise Risk management Financial RM Q2 
EY (2015, 2016)              EY’s ERM framework Financial ERM Q2 
PwC (2009, 2015) PwC’s Comprehensive Framework for Assessing ERM Financial  ERM Q1, Q2, Q3 
McKinsey (2013a, 2013b, 2016) 
 
McKinsey’s Enterprise Risk Management framework Financial  ERM Q2 
     
Source: The Researcher 
As summarised in Table 4-3 the ERM advisory-specific frameworks are identified as key 
contributors that happens to be tailored specifically to financial industry. 
KPMG’s ERM Framework  
KPMG’s ERM Framework 2009 proposes an approach based on risk governance, 
assessment, risk quantification, and control basis for performance enrichment. KPMG 
provides a useful approach to risk control function, emphasising the ERM benefits. Like 
many other frameworks, it recommends using a cyclical approach of a five-step sequence 
that concentrates on the management of organisational risks. A holistic approach that 
acknowledges the dependence on culture, communication, infrastructure, risk aggregation, 
and/or risk reporting (KPMG, 2017a). The way in which the framework develop refers to a 
strategic, operational, and social alignment in one single framework. Granting the value of 
a diverse perspective, this framework may serve as a descriptive guideline for ERM 
categorised as an adoption advocate (Q1). Overall, it provides a generic description that 
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discusses the value of ERM and not necessarily how enterprise-wide features can be 
achieved through strategic means. It specifically aggregates the financial industry’s risk, 
while in comparison with the proposed research Framework it addresses only a partial 
perspective on enterprise risks instead of full addressability.  
Grant Thornton’s Holistic Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
Grant Thornton (2013, 2016) provides a framework based on a top-down approach, 
formulated cyclically (similar to KPMG framework) and relying on governance, strategy, 
and risk culture to support the risk response processes. Grant Thornton’s framework is 
grounded on RM approach and driven by two main industry frameworks: ISO 31000 and 
COSO. On this basis, it recommends achievement of business strategy through the 
incorporation of governance, risk culture and compliance. Apart from its initial strategic 
focus, it considers the integration of operational and social dimension to be variants in RM 
deployment. Therefore, the Grant Thornton’s Holistic Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework has an operational focus (Q2) rather than theoretical. Thus, the theoretical 
premises of this framework are scarce but abundant in details of applicability and execution. 
The issue whether this framework is comparable with the research Framework is impractical, 
as it mainly addresses a partial perspective under a siloed approach of RM. 
EY’s ERM Framework 
Ernst and Young’s (2015, 2016) ERM Framework is an integrative framework of RM within 
the financial industry, guided by the integration of culture within processes, operations and 
strategy. A noticeable characteristic of this framework is that it examines the relationship 
between human side and risk culture aggregated in risk governance (EY, 2016). Overall, it 
promotes an integrative mechanism to support avoidance of decentralised risk control. Apart 
from this highly valuable contributing derivation, it validates the view that internal and 
external factors are desirable elements and are thus should be considered. However, it tackles 
a partial perspective of implementation (Q2) and omits ERM maturity assessment and 
compliance maturity. 
PwC’s Comprehensive Framework for Assessing ERM 
PwC (2009, 2015) forecast that leadership is essential if embedded in risk oversight. Based 
on leadership, the RM aggregates with organisation governance and strategy across all 
business functions. Similar to KPMG’s framework, PwC follows the same format of the 
five-step sequence. They include strategic and operational aspects of execution and define 
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its expectations beforehand through a risk appetite framework. In addition, it shows benefits 
of executives’ involvement by highlighting dependency on risk culture, role responsibilities, 
and organisation structure. Despite its main focus on assessment (Q3), PwC’s 
Comprehensive Framework for Assessing ERM is by far the most complete advisory 
framework; hence it addresses three components of maturity: Quadrant 1 Adoption (Q1), 
Quadrant 2 Implementation (Q2), and Quadrant 3 Maturity assessment (Q3). It omits to 
consider Quadrant 4, assessment of compliance. 
McKinsey’s Enterprise-Risk-Management Framework 
McKinsey’s Enterprise Risk Management Framework is strategic driven and is structured 
similarly to other frameworks in five-cyclical steps (e.g. Grant Thornton, KPMG and PwC 
frameworks). The framework incorporates a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches, hence it combines strategic (e.g. strategy, appetite, governance) and operational 
dimensions (e.g. processes, transparency) of implementation. It incorporates culture, 
communication, compliance, and governance in deploying integrated risk decisions to ensure 
performance, with specific consideration paid to the insurance sector. It engages operational 
aspects of implementation, scrutiny, and maintenance and is thus prescriptive in its form. 
Regardless of its derivation and its specific guidelines for implementation (Q2), by 
influencing practices for an organisation, this framework only partially addresses the 
research problem and is thus limited in applicability. While it is valuable in influencing 
sound practices for an organisation, regrettably it addresses only one limited perspective 
(adoption and ERM) relating to the research problem. 
4.3.1.3 ERM regulators’ frameworks  
In the case of regulators, the requirements for a proper governance of ERM imposed by laws 
and regulations include risk oversight, assurance, transparency and disclosure among many 
other factors; a fact that has triggered the development of norms. Overall, the norms are 
intended to avoid suboptimal practices concerning risk and in turn ensure basic resiliency. 
Along with its authority, the regulators’ recommendations (mandatory or voluntary) derive 
from further developments in the industry (e.g. standards, guidelines, frameworks, models). 
As an illustration, the case of the Combined Code of the Committee on Corporate 
Governance (2003) (also known as Turnbull guidance or the Guidance for directors on the 
Combined Code, 2005) reinforces the value of internal control in organisations in order to 
assure quality, compliance, and efficient operation. Its content emphasises the accountability 
and monitoring responsibility of management in communicating the risk to boards of 
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directors. Nonetheless, although these Acts praise themselves as frameworks, they in fact 
embody mandatory rules that omit the operative aspects of implementation. Therefore, apart 
from legal aspects and guidance, two main frameworks are identified—see below table 
(Table 4-4). 
Table 4-4 ERM regulatory framework, guidance-specific  
No. Issuer/year Framework Industry focus Domain/s Key 
function 
1. HM Treasury (2009) RM Assessment Framework (RMAF) Government and generic RM Q3 
2. HM Treasury (2004) The Orange Book - The Risk Management 
Model 
Government and generic 
 
IA: RM Q3 
      
Source: The Researcher 
Although the above are applicable to the public sector, due to the scarcity of specific 
regulatory framework for the financial industry, the Researcher makes reference to them as 
good ERM practices. Table 4-4 is similar in terms of industry focus (Q3) yet has some 
reminisces of Quadrant 1 which promotes good practices beforehand adoption. 
RM Assessment Framework (RMAF) 
RMAF (HM Treasury, 2009) is a generic framework that proposes to be a standard tool for 
organisations that want to assess their internal RM standard It focuses on leadership, 
partnership, processes, and risk handling to achieve the expected performance and progress 
after implementation. Mainly focused on assessment of RM, it makes use of its ability to 
handle risk (HM Treasury, 2009). Moreover, it aims to foster good practices of internal risk 
control and resources. It highlights the importance of a top-down approach and human 
aspects that contribute to the development of a RM framework. Despite its valuable insights, 
RM Assessment Framework remains an assessment tool (Q2) and adopts a siloed 
perspective, and as such it only considers enterprise risks through the perspective of 
traditional RM. 
The Orange Book - The Risk Management Model 
Perceived as a model, the Orange Book - The Risk Management Model promotes itself more 
as a guidance of internal control. What stands out in both regulatory frameworks is the 
general pattern of indicating what is expected along with the importance of the ongoing 
review of practices. Its directive aspects aim to influence improvements of risk control. By 
understanding the capabilities of internal controls, risk exposure, and more importantly risk 
appetite, public sector organisations will be expected to be more efficient regarding their 
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approach to risk (HM Treasury, 2004). Unfortunately, it mainly considers the RM and its 
measurement and neglects to consider enterprise-wide and cybersecurity aspects. 
4.3.2 Cybersecurity Management frameworks 
This subsection incorporates different sub-domains of CsM and shows the variations across 
academia, industry and regulators. 
4.3.2.1 CsM academics’ frameworks 
To assess the contribution of CsM frameworks, this section particularly evaluates academic 
framework contribution. This isolated perspective is later compared with the qualities and 
limitations of practitioners’ and regulators’ frameworks in order to understand the position 
and value of the proposed CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework. 
Table 4-5 below summaries the identified CsM frameworks that are related or specifically 
referred to as CsM frameworks. Due to limited literature and semantic confusion of the CsM 
domain, the terminology varies. However, these aspects were clarified previously in Chapter 
Two, Sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
Table 4-5 CsM conceptual frameworks 




1. Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) Information Security Governance (ISG) 
framework 
generic IS: RM Q2 
2. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007, 2010) Information security governance 
framework 
generic IT, IS: 
business 
Q2 
3. Ma et al. (2009) Integral framework for IS Management generic IS: business Q1 and Q2 
4. Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM) framework 
generic IT/IS: RM Q1 and Q2 
5. Atoom, Otoom and Abu Ali (2014, 
2017) 
Holistic Cyber Security Implementation 
Framework (HCS-IF) 
generic CsM: RM Q2 
6. Web et al. (2014) Situation Awareness Information 
Security Risk Management (SA-ISRM) 
generic IS: RM Q1 
      
Source: The Researcher 
The evidence illustrated in Table 4-5 provides a summative insight on how CsM is defined, 
categorised, and pertained. A more detailed assessment of derivations and limitations is 
discussed below for research framework justification and validity purposes. 
Information Security Governance (ISG) Framework  
The exemplification of Information Security Governance (ISG) framework of Posthumus 
and Von Solms (2004) points out that integration requires a combined governance in order 
to direct and control the management of IS. Besides its integration recommendations, the 
ISG framework associates technical CIA triad criteria with practice, referring to internal and 
external risks as prerequisites that complement informed decisions. The framework 
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contributes by providing positive supportive evidence of integrating IS with RM. However, 
it omits details in how functions control (governance and management) shall align. 
Consequently, the framework validates the value of integrating IS to organisational 
governance and suggests practical implications of understanding the internal and external 
factors before implementation in order to avoid negligence and uninformed decisions 
(Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004). Perhaps, a valuable insight can be obtained if a 
preliminary analysis of governance maturity is identified and correspondingly a further 
target state (anticipated) proposed. The security is limited to information assets (no valuation 
of other assets is recommended). Thus, the practicality of the framework is limited regarding 
applicability (even if its main focus is on implementation (Q2)) due to its conceptual aspects. 
Overall, the lack of details in regard to its applicability and restriction to a silo approach 
(information assets) of traditional RM that is driven by two determinants (leadership and 
competitive advantage) delimits the framework to a core function of implementation (Q2) 
with some consideration to support adoption (Q1). In short, the Information Security 
Governance (ISG) framework represents a governance baseline, adopted by many studies 
but incomplete in terms of accommodating today’s evolving context. 
Information Security Governance Framework  
Da Veiga and Eloff’s framework is constructed on the premise that the protection of 
information resources can only be initiated through the provision of cultural awareness. 
Thus, the authors claim that a proper cultivation of culture should protect an organisation 
against loss (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). On these premises, awareness, education, training, 
ethics and ethical conduct shall compound a code of conduct as a guidance of managerial 
expectations that influence attitudes and behaviours to risks. Although this represents only a 
side of a holistic plan to increase risk oversight, it delimitates the fact that governance 
encompasses multiple elements. Henceforth, the human behaviour towards cyber risk can 
influence/impede an organisation’s achievements (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010). It represents 
partial applicability (social) of a holistic approach in the context of IS and business. Broadly, 
the Information security governance framework tends to focus mainly on cultural aspects 
yet somehow it over-emphasises its impact and neglects the enterprise-wide strategic 
directions and implications. 
Integral Framework for IS Management 
Furthermore, in the Integral Framework for IS Management, Ma et al. (2009) suggest a 
structure in a five-step process (assess, establish, analyse, develop and implement), with the 
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purpose to align security goals with business strategy. Whilst valuable for strategic 
reflections and its consideration for internal and external requirements, the drawback of this 
framework is that it considers only IS and does not accept integrating RM or ERM. It 
combines strategic aspects, and operational dimension in the context of IT/IS, but remains 
traditionally embedded in the protection of information and information systems (i.e. refers 
to computer security) and recommends alignment with business strategy. A more 
comprehensive approach would include alignment with other control functions (RM, ERM) 
that would sustain the organisational goal achievement. Nerveless, it neglects to incorporate 
the new dimension of cybersecurity that moved from computerisation and informatisation 
phase, towards a cyberisation paradigm. Additionally, the non-empirical evidence 
categorises the framework as a conceptual framework. Synthesising the Integral Framework 
for IS Management, this conceptual framework builds its structure on a simple construct (IS) 
to validate the theoretical value of aligning security goals with business strategy for 
integrated objectives. Another drawback is that the order of steps recommended duplicate 
themselves (e.g. assess and analyse) due to assessment meaning identification, analysis, and 
evaluation. Overall, the framework of Ma et al. presents a contribution to IS domain but is 
limited to an IS silo approach and unclear path of direction, hence the framework initially 
being described as strategic but in reality, it refers to operational and technical aspects. 
Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) Framework 
The Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) framework of Saleh and Alfantookh 
(2011) is based on the STOPE view, which considers strategy, technology, organisation, 
people, and environment as a scope to construct the cyclic DMAIC (define, measure, 
analyse, improve and control) processes. Formulating this approach to implementation and 
control, the framework identifies itself as conceptual. Like many other frameworks, it 
validates the value of risk profile identification and additionally highlights the importance 
of responsibility for identification and classification of assets in a descriptive manner. 
Concerning the framework structure, is identified as a preparatory descriptive that fosters 
adoption yet is inclusive with a procedural dimension and thus focused on implementation 
guidance (Q2). Nonetheless, the framework’s drawback is that it mainly has an operational 
focus and is valid in its applicability only with additional support. Therefore, an 
implementation requires prior preparation (planning), planned investments, and an 
implementation strategy that relies on initial organisational objectives - for all of which it 
represents a strategic approach; an aspect neglected by the Information Security Risk 
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Management (ISRM) framework. Much work on the potential of IT/IS management 
implementation in RM context affects organisational strategy (measurement), and 
consideration for the alignment paradigm might be carried out if a wider assets reflection 
were to be considered. 
Holistic Cyber Security Implementation Framework (HCS-IF) 
The Holistic Cyber Security Implementation Framework (HCS-IF) of Atoom, Otoom and 
Abu Ali (2014) intends to control risk and to recommend strategies that evaluate its 
implementation’s maturity. Even if the framework is to be employed by governmental 
bodies, the basic principle of goal identification triggers prioritisation based on valuation. 
As a result, implementation occurs post-evaluation of existing control state, as an effect of 
valuation that stimulates the appropriate formation of strategic controls. Demonstrably, this 
represents a superficial approach due to the lack of details provided by the framework but 
nonetheless accounts for a positive initiative to signpost the value of a holistic approach to 
control and audit risk.  
However, in comparison to other frameworks, it at least uses appropriate terminology (i.e. 
even if in a different form ‘cyber security’, opposed to the form used by the present research 
‘cybersecurity’). Recommendation to assess an organisation’s existing state sets the context 
for future maturity levels. Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004, considered a similar approach 
in their framework. Another point worthy of consideration is that it identifies basic principle, 
despite its incomplete sequence (e.g. monitoring, improvement). Therefore, it argues that 
implementation is sufficient and runs automatically. 
Covering only one phase (respectively implementation (Q2)), this framework represents a 
partial solution for the research problem as is omits to explain how it relates to RM and more 
specifically how it integrates with business objectives. RM is a traditional approach to risks 
(Lundqvist and Vilhelmsson, 2016), and thus, an incomplete strategy. Additionally, CsM is 
addressed as operational and technical, and the framework lacks risk governance alignment 
correlation with business strategy. Perhaps less focus on software engineering, operational 
aspects, and IT-related concentration would redirect attention to a more transparent and 
strategic directions and implications. 
Situation Awareness Information Security Risk Management (SA-ISRM) 
From the above findings, it is clear that directing, executing, and controlling a framework is 
a complex process. As emphasised in the previous framework of Atoom, Otoom and Abu 
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Ali, the processes are often formulated superficially. In support of this view, Web et al. 
(2014) focus mainly on assessment and the development of a framework even if it were to 
represent a partial solution. The Situation Awareness Information Security Risk 
Management (SA-ISRM) provides confirmatory evidence that before any action is to be 
taken, an assessment is imposed to identify and collect details about the environment, 
looking at the past and current organisational profile, governance results, and the way it 
prioritises its actions. So, it considers all sources of risk (Web et al.,2014a) pertaining to 
internal and external pressure. However, despite being valuable for a pre-implementation 
phase (Q1), it is incomplete because it only addresses the protection of information resources 
in a single phase; a fact that indicates it is incomplete on its own. 
4.3.2.2 CsM practitioner’s frameworks 
This subsection portrays the practitioners’ influence on practices and extract derivations. In 
some cases, the baseline practices are described as frameworks or standards. Table 4-5 
illustrates this fact.  
4.3.2.2.1 CsM frameworks of mandatory-specific organisations 
This subsection is particularly focused on mandatory-specific frameworks, respectively 
standards. Below, the identified main standards are illustrated. 
Table 4-6 CsM frameworks of mandatory-specific organisations 
Issuer/Year Framework Industry  
focus 
Domain/s Key  
function 
BSI (2011a, 2013b, 2017a) ISO family standard series generic IS Q2, Q3 
NIST (2013, 2014) NIST family standard series generic CsM Q2, Q3 
OCTAVE (1999, 2003, 2007) OCTAVE series generic IS Q3 
ICAS (2011) ICAS Information Security standard generic IS Q3 
PAS 555 (2013) PAS 555 standard generic CsM Q2 
IASME Standard (2013) IASME framework generic IS Q3 
ISF (2011) Information Security Forum Standard of Good 
Practices for Information Security 
generic IS Q2 
     
Source: The Researcher 
From Table 4-6 shown above, it can be seen that CsM frameworks are scarce and most often 
are grounded on traditional views of IS. Based on these finding, the following section 
examines the practical and theoretical relevance of the frameworks in more detail.  
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ISO family standard series 
Among practitioners’ frameworks, the ISO family standard series provides guidance about 
planning, implementing, controlling, and assessing risk by supporting and supplementing 
different aspects of their interrelationship based on the basic principle used across ISO 
standards: plan, do, check, and act (initially cultivated by Deming’s PDCA cycle method) 
(Salaheddine and Ilias, 2017). Based on this principle, the standard family is constructed and 
has different purposes that result in, for example, all ISO standards being aligned towards a 
baseline standard to support the applicability over various dimensions. 
The initial BS ISO/IEC 27000 establishes vocabulary and a sound baseline for the whole 
series related to IS. Furthermore, ISO/IEC 27001:2013/2017 (BSI, 2013b; 2017a) 
establishes requirements for preparing implementation and maintenance. The characteristic 
of this standard and its contribution lies in the fact that behind the main goal of 
implementation, internal and external issues that can interfere with the action are considered. 
Additionally, it is driven by the assessment of organisational needs and establishes 
resilience. In this research, the assessment process of organisational needs (scope, 
boundaries, and applicability) and risk assessment structure is extracted as a derivation from 
this standard. 
Although not designed for the financial industry, BS ISO/IEC 27001 is one of the most 
heavily used (CSIS, 2015) and its employment demonstrates compliance and risk 
preparedness. One drawback of this standard is that it perceives security through information 
systems/information security yet combines both strategic and operational perspectives. 
Besides, it is grounded on the old approach of information security which focuses on the 
security of information and system within which they operate. Whereas cybersecurity sees 
outside its systems or information assets hence, it intends to protect more than just 
information (discussed previously in Section 2.6, Chapter Two). 
BS ISO/IEC 27003:2017 (BSI, 2017d) consolidates the implementation guidance initiated 
by BS ISO/IEC 27000, 27001 and 27002 as indispensable due to its value for documentation 
and direction for planning the implementation. The planning process is based on a five-step 
process: approval, scope identification, analysis of the organisation, assessment, and final 
design of implementation. The standard developed a logical structure, which is to be 
followed before implementation. This evidence supports the framework with its legacy 
regarding scope clarification, organisational planning, analysis, and design. 
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BS ISO/IEC 27004 advances an understanding of implementation maturity by evaluating 
and verifying the performance by subjective (human judgement) or objective (numerical) 
value (BSI, 2016b). 
The purpose of BS ISO/IEC 27005 is to align IS with RM and develop a procedure based on 
a four-step process of plan, do, check, and act (BSI, 2011a; 2018c), which has its roots in a 
quality control approach. The simple procedure starts by establishing the plan that builds its 
structure on identifying the context. The ‘do’ refers to the implementation based on the 
previous phase of assessment that leverages implementation of a treatment plan. It then 
incorporates ‘check’, which relates to the process of monitoring and reviewing of the 
process. Finally, ‘act’ is a continual process based on previous processes which were 
developed to improve existing practices and recommend good, new practices. For the 
purpose of this research, all processes stem from this standard. 
Although several standards and frameworks have proposed different approaches to 
strategically align IS and RM in an effort to explain the dynamic of implementation, the BS 
ISO/IEC 27005 differentiates itself because it proposes first to identify the organisation’s 
boundaries and scope before undertaking any actions. It considers the organisation’s 
objectives, function and structure, legal regulatory and contractual requirements, policy, 
approach to RM, assets, locations, constraints, cultural environment, and, finally, 
expectations. The drawback is that it considers assets from an information perspective, while 
RM considers assets as well as people, technology, and processes. Regrettably, IS on its own 
has a silo approach (risk considered in isolation) and its emphasis is on the security of assets 
that are stored electronically (information systems) as opposed to CsM, which considers all 
types of assets. While the standard has proposed to act holistically, in fact, it uses a two-silo 
approach to risk: IS and RM that considers tangible and intangible (digital) assets. 
While all ISO standards refer to security from an information system point of view, the BS 
ISO/IEC 27032 standard differentiates itself by using the terminology ‘cybersecurity’. The 
standard provides confirmatory evidence for inconsistency among practitioner’s 
terminology and articulates that IS mainly concerns the protection of information (e.g. 
personal information, trade secrets, employee data, financial data) and therefore the standard 
represents another fact that proves CsM to be different from IS. However, apart from this 
terminology evidence and other definitions of concepts, the standard represents a technical 
guidance, and in this research mainly theoretical aspects are considered. 
138 
 
NIST family standard series 
Clarification of terminology plays a significant role, and NIST family standard series 
demonstrates the feasibility of cybersecurity terminology. For instance, the Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) version 1.0 developed by NIST is widely used and 
differentiates itself by the fact that it addresses industries that are part of a critical 
infrastructure. With the purpose of managing risks, the framework applies the practices of 
RM and suggests an alignment with business objectives. Based on this recommended 
approach, business, and technology are aligning together towards the same goal (NIST, 
2014). By these means, it addresses the strategic and operational approach.  
For this research, considerations about profile identification (organisational risk profile) and 
target profile function (anticipated state) are extracted from this framework. Furthermore, 
detection and response incorporate technical and operational aspects and fr this reason were 
dismissed. The last function of recovery might incorporate all three dimensions: strategic, 
operational, and technical. 
OCTAVE series 
Incidentally, OCTAVE series are considered for their contribution to qualitative risk 
assessment of information assets. There are three Octaves (Octave, Octave-S, and Allegro) 
that form the Octave assessment family. Firstly, the frameworks propose to optimise the 
procedure of an assessment process for risks. They focus on qualitative evaluation and thus 
consider an evaluation based on the qualitative identification of assets, vulnerabilities, and 
threats (Octave Allegro, 2007). Even if the framework uses a qualitative method and is 
exposed to subjectivity due to a lack of numerical rules (objective), it measures its success 
against how many times it is adopted by organisations.  
Secondly, it mainly considers operational risk regarding assets. The profile of the framework 
derives from asset protection. Its focus is on the assets profile and threats, and the means to 
mitigate assets’ risks through an operational perspective. Thus, the framework omits the 
holistic view of CsM approach by primarily considering the information assets risk profile. 
Despite questions regarding the holistic approach, the Octave series’ contribution lies in the 
fact that it establishes basic principles of risk assessment. This is an essential step that, in 
combination with other measures, leads to a more consistent way to strategically respond to 
risks. These partial answers outline the methodology of identifying the organisational 
approach to risks; followed by a second step of assessment, which creates the asset’s profile 
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and in turn leads to an optimised process of prioritisation (should the case arise). As 
previously shown, the OCTAVE is based on operational and to some extent technical aspects 
of risk assessment. For the purpose of this research, assessment considerations are extracted 
from this framework series. 
ICAS Information Security standard 
ICAS Information Security Standard complies with the Octave series and has an operational 
focus. The control is set based on previous steps of risk profile and asset identification. While 
its structure is similar to that of other standards, it contributes to the clarification and 
validation of the control selection stage. 
PAS 555 standard 
Equally as relevant, other standards such as the PAS 555 broaden the applicability of a 
framework from internal to external, thus considering an extended approach that verifies all 
associates’ entities (e.g. partners, third party, suppliers) security measures. As well as other 
frameworks, it considers Asset Management (identification, measurement and protection) 
across all stages. Additionally, asset management is part of the risk assessment stage that 
incorporates threat management and vulnerability management. Therefore, it considers 
assets, the assets’ exposure, and possible vulnerabilities. Moving on, the framework 
proposes mitigation measures that ensure people security, physical security, and technical 
security to assure resilience preparedness. Once again, the incorporation of all these 
components confirms that CsM is complex and in turn, combines information assurance and 
technology security (BSI, 2013a) and is therefore different from IS. To better understand the 
discrepancies of terminology, a comparison can be made with the ISO family series. For this 
research, elements such as risk assessment, mitigation, detection, and response are extracted 
from this framework. The recovery phase is excluded due to its operational and technical 
aspects.  
IASME framework 
The dynamics of cybersecurity challenges determine over the years a multitude of guidance 
and frameworks. However, few consider advocating this approach for SMEs. Whereas most 
standards are generic and address large organisations, the IASME framework offers useful 
guidance to assess, adjust, test effectiveness, and recommend security needs. Nonetheless, 
its tendency is operational and technical, differing from the scope of this research. For this 
research, the sub-domains of assessment as risk identification, assets evaluation, monitoring, 
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and continuity are extracted from this framework. Additionally, the score matrix that 
evaluates the maturity of an organisation’s security is a good example to consider (for 
example, initial, minimal, in use, managed, control, and optimised). 
Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practices for Information Security 
Given the lack of attention paid to effective control of security models, the Information 
Security Forum Standard of Good Practices for Information Security (ISF, 2011) contributes 
through its focus on compliance and Asset Management. By initiating this approach, it shows 
an integration of strategic and operational structure through simplicity and efficiency (ISF, 
2011). Regrettably, there is a divergence regarding what the framework proposes to do, and 
thus it addresses a significant part of its content to compliance (for example, references to 
policies and documentation) and omits an in-depth focus on other attributes, contrary to its 
initial statement to deploy a strategic model based on governance of risk. Another drawback 
is that even though it discusses IS, the fact that it refers to the protection of assets, people, 
processes, and technology is actually a reference to CsM.  While the framework is more 
informative in this context, it is worthy to consider the benefits of the framework, 
respectively the potential of regulatory requirements to form a basis for assessment criteria 
and additional consideration of Asset Management. The underlying concept recommends a 
determination and classification of assets to determine the potential loss in case of an 
incident. While these steps have operational aspects, they also incorporate a strategic 
approach to identifying the purpose of CsM strategy before design and implementation. They 
also serve to determine the level of investment required based on the evaluation. As per 
derivations for the research Framework, compliance criteria considerations and asset 
valuation are extracted from this framework as a guide for assigning a value to organisational 
assets. 
4.3.2.2.2 CsM vendor advisory-specific frameworks (voluntarily) 
This subsection emphasises main practitioners’ frameworks that are vendor-consultancy 
specific for a general comparison. Within this scope, Table 4-7 summarises main 
frameworks related to CsM under several terminologies such as focus and functions. As thus, 





Table 4-7 CsM frameworks of advisory-specific organisations 
Issuer/year Framework Industry focus Domain/s Key function 
Ernst and Young (2014b) Cyber Program Management framework Generic IS: RM Q2 
KPMG (2015, 2016) Global Cyber Maturity framework Generic IS: RM Q3 
PwC (2014) Cyber Risk Management framework Financial industry IS: ERM Q2 
Deloitte (2015e) Cyber Risk Management framework Generic CsM: RM Q4 
Grant Thornton (2016) Cyber Risk Management framework Generic IT: RM Q1 
     
Source: The Researcher 
As Table 4-7 illustrates, few consultancy organisations endorse good practices of risk 
governance. Further analysis of the frameworks underlines differences in their quadrant 
focus, ranging from adoption stimulation (Q1), implementation (Q2), maturity assessment 
(Q3) or maturity compliance (Q4). 
Ernst and Young’s Cyber Program Management Framework 
Ernst and Young’s Cyber Program Management (CPM) framework of 2014 focuses on 
implementation (Q2) and is based on IS and RM principles. Aiming to enhance performance, 
flexibility and scalability, the framework suggests that alignment of security with business 
is a feasible solution (EY, 2014b). The framework advocates a strategic approach to sustain 
a multi-tiered alignment of structure, culture, and risks continuously. Consequently, if an 
organisation has difficulties in synchronisation of architecture, operation, and awareness 
(EY, 2014 a, b), a strategic centralisation shall identify enterprise-wide risk exposure and in 
turn respond accordingly. While the purpose is to widely ‘identify, protect, sustain, and 
optimise’ an organisation’s risk control, the framework is restricted to technological-centric 
and information assets protection. Therefore, the drawback of EY’s framework is that 
although it considers IS, RM and their alignments, it refers mainly to a partial valuation of 
assets. It thus omits to address identification and protection properly; respectively an 
integrated approach. 
KPMG’s Global Cyber Maturity Framework 
KPMG (2015) Global Cyber Maturity framework has a strategic and operational focus and 
differentiates itself through its consideration of six domains: human factors, leadership, 
governance, business continuity, operations, and regulatory considerations, all of which are 
led by enterprise-wide communications among all departments. Moreover, its function of 
assessment (Q3) helps organisations identify their cybersecurity maturity. Additionally, the 
initial framework from 2014 suggests that a cybersecurity framework should be embedded 
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in organisation culture and thus the strategic decision would be taken in a more informed 
manner. Hence the risk oversight strategy integrates all units/departments (KPMG, 2015). 
An additional version of 2016 placed more emphasis on boards involvement. While this 
framework is beneficial in understanding the maturity of strategic alignment, it remains 
dependant on being implemented together with other framework/s and thus mainly 
concentrates on promoting baseline practices of risk oversight (Q1) and maturity assessment 
(Q3). Apart from its partial applicability, it considers alignment through a strategic and 
operational perspective, with an emphasis on leadership and communication correlation with 
business continuity and crisis management, operation and technology, and compliance. 
Furthermore, KPMG’s Global Cyber Maturity framework 2016 demonstrates consideration 
of information protection in the context of RM and omits to consider the wider spectrum of 
assets and enterprise security while also failing to explain communication and leadership 
deployment in the context of the framework. 
PwC’s Cyber Risk Management Framework 
PwC (2014) Cyber Risk Management framework’s main purpose is to encourage and 
support organisational resiliency, specifically regarding the needs of the financial industry. 
Its strategic approach relies on the involvement of management executives and aims to 
leverage an optimised governance that incorporates and correlates RM functions across the 
all the organisation. Consequently, it involves executive management, and its philosophy is 
based on the need for leadership in deploying and implementing the framework. Thus, the 
pillars of the framework are grounded on the provision of governance, the establishment of 
perimeters boundaries, identification of what needs to be protected, identification of 
potential dangers, and a plan to communicate and respond. In short, it considers its priorities, 
its response planning, resources allocation, and required investments. Its core function is 
therefore categorised in Quadrant 2 implementation and as such fails to address the key 
aspects of ERM (Q1, Q3, Q4). However, this specific framework it only partially addresses 
implementation (Q2). While it considers both capabilities of IS and ERM, in a business 
context it partially addresses cybersecurity hence it focuses only on IS and uses the term 
‘cyber’. Also, it considers two components yet omits to discuss their strategic alignment and 
how this approach is applied. Instead, it focuses more on operational aspects. As a result, the 
PwC’s Cyber Risk Management framework represents an incomplete strategic alignment. 
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Deloitte’s Cyber Risk Management Framework 
Deloitte’s framework provides insight into control and assessment to ensure against cyber 
threats, and does so based on ‘three lines of defence’: management, RM and internal audit. 
Although valuable, the assessment represents a partial perspective (Q4) of the research 
problem. Deloitte’s framework reflects an exploration of channels of communication, RM 
capabilities, and deployment of an internal audit. The framework would have been more 
relevant if a wider range of components (not just people, processes, and technology) and 
more enablers were taken into account (e.g. cyberspace, practices, assets, information, 
culture). Apart from its consideration of assets valuation, an avoidance of pattern-based 
decision (IT-driven) would be recommendable. Nevertheless, involvement of board 
executives in incidents is unfeasible and operational driven. Perhaps executives involvement 
wold be justified only in exceptional cases of significant incidents. In such cases, the settled 
strategical proposal approach is contradictory. With this approach, Deloitte’s Cyber Risk 
Management framework fails to state differentiation between strategic and operational 
elements. For instance, external threats are emphasised more than internal threats. Moreover, 
they promote a cyber prioritisation that is technically focused (e.g. forensic, incident 
response) and omit considering how they relate to business strategy, how they align, and 
how the framework is embedded in organisational plan, strategy, or policy. The framework 
also fails to grasp ERM fully and complements it with COSO’s 2013 framework. The 
framework is mainly descriptive, with few considerations for the strategic approach 
(valuation, risk profile and risk appetite) and an incomplete distinction in how cybersecurity 
and ERM contribute together.  
Grant Thornton’s Cyber Risk Management Program 
The approach described in Grant Thornton’s framework may provide information about the 
association of cyber risk strategy aligned to business strategy. However, the entire content 
is IT-driven and focused towards the achievement of organisational performance. This in 
turn represents a weakness in contrast to the research Framework. There is no indication of 
how the framework will be implemented and thus it mainly fosters the adoption of a holistic 
approach (Q1). Although the framework encourages an enterprise-wide approach and calls 
for a management shift towards being integrated, there is an unclear differentiation between 
strategic and operational elements. Respectively, a technical component (i.e. policies, 
firewalls, assets management tools seen as key components of cyber risk management 
program) is, in fact, a confusion of strategic and operational components. Among the 
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relatively minor weaknesses of the programme are the fact that the terminology and 
meanings are insufficiently defined (e.g. cyber confusion with digital; cyber risk instead of 
cybersecurity; RM with ERM) and emphasise IT (thus, a silo approach). For instance, “ERM 
systems typically focus on data, systems and compliance without taking a holistic approach” 
(Grant Thornton, 2016, p. 7) and is defined as a reactive and siloed approach, seemingly a 
risk-based software perspective different from the strategic approach of ERM. The proposed 
consideration for security emphasises the second stage of cybersecurity development, 
respectively IS. Although IT-centric, the framework illustrates the context of security of 
information (e.g. customers’ details, vendor data, trade secrets) and information systems, as 
well as failing to consider the wider security perspective of assets considered by modern 
cybersecurity (only consider protection of digital assets). In short, the approach is rooted in 
both IT and IS alignment to business and demonstrates positive consideration regarding 
modern cybersecurity through the inclusion of people protection. Overall, the Grant 
Thornton’s programme (framework) is likely to be strategic due to its operational embedded 
approach and IT considerations. Additionally, the application of the programme is briefly 
discussed, and thus it covers a first stage, respectively adoption (Q1) and a silo perspective 
of adoption (performance).  
While KPMG, PwC and Deloitte are guided by leadership and governance capabilities as 
their core functions, EY’s framework adopts a different stance and articulates how 
performance can be attained by describing a sequence of steps that should be undertaken to 
achieve a performance in implementation. The consultancy frameworks advances leadership 
and performance attainment, implementation, and assessment/verification functions and 
distinctive terminologies (i.e. KPMG’s framework is the only framework that emphasises 
‘cybersecurity’). Moreover, among all four frameworks, PwC’s framework solely considers 
the financial industry. 
4.3.2.3 CsM regulators’ frameworks  
Apart from the regulatory contribution from many laws and guidelines, regulators have also 
contributed to regulatory frameworks. 
Information Assurance Maturity Model and Assessment Framework 
The CESG Cyber Security Model is a unique model that incorporates details concerning how 
maturity can be achieved and how its compliance can be assessed (CESG, 2015). Although 
its addressability is directed at governmental bodies, its structure can be applied to 
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organisations. This model validates the framework of Luftman (2000) due to similarities and 
this in turn emphasises that an organisation’s profile is significant. Besides this, it contributes 
to the assessment phase and therefore recommends a maturity assessment of leadership and 
governance, training, education and awareness, Information Risk Management, 
implemented controls, and compliance. In contrast, other standards and frameworks have 
addressed the assessment of risk controls. Thus, the Information Assurance Maturity Model 
and Assessment framework of CESG provides more than assessment, advocating a before 
and during preparation approach along with education and knowledge sharing. Nevertheless, 
it remains embedded in maturity assessment (Q3), dependent on ISO/IEC 27001: 2005 and 
oriented to a siloed approach of information assurance and RM. 
4.3.3 Strategic alignment frameworks  
Owing to the fact that the research regarding alignment is limited to IT business alignment 
(Karpovsky and Galliers, 2015), this subsection aims to demonstrate its roots and 
developments. Consequently, past approaches are analysed even though they mainly focus 
on the traditional paradigm of IT and in most cases omit security consequences. This 
additional subsection is complementary to CsM due to IT implications and an addition to an 
enterprise-wide alignment (ERM). As a result, the exploration of alignment paradigm 
identified that an array of approaches (such as social, strategic, operational and cultural) are 
disparate or compound as an organisational baseline, for a relational mechanism. This is to 
ensure quality assurance, sustainability, and performance. Table 4-8 below provides a brief 
outline of frameworks identified. 
Table 4-8 Alignment neutral frameworks 
Author/s/year Framework Domain/s Key 
function 
Baets (1992,1996) Information System Strategic Alignment Model  IT: business Q1 
Henderson and Venkatraman (1990,1993,1999) Strategic Alignment Model (SAM) IT: business Q2 
Luftman (2000) Strategic Alignment Maturity Model (SAMM) IT: business Q3 
Reich and Benbasat (2000)  Alignment between business and IT objectives research 
model 
IT: business Q2 
Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard (2004) Gestalt model of strategic model IT: business Q2 
Preston and Karahanna (2009) IS Strategic Alignment: a nomological network IT: business Q1 
Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang (2014) Model of Business Information Technology Alignment  IT: business Q3 
Mekawy, AlSabbagh and Kowalsky (2014) Business-IT Alignment (BITA) IT: business Q3 
Reynolds and Yetton (2015) Business and IT Strategy Alignment in MBOs IT: business Q3 
    
Source: The Researcher 
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In particular, the analysis of alignment was problematic due to its roots in IT and business 
alignment. Although not possible to investigate the relationship of CsM and ERM alignment, 
an observation on these frameworks provided an insight into the complexity of alignment. 
The findings support the view that alignment has consistent roots in IT and is thus 
fragmented into adoption (Q1), implementation (Q2), and assessment (Q3) phases. 
Moreover, the exploration of alignment frameworks identified various dimensions: strategic, 
structural, and cross-domain; strategic and operational; and social-strategic dimension. For 
this reason, the following subsections are organised based on their alignment dimension 
types. 
• Dimension One: intellectual (strategic) dimension 
Luftman’s Strategic Alignment Model   
Luftman’s model differentiation is that it proposes to construct the assessment and categorise 
five levels of maturity. The practical approach (in contrast with Henderson and Venkatraman 
1993 framework) proposes to assess an organisation’s existing state and establish further 
actions based on results. For instance, the lowest maturity is on an initial ad hoc level that 
represents inexistent alignment. In a second level, a commitment process is initiated, 
upgrading to established focused processes (level three), improved processes (level four), 
and lastly, the ideal state of optimised processes. All these levels represent the organisation’s 
level of maturity based on the evaluation. To increase maturity, an organisation must 
improve communication, competence, governance, partnership, architecture, and skills 
maturity (Luftman, 2000). Although the Strategic Alignment Model involves a contributing 
outline of enablers and inhibitors in the alignment process, it remains a partial perspective 
with a focus on assessment (Q3). Moreover, the alignment neglects to consider the security 
aspects in the business context being more concerned with evaluation rather than adoption, 
implementation, or compliance. 
• Dimension Two: Structural dimension  
Business and IT Strategy Alignment in MBOs framework 
To justify the adoption of alignment, Business and IT Strategy Alignment in MBOs 
framework outlines the advantages and disadvantages of alignment for a multi-business 
organisation. Reynolds and Yetton (2015) analysed the potential of business and IT strategy 
alignment within the business departments (structure) and corporate governance. The 
findings suggest that it triggers economic value and competitive advancement. This might 
be explained by the use of the theory of profit that conditions the process of financial gain. 
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While the financial gain is an important driver, there are many other indirect benefits 
disregarded by the framework (e.g. unified valuation, unified risk prioritisation, efficiency, 
response, reputation). It can thus be suggested that the framework of Reynolds and Yetton 
is limited to IT and business strategy alignment and value creation. The limited focus 
suggests that the framework could have been expanded by including the IT and 
organisational strategies in the context of security; ideally through the means of CsM and 
ERM in order to contribute to enterprise-wide security. Another possible improvement to 
the framework could have been the strategic approach rather than a functional, structural, or 
dynamic alignment. It focuses more on structural alignment of governance, resources, and 
capabilities but is nonetheless valuable. The approach outlined by the framework 
recommends a silo approach to IT and a partial focus of alignment assessment (Q3), 
dependent on strategy and infrastructure. 
Gestalt Model of Strategic Alignment  
Some models such as those presented by Bergeron, Raymond, and Rivard (2004) focus on 
developing the applicability of six patterns related to structure and strategy. The research 
model considers many variables to fit (Gestalt theory) as a whole that lead to proper 
alignment (Bergeron, Raymond, and Rivard (2004). The Gestalt model of strategic 
alignment is based on six aspects of alignment: moderation, mediation, matching, 
covariation, profile deviation, and gestalts. Alignment of strategy and structure is assumed 
to be the contributing factor to organisational performance. One of the flaws of this 
framework is that it is grounded on the initial phase of ‘computerisation’ development. 
Alignment is tackled as a solution for business sustainability and performance. It only 
addresses the descriptive value of alignment for utility purposes and outweighs security 
considerations. Understanding the complexity of strategy and structure alignment is one of 
the contributions made by Gestalt Model of Strategic Alignment; hence it provides useful 
guidance and confirming that IT and organisational strategies bring benefits. Despite its 
contribution, it omits to consider the external and internal variables, the current situation of 
an organisation, and how the alignment can be measured. Therefore, it partially addresses 
the alignment implementation (Q2), being descriptive. 
• Dimension Three: strategic and operational focus  
Information System Strategic Alignment Model 
The model of Baets (1992, 1996) recognises the value of intellectual (strategic) and 
operational dimensions convergence that relies on strategy and infrastructure processes 
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alignment. The framework suggests that the attainment of alignment necessitates well-
defined instructions to provide support in the form of a ‘map’. Inappropriately, this 
recommendation does not apply to the framework developed in 1996, which progressed to a 
strategic managerial mindset. While the framework (described as a model) shows valuable 
contribution towards the alignment adoption in the financial industry, the underlying flaw is 
that in the current context, it is mainly evocative and acts as a precursor of good practices, 
with limited applicability regarding the adoption phase (Q1). Embedded in the context of IT 
alignment with organisational strategy, the framework has tended to focus on infrastructure 
and processes, and less on strategic implication, asset valuation or effectiveness 
measurement. Due to this framework having initially been developed in 1992, it emphasises 
the traditional view of IT integration, where strategy, infrastructure and processes need to be 
integrated into business activities. Nevertheless, it fails to address the later consideration for 
security. 
Strategic Alignment Model      
The Strategic Alignment Model is constructed based on intellectual and operational 
alignment since it focuses on strategy and infrastructure (Henderson and Venkatraman, 
1993). The theoretical baseline of this model relies on the initial MIT 90s project (Reynolds 
and Yetton, 2015) and is noticeably focused on internal and external fit. It consequently 
analyses the alignment of IT and business strategy, along with the infrastructure and 
processes involved in the process. In short, the early perspective of the authors examines the 
relationship between the executive collaboration and processes alignment across all 
organisational levels. Henderson and Venkatraman assess the feasibility of the intellectual 
and operational paradigm alignment. The relevance of the initial framework version 
(Henderson 1989) is supported by the subsequent 1993 framework version that appears to 
be the most completed and most used. The improved version from 1993 (Henderson and 
Venkatraman) provided a deeper insight into the four perspectives of alignment: execution, 
transformation, exploitation, and focus. The additional version sheds additional light on the 
contentious aspects of strategy, infrastructure, and processes alignment. Although 
conceptual, the Strategic Alignment Model has served as a base for further research and 
supported the practicability of alignment indirectly. A limitation of using this framework is 
that all four types of alignment are descriptively discussed and disorganised regarding 
execution. Thus, organisations are advised to select one type from each of the four available 
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options. Moreover, the scope of the framework is limited to IT and business alignment and 
thus omits to integrate security aspects. 
Business-IT Alignment Model 
Mekawy, AlSabbagh, and Kowalski (2014) constructed Business-IT Alignment Model 
conceptual model that intended to validate SAM (Henderson and Venkatram’s model) 
through the investigation of another perspective that combined the classic approach with 
Security Values Chain Model (SVCM). The additional integration of SVCM transformed 
the approach from intellectual to intellectual-operational alignment. The model provides 
insights into whether the role of organisational objectives, communication, competence, 
governance, partnership, architecture, skills, or shared vision are effective. Although 
beneficial, all components are underpinned through an intellectual-operational paradigm 
while also incorporating aspects of cultural and social paradigms. Despite the fact the 
Business-IT alignment model focuses on the alignment of IT with organisational objectives, 
the model intends to recommend a bottom-up rather than top-to-bottom (strategic) approach. 
Such an approach is based more on setting the directions based on maturity evaluations; even 
though a strategic approach first sets its target (directions) and then implements it, optimising 
and measuring its achievement in accordance with the initial target. Accordingly, a post-
implementation assessment can be done. The recommended approach is the opposite, a fact 
that may lead to unclear objectives and strategies. Being more a prescriptive framework, it 
focuses mainly on benefits rather than how the communication, competence, governance, 
partnership, architecture, skills, and shared vision maturity contribute to a common control 
function (resiliency). The framework suggests a silo approach of IT with deficient 
consideration for an enterprise-wide security (e.g. RM, ERM, CsM). This leads to the 
conclusion that the framework of Mekawy, AlSabbagh, and Kowalski is valuable regarding 
the interconnection of components but incomplete regarding focus. 
Model of Business Information Technology Alignment (BIA) 
The Model of Business Information Technology Alignment, developed by Charoensuk, 
Wongsurawat and Khang (2014), reconfirms the long-term effects and benefits of alignment. 
The model sustains an interconnectivity between theory and execution, and argues that 
strategic and operational alignment are both equally imperative for the achievement of 
organisational performance (Wongsurawat and Khang (2014). In undertaking the 
construction of the model, the authors considered the model by Henderson and Venkatraman 
(1993) and Chan as well as that by Sabherwal and Thatcher (2006). Grounded on prior 
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models it incorporates shared domain knowledge, IT success, organisation size 
considerations, IT sophistication, and communication planning such as inhibitors and 
enhancers of performance. Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang present a contemporary 
analysis of IT business alignment through various components, but as do many other 
frameworks, it omits to consider the wider effects of internal and external factors, assets 
valuation, compliance, strategy, infrastructure unification, and even risk factors (security). 
• Dimension Four: social and strategic (intellectual) dimension 
Alignment Between Business and IT Objectives Research Model  
The social dimension paradigm is considered by Reich and Benbasat (2000) in the context 
of evaluating the perception and capability of executives’ understanding and commitment to 
support the alignment. Within this dimension of alignment, the model focuses on 
communication, shared domain knowledge (social), implementation (operational), and 
planning (intellectual). Although the model estimated that social dimension has an impact, 
it is unclear to what extent the informal factors influence the organisation’s objectives. There 
remains a paucity of how the social dimension impacts the strategic dimension, and more 
importantly how it will be assessed. Being more focused on sustainability through 
understanding and communication, the framework is limited to an IT business alignment and 
implementation (Q2) but with inexistent consideration for security. 
IS Strategic Alignment: a Nomological Network Model  
Preston’s and Karahanna’s model (2009) is based on the nomological action of language, 
knowledge, understanding, executives’ involvement and effects, as well as possible 
inhibitors and enablers of alignment. The IS Strategic Alignment: a Nomological Network 
Model involves understanding the benefits of the social dimension of alignment on strategic 
alignment. The mixing of social dimension with a strategic dimension of alignment has 
mainly focused on executives’ expectations, executives’ interactions, and structural effects 
in the healthcare industry. Even though this is a way to portray the alignment factors (partial, 
Q1), there is no evidence of how the alignment is attributed to organisational objectives, 
strategies, policies, or procedures within the financial industry. Furthermore, this remains a 




4.3.3.1 Main contributors of alignment 
From the analysis of alignment literature, it has been identified that researchers very often 
follow two main models. The first approach is the conceptual SAM, which emphasises a 
perspective based on the alignment of an external and internal domain of business and IT. 
The second approach is SAMM of Luftman, an extended version of SAM. 
 
Table 4-9 provides an overview of some authors that grounded their research on the initial 
two alignment models. 













































Papp (1999); Luftman, Papp and Brier (1999); Burn and Szeto 
(2000); Smaczny (2001); Avison et al. (2004); DeHaes and Van 
Grembergen (2009); Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano (2009); 
Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang (2014); Gerow, Thatcher 









r Luftman (2000) SAMM (strategic 
alignment maturity 
model) 
Sledgianovsky and Luftman (2005); Sledgianovski et al. (2006); 
Luftman and Kempaiah (2007); Gutierrez, Orozco and Serrano 
(2009); Cheng (2010); Mekawy, AlSabbagh, and Kowalsky 
(2014); Luftman, Lyytinen and ben Zvi (2015). 
Q3 
Source: The Researcher 
As shown in Table 4-9, the followers of the models reported significant consideration of two 
paths: implementation (Q2) and maturity assessment (3). A possible explanation is that the 
second model of Luftman builds its structure on the initial strategic model of implementation 
and extends it further with maturity assessment considerations, respectively Strategic 
Alignment Maturity Model (SAMM). Additionally, the table illustrates that significant 
consideration for the alignment paradigm exists; hence prominent literature following the 
initial paradigm of SAM (intellectual-operational). The basic premises of intellectual-
operational paradigms are that they not only consider directions but also how those directions 
are implemented in business departments (addressing the theoretical and the applicability of 
them). Nevertheless, the initial two alignment models received various criticisms but 
remained main advocates of the alignment concept. Supporting this, many subsequent 
frameworks followed the theoretical concept of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and 
Luftman (2000) but adapted to become a different domain; for example, IS, CsM, RM or 
ERM. For instance, the extended model of Luftman’s proposed to assess the alignment 
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maturity and explore inhibitors and enablers (Luftman, 2000). The merits of Luftman’s 
model from 2000 is that it anticipates the alignment results and sustains an inclusive model 
of six components: communication, value, governance, partnership, scope and architecture, 
and skills. Many others have considered the model of Luftman’s. For instance, the 
intellectual (strategic) dimension is evaluated and validated by Avison et al. (2004) since it 
proposes to test its applicability for financial services. Moreover, Luftman and Kempaiah 
(2007) updated and validated the original model through globally dispersed empirical 
research. Although the alignment had other research domains, the six domains are 
significantly considered in later frameworks. 
In summary, it is evident that Henderson’s and Venkatraman’s model (SAM) represents the 
baseline for IT: Business alignment. Accordingly, this model is significantly enhanced by 
Luftman (2000) in his model SAMM. The later model, SAMM, combines empirical 
evidence and explores the practicability of assessment maturity implementation. Its structure 
represents an initial step for organisations by identifying the current state in regard to 
alignment and proposes the next move. Despite the initial limited focus of both models 
(SAM and SAMM), they remain valuable due to their orientation to strategic alignment even 
though subsequent research and frameworks have progressed from this initial focus. 
4.3.4 Frameworks outline and gap identification 
On the premises of previous findings of literature gap identification (Section 3.5, Chapter 3) 
this section addresses the issue of the knowledge gap by looking at available frameworks 
being driven by Objective 3 stated previously. 
In cases of academics’ frameworks, there seems to be a lack of supporting frameworks for 
CsM and ERM alignment. The available evidence consists of models or frameworks that 
consider the alignment through the perspective of IT alignment with business alignment. 
Indeed, it has considered the strategic aspects of it, but the domains are different from the 
purpose of this research. A similar approach is taken by a small number of models that 
analyse alignment from an operational perspective yet are still related to IT. Thus, to cover 
all aspects, the models were considered part and in isolation. 
In cases of regulators, there is a lack of internal frameworks developed. However, it may be 
assumed that the regulators contribute directly through regulatory laws with expectations to 
apply already established frameworks rather than create their own. Evidence suggests the 
focus on the financial industry is scarcely considered by CsM and alignment and 
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predominated by ERM. It also shows that the domains are segregated in IT, IS, CsM, RM, 
and ERM. Moreover, the approach is fragmented on strategic, operational, and technical 
levels, a fact that illustrates a tendency to fluctuate. Although the strategic approach registers 
the most significant consideration, it is evident that all three domains failed to address the 
alignment of CsM and ERM holistically. From this it can be denoted that particular attention 
needs to be considered, hence the traditional view on IS still being unclarified. Moreover, 
the influence of industry and regulations and alignment to the main frameworks maintain a 
focus to RM as opposed to ERM (e.g. ISO 27k series, ISACA series, ISF standard). 
Additionally, the scope of most frameworks is generic and does not address industry-specific 
needs. Apart from these various approaches, the drawback is that most academic frameworks 
are conceptual and have not been validated in practice. The academics’ frameworks related 
to CsM are mainly conceptual in their focus and consider various factors such as 
environmental and organisational factors (Siponen and Willison, 2009). Consequently, their 
applicability appears to be under impracticable principles, and thus their applicability resides 
in theory. 
Although there are many standards for CsM, standards such as The Open Group Architecture 
Framework (Togaf), Information Infrastructure Library (ITIL), or the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) were intentionally omitted because their focus 
is specifically on technical aspects and not strictly regarding security attributes. They were, 
therefore, unsuitable to contribute towards the purpose of this research.  
The case of alignment is particular and is mainly formed by academics’ contributions to the 
field. The assessment of the literature on alignment shows that the main influential authors 
are Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and Luftman (2000). Although the frameworks are 
conceptually constructed, they are validated by the studies and frameworks that have 
followed. In order to exemplify the frameworks approach, domains and categorisation, the 
following Table (Table 4-10) has been constructed by using a standardised form for 






Table 4-10 Summary of research frameworks and derivations 
Prior frameworks dimensions 







Gap                  Paradigms 
emphasis 


























Integrative risk governance 
Structural and operational 
alignment. 
Advocates optimised risk 
practices. 
Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) ˅   
Ma et al. (2009)  ˅  
IASME Standard (2013)  ˅  
IT: RM Justifies the holistic management 
of risks. 
Widens risk awareness. 
COBIT 5 (2012) ˅   
ISSA IT Security RM Framework 
(2004) 








Situation awareness of risk profile. 
Focus on internal and external 
variables. 
Implementational guidance. 
Implementation directives.  
Baselines for implementation. 




Reflections on risk resiliency 
practices. 
Transparency of control functions. 
Performing integrative functions. 
Strategic and operational 
alignment. 
Security integration within the 
strategy. 
Web et al. (2014a)  ˅  
Saleh and Alfantookh (2011)  ˅  
BS ISO/IEC 27000:2016 ˅   
BS ISO/IEC 27004:2009 ˅   
Octave Standard series (1999, 2003, 
2007) 
 ˅  
ICAS Information Security Standard 
(2012) 
 ˅  
BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013  ˅  
NIST SP800-39:2011  ˅  
ISF (2011)   ˅ 
BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013   ˅ 
BS ISO/IEC 27015: 2012   ˅ 
EY’s Cyber Program Management 
framework (2014) 
˅   
CESG Cyber Security Model (2015) ˅   
HMG Security Policy Framework 
(2014) 






BS ISO/IEC 27003: 2010 ˅   








Internal and external risk 
resiliency 
Maturity assessment of 
implementation. 




Atoom, Otoom and Abu Ali (2014) ˅   
BS ISO/IEC 27032:2012  ˅  
NIST RMF 800-53 (2013)   ˅ 
PAS 555 (2013) ˅   
Global Cyber Maturity framework 
(KPMG, 2015, 2016) 
˅   
Deloitte’s Cyber Risk Management 
framework 
˅   
Grant Thornton’s Cyber Risk 
Management Program 
˅  ˅ 
CsM: ERM Cybersecurity strategy aligned 
with organisation strategy. 
Integration of RM functions across 
the whole organisation. 
PwC’s Cyber Risk Management 
framework (2014) 




















Internal and external factors 
variables. 
Implementation governance. 
Integrated processes and 
strategies. 
Miller (1992) ˅   
Ward (2003) ˅   
Ching and Colombo (2014) ˅   
BS ISO 31000 ˅   
BS ISO 31100 ˅   






Risk oversight and business 
strategy. 
Top-down versus bottom-up 
approach. 
Optimising risk oversight 
Optimising governance. 
Return on investment. 
Embedded RM practices. 
Drew and Kendrick (2005) ˅   
Shad and Woon (2015) ˅   
COSO (2004, 2013, 2016) ˅   
RIMS (2011)   ˅ 
Casualty Actuarial Society (2003)   ˅ 
KPMG’s ERM framework (2009) ˅   
Grant Thornton’s Holistic Enterprise 
Risk Management (2013) 
˅   
EY’s ERM framework (2015) ˅   
PwC’s Comprehensive framework for 
assessing ERM (2015) 
˅   
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Performance risk elements. 
Implementation maturity. 
McKinsey’s Enterprise-risk-
management framework (2013a, 
2013b, 2016) 




























Strategy and infrastructure 
processes. 
Embedded across business 
departments. 
Ongoing alignment. 
Strategic and operational 
alignment. 
Performance assessment. 













Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) ˅   
Luftman (2000) ˅   
Reich and Benbasat (2000)  ˅   
Bergeron, Raymond and Rivard 
(2004) 
˅   
Preston and Karahanna (2009) ˅   
Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang 
(2014) 
˅   
Mekawy, AlSabbagh and Kowalsky 
(2014) 
 ˅  
Reynolds and Yetton (2015)  ˅  
Source: The Researcher 
In summary, this review of prior Frameworks (Table 4-10 above) shows that undertaking an 
additional literature evaluation establishes a complimentary derivate to support the 
Framework of this research. This review demonstrates the following literature shortcomings 
and gaps in the existing research: 
 (1) Granular approach towards CsM 
Researchers tend to adopt a disjointed approach to CsM and in turn it addresses the research 
problem in isolation. As can be seen in Table 4-5 above, despite the fact that the strategic 
approach is the most prominent one, it has focused on other subdivisions. Whether rooted in 
cyber-related security development phases (computerisation-informatisation-cyberisation) 
or not, the cybersecurity discipline shows a fragmented legacy in terms of definitions and 
meanings. Accordingly, the prior legacy of the CsM frameworks are grounded on three 
granular types: IT, IS, IA, with a later influence of RM. Typically, these types of studies 
admit that information security evolves in a wider paradigm yet remain traditionally 
embedded. Opponents of cyber-related terminology reject the reformation in a new 
terminology but use the principles of it. For instance, in the case of academics’ framework, 
the 2014 Holistic Cyber Security Implementation Framework (HCS-IF) of Atoom, Otoom 
and Abu Ali is the only framework employing cybersecurity terminology. The remaining 
frameworks are rooted in the traditional terminology of IS (with regards both terminology 
and meanings), yet both approaches fail to align their focus and consequently recognise who 
is responsible for security. This is partially addressed because the first approach remains 
traditionally focused while the second approach uses the old terminology but applies modern 
concepts of cybersecurity. The evidence found in frameworks related to CsM illustrates that 
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only the vendor-specific frameworks show a positive trend towards ‘cyber’ terminology 
adoption but still fail to adopt the full terminology, which is used only partially (e.g. Cyber 
Program, Cyber Risk Management framework) except in the case of Deloitte’s and KPMG’s 
frameworks. Interestingly another indirect determinant is the variety of information 
protection acts (e.g. European Data Protection Act and General Data Protection Regulation).  
This category registers a variety of approaches and, surprisingly, only two of the academics’ 
frameworks are strategically developed, as opposed to the abundance of academics’ 
literature regarding cybersecurity. PwC’s framework is the only framework that considers 
both domains. The drawback of this framework is that it omits to explain, define and support 
the implication of alignment, and consider the alignment of ERM to business, in turn not 
undertaking a holistic alignment of CsM with ERM. 
Mandatory specific, practitioner’s frameworks produced by industry associations have often 
been indirectly supported by regulatory legislation, which endorses due diligence practices, 
although without particular recommendation to a specific one. Previous CsM frameworks 
have incorporated different sub-domains of CsM and have shown the variations across 
academic, industry, and regulators. Apart from the Holistic Cyber Security Implementation 
Framework developed by Atoom, Otoom and Abu Ali (2014), all frameworks have partially 
considered security as they referred to IS aspects and had omitted the holistic CsM aspects. 
Even if the frameworks use a partial perspective, the core principles of security represent a 
partial solution and static baseline for good practices. 
 (2) Mirroring past approaches of CsM and ERM 
Virtually, all CsM frameworks of practitioners have followed a similar pattern to ERM, and 
thus two identical types of practitioners: vendor advisory-specific frameworks and industry 
expert associations that in turn have produced two kinds of directions, standards, and 
frameworks. Regrettably, the standards of industry are mainly focusing on IS management, 
as do academic frameworks. Most often there is also a mirroring regarding framework stages 
and approaches (Hopkin, 2014). For instance, there is considerable similarity regarding the 
number (usually five) and order of phases (e.g. Ma et al., 2009; Saleh and Alfantook, 2011; 
EY, 2014; PwC, 2015).  
On the other hand, vendors’ advisory organisations have shown thoughtful consideration 
towards cybersecurity, albeit considered from an RM perspective. This makes this statement 
excluding PwC’s Cyber Risk Management framework, which has reviewed both aspects 
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(ERM and CsM) yet remains without specific regards to alignment. Thus, such frameworks 
fail to state their integration directly. Since this research has explored alignment through an 
array of approaches, it has been concluded that literature addresses alignment from social, 
strategic, operational, cultural, social, and intellectual dimensions, and it uses these 
approaches as a baseline and as a relational mechanism. 
 (3) There is limited consideration of CsM for financial industry-specific frameworks 
An indication that the financial industry has barely considered CsM and ERM alignment is 
only contrasted by ERM, which has received more attention over recent years. It has been 
identified that the domains are segregated in IT, IS, CsM, RM and ERM. Furthermore, the 
scope of most frameworks has been generic and has not addressed industry-specific 
requisites. Apart from these various approaches, the drawback is that most academic 
frameworks have been acknowledged as conceptual and thus not validated in practice. 
Academics’ frameworks related to CsM are mainly conceptual in their focus and considering 
their applicability appear to be impracticable, hence their applicability resides in theory. 
(4) Scarce consideration in studying the relationship between strategic, operational, cultural 
and social functions to manage the unpredictable. 
Granting the strategic approach to be the most significant consideration, it has shown that 
all three domains failed to address the alignment of CsM and ERM holistically. From this, 
it has been denoted that particular responsiveness must be reflected, henceforth the 
traditional view on IS security is still unclear. Additionally, the influence of industry 
regulations and alignment to the main frameworks have maintained a focus to RM as 
opposed to ERM. 
(5) Scarce consideration for alignment in practice 
The identified evidence supports the key argument that alignment is developed mainly by 
academics’ contribution to the field. The assessment of the literature on alignment shows 
that the main influencers are Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and Luftman (2000). With 
reference to academic’s contribution, regrettably, none of these frameworks demonstrate a 
complete approach. Some have partially addressed the problem, but others have lacked 
efficient applicability and in turn have focused more on documentation aspects rather than a 




An adequate alignment requires an interrelated alignment of CsM and ERM management, 
strategies, planning, structure, processes, skills, competencies, and culture. Additionally, a 
unified risk oversight should be acknowledged at all levels, in order to instil communication 
and mitigation on a common ground throughout community involvement and social 
engagement within an organisation. Therefore, successful implementation of the Framework 
can reduce over-investment, effort, and overlap, as well as develop organisational awareness. 
As a result, in-house risk procedures could be formulated and sustained through a strategy 
based on enterprise-wide effectiveness. 
The analysis of frameworks demonstrates that more aspects need to be articulated for a 
complete approach. Some partially address the proposed framework approach, whereas 
some apply them strictly as a documentation for compliance (fulfil obligation) rather than a 
way to act strategically so as to nurture a real strategic approach at an enterprise-wide level. 
It also suggests that security involves various layers and yet still focuses on information 
systems or computer security (IT-centric), where security incorporates a more complex array 
of components. Moreover, it demonstrates that priority of security decision is still seen from 
a silo perspective, resulting in a mismanagement of risks (unaligned). In contrast, a common 
governance infrastructure will create a ‘common mechanism’ that would prioritise it as a 
security enabler, support initiatives, unify planning, and prioritise investments based on 
current organisational needs (i.e. not on subjective departmental needs - IT department might 
have different investment security priorities than organisation security); thus alignment shall 
support identification of overall necessity on a multi-layered security basis. Moreover, the 
alignment shall improve the discipline and transparency of risk oversight across the whole 
organisation. 
(6) Incomplete stages of frameworks 
Another shortcoming of the frameworks examined is that they fluctuate in terms of 
completeness. Some focus on adoption and implementation whereas a significant number of 
frameworks analysed concentrate mainly on assessment. On the other hand, Quadrant four 
(Q4) registers insignificant considerations. 
While Section 4.3 and its subsections discuss framework derivations (frameworks’ 
contribution), Table 4-11 demonstrates the drawbacks of previous frameworks in order to 
emphasise what has been omitted and why the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
is relevant in today’s financial industry context. 
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Miller (1992) Mainly focused on pre-implementation aspects of RM. 
Ward (2003) It mainly addresses the RM component implementation. 
Drew and Kendrick 
(2005) 
Lacks clarity regarding on how the alignment of ERM with organisation objectives should be 
achieved. It mainly addresses the ERM component adaption. 
Ching and Colombo 
(2014) 
Descriptive in its nature, limited to implementation aspects of RM. 
Shad and Woon (2015) Focused mainly on ERM maturity (strategic and operational). 
FERMA (2003) Incomplete due to its dependency on ISO Guide 73, partial focus (Q2) and silo practices of RM. 
Casualty Actuarial 
Society (2003) 
Addresses only to the implementation of RM alignment with organisational strategy. 
BSI (2009a) Limited to traditional RM implementation, neglect to consider the integration of cybersecurity. 
COSO (1992, 2004, 2013, 
2016) 
While it considers technology for administrative purposes, it broadly omits to aggregate; ERM 
limited. 
RIMS (2006, 2015) Focused mainly on ERM maturity. 
KPMG (2009, 2017a) Only focused on performance enhancement variable; addresses risk partially through the view of 
ERM. 
Grant Thornton (2013, 
2016) 
Mainly focused on risk cultural basis awareness; addresses risk partially through the view of ERM 
implementation. 
EY (2015, 2016)              It tackles a partial perspective of ERM implementation and omits the cybersecurity aspects. 
PwC (2009, 2015) Limited to ERM neutral, neglects to consider the integration of cybersecurity. It omits the 
compliance aspects. 
McKinsey (2013a, 2013b, 
2016) 
It addresses a limited perspective of ERM adoption and implementation.  
HM Treasury (2009) Generic framework recommended as an assessment tool to measure RM. 
HM Treasury (2004) A guidance of internal control compliance which neglects to consider the enterprise-wide and 




Posthumus and Von 
Solms (2004) 
Anchored in IS/IT implementation practices with RM. 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007, 
2010) 
Implementation siloed perspective of IT and IS alignment to business objectives. Over-confidence 
in cultural impact. 
Ma et al. (2009) IT/IS adoption and implementation anchored; no evaluation beforehand implementation. 
Saleh and Alfantookh 
(2011) 
A structural and procedural focus which omits the strategic implications of IS and RM.  
Atoom, Otoom and Abu 
Ali (2014, 2017) 
Operational and technical focus of CsM. It fails to consider the ERM and its alignment and with 
organisational goals. 
Web et al. (2014) It focuses on a siloed perspective of IS and RM adoption. 
BSI (2011a, 2013b) Embedded in the traditional approach of information and information systems protection through 
RM. 
NIST (2013, 2014) Applies the practices of RM and omits to consider the alignment of CsM, ERM widely. 
OCTAVE (1999, 2003, 
2007) 
Omits the holistic view of CsM approach by primarily considering the information assets protection 
through RM. 
ICAS (2011) Operational focus of IS and RM maturity. 
PAS 555 (2013) Includes operational and technical aspects CsM and RM. Maturity. 
IASME Standard (2013) A generic framework that focuses on IS and IT implementation. 
ISF (2011) Focus on compliance of IS and RM. 
Ernst and Young (2014b) A silo framework that considers IS, RM and their alignments in the context of business objectives. 
It omits to address an integrated approach. 
KPMG (2015, 2016) Attentive on maturity assessment and it shows a siloed perspective on information protection in the 
context of RM; neglects CsM and ERM. 
PwC (2014) The security is rooted in the traditional IS and ERM implementation, thus impartial. 
Deloitte (2015e) Mainly descriptive, IT and RM driven (pattern-based decisions) despite misusing cybersecurity 
terminology. 
Grant Thornton (2016) Does not provide ample support for the assertion of cyber risks alignment to ERM, therefore 














Limited to IT and business alignment unable to integrate security characteristics. 
Luftman (2000) IT and business alignment maturity, thus unable to integrate security characteristics. 
Reich and Benbasat 
(2000)  
Limited to IT and business alignment. 
Bergeron, Raymond and 
Rivard (2004) 
Limited to the alignment of IT with the business strategy and structure for performance purposes. 
Preston and Karahanna 
(2009) 





Wongsurawat and Khang 
(2014) 
Mainly focused on IT and business alignment omitting the security aspects. 
Mekawy, AlSabbagh and 
Kowalsky (2014) 
A silo approach to IT business maturity alignment that omits to consider the strategic security 
posture. 
Reynolds and Yetton 
(2015) 
It considers a structural alignment of IT strategy and organisation strategy with no consideration for 
security. 
44 Frameworks  
Source: The Researcher 
On basis of the above (illustrated in Table 4-11), the research framework justifies its value 
and delimitations.  
4.4 Conceptual framework 
A conceptual research framework represents a construct that compounds various concepts 
(Maxwell, 2012), to support resolution of the research problem (Imenda, 2014). Moreover, 
it represents the paradigm shift perspective through which the researcher approaches the 
problem. Usually, the framework is defined as a ‘model’ compounded from pieces 
(Maxwell, 2012). Accordingly, the conceptual framework of this research is built upon five 
derivates (constructs): literature review (first derivate), systematic literature evaluation 
extracted from Chapter Three (second derivate), the research gap (third derivate), supporting 
theories (fourth derivate), and supporting frameworks knowledge gaps (fifth derivate). 
Given the fact that the purpose, derivations, stance, and limitations of the proposed 
Framework have been previously discussed, the following first section provides only a brief 
reiteration in order to set the context. The second part presents the outcome of 
aforementioned derivates (literature review contribution, systematic literature review 
contribution, literature research gap, supporting theories, and frameworks gap) which 
synopsise the development motivation and relevance of the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment 
Framework. 
4.4.1 Synthesis of Framework derivations 
With reference to the above-mentioned derivations and adopted approach, the framework 
represents a ‘structure’, ‘system’, or ‘plan’ that incorporates concepts, variables, 
interdependencies and interrelation of a phenomenon (Nilsen, 2015) that has as a purpose to 
argument the value of researching the issue, determination and proposed solution for the 
research problem (Maxwell, 2012). Thus, the framework for CsM alignment with ERM 
provides strategic means for the alignment of risk governance, strategies, objectives, 
appetite, planning, structure, processes, capabilities, competencies, and risk culture for the 
purpose of serving organisational mission and vision in a unified manner; along with the 
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preservation of resiliency that advocate the idea of rejecting the ‘organisational dissociation’. 
In other words, it embodies a representation of how strategic organisational statement 
(strategy) is to achieve its main mission. 
In view of this, the strategy can be illustrated in the policy as a managerial mechanism (Miles 
et al., 1978). Consequently, its application is based on baseline expectations, managerial 
directions, and the establishment of strategic directions. Such an approach hones a unified 
management that endorses risk safeguards and that acknowledge identification, 
communication and mitigation on a common ground (e.g. ICT-related risks and enterprise 
risks must be recognised at an enterprise-wide level) for decisions and behaviours (Miles et 
al., 1978). Therefore, through the implementation of the Framework, an organisation can 
lessen over-investment and efforts to adapt to internal and external changes (Miles et al., 
1978), overlaps of functions, and much more. Furthermore, in-house risk procedures shall 
be formulated and sustained through a common strategy centered on the significance of 
enterprise-wide effectiveness. 
The Framework proposes to support organisations’ risk governance procedures by 
emphasising strategic responsibility and leadership with the intention to seize opportunities, 
make risk-informed decisions, and contribute to the achievement of the resilience against 
enterprise risks and cyber risks. 
The underlying development motivation of this Framework is grounded in the arguments 
of the aims of this research, namely: 
1) To investigate the alignment of CsM with ERM within the financial industry. 
2) To develop a framework that assists CsM with ERM alignment within the financial 
industry, supported by practical guidance for the implementation of the proposed 
framework. 








Table 4-12 Research gap derivations 
Source: The Researcher 
Within this context, Table 4-12 depicts the totality of gaps identified during the investigation 
of the research problem, a fact that validates the inconsistency and granularity of current 
theoretical and empirical research. 
4.4.2 CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
The Framework derives from previous findings of the literature review (first derivate-
contribution), systematic literature evaluation (second derivate), frameworks evaluation 
(third derivation), and research gap (fourth derivate). Based on these four derivations, the 
structure of the Framework is further compounded with another derivate, supporting theory 
(fifth derivate). The precursor to Framework implementation is understanding organisational 
goals, objectives, strategy, risk appetite, risk tolerance, acceptable residual risk, and 
alignment expectations. This is also the case for CsM and ERM. Consequently, a prior 
understanding can foster an effective alignment in accordance with organisation goals and 
objectives (Ezingeard, McFadzean and Birchall, 2007).  
Identified literature gaps 
Literature Review (1) Scarce strategic alignment literature that focuses on CsM and ERM alignment, (2) low level 
of maturity in the implementation of the alignment, (3) lack of bottom-up consideration of the 
concept,(4) lack of common terminology, (5) lack of common  guidance for implementation 
and (6) low level of cyber risk awareness inside organisations, (7) lack of coherent theory. 
Systematic Literature Evaluation (1) A lack of clear terminology and definitions in all three domains, (2) a lack of practical 
alignment literature guidance (academics, practitioners and regulators), (3) a lack of common 
governance practices across all three domains, (4) scarce alignment literature that considers 
integration of CsM, (5) scarce financial industry-specific focus, (6) scarce consideration of 
regulatory bodies regarding the alignment processes, (7) a lack of clear practices towards ERM, 
CsM and alignment implementation, (8) the literature of CsM is fragmented among different 
domains, (9) granularity of CsM terminology encouraged various professional accreditation, 
(10) geographical dispersion of industry practices and procedure, (11) a discontinual temporal 
attention in  research literature, (12) criteria considered by the literature of ERM varies between 
value, performance, appetite, culture, governance and each of them is addressed in isolation, 
(13) CsM still seen as an IT problem, problems treated in isolation, (14) ERM and CsM practices 
seen as minimum compliance (reactive measure rather than proactive controls). 
Frameworks Evaluation (1) Granular approach towards CsM, (2) Mirroring past approaches of CsM and ERM, (3) there 
is limited consideration of CsM for financial industry-specific frameworks, (4) scarce 
consideration in studying the relationship between strategic, operational, cultural and social 
functions to manage the unpredictable, (5) scarce consideration for alignment in practice. 
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The CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework constantly adapts to internal and external 
variables and its dependencies. As the Framework has at its roots five main functions 
(‘baseline expectations’, ‘managerial directions’, ‘established strategic directions’, 
‘implemented managerial directions’ and ‘monitor and review’), to a large extent it 
advocates a sequential practice in context of requirement fulfilment, planning, control, and 
measurement as essential conditions. 
To illustrate the above mentioned, Figure 4-13 below synthesises all five phases to outline 
















Figure 4-5 CsM – ERM Strategic alignmnet Framework 
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As shown in Figure 4-13, the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework is grounded on 
the assumption of preparation based on demanded requirement, administration (diagnosis 
before implementation), control (change), implementation as a validation for proper 
directions and review (improve) phase ─ all in the form of cyclical phases. The 
implementation contains five different phases and is based on processes and an operation’s 
adaptation to a common scope-achieved by the directions of strategic alignment). Although 
this ‘preparation’ phase is significantly discussed in academia, industry and regulation, the 
methodology needs a baseline of principles, context consideration (demographic and 
industry specification) along with an internal strategy to mandate implementation. If there 
are unclear statements and principles that define and mandate actions, the establishment of 
implementation is incomplete. Additionally, an unclear profile practice of an organisation is 
a drawback; the applicability starting point is thus unknown. An assessment that includes 
identification, analysis, evaluation, visualisation of what to protect, and designed value is 
the core step that guides the application of the Framework in an interrelated cyclical manner 
(Ching and Colombo, 2014). 
The guidance how to use/operationalise the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
will be further discussed and presented in Chapter Seven, Section 7.4.  
At its roots, the Framework compiles the coercive pressure of institutional norms along with 
variables and interdependencies of Contingency Theory. Such an approach aims to assure 
an organisation’s review and optimises its practices in order to ensure appropriate strategic 
practices that warrant the fulfilment of organisational goals and mission. Therefore, the CsM 
- ERM Strategic Alignment Framework is driven by the paradigm of Contingency Theory 
and Institutional Theory by their commonality: alignment (Vorbeda et al., 2011). Although 
the contingency and institutional theories focus on different and partial aspects of alignment, 
the synergy of both strives to marry two facets of alignment as a whole (Greenwood, Hining 
and Wheten, 2014). By the complementarity and co-dependency of theories, the Framework 
compiles a double paradigm perspective of alignment to ensure that alignment is achieved 
by considering an internal fit towards an external fit (Contingency Theory), whereas 
Institutional Theory concentrates on achieving an external fit (e.g. recognition of conformity, 
external support) rooted on internal fit, which together can lead to a ‘meta-fit’ (Donaldson, 
2008). More specifically, Institutional Theory defines the normative pressure on 
organisations to conform with a legitim ‘pattern’ of organisational behaviour (external 
expectations) and homogeneity of dependables on the basis of coercive pressure 
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(organisational values, normative rules, legitimacy, beliefs, principles, behaviour, ethics, and 
social systems). On the other hand, Contingency Theory refers to an internal alignment of 
culture, organisational design, processes, leadership, technology, size, and structural 
alignment to ensure organisational sustainability despite considering internal variations and 
aiming to adapt to external interdependencies. 
4.4.3 Overview of framework functions 
The sections that follow explain cyclically how the framework implications and 
propositions, help to understand specific characteristics that interrelate. Accordingly, these 
five phases are outlined below: 
• Phase One: ‘baseline expectations’ 
• Phase Two: ‘mandate managerial directions’ 
• Phase Three: ‘establishment of strategic directions’ 
• Phase Four: ‘implement managerial directions’ 
• Phase Five ‘monitoring and reviewing practices’ 
4.4.3.1 Phase One: ‘baseline expectations’– the premise behind the first phase is that it 
represents the definition of strategic baseline expectations of an external environment from 
which principles and context derive with the determination to establish the drivers (purpose, 
limitation and constraints) and how alignment should be achieved. This first phase defines 
the ‘purpose, outcome, and delimitations’ of organisations within the context of theoretical 
legacy, regulatory prospects, or industry requirements (e.g. contractual, baseline), related to 
organisation, CsM and ERM. 
 




























Figure 4-6 Phase One of the Framework: ‘baseline expectations’ 
Source: The Researcher 
Anticipating the implications, Figure 4-6 displays the effects and interdependencies of an 
external environment within today’s business context. In supporting this view Casualty 
Actuarial Society (2003) and ISO 31000:2009 (BSI, 2009) recommend this initial step, 
recognising the utmost importance of this stage. By acknowledging external exposure and 
pressure, an organisation can advantageously adapt; a fact that facilitates an advanced 
preparation and understanding of industry and business settings, clarifies expectations, 
defines internal requirements, enables accountability, assures transparency of decisions, and 
determines justified strategic decisions (informed). Such acknowledgements help to 
improve/adapt/prepare in advance for constraints, interdependencies, or variations (Nair et 
al., 2014). Defined most often as situational awareness (Web et al., 2014a), this approach 
facilitates clarification of expectation, requirement (accountability and transparency), 
constraints, and limitations through a macroeconomic view. The external context refers to 
the identification, analysis, and evaluation of different types of uncertainties from political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental, legal (PESTLE), cultural, regulatory, 
financial, or demographical. It is often considered as a classification system that enables a 
better understanding of whether the organisation’s approach, resources and resilience are 
sufficient (Hopkin, 2017). In short, deploying this phase facilitates prudent practice in 
understanding an external environment’s potential impact on internal organisational factors 
and lastly on the appropriate development of control function (Ma et al., 2009). It ensures a 
baseline in mandating, establishing, and measuring the Framework and helps a continuous 
adjustment in alignment with requirements and organisational goals. 
4.4.3.2. Phase Two: ‘mandate managerial directions’- moving further, the second phase 
advances a facet of strategic risk control; it changes its focus from macro (phase 1) to micro 
dimensions that emphasise the internal strategy in alignment with internal requirements.  
The idea conveyed in this phase is that it contains settings of internal directions in balance 
with identified external directions, defining how the appetite, structure, processes, 
responsibilities, and work commitment in a unified manner. Typically, the recommended 
approach is based on the alignment of CsM and ERM objectives, strategies, policies, 
guidelines, procedures for transparency, and prioritisation in accordance with the 
organisation’s goals and objectives. Therefore, an organisation is more proficient to state its 
attitude to risk (i.e. in the form of a documented policy) in accordance with all implied, based 
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on a predefined direction (BSI, 2009). Being a stated strategy, it mandates increased 
expectations of capabilities for implementation (BSI, 2016). 
In addition to the range of activities included in this phase, it employs the identification risk 
of owners, measurement (performance), improvement (development), transparency, and 
compliance. A similar approach towards understanding the significance of the internal 
environment is considered by FERMA (2003) and by BS ISO 31000 (BSI, 2009), a fact that 









Figure 4-7 Phase Two of the Framework: ‘mandate managerial directions’ 
Source: The Researcher 
For a visual representation, Figure 4-7 outlines a unified strategy that considers structural 
alignment based on strategic alignment and managerial directions. Moreover, it proposes a 
reflection on all components (purpose, objectives, appetite, processes, responsibilities, and 
expected performance in regard to risk) documented and stated in the policy. A policy 
illustrates a clear statement that clarifies responsibility and promulgates good practices 
(ISSA, 2004). Typically, its content comprises a description of an organisation’s attitude, 
directions, control mechanism, privileges and monitoring processes, all in accordance with 
objectives (CESG, 2012).  
Even though the objectives set are seen by ISO 31000:2009 (BSI, 2009) as part of the 
‘process phase’, the Researcher considers that this phase is part of directions settings, thus 
acknowledgement of the philosophy, appetite and directions should be established in the 
mandate phase, so it can in turn trigger the design and deployment of actions beforehand. 
Likewise, Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) shows that ability to understand objectives and 
means of applying strategies lead to real vigilance and proper governance. Additionally, the 
inclusion of performance assessment, organisation risk culture, and communication of 
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alignment strategy can contribute to the establishment of a unified internal strategy of CsM 
and ERM. 
Therefore, phase one and phase two only considered the driving principles that set directions 
before implementation and how strategic control prioritises goals (dependency, requirement) 
to foster efficiency and resiliency (Atoom, Otoom and Abu Ali, 2014). 
4.4.3.3. Phase Three: ‘establishment of strategic directions’- the third phase is a complex 
phase of the Framework hence it moves from examination and planning before 
implementation, towards the establishment of processes of strategic alignment 
implementation between CsM and ERM. As a starting point, internal contexts are considered 
and assessed which, according to ISO 31000:2009 (BSI, 2009), is a desirable approach that 
supports an understanding of organisational governance, structure, risk accountability, 
objectives, strategies, policies, capabilities, culture, methods, and/or tools used (standards, 
guidelines, models), and/or contractual and legal responsibility as proposed in ISO 
31000:2009 (BSI, 2009). This approach appears to be the most commonly practised in 
academic and industry frameworks, despite some frameworks only containing this single 
phase (e.g. BS ISO 27005:2011; ISF Standard of Good Practices for Information Security 
2011; IASME Standard for Information Assurance, 2013). Apart from internal context 
identification and risk examination, this category represents a cyclical deployment of 
processes in which strategic and structural alignment adjusts to ensure availability of 
resources and directions. The context refers to the assessment of internal and external 
uncertainties, interdependencies or variables that might affect organisational goals and 
mission. In correlation with the strategic alignment, the control function adjusts towards 








Figure 4-8 Phase Three of the Framework: ‘establishment of strategic directions’ 
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As shown in Figure 4-8, Phase Three applies the directions of Phase One and Phase Two. In 
contrast to the first phase, which considered the macroeconomic aspects, Figure 4-8 
highlights considerations for strategic and structural alignment enhanced with internal and 
external factors. Phase Three expresses the strategic directions as a plan for understanding 
that must be put into practice and which factors may enable or inhibit the alignment. 
Scrutinising critical business domains, assets, legal, regulatory, contractual requirements 
(e.g. third-party agreements, outsourced services), industry requirements, and expected 
protection and demanded protection from shareholders (i.e. BS ISO 27003:2010) (BSI, 
2010) represents an acknowledgement and understanding of the Framework’s capability 
within the context. Correspondingly, Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) specify that establishing 
the context, identifying current situations (assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and control), 
recognising the risk owners, location, or source of threats are all prerequisites in assuring 
flexibility of implementation. Miller (1992) recommends classification and categorisation of 
risks to understand the value and impact of a potential loss. Thus, confirming the context in 
the form of external and internal environment analysis can be done by using tools such as 
Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) to support the validity of an 
enterprise-wide profile (Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003).  
While the main determination of the third phase is to establish how strategic directions are 
implemented, per total it is an optimisation of the context of alignment, of limitations, and 
of organisational capabilities. On this basis, the following phase moves beyond theoretical 
applicability, in the direction of an in-depth enterprise-wide implementation. 
4.4.3.4. Phase Four: ‘implement managerial directions’ – overall this phase transfers the 
strategic guidance into an operational and social dimension that aligns with operations to 
deploy enterprise-wide alignment. It advances the mindset of different elements congruence 
(e.g. identification of organisational practice profile, assessment, alignment of processes, 
response, and communication) as determinants. Understanding how the strategic, structural, 
and social dimensions of alignment can enable or inhibit strategic enterprise-wide alignment 
is a precondition for achieving performance (Chan, 2002; Alecsić and Jelavić, 2017). To 
illustrate, Figure 4-9 below emphasises how the initial phases (Phase One, Phase Two, and 
Phase Three) migrate from the formulation of a strategy to achieve organisational objectives 
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Figure 4-9 Phase Four of the Framework: ‘implement managerial directions’ 
Source: The Researcher 
Figure 4-9 indicates that Phase Four relies on specific managerial directions balanced with 
the internal and external environment. More specifically, it emphasises the organisational 
adaptability to various variables mandatory to achieve alignment. 
1)  Step One of Phase Four: Identification of organisational risk profile 
The first step, organisational profile, embodies identification of the practice profile that 
defines the status of an organisation, clarifies goals, and recommends advancement as well 
as determining an appropriate level of investments. The practice of risk profile is based on 
the initial Luftman (2000) strategic alignment maturity assessment model, which assessed 
the alignment maturity level based on five-phase models: (1) initial, (2) committed 
processes, (3) established processes, (4) improved/managed processes, and (5) optimised 
process. Apart from this, a similar model is RMM. It was developed by RIMS (2006) and 
has a similar format of five criteria: ad-hoc, initial, repeatable, managed, and leadership. 
Considering the above-discussed models, the current Framework adopts a simpler structure 
to evaluate organisational maturity on a scale of one to five and proposes the followings 
levels of categorisation:  
 
 
Figure 4-10 Maturity Diagnosis Model  
Source: Adapted after Luftman (2000)  
• Level zero – absent, there is a lack of strategic alignment implementation of CsM 
and ERM; 
• Level one – basic, some kind of strategic alignment is planned, considered, or 
initiated; 
• Level two – structured and implemented alignment, some form of risk approach is 












• Level three – established complex policies, processes, and procedures developed. 
Past events used to learn, predict, adapt, and respond in a timely manner; 
• Level four – grounded, integrated and aligned strategic policies, processes and 
procedures of CsM and ERM.  
Based on the above criteria, the profile assessment supports the identification of an 
organisational profile (a), which determines the target profile (outcome) and further 
directions. Moreover, the difference between these two profiles reveals the organisational 
gap (NIST, 2014), which needs to be considered. A similar approach has been considered in 
other frameworks (e.g. Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011; Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004; NIST 
standard series). 
2)  Step Two of Phase Four: Assessment of organisation risk practices 
After identification and categorisation of the organisation’s practice profile, the second step 
is an assessment of the organisation’s risk practices. The assessment is structured on a 
sequence of four steps: identify-analyse-evaluate and visualise (IAEV) key risks. 
Assessment determines further actions based on identification (risk, threat, and 
vulnerabilities), analysis and evaluation of facts (as seen in BS ISO/IEC 27005), assets and 
requirements (as seen in BS ISO/IEC 27003:2010) and their likely cause and consequences 
(as seen in BS ISO 31000:2009), controls, vulnerabilities, or likelihood of such, that 
underpin priority and actions. 
The financial industry in particular is frequently being targeted and thus requires optimised 
strategies related specifically to industry risks, in parallel with an assessment of risks for 
tangible and intangible assets and assessment of digital and physical environment risks. 
Adopting an assessment based on four steps (IAEV) assures the avoidance of duplication of 
identification (I), analysis (A) and evaluation (E). There are standards (e.g. Casualty 
Actuarial Society, 2003) that repeat these phases (identification, analysis and evaluation) as 
they consider an additional phase of assessment and only a few incorporate all three phases 
(e.g. BS ISO 31000: 2009, BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011). However, IAE is all part of the 
assessment and such approach duplicates the steps. Apart from this clarification and 
systematisation of prior contributions, the Researcher contributes by providing an additional 
step: visualisation to expose the results of the assessment. Visualisation refers to the 




The identify-analyse-evaluate-visualise (IAEV) assessment implies:  
• Identification (I) refers to the capability to find, recognise, and outline risk exposure 
through the lenses of both CsM and ERM in accordance with the organisation. In a 
broader sense, risk identification aims to identify what can harm the organisation by 
focusing on potential loss and anticipating how, where, and why it can happen (as seen 
in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011) (BSI, 2011).  
• Analysis (A) process refers to a strategic mechanism of understanding the enterprise-
wide risks and their level (BSI, 2011). For example, the ISO standard describes the 
analysis process based on criticality, vulnerability, and prior incidents encountered. The 
analysis can be undertaken through a qualitative method, a quantitative method, or 
mixed-method. The analysis is defined by Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) as a process of 
identifying the gap profile. 
• Evaluation (E) compares the analysis results in order to identify the magnitude of risk 
(as seen in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011) (BSI, 2011). To provide support, techniques such 
as Swot analysis, prospecting, PESTLE, or event tree analysis can be used (FERMA, 
2003). Evaluation criteria: strategic value, criticality, legal, regulatory, and contractual 
requirement, as well as operational and business importance (BS ISO/IEC 27005) 
consider all these aspects by analysing the impact criteria (damage, disruption cost, 
value, operational, and regulatory effects). 
• Visualisation (V) relies on identification, analysis and evaluation to visualise vectors, 
processes, assets, and actors, and to expose and communicate the value. This phase 
represents a process of asset value allocation that needs to be estimated through cost-
effective analysis. Based on this evaluation, the investment cannot be higher than its 
value. The value needs to be estimated, classified, and visualised. As a result, based on 
the categorisation and classification pre-assigned security controls are applied in 
accordance with their value. This section must consider the potential loss, impact, 
reputation damages, and replacement cost. Visualisation aims to deploy 
decisions/respond based on the assessment. This step is based on the principles of 
assessment in order to determine the value of an organisation and elicit a means to protect 
it within the balance of security cost expenditure. 
The concepts of risk in terms of value can be quantified through an assigned value of critical 
assets. Since the interest of a perpetrator is interlinked with the asset value, Fenz et al. (2014) 
suggest that a valuation of assets (inventory) provides a reliable estimate of which assets 
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might be targeted. This perspective underpins an effective allocation of resources, 
preparedness, avoidance of overconfidence, cost-effectiveness, and advice on safeguards. 
Generally, the valuation can be quantitative if it is based on cost (e.g. new 
acquisition/replacement cost, the cost of inoperability, opportunity cost, interruption, 
financial loss, and regulatory infringement) or qualitative (e.g. competitive advantage, 
reputation) as seen in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011) (BSI, 2011). For instance, the valuation 
phase is considered by Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) to be a mechanism, thus representing 
an assessment of strategy, governance, controls, compliance, and organisational profile to 
help identify any gaps between the current profile and the anticipated target profile.  
Additionally, FERMA (2003) standard suggests that the assessment phase should be 
documented and organised in a structured format with clear descriptions for further use. 
Therefore, the assessment of leadership and governance, training, education and awareness, 
and controls and compliance should be integrated (processes) and aligned (strategy) (CESG, 
2015). Thus, the assessment can be in the form of qualitative, quantitative, or mixed analysis. 
Usually, assessment leads to prioritisation (Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003). For instance, 
Octave standard focuses on the assessment of information assets and develops a 
methodology to assess risk, organisation profile, and areas of concern, all based on analysis 
and followed by mitigation. Obviously, considering only the information assets represents 
an incomplete process. Thus, for a comprehensive assessment, asset management should be 
considered. This is a function that has the purpose of cataloguing and assigning a value to 
assets based on their sensitivity and criticality (ISSA, 2004). 
Valuation compiling of physical and digital assets recommends inventory practices and 
ownership followed by asset classification based on type, sensitivity, value (criticality), and 
degree of assurance (BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013). In addition to this practice, organisations 
can develop a documentation regarding risk taxonomy (types of risks) in order to better make 
decisions (actions plan). In connection with the assigned value of assets and risk taxonomy, 
it can foster further necessary actions and informed decisions; a practice which ensures 
efficiency and transparency. Moreover, the acknowledgement of assets value, processes, 
infrastructures, information, or technology that might determine and facilitate a preparedness 
and anticipated view towards possible security incidents (negative) impact on an 












Figure 4-11 Valuation process (value identification of organisational assets) 
Source: The Researcher 
Regarding Figure 4-11 above, the process of valuation can be considered a diagnosis 
function that addresses valuation in order to prioritise and increase resiliency based on 
criticality.  
3) Step Three of Phase Four: implement unified risk governance  
Alignment process takes place in an established infrastructure. Thus, integration refers to 
different acts that together form the alignment. For instance, structural alignment relates to 
formal structures such as infrastructures/departments. Through these, an alignment can be 
deployed (Chan, 2002). Alignment of processes, decisions, reporting, employee’s 
deployment, and prioritisation depend on strategic guidance. Thus, their common 
collaborative effect is significant (Chan, 2002). While this action is based on operational 
aspects, at its core lies the integration of CsM and ERM strategy to organisational strategy 
(contextualised in objectives, directions, appetite, and risk oversight in a centralised form). 
Additionally, a stimulation of aligned communication and acknowledgement concerning 
organisational strategy (vision, objective, and direction), implementation purpose, and 
results expected by each employee is believed to stand-in towards a successful result. 
Therefore, implementing a unified risk governance as a control function comprises of two 
steps (response and communication). These require a strategic alignment, structural 
alignment, and social alignment to address the risk governance enterprise wide. This phase 
is similar to the description of risk treatment mentioned in the Australian/New Zeeland 
Standard (2004), which defines the response step as a process of selection and 
implementation of measures to adjust risks. The Australian/New Zeeland Standard (2004) 
also clarifies that residual risk is the result of the intervention (response) and treatment phase 
(risk minus treatment). The main attributes of this step are based on knowledge and shared 
domain knowledge across the whole organisation (part of the frameworks). Obviously, this 
technology infrastructure assetspeople processes 






implies communication which is another essential attribute that can foster performance in 
the alignment (Charoensuk, Wongsurawat and Khang, 2014). Interdepartmental 
communication (social alignment) and unified risk governance structure (structural 
alignment) ensure a continuous process of oversight and awareness across an organisation 
(cultural alignment). For example, Orange Book released by HM Government (2004) 
recommends risk identification to approximate likelihood and document activity 
accordingly. Risk treatment can use different strategies: avoid, accept, reduce/mitigate, and 
transfer (as seen in Casualty Actuarial Society, 2003; ISO 31000: 2009), and generally it 
selects and applies methods (ISO 31000:2009). 
In cases where organisations may decide to transfer risk to insurance, this partially offers a 
solution because this option is only effective in part due to its limitations regarding financial 
coverage and because it does not have long-term implications for strategic organisational 
resilience.  As a result, a false sense of security lulls organisations into believing they are 
taking adequate measures when adopting a policy without an organisational change 
(Websense Lab Security, 2015; Thakor, 2015). 
‘Respond’ is a risk control function and refers to the amount of response that modifies a risk 
(BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011), respectively it is based on processes, policies, procedures, or 
guidelines to safeguard an organisation; for example, response capability can be sustained 
by increasing staff competencies, identification of necessary resources, culture, preparedness 
and a well-established strategy in regards to risks (as seen in BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013) (BSI, 
2013). Additionally, the risk function ‘response’ can be complemented with an action plan 
(e.g. incident management or business continuity). Response through mitigation represents 
a treatment process with the purpose of changing risk (create resiliency) in close relationship 
to an organisation’s policies, goals, and objectives, and stakeholders’ expectations. 
Nonetheless, the fact that mitigation actions are taken brings a foreseeable remanence of 
risks. However, in such cases, post-mitigation, a risk remanence represents only residual 
risks. In other words, a risk that remains after measures have been taken (residual risk), one 
that should irrelevant, accepted or tolerable for an organisation (BSI, 2011). Nonetheless, 
this remains a phase that needs continuous monitoring and reviewing in order to assure that 
the mitigation measures ensure acceptable levels of predefined residual risks (Saleh and 
Alfantookh, 2011). Additionally, implementation of strategic controls ensures a risk 
governance quality as well as oversight and performance assurance (Chan, 2002; Atoom, 
Otoom, and Abu Ali, 2014). 
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4.4.3.5 Phase Five ‘Monitoring and reviewing practices’ 
The fifth phase, ‘monitoring’ refers to the process of continuous measurement of 
organisation risk approach, its strategies, applicability, and response. Based on this, further 
tasks are deployed, investment considered, and review tasks commenced. This phase 
includes documentation for further use of reviewing processes that depend on comparisons 
of practices with the predetermined baselines, past learned lessons, experiences, 
organisational cultural dimension, observations and research. Being a measurement 
category, it aims to assess and test how effective the implementation is (BS ISO/IEC 
27004:2009) and to reinforce whether further improvements are needed. In short, 
measurement refers to the identification of a deviation between actual results in contrast to 
planned results (Aguilera, Judge, and Terjesen, 2018), and a means to improve risk control 
and practice. As an example, Figure 4-12 exemplifies the supportive role of monitor and 







Figure 4-12 Phase Five of the Framework: ‘Monitoring and reviewing practices’ 
Source: The Researcher 
As can be seen in Table 4-12 above, the ‘review’ phase embodies an “activity undertaken to 
determine suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of the subject matter to establish 
objectives” (BSI, 2009, p. 7). Usually, the results from monitoring are compared against the 
recommended criteria from practitioners or regulators; for instance, ISO 31000:2009 (BSI, 
2009) recognises the value of optimised, integrated, and, if necessary, modified control 
function. Henceforth, the monitoring and review processes are a way to validate whether 
organisational practice and performance is at the right maturity level. In some cases, 
organisations may choose to use tools to measure the results (e.g. Economic Value Added 
(EVA) and annual audits are used to reassess implementation. 
Typically, a review phase relies on monitoring and continuing the process through two 
categories: ‘plan’ and ‘sustain’, which in turn comprise of another step to undertake the 
activity. Based on the results of monitoring, the review phase takes place, and plans are made 
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to optimise the identified weaknesses (e.g. communication, appetite, infrastructure, 
governance, policies, and procedures). In this manner, an organisation prepares to upgrade 
to a superior profile being influenced by plans and directions that have roots in an informed 
risk approach (Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011). Such an approach includes a strategic direction 
and preparation, but it can also include education, communication, capabilities, culture, and 
compliance among other means. Planning of continuous improvements has proven to be 
good practice (Luftman, 2000; Chan et al., 2006) that sustains the effectiveness of the 
Framework (i.e. from design, implementation, monitoring). Moreover, it assures that any 
flaws or weaknesses in the alignment process can be acknowledged, amended, and re-
secured towards the positive outcome of alignment. Accordingly, re-assessment of internal 
control is recommended due to its interchangeable nature of an environment. A practice 
highlighted from early 1999 by the Combined Code (also known as Turnbull report) as it 
has played an incremental role in identification effectiveness flaws and gaps (The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 1999). Most often positive indicators of 
alignment effectiveness are stated in terms of common objectives achievement, acceptable 
residual risk, reduced incident frequency, reduced scale of loss, positive feedback from 
executives’ surveys, maturity advancement from one level to another one, market share 
increase, maturity of formalisation and centralisation (Alecsić and Jelavić, 2017). The 
identified maturity level is often compared against industry baselines to determine the degree 
of control function effectiveness. 
For the reasons mentioned above, CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework incorporates 
all components in order to assure a security baseline for organisations.  
4.4.4 Benefits of adopting the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
Previous theory and practice of the strategic alignment of both CsM and ERM have a 
fragmented legacy. The findings of this research suggest even a misleading legacy in some 
cases due to unclear terminology, scope, and meanings. Much of the current frameworks 
revolve around IT, IS, or RM alignment. The CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
is proposed in order to bridge the three literature gaps: as stated in Literature Review 
(Chapter Two), research gap found based on systematic literature evaluation (Chapter 
Three), and research gap framework evaluation (Chapter Four, Section 4.3). This Framework 
introduces and sheds insights on common governance across all three domains built on the 
research gap. While the Framework helps to avoid any duplication of efforts, it incorporates 
the modern CsM that adopts wider assets protection (not only partially as so in IS or IT) and 
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the wider principles of ERM; in turn combining together two risk controls and two risk 
oversights that often duplicate each other. Such practice has been scarcely considered. The 
lack of clear practices regarding ERM, CsM, and alignment implementation leads to a 
fragmented theory and applicability. The framework thus proposes to yield clarity through a 
unified governance that comprises both controls and oversight. The framework emphasises 
how profitable it is to assign value to intangible and tangible assets, something that has been 
omitted in some studies. It compounds a recognition of temporal trends and acknowledges 
its developments. Additionally, it clarifies both domains’ theory and the definitions and 
meanings of terminology. Finally, it proposes to leverage an awareness of misalignment and 
value of collaborative effort. 
The specificity of the Framework is that it extracts derivation from theory, current practices, 
and regulatory framework, as well as unifying external and internal pressures in a single way 
to coordinate in accordance to the identified maturity level of security (internal), 
expectations, and targets. It harmonises responses itself with the external 
pressures/influences. This is all done with the intention of ensuring that the Framework is 
properly optimised to both environments as well as being specifically adapted for the 
financial industry. It thus creates a common risk governance that holistically manage risks. 
The Framework contributes towards an understanding of how organisational appetite, 
culture, governance, risk oversight, risk profile, maturity, compliance, structure, 
performance, and leadership are dependent on a strategic risk governance; most often these 
aspects have been investigated previously in isolation. 
Particular attention is paid to baseline expectations in order to embrace a prudential practice 
of risk oversight. The advantages of adopting the research Framework is that conformance, 
performance, sustainability, and effective strategic alignment between CsM and ERM are 
ensured. From its initial phase, the Framework proposes to identify the requirement—the 
minimal baseline expectations to which an organisation shall abide in order to ensure proper 
resiliency. It considers the external environmental pressures as a preparation method before 
implementation. The specificity of this phase is advantageous because it defines the purpose, 
requirement before implementation (internal and external), limitation and constraints. In 
other words, it supports a common purpose for CsM and ERM through strategic lenses that 
in turn align planning, control, measurement, and mitigation measures in one unified 
mechanism. Moreover, the alignment brings the benefit of defining a common risk profile, 
based on which the risk appetite is forged in accordance with organisational capabilities. 
179 
 
Additionally, unifying the principles of CsM and ERM supports a common culture and 
communication within the organisation. The CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework is 
a solution to avoid duplication of strategies, policies, guidelines, and procedures.  
Overall, the first phase of the framework anticipates effects and interdependencies of an 
external environment within today’s business context, and acknowledges internal 
requirements and dependencies and prudence in order to ensure the effectiveness, 
sustainability, and resilience of an organisation in the long-term. 
Furthermore, one of the benefits of Phase Two of the Framework is that it is driven by 
managerial directions to establish risk appetite, structure, processes, responsibilities, and 
commitment. Considering external and internal environment pressures prompt a rethink of 
what is expected and how it is expected to respond. The Framework puts forward the view 
that a clear statement which identifies an organisation’s purpose and objectives, appetite, 
structure, processes, responsibilities, and commitment is a part of proactive practice. 
Accordingly, the advantages are that the expected ‘norm’ and result are defined beforehand 
in accordance with both external and internal expectations and thus legitimacy. The 
‘relationship’ of CsM and ERM through alignment has the advantage that it delegates 
departmental communication to identify wider vulnerabilities in terms of structure and 
processes alignment. It also creates a mechanism that, once unified, has a common capability 
to respond to external vulnerabilities and threats. This implies that at their roots, both 
domains are driven by RM principles. Therefore, the alignment has the benefits of increasing 
the performance based on the response to threats. Confirming that the alignment creates 
collaboration between departments, the cost of risk awareness can be decreased instead of 
two different training sessions that refer to enterprise and cyber risks. When compiled 
together, this widens the understanding of organisational risk exposure. A similar practice 
can be applied to guidelines and communication campaigns. As such, the Framework 
advocates a common mechanism of control, monitoring, measuring, and ultimately a 
common solution to increase resiliency.  
The Frameworks supports acknowledgement of management directions (driving principles: 
philosophy, appetite, and directions) beforehand and optimises as needed to predict strategic 
requirements. Once external and internal requirements are identified, managerial directions 
are acknowledged. These benefits of the Frameworks clearly delimitate what is expected, 
why it should be done, and how it should be applied. It renders dependence on a cyclical 
deployment of actions that, once omitted, might affect the achievement of organisational 
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goals and mission. Such a practice shall ensure that implementation is in accordance with 
organisation objectives, capabilities and limitations, identifying current situations (assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities and control), identifying the risk owners, location, the source of 
threats as well as leverage an enterprise-wide implementation security. 
For instance, Phase Four of the Framework (implementation directions) is mainly based on 
the identification of organisational practice profile, assessment, alignment of processes, 
response and communication, and delivery of results. Once again, it supports an informed 
implementation which assesses organisational risk profile based on a maturity model 
diagnosis. On this basis, the advantages are that the organisation understands its current 
exposure and capabilities profile and can set strategic directions as well as implement 
corrective measures.  
It is a continuous measurement of suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of organisational 
risk approach, and thus its strategies, applicability, and response are advisable to assure value 
delivery.  
Therefore, financial organisations should consider the adoption of CsM—ERM Strategic 
Alignment Framework to attain the following advantages:  
(1) create a common risk governance for risk control and risk oversight to support 
achievement of the overall business strategy and objectives;  
(2) define common objectives in balance with organisation goals and objectives (all domains 
are equally important);  
(3) help avoid bias in decision-related to investments or budget allocation;  
(4) define what will be protected (tangible and intangible assets); 
(5) correlate capabilities of CsM with ERM whille risk appetite and tolerance is aligned with 
the organisational risk appetite, risk tolerance and acceptable residual risk;  
(6) provide due care for risk oversight and in turn leads to competitive advantages;  
(7) establishes compliance (unified mechanism ensures efficiency of risk oversight);  
(8) develop a cross-domain knowledge;  
(9) efficiently understand how risk can overlap and how it can be managed holistically;  
(10) increase business performance due to increased risk resiliency;  
(11) employ fewer as risk governance optimises use of resources;  
(12) lower costs and reduce effort;  
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(13) maintain shareholders’ and stakeholders’ trust that the organisation is strategically led; 
(14) unify safeguards and countermeasures, and in turn, minimise loss;  
(15) provide awareness of Framework capabilities and in turn establishes proactive and 
continuous risk oversight;  
(16) ensure continuous performance assessment;  
(17) create a shared communication;  
(18) promote a proactive strategy in achieving resiliency with careful consideration to 
internal and external requirements;  
(19) be driven by a maturity-performance relationship;  
(20) consider a varied spectrum of variables (strategy, structure, culture, organisational 
design, processes, leadership, technology, structural alignment, risk appetite, risk tolerance) 
that can impact the return on investment (ROI) and performance (Chan, 2002);  
(21) consider operational dimension (e.g. processes, infrastructures, communication, 
competence, governance, partnerships, scope, architecture or skills) when implement the 
strategic alignment, respectively a structural alignment;  
(22) consider cultural dimensions as significant determinant in implementation, hence the 
human aspects are a variable (informal procedures, norms, beliefs, behaviour, ethics);  
(23) address industry-specific needs, most frameworks are generic and do not address 
financial industry-specifically (such as regulatory compliance for the finance industry); 
(24) promote executives’ involvement—being a top-down approach;  
(25) recommend optimisation based on organisational needs;  
(26) integrate shared risk oversight (unified capabilities of reporting, analysis and 
mitigation);  
(27) ensure a continuous identification for internal challenges;  
(28) perform assets valuation (known as ‘value at risk’ (VaR)) in conjunction with CsM and 
ERM in accord with organisational objectives. Thus, prioritisation of actions is made in 
alignment with all three components and ensures that the common valuation leads to an 
optimised response, whereas a silo valuation presumably lead to an incorrect response;  
(29) ensure a coherent terminology and theory through a common strategy, policy and 
guidance;  
(30) compounds a hybrid dimension of all four dimensions (Quadrant 1: Adoption-
theoretical focus, Quadrant 2: Implementation, Quadrant 3: Maturity assessment, Quadrant: 
4 Assesses compliance) in one single framework and thus able to act on its own as an 
integrative mechanism without additional support of other frameworks. 
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Overall, the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework benefits are accountability, 
transparency, self-preservation, and response preparedness to ensure that negligence is 
avoided, and less disruptive actions lead to organisational value (Posthumus and Von Solms, 
2004; McKinsey, 2015; KPMG, 2016). Additionally, the formalised procedure triggered by 
the research Framework demonstrates that the due care for risk oversight is addressed and 
the collaborative efforts support the effectiveness of control. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Hence the Framework relies on derivations from Chapters Two and Three as a baseline in 
the development of this chapter. On these premises, this chapter has been further developed 
into three sections: 1) supporting theories, 2) prior frameworks derivations, and lastly 3) 
theoretical CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework. 
Regarding the first section, supporting theories are chosen based on the premises of 
governance, alignment, and coordination of interdepartmental control. Thus, Contingency 
Theory and Institutional Theory are driven by strategic contingencies and dependent factors 
within an internal and external environment. This agreement demonstrates inclusiveness of 
legacy support for the alignment mechanism that combines two approaches for a common 
and integrated purpose: alignment. Each of the theories has specific philosophical 
perspectives, and their association illustrates two different insights (institutional norms and 
variations of contingencies) with a commonality based on performance directed by 
sustainability (Contingency Theory) and legitimacy (Institutional Theory). 
The second section concerns the examination of supporting frameworks through the lenses 
of academics, practitioners and regulators in order to understand the applicable procedures 
for all three domains (CsM, ERM and Alignment). Accordingly, compelling evidence in 
regard to ERM frameworks of academics has illustrated that their contribution represents a 
descriptive approach (lack of empirical evidence). Consequently, the applicable procedures 
of establishing an ERM framework are incomplete/immature and the need for a more 
realistic and practical approach has been argued. On the contrary, the practitioners’ 
frameworks have shown practical consideration for implementation. Looking at how 
practitioners have addressed the issue, there have been two categories of supportive entities: 
practitioners’ associations and vendor-advisory organisations. The voluntary implication of 
these frameworks refers to vendor-specific frameworks, which happen to have been tailored 
to the financial industry.  
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Overall, this chapter has addressed the research objectives: to identify, analyse and critically 
evaluate academic, industry-based and regulatory literature regarding ERM, CsM and their 
alignment and explore the current state of the topic, in order to understand the value of this 
research. Although the problem of risk exposure is difficult to eradicate totally, alignment 
can ensure due diligence (legally ensure avoidance of negligent practices) and determine 
appropriate governance to ensure a fewer losses. A more efficient manner to counteract 
cyber risk (namely, frameworks aiming to sustain this initiative) is necessary because a lack 
of safeguarding measures and awareness (due diligence) along with misalignment could 
result in liability disputes besides other negative effects on society as a whole. Furthermore, 
the framework proposes to support organisations in generating enhanced governance 
procedures for themselves (emphasising responsibility and leadership) and to seize 
opportunities centred on risk-informed choices, striving to contribute to the achievement of 
societal risk resilience regarding enterprise and cyber risks at all times. 
In order to explain how this research has been undertaken (through which means, methods, 
and tools), the next chapter (Chapter Five) outlines in detail how the research problem is 
explored. Accordingly, a specific methodology is chosen in close relationship to the research 
aims and objective. 
 
 
5. Chapter Five: Research Design  
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have considered the literature as a baseline to address the research 
questions. This methodology explains how they correlate with the research questions 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Bryman, 2012). This chapter introduces the steps taken in the 
development and execution of the research. It contains a theoretical discussion regarding 
what a research methodology represents and how it consequently sets the researcher’s 
priorities (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). ‘[B]usiness research may be defined as a 
systematic inquiry whose objective is to provide the information that will allow managerial 
problems to be solved’ (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2004, p. 4); this quote mainly 
define what a research rationale is, respectively, if applied to this particular chapter, it 
explains how the ‘systematic inquiry’ is deployed. 
This chapter is subdivided into sections which explain why specific research methods were 
chosen over others. Section 5.2 summarises the totality of components that were selected, 
Section 5.3 explains the research purpose type, and Section 5.4 which clarifies the research 
philosophy chosen. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 discuss the approach and strategy, and Section 5.7 
outlines the methodology where research methods and techniques chosen are emphasised. 
Section 5.8 explains how the data was analysed. Sections 5.9 et seq. examine the research 
rigour, limitations and ethical consideration, and Section 5.15 provides a chapter conclusion. 
5.2 Research design 
In order to justify how this research commenced, the research design defines how its 
components (such as purpose, philosophy, approach, strategy, time horizon, research 
methods and techniques, and research boundaries) all intersect (Creswell, 2004). 
Additionally, a research design indicates how the research methods and analysis are applied 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). Thus, Figure 5-1 below exemplifies the research design through 







Figure 5-1 Thesis’ Research Design  
Source: The Researcher  
A research design represents a planned sequence of steps (also known as sequential research 
design) that map together and contribute towards the research goal achievement (Robson, 
2011; Maxwell, 2013; Leavy, 2017; Thomas, 2017), Figure 5-1 highlights how the research 
design is conducted and interconnected. A planned and detailed research design acts as a 
‘map’ that assures research repeatability (Maxwell, 2013). Having demarcated the research 
design, this research serves to understand and explore the phenomenon. It does so through 
the adoption of a qualitative research design that intends to capture flexibility in responses 
and to foster in-depth answers and meanings (Silverman 2007; Leavy, 2017). With this scope 
in mind, the following data, tools, and techniques have been designated: 
1) Secondary 
• Literature review 
• Systematic literature evaluation  
2) Primary 
• Semi-structured interviews 
By considering secondary and primary qualitative data, the research design explores the 
phenomenon under an inductive research approach. Regarding the time frame, this research 
is limited to research degree prerequisites. Consequently, it embraces a cross-sectional 
design to explore the phenomenon and the data is collected over a given period (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2013; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015; Bryman, 2016). This results in a 
methodological research approach, circumscribed by time whilst seeking to explore the past 
and current states of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the option to undertake a 
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examination (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). Regarding the research design selected, 
data analysis of both secondary and primary data relies on interpretive research philosophy 
driven by research questions. 
5.3 Research purpose type 
A research purpose type represents the outcome that a researcher seeks to produce (Blaikie, 
2009) and in the case of social research, the most common types of research purpose are 
descriptive, explanatory, and exploratory. 
This research adopts an exploratory design purpose because it seeks to investigate beyond 
explanation and reasons behind a phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Consequently, by 
selecting the exploratory research type, this research aims to address how the research 
problem has been analysed in the past, and whether this research would provide a resolution 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).  
In contrast, adopting an explanatory or descriptive research purpose would only address 
causality and description and may therefore not render an enhanced understanding of the 
research problem. Concerning those mentioned above, it is obvious that descriptive research 
is unsuitable as it provides a significant amount of information about a specific phenomenon 
and its characteristics, in a detailed format, to contribute to the understanding of a problem 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). In a simplified manner, the profile of a 
phenomenon or a problem (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015) can be considered but, if 
so, would be an incomplete approach towards the scope of this particular research. Likewise, 
adopting an explanatory research type would only seek explanations for a given situation; 
its main characteristics being rooted in elucidating the relationships amongst variables 
(Saunders and Lewis, 2012).  
Regarding the limitations, neither explanatory nor descriptive research types are suitable. 
Consequently, adoption of an exploratory research type is appropriate and in turn, the 
research it proposes would move beyond mere identification and observation and develop 
into an exploration of further possible answers. 
5.4 Research philosophy 
A research philosophy (also known as a research paradigm) indicates the beliefs and 
assumption (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015) based on which a researcher explains the 
nature of specific knowledge (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005; Bryman and Bell, 2007; 





knowledge as epistemological assumptions (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015) and how 
it interprets the reality. Another perspective is that of ontological assumptions, which refers 
to the problems encountered by a researcher (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015) 
regarding his/her perception and how the research problem is perceived by others 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). It usually relates to an external perception (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
A third perspective of research philosophy is that of axiological assumption. This philosophy 
refers to the effects of researchers’ values/ethics regarding the content of the research 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). 
Referring to research philosophy options, general business study research can be based on 
several main types of philosophies: Positivism, Critical Realism, Postmodernism, 
Interpretivism, and Pragmatism. Selecting a Positivism philosophy would lead to research 
findings being based on testing a theory (Myers, 2013). Therefore, it is unsuitable for this 
research as it relies on ‘cause and effect’ and considers the use of hypothesis and quantitative 
measures to test a theory; not considering the perspectives of human interpretation and 
behaviour but instead considering it as an independent variable (Saunders and Lewis, 2012; 
Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2014). 
This research selects and adopts the philosophy of Interpretivism (also known as 
phenomenology) because this philosophy provides a practical and theoretical perspective of 
the phenomenon through an inductive approach. Interpretivism philosophy enhances 
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon through the eyes of individuals and their 
personal experiences (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2014; Gray, 2014; Taylor, Bogdan 
and DeVault, 2016). Interpretive research emphasises the connotation of meanings in a 
social context to understand the ‘status quo’ of a phenomenon (Myers, 2013). Such an 
approach seemed suitable and justified given the fact that there is scarce literature concerning 
the alignment of risk governance where practical insights and meanings prevail. Moreover, 
the practical facets endeavoured to explore and subsidise the interpretive philosophy 
perspective; henceforth the research intends to capture the views, behaviours, and 
understanding of the phenomenon (Thomas, 2017).  
Adopting the interpretive philosophy and acknowledging the possible biases, the Researcher 
recognises that in order to achieve the research objective, self-reflexivity and neutrality 
represent an additional point to consider. Therefore, self-awareness can distinguish the way 





beliefs, background, gender or ethnicity (Tracy, 2012; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015; 
Thomas, 2017). 
5.5 Research approach 
A research approach represents the plans and the procedures upon which decisions are taken 
to underpin the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data (Creswell, 2014). Given the 
exploratory specificity of this research, the research approach is based upon an inductive 
approach because data collection and analysis intend to explain patterns, facts, causes, and 
meanings (Sanders et al., 2009; Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2014; Gray, 2014; 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). A particular characteristic of inductive research is 
that it is a theory building approach, which seeks to discover insight and understanding of 
the research context (Bhattacherjee, 2012). On the other hand, selecting a deductive 
approach would support a causality understanding of a problem verified through hypotheses 
testing (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). For that reason, by choosing an inductive approach, the 
results are drawn based on the discovery of meanings instead of testing hypothesis (as in the 
deductive approach) (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Consequently, the inductive approach is 
considered a ‘bottom-up’ approach, hence the result appears upon exploration of the research 
problem (Myers, 2013) and the theory is developed post analysis (Saunders and Lewis, 
2012). Moreover, given the qualitative nature of the research, exploring a social phenomenon 
through an inductive approach is feasible for small samples of participants, respectively 
semi-structured interviews (Leavy, 2017). 
5.6 Research strategy 
A research strategy represents a significant component of the research design as it portrays 
the logic of which responses are identified (Mason, 2013). It is strategic in its nature because 
it emphasises the relationship between the research goals and how questions are answered 
(i.e. the strategic purpose of the planning of methodology). As the ‘strategy’ refers to a plan 
of action to be achieved and guided by a goal (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015), the 
research strategies refer to methods and techniques employed to answer the research 
questions and thus set the research directions. Based on an exploration of various strategies, 
the research strategy was chosen on the acknowledgement of other possible means to 
respond to the research questions (Mason, 2013).  
Commonly used tools are experiments, surveys, case studies, action research, grounded 





Experiments imply testing of theories through various means, usually in a laboratory-based 
format (Saunders and Lewis, 2012; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). The survey 
represents a structured research strategy of gathering data about a specific population 
(Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Ethnography refers to research that focuses on culture or social 
aspects of a specific group (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). 
Adopting a grounded theory would be unsuitable as findings emerge from explanation 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015) based on coding and contrast (Fisher, 2004). 
Likewise, action research is inappropriate as it involves participation as a learning process, 
and results are based on practical results (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). 
Having considered the purpose and research strategy specifics of this research, data has been 
collected in accordance with the interviews limitations attributes. 
5.7 Research methods (methodology) 
Research methods represent the general guidance that structure the execution of how data is 
collected and organised (Jankowicz, 2005; Silverman, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2007). More 
specifically, it defines the Researcher’s preference regarding how he/she explores and 
proceeds in studying the phenomenon (Silverman, 2007). In short, it refers to the way the 
problem is perceived and how answers are pursued (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, 2016). 
Also described as a methodology (Silverman, 2007), it incorporates the research techniques 
as a means of applying the guidance through procedures (Jankowicz, 2005). Therefore, the 
methods for conducting the research embody the techniques and tools proposed for 
identifying, defining, interpreting, and analysing the problem (Bazeley, 2013; Bryman, 
2016). Very often, research methods are in the form of the mono method, mixed method, 
and multi-method (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). In accordance with the research 
aims, this research adopts qualitative research methods as mono research techniques. 
5.7.1 Qualitative research methods 
This research adopts qualitative research methods for the reason that it implies a combination 
of multiple perspectives that are contextual and applied in practice; a fact that assures variety 
strength and validity of results (Blaikie, 2010; Robson, 2011; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013; 
Gray, 2014; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). The nature of this research is qualitative 
as it seeks to explore the qualitative aspect of concepts, and meanings based on qualitative 





to the literature review and systematic literature evaluation, followed by a second phase 
where qualitative data analysis is undertaken in a field exploration of the phenomenon 
through interviews. This represents a sequential exploratory design, which orders the 
sequence of the steps (Robson, 2011) that compound data for validation. Nonetheless, it 
concerns the qualitative rational. On the other hand, a sequential explanatory design would 
firstly use quantitative data and later on would use qualitative data for explanatory purposes 
(Robson, 2011). 
The decision to make use of qualitative data stands to enhance the prospect of findings 
through the exploration of a range of perspectives gaining further insights and an in-depth 
understanding regarding the research problem (Robson, 2011; Rubin and Ruin, 2012; 
Creswell, 2014) and supporting compelling findings (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, 2016). 
Moreover, by means of qualitative methods, research yields diverse viewpoints, thus 
enhancing varied and justifiable outcomes via responses obtained through semi-structured 
interviews and then assimilated all altogether.  
5.7.2 Techniques and procedures of data collection 
Data collection and data analysis are divided into two categories for transparency (desk 
research and field research) and follow a sequential exploratory design that relies of 
secondary and primary data. 
5.7.2.1 Secondary data  
Literature Review—Phase One 
The first stage of the research investigation starts with a traditional literature review based 
on a manual selection of academic papers. Within the initial literature identification, the 
topic is broadly searched and researched, and once reviewed, the documents are allocated to 
a more specific area and themes (e.g. cybersecurity, RM, ERM, alignment). Although the 
search determines various results, an initial estimate of how many papers are available was 
unfeasible in this particular case because the data retrieval covered the research problem 
partially. Therefore, the selection of academic papers was made individually. Consequently, 
the research is interdisciplinary of three different disciplines. The exploration of prior 
research begins with an electronic database search, based on keywords and simple phrases. 
Later on, their complexity increases based on data extracted from analysed papers and 





approach, various key terms and phrases are identified, hence the disciplines’ terminologies 
fluctuating over the years (See Appendix B). Once the keywords and phrases results are 
significant, the same keywords were used to create automatic alerts from electronic journals 
and Google Scholar to ease the volume of search and ensure an up-to-date access to new 
references. Accumulation of research sources/contributors continued through an analysis of 
references regarding the newly identified references. Based on identified references, a 
literature synthesis was extracted in the form of field notes (electronic and physical format). 
Through the field notes, the researcher registers summaries of scrutinised data. Following 
this, further meanings are extracted and evaluated (Zikmund et al., 2013).  
When carrying out this particular literature evaluation of academic sources, the main 
materials considered were electronic peer-reviewed journals. Books and conference papers 
were not included in the main analysis (see Table 2.8, Chapter 2) and the Researcher seldom 
referred to additional sources for definitions or secondary purposes. Regarding the resources 
used, in the case of practitioners and regulators legacy, various sources such as professional 
articles, reports, guidelines, policies, standards and laws were identified and reviewed. As a 
result, 169 academic papers, 91 practitioner’s papers and 51 regulators documents (312 in 
total) were explicitly analysed. By employing the literature review, the scope of this stage 
levers answers to Question 1 and Question 2 of this research.  
 
Systematic Literature Review—Phase Two 
Consequently, the literature review of this research represents the rationale and the basis of 
further investigation. The systematic review’s purpose is to ‘locate, appraise, and synthesise’ 
the evidence and solutions suggested by prior literature (Boland, Cherry and Dickson, 2013). 
The systematic literature review evaluates and interprets prior studies of scholars, 
practitioners, and regulators relating to the research paper’s problem (Kitchenham and 
Charters, 2007; Boland, Cherry and Dickson, 2013). Therefore, data analysis relies on a 
thematic analysis that studies the qualitative nature of research through a pre-planned 
assessment protocol (Boland, Cherry and Dickson, 2013) in order to identify the current 
research state, limitation, and research gaps, and in turn to validate the position and 
contribution of this research. By adopting a systematic literature review, the analysis starts 
with 312 sources initially identified in the literature review along with additional references 
supplemented to sustain the validity of any findings and research gaps. In contrast to a 





systematic review phase focuses on mapping the key elements as well as evaluating and 
synthesising the findings in order to depict the various dimensions of the phenomenon 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2004). Owing to the research problem involving a broad field of research, 
the literature was explored thematically (commonalities, difference, typologies, and trends) 
in order to understand the prominent themes and correlations related to the research problem 
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2005). This supports understanding of the current research problem 
and how the identified summarised derivation can contribute towards the Framework. 
Being qualitative research, data is explored through an interpretive philosophy in order to 
understand behaviour and attitudes towards the interchangeable use of terminologies and 
meanings, respectively the effects. Owing to the research problem being a broad field, the 
research theory is fragmented into few disciplines. The investigation aims to identify 
commonalities, difference, typologies, and derivations of current research trends. Therefore, 
both data selection and analysis were manually made based on scope, the research paper’s 
questions that demarcated the inclusion, and exclusion criteria (Boland, Cherry and Dickson, 
2013). Thus, the research is constructed on the review on qualitative evidence of academic 
journals, industry publications, and regulatory documents for a wider understanding of the 
phenomenon. Exploratory in its nature, the selection of papers is made through a database 
search (search string) but also through consideration of references from relevant publications 
identified regarding relevance, paradigm typology, research dimension, focus, strengths, 
limitations, key findings, contribution, and/or omitted components. 
The additional literature review follows a specific methodology based on the Four-Quadrant 
Framework developed by Althonayan (2003). Optimised to the research problem, the Four-
Quadrant Framework is adapted to evaluate the literature on four criteria: Quadrant 1: 
Adoption-theoretical focus, Quadrant 2: Implementation, Quadrant 3: Maturity assessment, 
Quadrant: 4 Assesses compliance. In this way, the literature was identified and categorised 
to support in understanding and evaluating existing literature concentration and limitations 
(Kitchenham and Charters, 2007). Additionally, exclusion criteria were based on research 
aims connection with the identified literature; the technical and operational focus was 
another exclusion criterion considered, hence the research focusing on the strategic views.  
5.7.2.2 Primary Data 





Collecting primary data through interviews 
Semi-structured Interviews—Phase Three 
The interview represents a research tool that elicits responses from respondents in the form 
of a discussion between one or more parties and the researcher (O’Gorman and Macintosh, 
2014; Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016). Focusing on the research topic, an interview objective 
is to provide information about a particular phenomenon in the form of empirical data, 
respectively real-life experiences and insights (Erisksson and Kovalainen, 2008). In 
undertaking this step, the design of interviews can be typically unstructured, structured, and 
semi-structured. Considering the research goals, it seems unfeasible to undertake 
unstructured interviews in this research because the research objectives are specific. Even if 
unstructured interviews might elicit various and unforeseen information (O’Gorman and 
Macintosh, 2014), the format of the unstructured interview is flexible (open conversation) 
and thus unfeasible; henceforth the responses might be conducted by what an interviewee 
considers relevant (Bryman and Bell, 2011), and it might not necessarily abide by the 
question investigated. Using the unstructured interview, difficulties in developing meanings 
through comparisons may also evolve (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Likewise, the structured interview is not appropriate for this research because its main 
characteristic is to assure production of significant data (quantitative). Although it is a fast 
method of gathering data and the risk of biases is low (O’Gorman and Macintosh, 2014), 
there are also limits such as inflexible conversation (standardised questions format), possibly 
inducing specific responses or allowing for some aspects of the phenomenon to be omitted 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
Lastly, the semi-structured interview seems appropriate to use for this research because it 
differentiates itself by its flexibility and versatility in gathering responses (O’Gorman and 
Macintosh, 2014; Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016) and thus it aligns with the research problem. 
Even though semi-structured interviews have a pre-formulated format of questions, it is 
flexible and allows the researcher to go in a specific direction (if necessary) during the 
interview as it wants to encourage the respondents to discuss openly (Myers, 2013). Probing 
and prompting are attributes permitted in this type of interview (Gilbert and Stoneman, 
2016). Therefore, in some exceptional cases, where the elicited answers are partial or 
ambiguous, a repetition of the question or a slight rephrasing of the same questions/wording 





The semi-structured format is often referred to as an interview guide in deploying the 
interview and conversation (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
With the intention of incurring knowledge from practical evidence, the main interview 
method considered is face-to-face (individual interview) with senior executives responsible 
for risk oversight in different financial organisations. The benefit of the face-to-face 
interview is that it ensures direct contact with the respondents and can elicit open 
communication that prompts identification of a research dimension and attitude towards a 
social phenomenon (Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016). In addition, any doubts can be 
immediately clarified, allowing non-verbal communication, and thus questions can be 
adjusted and optimised in correlation to previous responses (Sapsford and Jupp 2008; 
Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). In as much as it has advantages, it can also have disadvantages 
such as a geographical barrier (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), increased preparation, need for 
improvisation skills, effective communication skills, resource implications, and/or 
respondent inhibitions, to name but a few (Denscombe, 2016). 
Alternatively, despite the advantages of a face-to-face interview, the Researcher is 
considering telephonic interviews as a secondary option to gather data. Hence, the research 
is not geographically limited, and a larger sample of respondents might be reached, in turn 
leading to more complex research (Flick, 2014). The decision to use two types of interviews 
is due to face-to-face interviews probably being unfeasible in some cases owing to the 
geographical dispersion, interviewee availability, time of reflection or even anxiety of some 
respondents (Robson, 2011; Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016). Furthermore, some studies 
suggest that telephonic interviews are more comfortable in terms of topic focus (Gilbert and 
Stoneman, 2016). Disadvantages of the telephonic interview are related to human-interaction 
and non-verbal cues or additional preliminary arrangements (call, messages) (Gilbert and 
Stoneman, 2016). 
The interview format was elaborated based on preliminary results of secondary research 
results from the literature review and literature evaluation. The realisation of this approach 
rests on three motivations: first, an efficient interaction with the industry respondents; 
second, there is a collection of primary data that points out current trends and thus provides 
a means of comparison with previous data results; third, there is the possible identification 






Therefore, the expert interview structure is created in a semi-standardised style, employing 
the open-ended question format to ensure flexibility in responses (Silverman, 2014). By 
undertaking a semi-structured interview, it assures consistency of answers by limiting 
deviations and strongly focusing on the answers themselves (Silverman, 2014). Moreover, 
it gives the interviewees flexibility when identifying new ideas/perspectives. Consequently, 
the Researcher wishes to take the opportunity to gain insightful information (tacit 
knowledge), as opposed to structured interviews where a researcher might predispose 
possible answers due to the open-ended nature of the questions. Although interviews are 
time-consuming, the format gains detailed feedback through questioning experts.  
Having chosen these methodologies, it can be concluded that the research is based on 
qualitative methods and the feasibility of this proposed project is thus sustained by its 
explorative nature. Additionally, by applying two tools of data collection (face-to-face, 
telephonic interview (i.e. by Voice over Internet Protocol (Skype) or telephonic 
communication), the suitability seems to guarantee an alternative plan in case of an 
unfeasible method. Furthermore, the researcher’s methodological approaches are to be 
interlinked to achieve the same goal and gain additional insight into the researched field 
(Flick, 2014). 
Participant selection 
The selection of participants was decided based on each potential participant’s expertise, 
industry practice, and rate of response to interview invitation. Moreover, the pull of 
participants is strictly limited to being from within the financial industry (e.g. banks, retail 
banks, commercial banks, private banks, savings banks, postal saving banks, building 
societies, community banks, credit unions, corporate finance, mutual funds, hedge funds, 
mortgage brokers, clearing houses, finance organisations, and investment organisations). 
Participant selection for both face-to-face in-person and telephone interviews is via: 
1) Direct approach 
a. Identification of individuals that work within the Enterprise Risk Management, Risk 
Management, Information Technology, or Cybersecurity departments (whether other 
types of terminologies are used) was made. The criteria for selection was based on 
their direct involvement within one of the departments mentioned above, with focus 





b. Also, direct communication with a range of selected organisations was initiated and 
formal requests were sent. 
2) Indirect approach, identification made through recommendations of peers (snowball and 
recommendations from professional associations; e.g. ISACA, International Information 
System Security Certification Consortium (ISC2), RIMS, Global Association of Risk 
Professionals (GARP)). Targeting associations warranted that the respondents are 
affiliated and that the interview is targeted towards a precise specialised audience. 
Nonetheless, the respondents’ selection criteria were also based on other criteria (e.g. 
industry, department, role superiority). In addition, specialised professionals from social 
media were targeted, and invitations were sent to members through open-wide 
communication platforms. 
In this phase, the advantages of primary data collection (such as unbiased data) is that 
availability and originality add more value to the research, hence primary data representing a 
useful technique for identifying new valid data (Zikmund, 2013). Consequently, the sample 
is dispersed globally to steer and acquire meaningful and accountable primary data.  
Sample population 
The sample population refers to the selection of a minor set from a grand total (Saunders and 
Lewis, 2012) and can refer to people, organisations, places, products, services, and much 
more. For practicality, usually a specific sample that is considered representative is extracted 
rather than considering the whole total (Saunders and Lewis, 2012; Thomas, 2017). The total 
whole is labelled a ‘sampling frame’. To extract the sampling (explicit sample) various 
techniques are used such as simple random techniques, systematic sampling, and/or stratified 
random sampling. The simple random technique refers to random numbers chosen, with the 
probability of any number selection (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). The second technique is 
systematic sampling, referring to a selection based on regular time intervals (Saunders and 
Lewis, 2012). The third technique is stratified random sampling and combines the previous 
two techniques while relying on geographical area separation (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). 
In this research, the non-probability sampling techniques seem suitable hence there is an 
inability to define the total population within the financial industry on a global scale. 
Respectively, the sample of participants includes respondents from various sectors of the 
financial industry. Additionally, the geographical area location of respondents ranges from 





Along with quota sampling and purposive sampling (selected due to the correlation of 
respondent with research problem), the Researcher ensures that the sample can offer new 
insight, helpful in exploring the research question (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Thus, this 
research uses non-probability sampling because the population is undefined since it would 
be impossible to define it globally and objectively. Secondly, it considers quota sampling as 
the respondents should correspond to specific characteristics (e.g. job position, expertise, 
industry). The purposive sample population selection criteria is based on job positions 
related to risk management or cybersecurity management.  This criterion is considered 
depending on the organisation’s governance structure. The pre-selection of the population is 
delimited regarding departmental involvement and does not include a specific rank/role as 
long as participants are top management executives that work in the financial industry. In 
addition, this research takes a gender-neutral position in selecting the sample in order to 
avoid any bias or discrimination. Undoubtedly, full addressability of investigation of all 
departments might underpin other aspects if gender is considered, different from the search 
purpose. For this reason, the investigation delimits its focus on ERM and cybersecurity 
comparative analysis and intentionally omits addressing all departments to ensure that the 
sample selection is associated with the research problem. 
5.8 Data analysis  
To respond to research questions, the qualitative data has been designated based on how 
appropriate it is for the research problem.  
5.8.1 Qualitative analysis: interviews 
The interview format is qualitative semi-structured, which can generate meaningful views 
of social reality (Mason, 2013) concerning respondent’s perceptions of a particular context. 
While qualitative interviews are one of the most used methods in qualitative research 
(Mason, 2013), the results are dependent on the respondents’ capabilities to interact and 
express an opinion and also the Researcher’s ability interpret that which is narrated rather 
than what the interviewee says (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Moreover, the interview techniques 
are appropriate with the interpretive research paradigm because they aim to explore the 
qualitative dimension of the phenomenon and to reflect an additional dimension of the 
research problem. By this reason, selection of interview data collection relies on two 
complementarily techniques: 





• Conducted by telephonic interviews (a number of 19 telephone interviews). 
Such approaches have been adopted due to the geographical barrier as well as cost and time 
constraints. Likewise, many authors considered a combination of both in-person interviews 
and telephonic interviews to ensure additional views (e.g. Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 
2017). Distinguishing this dual approach is that it presents a variety of options in sample 
identification for the Researcher. Additionally, for accuracy, each interview follows an 
identical semi-structured format, where an interviewee’s speech is aimed to be preserved 
through the use of a digital voice recorder.  
Interview pilot study 
Moreover, before the interview, a pilot test was conducted to ensure that the interview is 
appropriate regarding the questions’ content and tone, the level of detail required in the 
answers, and the length of time needed to respond. The procedure was tested upwards to 
help prepare for exceptional cases; for example, should an interviewee refuse to record, or 
should the recording device encounter a malfunction. In this case, a pre-test also helped there 
to estimate the time length of transcription during the interview. Additionally, the pilot test 
was applied to validate the significance and clarity of questions. The pilot study was 
addressed to six participants: two academic and four industry experts from financial industry. 
As a result, from an initial 37 questions, two more were added to portray practicality of the 
phenomenon. 39 questions were finally refined and correlated with the Framework thematic 
and research questions; yet all aligned to the research aims and objectives. The first ten 
questions refer to organisational profile (e.g. geographical, industry, size) and to participant 
profile (e.g. role, job focus, experience, certifications) and experience to validate the quality 
of competences. The second part of the interview contains the remaining questions (29), 
which specifically address the research problem. Although the number of questions may 
seem high, during the pilot test, the results showed that adopting such approach can leverage 
a broader perspective of answers. The average time of interviews during a pilot study ranged 
between 35-75 minutes depending on the interviewee’s characteristics. 
To overcome difficulties in responding to the questions, some (22 questions out of 39) 
offered potential answers as pre-coded themes. However, before the interview, all 
interviewees were informed that the options available are mainly to open the discussion and 





perspective and ‘view’ specifies that it refers to an individual knowledge and experiences 
(Kvale, 2010). 
To ensure reliability, the thematising and designing took place in the pre-interview phase, 
respectively a pilot interview (Kvale, 2010). Whereas interviewing, transcribing, analysis 
and verifying are phases of post-interview (Kvale, 2010). Correspondingly, pilot testing was 
used to evaluate comprehension of the research questions and their perceived 
relevance/validity for the chosen sample of respondents (Sapsford and Jupp, 2008). 
Based on the feedback received from piloting the interviews, the questions were refined in 
terms of structure and meanings to better address real-world settings and research 
Framework format. For instance, for the format of question eight it seemed inappropriate to 
use ‘required’ (i.e. enforced/mandated requirement) and so the word was changed to 
recommended in order to infer that it is not mandatory. Likewise, question 11 was 
reformulated to clarify that it specifically refers to the attacks/level of threat encountered by 
the organisation. Question 12 was also reworded as it initially included ‘who is responsible’ 
and the question seemed to be misinterpreted hence it became common practice to state that 
for risk oversight and prevention all organisation members are considered responsible. In 
other cases, for example, question 13, clarification was needed to illustrate which type of 
departments were included (e.g. RM, ERM) in order to avoid biased answers. On the 
contrary, however, in question 14 a neutral word was used (risk control) to ensure that the 
question did not influence the answer. Instead, in question 15, when referring to a department 
name, risk governance was chosen. In the case of question 20, additional guidance was added 
to clarify what kind of response was expected. Likewise, question 24 was reformulated to 
clarify that it refers to the top senior executive and not to the perspective of other managers; 
executive board terminology was chosen instead. 
5.8.2 Interview guideline 
At its core, the interview structure is constructed based on the research Framework format 
and similarly relies on five groups of topics that query the contingency and extensive 
institutional applicability of CsM and ERM alignment within an organisational context, 
summarised in the below; see Appendix A for further details. 
Phase One: ‘baseline expectations’ (strategic) 
• Baseline expectations-preparation, understanding how risks are perceived through the 





• Cybersecurity Management, understanding behaviour towards risk; 
• Enterprise Risk Management; 
• Strategic alignment/ Interconnectivity and Partnership (purpose, objectives, strategy); 
• Context of alignment (internal and external); 
• Organisation mission and vision; 
• Barriers; 
• Benefits. 
Phase Two: ‘mandate managerial directions’ (Administrative) 
• Managerial directions; 
• Strategic directions; 
• Context of alignment. 
Phase Three: ‘establishment of strategic directions’ (strategic-structural) 
• Security governance, security programs, strategic alignment; 
• Strategic alignment; 
• Structural alignment. 
Phase Four: ‘implement managerial directions’ (operational) 
• Structure/Architecture; 
• Process – to understand how an organisational risk exposure is dealt in the organisation; 
• Accountability/responsibilities - understanding what they experience; 
• Technology. 
Phase Five: ‘Monitoring and reviewing practices’ – improvement (strategic-operational-
structural) 
• Monitor, measure, plan, re-align risk profile with risk practices; 
• Barriers and limitations of CsM with ERM alignment; 
• Benefits of alignment assessment; 
• Recommendations and improvements – interviewee’s general advice for experts that 
face similar issues. 
The format of the interview avoids being intrusive or addressing sensitive questions. 
Therefore, the format focuses on strategic and governance aspects in order to understand 
how organisations generally plan their control. With all five phases being interrelated with 
the Framework thematic, it aims to ensure that all aspects initially identified are addressed 





capture the immediate impression (Kvale, 2010). The Researcher transcribed the interviews 
verbatim instead of opting for selective transcription so as to ensure all information was 
gathered for later analysis (Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016). Transcriptions were reviewed to 
ensure accuracy and then put through NVIVO software. NVIVO software is a digital tool 
especially for the analysis of qualitative data. The transcriptions were out through NVIVO 
for information extraction through coding and thematic analysis. Moreover, the software 
package NVIVO is justifiable because it allows to store data, analyse, and retrieve the 
verbatim transcript of interviews at any later point (Barbour, 2014). By undertaking 
computer-assisted analyses as opposed to conventional analysis, the data derived is reduced 
(Barbour, 2014). 
The interview contains some open-ended questions, representing un-coded questions 
(Sapsford and Jupp, 2008) which are open to variable answers that need to be categorised at 
a later point. Such range of answers offers various insight, which is not predetermined by 
the Researcher. By using a computer-assisted analysis for qualitative data, this research 
implements the method recommended by O’Leary (2014) based on five stages: (1) 
organisation of raw data, (2) storage and coding for reduction purposes, (3) thematic analysis 
for identification of concepts, patterns, interconnectedness, understanding similarities, (4) 
interpretation, and (5) theoretical visualisation of results and understanding. All of the 
aforementioned ascertain a systematic way of organising information, encoding the research 
translation of viewing facts (Boyatzis, 1998). 
5.9 Research reliability  
This criterion represents an expected quality level of techniques used (Bryman, 2016); for 
example, trustworthiness and accuracy of the methodology involved (Bryman, 2011; Mason, 
2013). The research quality is critical for any research (Pellissier, 2007) because it represents 
the trustworthiness and reliability in all aspects of the research. Reliability is the degree of 
quality on which research can be replicated (Pellissier, 2007). It can refer to internal validity 
(findings vs. reality) or external (findings vs. other contexts), and thus the accuracy of 
methods represents the pillars in achieving reliable research. 
Relying on rigorous research ethics, this research aims to assure its reliability based on 
objectivity and relevance as it employs the application of moral principles that rely on moral 
stance (Myers, 2013). Thus, this research is consistent, transparent, and accurate in listing 





research content is in accordance to the research problem (which is based on the construction 
of theoretical foundation) and sustained by replicable methods and techniques. For instance, 
prior to testing the interview, a data collection protocol and interview guide were created. In 
the case of interviews, pre-testing of questions is an initial verification. This is followed by 
the interview’s transparency and consistency, which is sustained by audio recording (tape 
recording) and transcribing techniques (Silverman, 2014), respectively in verbatim 
transcripts. Moreover, the Researcher considered note taking during the interview should 
recording be rejected by the respondent (Sapsford and Jupp, 2008). However, none of the 
respondents requested such practice.  
5.10 Research replicability 
Research replicability represents the possibility of another researcher replicating the research 
at another point in time and identifying similar results (Bryman, 2016). Thus, an accurate 
documentation of data collection and analysis can ensure credibility. This research considers 
this aspect along with precision characteristics of theoretical concepts (Bhattacherjee, 2012), 
considers parsimony (unique and own explanation of a concept/s) and acknowledges 
falsifiability (untruthful findings) aspects. However, the extent of replicability depends on 
the Researcher’s reflection of legitimacy and ascribed characteristics as every person is 
unique and personal attributes, social skills, or research skills are different (Lewis-Beck, 
Bryman and Liao, 2004; Sapsford and Jupp, 2008). Therefore, the Researcher acknowledges 
these aspects and accepts these possible contextual and procedural variables. 
To overcome possible procedural biases, the Research uses standardised interviews, aiming 
to use the same wording format, procedure, length, and sequence (Sapsford and Jupp, 2008) 
in all interviews in order to assure good practices.  
5.11 Research rigour (validity)  
The research criteria of rigour refers to the quality of contribution generated (Bryman, 2016) 
and denotes if the interpretations made by the Researcher are genuine and that they respect 
academic scientific standards (Bryman, 2011; Myers, 2013). It can be based on descriptive, 
interpretive, evaluative, or theoretical validity (Maxwell, 1992). Research rigour can also 
emphasise the trustworthiness of the whole process of data collection, analysis, and 
elucidation (Flick, 2008). Therefore, the rigour and quality of this research are based on the 
validity, transparency, and reliability of methods that in turn might yield various perspectives 





5.12 Research delimitation 
Delimitation of research can be defined as parameters of investigation that are intentionally 
restricted by the researcher to cap the inquiry to stay within a specific scope (Mertler, 2015; 
Molina, 2015). This research delimits its investigation through fieldwork delimitation and 
literature delimitation. 
5.12.1 Fieldwork delimitation is related to the focus of the research in analysing the 
phenomenon as the research undertakes its empirical investigation focusing on specific 
fieldwork (financial industry). Accordingly, the strategic alignment framework might be 
optimised and used for other industries because the conceptual framework adopts a general 
perspective due to limited literature available regarding the financial industry. 
5.12.2 Literature delimitation is defined by a non-technical focus although some technical 
aspects might be discussed. This research also undertakes an exploration through the nature 
of qualitative lenses of academics, practitioners and regulators. When undertaking the 
research, a mono methodology was selected. The nature of the research remains qualitative, 
hence the investigation focusing on exploratory dynamics and explanations for a 
phenomenon. 
5.13 Ethical considerations 
Having taken into account ethical concerns, the first phase of this research begins with 
reviewing the literature, where the research embraced transparent methods by paying proper 
attention to other research work in order to avoid possible plagiarism (e.g. note taking, 
source citation, source attribution) (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2015). Similar approaches apply 
to the second phase of this research (Systematic literature review), where similar 
considerations are applied. 
For the third phase, which implies participants in research, an ethics approval 
from the university was mandatory. As soon as the procedure were established, the 
Researcher required authorisation from Brunel University Research Ethics Committee 
(UREC) to verify research adherence to respectable ethical practice, in accordance with the 
university’s expectation for research ethics (Rudestam and Newton, 2014). 
Additionally, it is worthy of mention that the financial nature of research is independent and 
self-funded. Accordingly, the research position is neutral about respondents and 





received the research documentation to ensure that their confidentiality and anonymity 
represents a significant aspect. Besides, the data gathered from respondents was provided on 
a voluntary basis and not based on constraints; informed consent is advisable along with a 
complimentary copy of written consent handed to participants in pursuit of reliable and 
ethical practice (Rudestam and Newton, 2014). In this way, Quinland et al. (2015) articulate 
that written consent can leverage a precise understanding and trust-building effect with 
participants because it provides confirmatory evidence that their ethical rights are carefully 
considered. 
In the same way, Oliver (2014) emphasises that written consent would assure and confirm 
that the participants have been informed both verbally and in writing about standard 
information regarding the research. That is why all procedures (written, verbal, and recorded 
consent), the nature of research, methods, participant role, and risk exposure must be clearly 
explained before questioning commences. Moreover, the participant should be informed 
about potential risks (if any), benefits, time commitment, interview procedures, location, and 
if any incentives exist for participation (Rudestam and Newton, 2014). 
Consequently, addressing ethical issues is undeniably a sensitive aspect of any research. 
Therefore, the content of the questions are general with no personal aspects or psychological 
aspects that might cause distress to respondents. In addition, the format of questioning avoids 
requesting information that can reveal sensitive information about their organisation. This 
means that questions are written in a professional format with the intention to respect 
confidentiality and anonymity aspects of both respondents and their organisations as 
discussed in advance. 
5.13.1 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Anonymity refers to personal information (i.e. identity or any details that might lead to 
individual identification) or precise information (e.g. location or other possible links) and 
this research aims to preserve and anonymise the participants (Cottrell and McKenzie, 2010; 
Fisher, 2010), who are only known by the Researcher (Rudestam and Newton, 2014). Thus, 
the Researcher takes the responsibility to ensure that personal information collected is 
organised under codified names/pseudonyms, or numbers. 
When comparing aspects of anonymity with confidentiality, they tend to be interrelated by 
aspects of secrecy but are nonetheless different because anonymity refers to the concealed 





ensures that data gathered is used for the purpose stated and is stored securely (use of 
passwords, encryption, limited access, etc.) (Cottrell and McKenzie, 2010; O’Hara et al., 
2011; Rudestam and Newton, 2014; Harding, 2013). 
For this reason, anonymity and confidentiality in conducting the research should 
be continuously preserved and guaranteed to respondents as they represent a ‘promise’ that 
contributes towards the respondent’s decision to participate (O’Hara et al., 2011). Therefore, 
all procedures, methods, and risks were explained to participants beforehand in order to 
ensure transparent and unbiased results. Accordingly, based on proposed methods, the 
veracity of data collected ensures reliable research as ethical conditions are taken into 
account.  
5.13.2 Research sensitivity/level of intrusiveness 
The research may involve examining issues related to risk governance that could be sensitive 
to company management due to secrecy aspects. In this case, the participant will be assured 
that the research focuses on general aspects and all information will be used only for 
promoting good practices. Moreover, this information will be provided in writing and 
verbally to each participant. If the participant considers that the information requested is 
sensitive, the participant is free not to answer. Additionally, the interview will take place 
based on access granted through a letter of permission, addressed in advance to the 
organisation’s management. 
Moreover, under no circumstances did the Researcher request confidential information at 
any point as the interview addresses general questions that inquire personal opinion, 
experience, behaviour, and attitudes regarding elicit current industry practices. Participation 
was made on a voluntary basis, and all participants were able to cease their participation at 
any point in time. The Researcher acknowledged that some respondents might believe that 
current research might be interested in risk governance issues that could be sensitive to 
company management due to secrecy aspects. In this case, the participants were assured that 
the research is focused on general aspects and all information will be used only for promoting 
good practices. Moreover, this information was provided in both writing and verbally to each 
participant. If the participant considered that the information requested is sensitive, the 





Additionally, the interview took place based on access granted through a letter of permission 
addressed in advance to the organisation management. The participants were provided with 
the Researcher’s contact details should they request further information or wish to make a 
complaint. The Researcher did not request confidential information at any point as the 
interview addresses general questions that inquire personal opinion, experience, behaviour, 
and attitude to elicit the current industry practices. 
Having understood the responsibilities regarding the sensitivity of data protection, the 
Researcher adheres to Data Protection Act of 1998. Accordingly, the data shall be “used 
fairly and lawfully”, “specifically for stated purposes”, in an accurate manner, and “kept for 
no longer than is absolutely necessary”. Additionally, the Researcher assures non-
transferability of data to other parties and assures to encrypt data and to store it in a secure 
environment (Data Protection Act, 1998). Moreover, the research aims to respect the 
principle of ethics, therefore, to present results in an honest manner, avoiding any 
misinterpretations (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005).  
5.14 Conclusion 
In structuring this chapter, reflections for explanation and justification of methodological 
choices such as research purpose, philosophy, approach, strategy, methods, and techniques 
have been considered. Their selection was based on how appropriate they were for the 
research problem and research questions. This chapter justifies the exploratory research 
purpose based on the interpretive philosophy that underpins enhanced findings, the 
collection of data, analysis, and interpretation. An inductive approach has been selected due 
to its suitability for the research problem. The research strategy chosen is qualitative because 
it focuses on understanding specific situations (Silverman, 2014). The research design uses 
a mono research method to correlate qualitatively to enhance the explorative prospect of 
findings. 
Henceforth, qualitative methods have been selected to explore different perspectives and 
offer an argument that explains and illustrates the findings, enhancing varied and sustainable 
outcomes through various responses, adopting a sequential research construction. 
Additionally, the findings of the Literature Review (Chapter Two) and Systematic Literature 
Evaluation (Chapter Three) formed the baseline for gathering empirical data. All three stages 





This chapter concludes with a consideration of data collection reliability, rigourisity, 
limitations, and ethics in order to highlight the Researcher’s acknowledgement of academic 
quality. Additionally, this chapter acts as a comprehensive guide regarding previous chapters 
but also as a basis for building the following chapter (Chapter Six, Collection and analysis 
of primary data), which conveys a real-world perspective. 
 
 
6. Chapter Six: Collection and Analysis of Primary Data  
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the research methodology guidance is used to address the research objectives 
and determine the extent of fulfilment. It introduces the research findings from the interviews 
and aims to contextualise the validity for the CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment Framework. In 
seeking to investigate the effectiveness and sustainability of CsM and ERM alignment in the 
financial industry, it employs a qualitative content analysis of research findings directed by 
the research objectives 1-4: 
• Research Objective 1: To identify, analyse and critically evaluate academic, 
industry-based and regulatory literature regarding ERM, CsM and their alignment 
and explore the current state of the topic. 
• Research Objective 2: To analyse the financial industry’s environment and current 
practices regarding alignment. 
• Research Objective 3: To review and evaluate the effectiveness of current CsM and 
ERM frameworks. 
• Research Objective 4: To evaluate the potential and limitations of CsM with ERM 
alignment within the financial industry, supported by practical guidance. 
Although content analysis leads to descriptive findings, the main research findings will be 
fed into a further phase of interpretation in Chapter Seven. This chapter represents a first 
phase, a derivate that determines the ground of the interpretive phase ─ thematic analysis. 
6.2 Data analysis 
To provide systematic retrieval of findings in this phase of research, a content analysis was 
employed to describe ‘trends’, ‘patterns’, ‘frequencies’, and ‘relationships’ among 
respondents’ answers (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). In this regard, qualitative content analysis 
categorises findings into descriptive qualitative data and in the same time into descriptive 
quantitative because it is quantifying the content analysis (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). During 
analysis the Researcher used NVivo 12 Pro, a qualitative data analysis software for 
processing and organising the data. As codes are labels that reduce the chance of repetition, 
minimising data (Ignatow and Mihalcea, 2017) was applied to all 26 semi-structured 
interviews in order to provide descriptive findings, indicating current practices within the 
financial industry as opposed to theory. To gain a practical insight into the phenomenon, the 





various financial institutions with either strategic or operational roles. Correspondingly, a 
balanced representation of senior executives was considered from both ERM and CsM 
managerial component, however there were many cases where an expert was familiar or 
responsible with both. Although the degree of balanced representation might be challenged, 
separation by coding delimitates research findings of initial analysis to ensure transparency 
and to delimitate the results. According to the codes identified, four themes emerged (as 
presented below):  
1. Theme One: Respondent and Organisation Profile (Q1-Q9); 
2. Theme Two: Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity (Q10-Q16); 
3. Theme Three: Cyber Risk Oversight Maturity (Q17-Q24); 
4. Theme Four: Strategic Alignment (Q25-Q39). 
In keeping this format, the same approach was applied before uploading the transcripts in 
NVivo, creating codes and sub-codes accordingly. This method was chosen to ensure that 
initial automatic coding (nodes) was sustainable across the analysis. From a total of 39 
questions, 23 were semi-structured, and the remaining 16 were open questions that aimed to 
identify new research insights. Nevertheless, to ensure objectivity of the semi-structured 
questions, the format of questions offered an option for different/optional answers in 
alignment with the respondent’s own views. These options for responses (open questions 
and semi-structured) were addressed this way to ensure a starting discussion point and 
illustration of comprehensive understanding of various interpretations of the phenomenon. 
Bazeley (2007) defines this process as a way of obtaining initial information to determine 
the nature of a problem.  
Ensuing the above, the data analysis comprises the below themes. 
6.2.1 Theme One: Respondents and Organisation Profile 
To select the respondents four main criteria were used: financial industry focused, size of 
the organisation, seniority (in terms of their role with the organisation), and role-related to 
risk oversight. Based on the initial criteria, some respondents were identified and invited 
based on the professional network of the Researcher. Later on, due to recommendations of 
the initial respondents’, other respondents joined and contributed (snowball sampling). This 
led to a number of 26 interviews with more than 18 hours of recording and above 80,000 
words to be analysed. Table below gives an overall overview of respondents’ codes, 






Table 6-1 Interviews particulars 
No. Respondent code Duration Words Interview setting 
1.  Respondent [1] 34:44 3087 In person 
2.  Respondent [2] 53:76 1184 Call 
3.  Respondent [3] 44:56 2785 Call 
4.  Respondent [4] 47:53 4052 In person 
5.  Respondent [5] 53.26 2634 Call 
6.  Respondent [6] 49.25 3374 In person 
7.  Respondent [7] 20.01 1912 Call and email 
8.  Respondent [8] 44:10 2963 Call 
9.  Respondent [9] 38:48 2963 Call 
10.  Respondent [10] 58:07 3508 Call 
11.  Respondent [11] 75:41 3924 Call 
12.  Respondent [12] 58.65 2068 In person 
13.  Respondent [13] 51:18 5027 Call 
14.  Respondent [14] 37:42 3347 Call 
15.  Respondent [15] 44:36 3292 Call 
16.  Respondent [16] 26:38 2274 Call 
17.  Respondent [17] 25:01 399 Call 
18.  Respondent [18] 49:15 3716 Call 
19.  Respondent [19] 45.03 3278 Call 
20.  Respondent [20] 33:10 2154 In person 
21.  Respondent [21] 37:56 4415 In person 
22.  Respondent [22] 14:42 670 Call 
23.  Respondent [23] 44:44 3172 Call 
24.  Respondent [24] 60.03 6842 In person 
25.  Respondent [25] 31:42 2989 Call 
26.  Respondent [26] 41:19 4811 Call 
 
Total 26 interviews 
Duration 
1123:40 min 









A key point of Table 6-1 is that interviews ranged from being face-to-face interviews to 
telephone-based interviews (7 face-to-face and 19 telephone interviews), which gave the 
Researcher a mixed overview. Although additional approaches were possible, the 80400 
words content allowed a thoughtful overview of the research problem in practice. 
Furthermore, the following subsections discuss the respondents’ profile in more detail. 
6.2.1.1 Demographic data (Q1) 
Addressing Question 1 (Q1) the results showed that respondents were from seven 
geographical areas. Respondents were predominantly UK-based (58%). However, it must be 
considered that in some cases, roles and responsibilities were acknowledged to extend 






Figure 6-1 Respondents main geographical residence 
As shown in Figure 6-1 the majority of respondents are UK-based, followed by Canada and 
the United States preponderance. However, this mainly represents headquarters affiliation, 
hence responsibilities of some circumvent geographical borders. 
6.2.1.2 Organisation sector (Q2) 
Aiming to understand in much detail the nature of the financial industry in which the 
respondents operate, Question 2 articulates that despite being part of the same financial 
industry, organisations have different activities, respectively different sectors, and thus 
various challenges and opportunities. Figure 6-2 (below) presents a depiction of results with 
three main types of institutions and two secondary subcategories, correspondingly: 
• Depository institutions (e.g. retail bank, commercial bank, private bank, savings 
bank, building society, credit union); 
• Insurance and pension fund institutions (e.g. insurance organisations); 
• Brokers and investments institutions (e.g. asset management, investment banks, 
corporate finance, mutual funds, hedge funds, mortgage brokers, clearinghouses, 
finance organisations, and investment organisations); 























0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00%







Figure 6-2 Financial industry dispersion per sectors 
It has been identified that financial industry dispersion per sectors varies. For instance, 
brokers and investment institutions register the highest domain of activities with 35%. 
However, this percentage is higher given the mix of a depository institutions with brokers 
institutions (19%), which were treated as a different type of organisation due to their dual-
characteristics. This overview of industry dispersion helps one to understand the diversity of 
respondents’ affiliation, and thus implications. 
6.2.1.3 Organisation size (Q3) 
Organisation size of participants is another aspect to consider when receiving views. 
Consequently, measuring a company involves paying attention to many other characteristics 
such as assets, revenue turnover, annual growth, profitability, among many other features 
(Dang, Li and Yang, 2018). If we refer to some respondents that are part of broker and 
investment institutions with large global footprints, the size might be irrelevant, hence its 
size can be defined by other means, e.g. revenue turnover. In short, it should be considered 
that the number of employees reported by respondents is mainly for informative purposes, 
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Figure 6-3 Size of sampled organisations 
Table 6-3 shows that the sampled organisations’ size varied and thus only four categories 
scored higher percentages. The category of organisations was between 100 and 500 
employees (30.77%) with 8 out of 26 respondents. The second group of organisations scored 
a significant percentage, 15.38%, and the organisations were made up of 501 and 1000 
employees. Equally, the third category saw above 10,000 employees (15.38%), followed by 
a fourth category that had between 3001 and 4000 employees with 7.69%. 
To conclude, Figure 6-3 shows a breakdown of main categories and also a breakdown of 
remaining categories. These results demonstrate that the sample chosen comprises both 
small and medium enterprise as well as large organisations. However, as discussed 
previously, given the nature of some financial organisations’ business model, the number of 
employees may not necessarily reflect a realistic size of an organisation. 
6.2.1.4 Respondent’s roles (Q4) 
Seeking to assess the respondent’s accountability and implications of responsibilities, this 
question 4 was considered. However, given the nature of CsM and ERM disciplines 
intersection, a clear separation of Respondent’s roles was unfeasible because roles 
intertwined in some aspects of strategic or operational capabilities. This relates to literature 





































Table 6-2 Interviewees’ roles within the organisation 
Interviewees’ roles No. Business Unit-related 
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 4 CsM 
Chief Revenue Officer  1 Business 
Director for Information Security 1 CsM 
Director within ERM 1 ERM 
Global Head of Information Security Risk and Compliance 1 CsM 
Group Head of Strategic Initiatives 1 CsM-ERM 
Head of Corporate Services 1 Business 
Head of Cyber and Technology Risk 1 CsM 
Head of Cyber Insurance and Oversight 1 CsM 
Head of Risk  2 ERM 
Head of Security and Information Assurance 1 CsM 
Information Security Officer and Operation Risk Strategic Lead 1 CsM -ERM 
IT Controls Manager 1 CsM 
Operational Risk Information Security Officer 1 CsM 
Operational Risk Manager 1 ERM 
Policing Governance Manager  1 Business-ERM 
Principal Cyber Security Engineer 1 CsM 
Senior Audit Specialist 1 Business-ERM 
Senior Manager 1 Business 
Senior Manager of Cyber Risk 1 CsM 
Senior Operational Risk Manager 1 ERM 
Vice President Security Architecture 1 CsM 
Table 6-2 provides an overview of respondents’ roles (even though provisional and 
demarcated through the lenses of CsM and ERM job-relation), registering 14 respondents as 
having CsM related roles (53%), 5 respondents (19.23%) with ERM related roles, 2 
respondents (7.69%) with both business and ERM related roles , 2 respondents (7.69%) with 
both CsM and ERM related roles, and lastly 3 respondents (11.54%) with other business-
related roles. Noticing possible misunderstanding of respondent roles and responsibilities, 
Question 5 extends analyses this issue. 
6.2.1.5 Respondents responsibilities (Q5) 
While previous questions investigated the terminology and/or role label, this question seeks 
an understanding of the respondents’ accountability regarding risk oversight. Such analysis 
seeks to highlight practical experience whilst also delimiting the expertise and grounds of 
shared practices. Granted that the selection process of respondents was made on rigorous 
criteria, these findings add additional legitimacy for respondents’ views. With a total of 48-
word selection frequency elicited in defining roles, the majority of those who responded to 













Initial practice attributes 





Audit 4 8% 
Compliance 4 8% 
Education/awareness/training 3 6% 
Enterprise-wide risk control 7 15% 
Implementation – operational 4 8% 
Implementation – strategic 7 15% 
Risk control 11 23% 
Risk assessment/measurement 8 17% 
Total 48 100% 
As shown in Table 6-3, respondents reported a focus on risk control (23%), risk 
assessment/measurement (17%), enterprise-wide risk control (15%), and, in some cases, 
implementation – strategic (15%). To acknowledge these variations in terms of roles and 
responsibilities, a statement by Respondent [13] is outlined: 
“I’m really focused on enterprise risk controls. From my perspective, I’m focused on 
governance and overseeing risks across my organisation, making sure that we have 
the right controls in place and that we’re getting the right measurement and 
assessments for risks.” 
Even Respondent [18] subscribed to that idea that responsibilities within an are complex: 
“As a director, I’m mainly responsible for overseeing the overall information security 
programme. From a governance, risk and program development perspective, I’m 
ultimately responsible for the overall enterprise information security of the bank.”  
Likewise, Respondent [24] stresses a similar view: 
“So, I look after strategy and strategic initiatives for the group. [I’m the] Group Head 
of Strategic Initiatives. The role title does not necessarily reflect what I do, so, I 
actually have three roles. So [for] strategic initiatives, [I] also serve as adviser 
between groups and I effectively go around trying to fix things wherever may pop 
up, so [it’s] bit of a multi-faceted role.” 
6.3.1.6 Respondents amount of experience in current role (Q6) 
To further ascertain rigours and legitimate validity of respondent’s opinions, Question 6 







Figure 6-4 Respondents years’ experience 
The analysis of Respondents experience identified that a vast majority of respondents had 
been in their given role for fewer than five years (36.62% under 1 year, 19.26% at least 1 
year but fewer than 5 years, 34.62% at least 3 years but fewer than 5 years), cumulating a 
total of 88.47%. In short, only 11.54% of respondents had been in the given role more than 
5 years. 
6.2.1.7 Respondents total amount of experience in similar roles (Q7) 
Although Question 6 grouped respondents’ experience with their current organisation, 
respondents were further challenged to disclose similar experience in order to draw the final 
conclusion regarding seniority in terms of dealing with risk oversight. As such, initial 
analysis might represent only a partial interpretation. Such differences are shown below in 
Figure 6-5.  
 
Figure 6-5 Respondents total years of experience 
From the data in Figure 6-5, it is apparent that the length of time determines that 61.54% of 
respondents have more than 10 years’ experience but fewer than 20 years. Less than 20% of 
Under 1 year
At least 1 year but fewer than 3 years
At least 3 years but fewer than 5 years



































respondents served for a longer period of time. The results of this background examination 
probe that respondents have experience and expertise with designated responsibilities. 
6.2.1.8 Respondents professional credentials (Q8) 
As a continuation of confirming respondents’ credentials, respondents were asked if their 
current role is conditioned by specific industry professional certifications. At the same time, 
the question deemed to identify and understand key suggested ‘literacy’ for both ERM an 
CsM. Figure 6-6 below elicits a breakdown regarding organisations’ pressure for 
certifications. 
 
Figure 6-6 Industry certification prerequisite 
Given the abundance of industry-based certifications related to risk oversight (RM, IS), it is 
believed that adherence to a certification baseline positively enhances a candidate and 
validates suitability for a certain position (Pym, 2014). In the light of reported views, it is 
conceivable that certifications are not mandatory (not required 61.54%). 
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Figure 6-7 emphasises the industry’s certifications undertaken by respondents. Findings 
illustrated in Figure 6-7 have challenged some of the conclusions drawn in previous 
questions, arguing that the prerequisite of certifications is indirectly mandated. While 
voluntarily and not specifically required (as stated by 61.54% of respondents), the general 
agreement was that certifications are ‘recommended’. Respondent [9] noted that: “[it] 
definitely is recommended but not required”. Supporting this view, Respondent [19] 
sustained the same argument when, saying that while not officially required, organisations 
elect a set of requirements internally. Within these lines, it was clarified by Respondent [11] 
that: 
“Generally, what happens, although [it] is not ultimately required with all of us 
working in enterprise, and one of the conditions of employment, [is that] we have to 
get certifications.”  
It is interesting to note the view of Respondent [13], which reconfirms the certification 
paradox. Respondent [13] does not have a certification, however it delegates such 
expectations as a pre-requisite of employment: 
 “Our goal is to make sure that we find people who do hire the right people, and that 
we’ve got the right framework.”      
Respondent [24] believes that one possible reason for a growing interest in industry-based 
certification utilisation is the creation of a risk resilience baseline that, among many other 
things, develops a common language. Although not regulatory mandated as stated by 
Respondent [4], it seems indirectly mandated by industry practices (e.g. ISO 27001 
certification for organisations). Thus, Respondent [5] and Respondent [26] state that 
organisations prefer those sorts of certifications and they do encourage and facilitate training 
to gain the qualifications. Overall, this section originated from the assumption of strategic 
leadership theory, which suggests that organisational effectiveness represents a reflection of 
senior executives’ competencies (Zhao, 2018).     
6.2.1.9 Respondents interaction with risk governance (Q9) 
Following an assessment of experience and expertise, Question 9 essentially defines the 
respondent’s interaction with risk governance within the given organisations. This position 
offers a holistic understanding of the respondents’ accountability limitations and explores 
any potential outcome framed by designated roles and expressed views. To enable a 






Table 6-4 Roles categorisation in alignment with Three Lines of Defense Model 
Roles categorisation in alignment with Three Lines of Defense Model 
1st Line of Defence 2nd Line of Defence 3rd Line of defence 










Respondent [3] Audit Respondent 
[6] 
Respondent [12] Respondent [4] Relative frequency 3.85% 
Respondent [19] Respondent [14] 
Risk control Respondent [25] Respondent [15] 
Risk mitigation Respondent [10] Respondent [16] 
Operational management Respondent [23] 
Operational 
management 
Respondent [7] IT and Cyber Oversight 
Respondent [8]  Respondent [2] 
Respondent [21]  Respondent [5] 
Respondent [26]  Respondent [17] 
Management control  Respondent [18] 
Management 
control 
Respondent [1]  Respondent [22] 
Respondent [11] Compliance 
Respondent [13] Compliance Respondent [20] 
Respondent [24] Relative frequency of 46.15% 
Relative frequency of 50.00% 
R=Respondent 
Figure 6-8 Roles categorisation in alignment with Three Lines of Defense Model 
As illustrated above in Figure 6-4, respondents’ interaction with risk governance was 
categorised into three main themes, 1st line, 2nd line and 3rd line. The Three Lines of Defence 
Model was considered a guide for defining respondents’ designated activities because of the 
multiple responsibilities mentioned. The Institute of Internal Auditors’ Three Lines of 
Defence (3LoD) is a regulatory benchmark for operational risk governance specifically for 
banks. Consequently, the principles of (3LoD) are defined by the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision and systematic structure is significantly encouraged (Luburić, 2017). 
All three lines of defence interrelate and aim to support proper functioning by designating 
roles, functions, processes, and support structured coordination that endorse accountability 
(1st line), control and oversight (2nd line), and assurance (3rd line) (COSO, 2015). In short, 
the rationale of using the Three Lines of Defence Model was because many respondents 
made reference to it and also because it is a predictable practice for the financial industry. 
6.2.2 Theme Two: Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity 
This section seeks to determine sampled organisation’s maturity in order to evidence the 
rationale of research. To establish whether enterprise Risk Oversight is mature, seven 





6.2.2.1 Organisation preparation against risks (Q10) 
In addition to establishing respondents’ credentials, Question 10 queries the preparation 
against risks of sampled organisations. Results clarify an organisation’s position in terms of 
preparation against risks concluded by respondents. They emphasise how susceptible 
organisations are in terms of challenges regarding security preparedness. To this end, 
findings ensue security maturity in for main states: proactive, reactive, ready, and 
unprepared. Table 6-5 below shows the proportion of different categories.  
Table 6-5 Current security maturity 
Current security maturity 
Proactive Reactive Ready Unprepared 
Respondent [7] Respondent [1] Respondent [2] Respondent [5] 
Respondent [8] Respondent [9] Respondent [3] Respondent [6] 
Respondent [11] Respondent [10] Respondent [4] Respondent [18] 
Respondent [14] Respondent [12] Respondent [13]  
Respondent [16] Respondent [17] Respondent [15]  
Respondent [22] Respondent [19]   
Respondent [24] Respondent [20]   
Respondent [26] Respondent [21]   
 Respondent [23]   
 Respondent [25]   
Total = 8  Total = 10  Total = 5 Total = 3 
keyword rf keyword rf keyword rf keyword rf 
strategy 6.79% risk control 14.55% compliance 5.57% maturity 3.02% 
governance 7.98% standards 2.63%  silo 3.51% 
oversight 5.39% financial risks 5.65%  
management 19.50% cautious 1.88% 
framework 7.19% reputational 
risks 
7.54% 
culture 4.86% regulatory risk 14.55% 











Table 6-5 shows that on a maturity curve, security is achieved when proactive practices are 
implemented. Current security maturity was confirmed by 55.65%. 32.25% categorise 
organisation maturity as reactive (i.e., defensive), focusing on mitigating the risk rather than 
proactively preventing it. Another 5.57% of respondents indicated that they are prepared. 
However, unfortunately, it is unexpectedly difficult to categorise these answers due to a lack 
of information. This result is somewhat counterintuitive; hence only 6.53% declare 
themselves as unprepared. In the literature, there is evidence that organisations continue to 





against risks, hence it is misleading to label organisations as proactive or reactive (e.g., 
Respondent [2], [4], [3], [13] and [15]). As well, Respondent [4] noted that: 
“Significant, we are very well prepared and that’s been driven by our clients that 
expect all of their suppliers to have good risk management processes in place and 
good information security protection in place. So, the field has changed over the last 
few years and more and more clients, particularly financial services clients, are 
driving forward the requirements for their suppliers to have security in place.” 
Respondent [18] explicates that:   
“Honestly, it’s quite a challenge in most industries. It should be better in financial 
industry, but I would still rate our quite low in terms of our maturity level. Risk 
management at enterprise level is one of the key five [strategies] identified by the 
board of directors.” 
In addition, Respondent [5] emphasises a paradox of preparedness:  
“Very well prepared because is a very process-oriented organisation because of the 
regulation. But from implementation point of view, a lot of improvement [is] needed. 
There are a lot of gaps that needs to be taken care of. This [preparedness] it’s in early 
phase.”    
‘Maturity’ for some respondents means different things. For instance, Respondent [11] 
places value on maturity in perspective of culture and preparation against risk. Whereas 
Respondent [7] describes security maturity as a good level of cyber and technology risk of 
frameworks, processes and controls, speaking a common language, being driven by risk 
appetite, risk tolerances, and risk profiles. In this regard seven derivates were identified as 
being proactive: governance, oversight, management, framework, culture and appetite, and 
management (the latter reaching the highest value with 19.50%). 
Some other respondents indirectly describe their approach as reactive (32.25%) when 
defending the organisation. A reactive risk control means that mitigation is deployed post-
incident and is rarely planned. Although this practice may seem of concern, it remains usual 
practice for some organisations (Society of Actuaries, 2018). Respondents [1] and [10] 
believe that because financial and regulatory risks have been emphasised, risk control 
became reactive mainly to factors.  
While the first category of respondents warns that organisations align to pressure, 
Respondents [9] and [25] assess security vulnerabilities, understanding how the system 
works and comprehending data flow, list of gaps or issues, and assignment. In this regard, 





In addition, Respondents [21] and [23] suggest creating a contingency plan in addition to 
risk monitoring. 
A further derivate of cautiousness was reported by Respondents [12] and [19], who subscribe 
to the school of thought that being cautious in business is imperative; hence banks being 
subjected to many regulations. Another perspective on being reactive is heightened by 
Respondent [17], who is concerned about reputation as a main issue in deploying mitigation. 
In conclusion, organisation preparation against risks varies between reactive and proactive. 
It may be assumed that principles of modern risk oversight have a tendency to be applied 
(e.g. CsM, ERM). 
6.2.2.2 Velocity of risks/attacks encountered by organisations (Q11) 
Formulating a link between risk exposure, capabilities, and risk appetite is the ultimate 
challenge to determine organisational safeguards in overtaking excessive risks. This aspect 
was shown previously in Table 2-2, Chapter Two. Correspondingly, previous studies have 
shown that risk appetite is an essential determinant in weighing up decisions for risk 
exposure because it ensures that risk remains within established boundaries (Manigent, 
2011; Deloitte, 2014a; Protivity, 2012; PwC, 2015; COSO, 2016). Thus, in estimating risk 
exposure, risk appetite is trivial for recognising maximum acceptable risk (Oliver et al., 
2018; Oliver Wyman, 2018a). Consequently, risk appetite is a determinant in deploying risk 
oversight framework; thus, incorporating diverse roles (i.e. being a risk statement, a metric 
that set boundaries and lastly a ‘warning indicator’) (Oliver Wyman, 2018a).  
Question 11 focuses on examining the scale of attacks encountered by organisations in order 
to understand levels and types of exposure; besides, it appraises if capacity to risk is within 
risk appetite. Insights drawn from examination are synthesised below (Figure 6-8). 
 
Figure 6-8 Velocity of risks/attacks encountered by organisations 
Figure 6-8 illustrates that most respondents (61.54%) self-diagnosticated velocity of risk as 
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tolerance (15.38%) and above expectations (15.38%) register similar results. 15 out of 26 
respondents reported that risk is within acceptable tolerance and has not exceeded the agreed 
organisational risk tolerance.  
However, Respondents [3], [8] and [9] envisage that risk exposure of the financial industry 
will continue to increase. Respondent [7] articulates that: “We are targeted, almost minute 
by minute on a daily basis.” While Respondent [24] stresses that:  
“I think in terms of risk velocity, it’s going up. That’s the reality of it.” 
Despite control and measures in place, Respondents [10], [13], and [16] believe that financial 
institutions remain visible. Of more concern, Respondent [23] feels that attacks might be 
underreported: 
“I think that we have to distinguish [this] because, I would say, [it’s] medium, but at 
the same time, when you think about cyber risk, all organisations are subject to a 
number of risks and sometimes, they don’t even know they are the target[ed]. So, I 
think that from [a] conscious point of view, that it is not the reality. The reality is that 
the level of risk that we are facing every day is high, but we don’t know.” 
When asked whether organisations are targeted, only 7.69% of the respondents reported that 
the velocity of risk encountered by their organisation is low. Respondents [2], [11] and [12] 
substantiate risk as non-existent. Respondent [12] clarifies that sensitivity in the market has 
increased and is, in turn, amplifying the velocity of risk. Also pertaining to high velocity, 
risk appetite became a parameter in systematically defining risks acceptability and allocating 
controls (PwC, 2018). The problem of dealing with risk systematically has also been 
emphasised by Bogodistov and Wohlgemuth (2017). 
6.2.2.3 Managerial component/department responsible for enterprise risks (Q12)  
Question 12 questions the names of departments that carry a duty of care/responsibility 
regarding enterprise risks. Owing to organisations possibly having various ways of defining 
risk oversight approach, respectively the department’s name, respondents were challenged 
to express which unit/department is responsible for planning, organising, leading and 
controlling risk, respectively to minimise the effect of risks in a centralised, unified and 
systematic way; either physical risks, environmental risks, strategy risks, financial risks, 
intangible risk (cyber) or any other business-related risks. Descriptive data was generated 






Figure 6-9 Department’s responsible for enterprise risk 
The themes identified in these responses show that RM remains among the most significant 
department name, as declared by 34.62% of respondents. A second theme that emerged is 
ERM, with a lower value of 15.38%, followed by Operational Risk Management (7.69%), 
and Enterprise risk (7.69%). Assuming department names reflect risk oversight principles, 
these variations among responses demonstrate and reiterate the ERM paradigm evolution; 
respectively the roadmap from reactive towards proactive approaches regarding risks. For 
instance, taking the example of a finance department, risk and compliance and operational 
risk management demonstrate the early origins of traditional/siloed RM, meaning that risk 
arises at a departmental level and are dealt with separately (Berry-Stölzle and Xu, 2016; 
Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018); thus, characterised by a sided perspective. For example, 
Respondent [14] said: “You can call it two things, either risk management or operational and 
enterprise risk.” This shows that the risk function has a tendency towards operation, reactive 
rather than strategic, and proactive. Respondent [21] added: 
“So, risk management, with the risk function… so… we have the risk officer, and 
under that, we have the risk management team, below that there’s operational risk, 
credit risk, and market risk. However, we do not have an enterprise risk 
management.” 
When asked to describe the RM function, Respondent [5] stated:  
“It depends from company to company. In this company the usual RM has three 
different teams in broader perspective. One is like [a] finance team that do[es] RM 
from [a] financial perspective. And then [there] is a legal side; the legal team takes 
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property and those kinds of stuff). And then is a cybersecurity risk, pretty much from 
an infrastructure side of things.” 
Overall, these results indicate that ERM remains immature, with a lower value of 15.38%. 
This is in line with other research (Mensah and Gottwald, 2016; Viscelli et al., 2017; 
Althonayan, Matin and Andronache, 2018) who indicated stagnation of ERM in a 
developmental stage. Only a few examples show that some other organisations are proactive 
and show openness in adopting the Governance Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) 
paradigm, which is suggested to be the next paradigm wave—an advancement of ERM 
(Althonayan, Matin and Andronache, 2018). 
6.2.2.4 Risk governance maturity (Q13) 
The central issue addressed here is how respondents describe the overall status of risk 
governance maturity (e.g. Risk Management, Enterprise Risk Management) in terms of their 
organisation protecting against its risks (on a scale of 1-5, 1 representing the low value on a 
level from 1 to 5). The results obtained are displayed below in Figure 6-10. 
 
Figure 6-10 Risk governance maturity 
As shown in Figure 6-10, 38.46% of respondents consider that risk governance is evolved 
but partially implemented across units/departments (3). 23.08% state that mature risk 
governance[is] embedded at enterprise level (4). 19.23% of respondents define maturity as 
developed but not yet applied enterprise-wide (2), whilst only 11.54% declared themselves 
to be robust (5). 
Evolved risk governance yet partially implemented across units/departments was justified 
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“I think it’s interesting, we look at it from a couple [view] of components. I think we 
look at it as a common governance tool [view] to make sure that we’re understanding. 
It is a risk control function there’s (no doubt that we’re trying to identify, isolate the 
risks), and there is leverage as a governance tool. But in other areas, compliance 
requirement is also a key driver, making sure we are binding by whatever the 
regulations are in certain jurisdictions. So those three things are the drivers [common 
governance tool, risk control function and compliance requirement].” 
In addition, Respondent [15] defends the scale of maturity by stating that: 
“I think it would be based on departments[maturity], certain departments are more 
organised than others, so I would… overall… I think… we are evolved at risk 
governance, but it’s partially implemented, making it level 3.” 
7.69% are at very immature - at its early stages of preparation Respondent [21] argued:  
“I am going to be honest, [it is] very immature. So I was saying we are a bank that 
lives in the 21st century but operate in a pre-financial crisis at most. So executive 
management believe we only have to focus on making money, making the customer 
happy and [manage] financial risk, but not what the regulator is saying. We have to 
focus on the non-financial risk in terms of reputational, regulatory staff impact and 
customer impact. So, we have [a] journey to go on. The plan is always easy.” 
Within these lines, Respondent [6] further justifies that a lack of a framework in place for 
managing risks and measuring risks hinders maturity. Respondents [7], [8], [12], and [14] 
argue that the development of maturity stems from the framework, policies and standards, 
conduct and culture (institutional and contingency). In summary, this review demonstrates 
that risk governance maturity is yet to achieve its maximum potential. Appraising 
organisations’ maturity reflects literature’s comment on RM/ERM maturity frameworks 
(discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, Chapter Four). 
6.2.2.5 Account of organisation risk governance (Q14) 
ERM has established a strategic approach that incorporates a compound of existing 
strategies, resources, technology, and knowledge that leverage enhanced capabilities for 
evaluating and managing uncertainties (Hoffman, 2009; Burnaby and Hass, 2009). 
Moreover, the main purpose of ERM is to determine risk, to measure, to mitigate, and to 
proactively manage risks in order to meet organisational objectives (Francis and Richards, 
2007; Hoffman, 2009). Literature suggests various definitions of ERM but, despite a 
significant contribution from scholars, a common agreement has not been reached (See 
Section 2.4, Chapter 2). In other words, having roots in RM paradigm hinders the potential 
of ERM. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the siloed practice of RM is being abandoned 





inefficiency (Mensah and Gottwald, 2016; Althonayan, Matin and Andronache, 2018). The 
question remains whether the respondents adopted the traditional RM or advanced 
implementation of ERM. Therefore, to develop a deeper understanding of how risk 
governance is perceived by respondents, the below Table 6-6 synthesises the main findings. 
Table 6-6 Components of organisation risk governance 
 
Unfolding the role of organisational risk governance, the respondents’ answers have been 
categorised into three main themes: strategic governance, performance-centric, and risk 
resiliency. Despite addressing the question to 26 respondents, the frequency of sub-themes 
was higher because some chose multiple options. Effective strategic prioritisation (22.58%) 
is the top constituent for organisational risk governance. Secondly, common governance tool 
(17.74%) reconfirms the construct of ERM, something that is in alignment with literature 
(see Section 3.5, Chapter 3). Thirdly, the respondents appreciate that ERM is a value 
creation tool (6.44%) and within these lines Respondent [2] reassures that: 
 “Definitely [ERM is] a value creation tool because you need to know where to direct 
your resources, which areas, which issues to object first.” 
The above arguments are also indicated by Sax and Andersen (2018), who declare ERM an 
‘enhancement’ tool for value and performance through systematic management of risks. 
Likewise, Respondent [24] said: 
“ERM is a central risk governance tool. It’s the governance and management of risk 
across the organisation …that’s the ‘vehicle’ that ERM is - that is the platform, and 
that is the language that everyone should be speaking. In an ideal world that would 
be what the ERM should be.” 
To another extent of risk resiliency, Respondent [11] considers that: 








Governance Common governance tool 11 17.74% 
Strategy Supportive business strategy and 
objectives alignment tool 
3 4.84% 
Prioritisation Effective strategic prioritisation 





Differentiation Competitive advantages advocate 3 4.84% 
Value Value creation tool 3 6.44% 
Risk resiliency 
43.56% 
Control Risk control function 10 14.52% 
Compliance Compliance requirement 9 14.52% 
Knowledge Cross-domain risk knowledge 9 14.52% 








“Enterprise Risk Management almost acts like a government regulator.” 
A view that is partially confirmed by Respondent [3]: 
“In most cases, it’s a compliance requirement, it’s a ticking box of Sarbanes-Oxley 
point of view, or it’s a more general audit requirement to have, a risk function that 
extends into the security.” 
The findings suggests that compliance requirement has become an audit exercise for some 
organisations. Whilst this finding did not confirm the ethical accountability of reasons of 
why traditional RM emerged towards ERM, literature emphasises that instead of being an 
exercise, the Sarbanes Oxley Act makes executive management accountable and mandate 
RM principles on daily basis to ensure integrated practice and cross-functional resiliency 
(Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 2014). Respondent [14] highlighted the potential usefulness of 
ERM by stating: 
“I think ultimately you’ve got to look at ERM as a set of processes that exist at all 
levels of the organisation to do a number of things. One is to give out risk from an 
enterprise perspective as in you break across silos and you think end to end, you also 
think more holistically about how risks are being managed tat an organisational level. 
So you take an aggregated view rather than looking at events in their isolation or any 
other individual events in isolation…[ERM] support business strategy and value 
creation.” 
For some respondents, the main focus is compliance due to the industry being highly 
regulated. Issues pertaining to banking in the past in the UK, regulation, and observation of 
regulation have gone up. Media impact and reputation have become a starting point for 
achieving compliance. The view of Respondent [8] is that succeeding compliance leads to 
competitive advantage, and so on. 
Moving to strategic governance emphasis, Respondent [1] concluded that ERM’s role is, 
among other things, to support business strategy alignment. Moreover, any mismatch may 
affect the business strategy and its objectives. Likewise, Respondents [13], [11], and [25] 
think that ERM is a risk control function with shared responsibility. The risk is co-owned by 
each business unit; for instance, wealth management and corporate banking own the risk but 
ERM will prescribe how they own it and how quickly they must mitigate and remediate that 
risk. 
6.2.2.6 Main determining factors to implement risk governance (RM/ERM) (Q15) 
Defined as ‘critical success factors’ (CSFs) by Olivera et al. (2018), the determining factors 





implementation of ERM and what is the basis of transformation. Then again, CSFs are 
dependent on variables such as people, processes, culture, leadership style, technology, and 
organisational strategy. It was also suggested by Althonayan, Matin and Andronache (2018) 
that the evolving risks landscape is another important variable to consider. Below, Table 6-
7 provides a synopsis of the research findings. 
Table 6-7 Critical success factors’ in implementing ERM 
 
 
From an initial 16 available options, 3 sub-themes were confirmed and another 2 identified 
as nil, hence the responses to these questions being non-existent. Sub-themes (a) 
Consultancy organisations, (b) Insurance prerequisites, (c) Laws, (d) Organisational 
internal norms, and (e) Practitioners’ recommendations received zero answers. In turn, three 
of them ((c), (d) and (e)) were absorbed by related sub-themes due to the terminology 
similarities. For instance, sub-theme Regulation was preferred instead of Law (Respondent 
[11] confirms the confusion). A similar assumption can also be made in the case of 
Practitioners’ recommendations shift in Standards/Frameworks-driven sub-theme, which 
covers a much broader spectrum of industry expectations and guidelines. Instead, insurance 
prerequisites and consultancy organisations do not seem to be factors that impact 
implementation of a risk governance and thus are overall nil. 




Objectives Corporate strategic objectives 2 2.86% 
Initiative Organisation’s own initiative 3 4.29% 
Strategy Business strategy 1 1.43% 
Appetite Risk appetite  3 4.29% 
Leadership Senior management leadership 2 2.86% 
Lessons Post-financial crisis lessons 4 5.71% 
Culture Organisational risk oversight culture  6 8.57% 
Requirements Shareholders’ requirements 5 7.14% 
Oversight Organisational risk oversight  2 2.86% 
Audit External and internal audit expectations 2 2.86% 
Externally 
57.15% 
Threats Evolving threat environment; external 
factors 
2 2.86% 
Expectations Customers’ expectations 5 7.14% 
Competition Competition 7 10.00% 
Regulation Regulatory requirements 21 30.00% 
Standards Standards/Frameworks-driven 3 4.29% 
Reputation Reputational impact 2 2.86% 
2 Themes Total=16 
Sub-themes 
8 new sub-themes (blue colour) 22.86% 









The most striking result to emerge from the data is the identification of new 
determinants/drivers on which an organisation decides to implement a risk governance 
(RM/ERM). Despite being identified in literature (see Section 2.8, Chapter 2), the new 
determinants were not included in the interview format. However, they came to light through 
respondents’ answers as proof that aligns with previous literature. 
The evidence presented has shown that 8 out of 16 sub-themes are emerging issues reported 
by respondents (blue colour). The sub-themes of objectives (2.86%), strategy (1.43%), 
appetite (4.29%), leadership (2.86%), oversight (2.86%), audit (2.86%), threats (2.86%), 
and reputation (2.86%) recurred throughout the analysis. New sub-themes were not 
particularly prominent in the interview data. However, as a compound they represent 22.86% 
of the main factors. Additionally, some respondents indicated other determinants: profile of 
the organisation (Respondent [26]), fear of loss (Respondent [3]), the duty of care 
(Respondent [4]), internal policy (Respondent [9], and risk oversight structure (Respondent 
[23]). 
Following the example by Olivera et al. (2018) that exemplifies the ten main success factors 
in implementing ERM, the Researcher chose to emphasise only the top 5 factors being 
conditioned by the low relative frequency of sub-themes: 
• Regulatory requirements (30.00%); 
• Competition (10.00%); 
• Organisational risk oversight culture (8.57%); 
• Shareholders’ requirements (7.14%); 
• Customer expectations (7.14%). 
It has been found that regulatory requirement is the most significant factor and one strength 
of this is emphasised below by Respondent [24]: 
“[The] financial services sector is unfortunately (or fortunately even) under 
regulatory pressure. Regulatory pressure is always at the top of the list because, long 
and short of it, the regulators are the ones who probably have the most… the biggest 
stick to give away. They’re the ones that are going to cause the most amount of pain 
financially - whether it is pulling your banking licence, or they give you a large fine 
because that cuts your profits and then the shareholders’ profits… domino effect.” 
Likewise, Respondent [11] asserts that: 
“We are heavily scrutinised by government regulators (overall banking health, 
Ministry of Finance, Fin track…). That’s probably the biggest driver, we want to be 
compliant with laws. That is our greatest determinant. I would link regulatory 





Despite the fact Respondent [25] prefers to simply argue compliance by stating that: “I think 
it’s probably going to support our business strategy for what we do”, these statements show 
that organisations discern good practice of risk oversight under the strict pressure of 
regulations. As an example, Respondent [14] shared similar views considering compliance 
an element of governance. However, there is literature which mentions compliance as a 
business decision rather than a driver. Furthermore, a second critical success factor was 
identified: competition (10.00%) that drives good practices. Respondent [18] describes 
competition as one of the biggest drivers hence the financial landscape is complex, and the 
market is dynamic. While compliance and competition are important, Respondent [23] re-
orientates consideration towards the importance of meeting customer expectations: 
“I would say organisational risk oversight structure is important. Then, customer 
expectations, which links to standard framework; because if you are active in certain 
businesses, I think that having a risk management framework is… you know… the 
stuff that you have is standard…a necessary framework that can lift trust and 
reputation.” 
The ideal situation of a customer-centric approach reveals the necessity of multiple factors 
to drive ERM. Most often, they are interrelated (i.e. to meet expectations good standard 
practices need to be implemented). Subsequently, Respondent [24] emphasises a synopsis 
of the above view by articulating that: 
“One of the main ones [determinants] is customer expectations. Our clients are 
customers/counterparties who have a certain level of expectation that we maintain 
and manage. But if we substitute risk under the ERM to a level that is acceptable and 
the reason for that is very simple—[it] is: it’s a chain effect, (we’re not an island), so 
when institutions connect to another institution, to another, ripple effects can appear 
if you fail on something.” 
 
Despite the importance of external factors (compliance, understanding of competition, 
meeting customer expectations), there remains a paucity of evidence for internal factors. The 
only significant factors identified were the shareholders’ requirements and risk oversight 
culture. These findings are not surprising given the fact that other research has shown 
significant consideration for the regulatory impact on implementing ERM. The evolution of 
ERM was discussed in Section 2.3, Chapter Two, and it explains why the financial industry 
received significant confirmation from industry and regulatory pressure to incorporate RM 
in organisational governance (Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 2014). From this, it can be 
understood that it is reasonable to expect ERM robustness given the financial industry’s past 





However, despite a significant focus by respondents on aligning with regulations, 
Respondent [10] was among the few that advocates the importance of organisational 
objectives achievement as a scope of having the risk oversight. In short, ERM seems 
‘induced’ by regulations, making practices mandatory and thus replacing an organisation’s 
own initiative to adhere to risks practices (Sax and Andersen, 2018). This is an important 
issue for future research, hence good practices are significantly driven by regulations and 
less by the initiative of financial institutions to implement ERM. This aligns with 
Althonayan, Matin and Andronache (2018) regarding organisations’ own willingness to 
implement and improve their risk oversight.  
6.2.2.7 Main barriers that hinder a successful implementation of RM/ERM (Q16) 
Question 15 demonstrated that despite onerous regulations and various barriers to 
implementing ERM, organisations have also registered positive effects post-implementation 
(see Section 2.4, Chapter 2). ERM is viewed as an integrative mechanism that drives a 
unified risk oversight that supports organisations to deal with a multidimensional spectrum 
of risks in a holistic way (Sax and Andersen, 2018). Despite its recognised value, ERM 
currently remains immature in terms of implementation, thus effecting an organisations’ 
performance, viability and resiliency (Althonayan, Matin and Andronache, 2018; McShane, 
2018). Consequently, understanding what hinders proper implementation is the first step to 
understanding what is required by ERM maturity (Mensah and Gottwald, 2016; Viscelli et 
al., 2017). 
Despite the benefits, the interviews produced evidence which highlights that sampled 
organisations have different results in implementing ERM. Since each organisation is 
unique, its performance is correlated with all factors. As a result, the ability to adapt and 
optimise ERM continually creates a difference yet continues to remain a challenge for some 
organisations.  Likewise, Althonayan, Matin and Andronache (2018) and McShane (2018) 
found that even though good practices are adopted, this does not mean that the best practices 
are generated. Barriers in implementing ERM hinder not only the implementation of ERM 
but also its maturity (Sweetening, 2011). Having considered initial findings of literature 
regarding barriers in implementing ERM (Section 2.4, Chapter Two), research findings 







Table 6-8 Inhibitors in implementing ERM 
    
Table 6-8 illustrates lower values regarding inhibitors of ERM and discloses a potential 
association among inhibitors. Upon initial observation, it can be assumed that there are not 
any significant inhibitors to be considered. As previously identified in literature, the 
correlation between inhibitors as a compound demonstrates ripple effects and a broad 
spectrum of factors that can hinder ERM. 
These findings broadly support the work of previous research in this area linking the value 
of understanding the benefits by way of thoughtful deliberation about what hinders ERM. 
As a result, it has been found that there are four main themes and 21 sub-themes that were 
significant for respondents. The low values of some sub-themes are impressive but not 
surprisingly so, hence them most often interrelating with each other. The highest values 
registered are an organisation’s capability-related, respectively sub-theme RM maturity 
(9.86%) and risk culture (8.45%). Followed by implied cost (7.04%), data quality (7.04%) 




Cost Implied costs 5 7.04% 
Time Implementation time 1 1.41% 
People People availability 2 5.63% 
Skills Skills set 4 5.63% 
Technology Technology 3 4.23% 
Data Data quality - incomplete info 5 7.04% 
Structure Organisational structure 1 1.41% 
Direction 
9.86% 
Strategy Strategy 3 4.23% 
Leadership Senior management support 4 5.63% 
Capability 
43.66% 
Risk Assessment Risk assessment and review 4 5.63% 
Prioritisation Prioritisation and workload 4 5.63% 
Culture Risk culture 6 8.45% 
Maturity RM maturity function 7 9.86% 
Procedures Procedures 1 1.41% 
Communication Interorganisational Communication 2 2.82% 
Education Lack of educational awareness 5 7.04% 




Risks and Threats Emerging risks and their velocity 5 7.04% 
Practice Standards and frameworks 4 5.63% 
Competition Competition 1 1.41% 
Regulations Regulatory demands 2 2.82% 







—which refers to information regarding risks — lack of education with 7.04%, and lastly 
emerging risks and their velocity with a value of 7.04%. 
RM maturity (9.86%) received the highest consideration from respondents. Respondents 
[12], [13], [14], [17], [20], [21], and [25] were among the ones that support the consensus 
idea of RM maturity. Risk culture (8.45%) is a multi-layered factor that demands both 
strategic and operational guidance. In this respect, Respondent [14] used the following 
argument: 
“There are a number, of possibly cultural issues. What I mean by that, I mean the 
actual risk management risk functions within organisation, sometimes they don’t 
understand what the business need and want and therefore [are] not very usable in 
terms of getting to extract the benefits of risk. So, I’d say it’s probably a cultural 
thing. The other thing is conflicting priorities. Everyone’s got day jobs, and everyone 
is busy, [under] over-capacity and under-resourced, and to actually give proper risk 
management takes time, resource, and investment.” 
Respondent [23] exemplifies another side of culture that interrelates an organisation’s vision 
and educational awareness, as well as skills and knowledge:  
“I think, one of the main inhibitors could also be the culture because … I will make 
an example…one of the components of an ERM system is the data loss collection 
tool, so you should log the events, risk events… However, sometimes employees are 
scared about notifying an error because they think that this would be used against 
them or in a negative way or affect their performance.” 
Investment in skills and knowledge of employees is a common factor mentioned in literature. 
Skills set (5.63%) is another inhibitor. According to Respondent [21], not having the skills 
set affects the understanding of what risk is and what is the purpose of it, and what is the 
value, affecting the deployment of a suitable solution. If the sub-themes of risk culture 
(8.45%), skills set (5.63%), and lack of education (7.04%) and inter-organisational 
communication (2.82%) were all absorbed, a total of 23.94% would be obtained and that 
percentage is in turn particularly people-centric. Rodriguez and Edwards (2010) conclude 
a similar remark. From this result, it can be assumed that 23.94% of ERM is rooted in 
people’s capabilities. This association of four elements help to visualise, if quantified, the 
relationship and ripple effects. Capturing how the suitable solution to risk ought to be 
deployed, the results also exposed a surprising reference to data quality (7.04%) in ERM 
implementation. In fact, Respondent [10] asserts a practical view from their organisation: 
“I think that what might impede [ERM implementation] is not being aware of the 
risk. The biggest risk is not knowing what risk you have, identification and definition 





[the] risk. Emerging risk is part of the agenda, is standard. I think that accurate 
information is the key.” 
Additionally, Respondent [12] stated the relevance of having quality in data/information in 
combination with technology support and people, arguing that: 
“Quality of data, if [you] don’t have good quality data, all the RM will not have a 
clear vision. That is the biggest to challenge …to get timely, granular and good 
quality data. Second is technology, if you don’t have good risk systems, either in-
house or bought from somebody else, you can’t do much. Even if you have data, if 
you don’t pass it through processor and risks engines, that doesn’t help. [Also], you 
need to have people who understand that data. And finally, you need an internal 
acceptance of what RM can do. That can it deliver, buy-in?” 
Consequently, using inaccurate, unreliable, or incomplete information may have top-down 
consequences in an organisation. Solutions may differ if risks are underestimated or 
overestimated (e.g. funds, mitigation, prioritisation, resource allocation, technology). For 
instance, a key component for organisations is understanding emerging risks and their 
velocity. Respondent [15] concludes that: 
“Risk is something that always happens in the future, it hasn’t happened yet but 
knowing what could affect the future… making the business aware, so they can take 
risks by adjusting their decisions based on forecasted risks.” 
Predicting risks implies an appreciation of risk history which can help an organisation 
prioritise against major risk factors, except sporadic events (Allan et al., 2012). Apart from 
forecasting, risks quantifying shows a relative frequency of 7.04%. The main difference is 
detailed by Respondent [24]: 
“When you look at risk management, particularly in financial institutions, each risk 
is tied to a dollar sum, that dollar sum translates to something that will impact your 
capital reserves. It’s very easy to say, hey there’s going to be a denial service attack, 
how much is going to cost you? What is the actual loss of denial services? You have 
to estimate or ‘guesstimate’.”  
Cost may also be considered a barrier when believe that the benefits of ERM controls are 
lesser than the invested cost (AICPA, 2018). Being able to qualify and quantify those risk 
types as pragmatic intangible is pivotal to good ERM. Likewise, Respondents [3] and [23] 
believe that it is difficult to place any quantifiable number either in terms of percentage 
probability or regarding impact into incidents and therefore being able to scale what annual 





6.2.3 Theme Three: Cyber Risk Oversight Maturity 
This theme comprises of seven questions centred on the identification of existing cyber risk 
oversight maturity. Since maturity is argued to be immature (see Subsection 4.4.1, Chapter 
4) the following sections investigate the realism of the argument. 
6.2.3.1 Main managerial component/department responsible for cyber risks (Q17) 
Cybersecurity paradigm has advanced and so far, undergone numerous stages over the years, 
ensuing in a fragmented theoretical legacy (Althonayan and Andronache, 2018). Althonayan 
and this Researcher have expressed concerns about the effects of discrepancy in terminology 
and connotations; and more specifically how misperception may trigger continual misuse of 
terms, respectively ripple effects regarding comprehension of the meanings, purpose, and 
value of cybersecurity. A lack of standardisation in terminology and meanings leads to 
ambiguity (despite literature having some points in common). To date, there has been little 
discussion about cybersecurity. This is because it has been addressed in literature under 
numerous appellations (e.g. Information Security Management, Information Security Risk 
Management, IT Management, IT Governance, Information Computer Technology Security, 
Information Technology Governance, or Cyber Risk Management). This research question 
was proposed for transparency purposes in order to clarify under which category the sampled 
organisations abide. Differences between the above mentioned are illustrated below in 
Figure 6-11.  
 
Figure 6-11 Variety of departmental names for cyber-related risk oversight 
Evidence highlighted in Figure 6-11 indicates an initial assumption of fragmented meanings 
of cybersecurity. The analysis retrieved 11 categories that define or are related to the same 
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departments, assuming that the name is related with the practice of risk oversight. Grounded 
in IS legacy, this finding demonstrates that 46.15% of organisations sampled remain 
grounded in an IS perspective and 15.38% was registered for IT. Notwithstanding, these 
delimitations of IS and IT evoke the cybersecurity roots. One of the strengths of these 
findings is, however, a predicted trend toward a cybersecurity paradigm. Taken together, the 
Cyber Security Department (7.69%) and Cyber Risk Management (3.85%) reach a total of 
11.54%; thus, supporting the notion towards adopting cybersecurity terminology. 
Commenting on the ambiguity of cybersecurity meanings, Respondent [8] argues that: 
“The framework I work [is] under Information Security framework (where 
cybersecurity is an element of that). So, IS wise, [it] goes across the whole enterprise. 
Because that covers IT and normal activities. The cyber risk is very focused on web 
offering. There’s information security, IT security and cybersecurity. And the cyber 
is the small one within the next one, with[in] the next one. The cybersecurity would 
be under IT security. Obviously, I report under IT. My area would be IT Security.” 
Interestingly, the above argument of Respondent [8] calls for clarity and supports the initial 
findings from Section 2.6, Chapter Two, which discusses the consequences of using a non-
unified terminology for cybersecurity. 
6.2.3.2 Main determining factors to implement CsM (Q18) 
This section presents the rationale of implementing CsM by consensus of drivers. In line 
with Raban and Hauptman (2018), the determining factors reflect both positive and negative 
attributes. Cyberspace became the 5th element of human activities (the other four elements 
being land, sea, air, and space) in 2018, and as such opportunities and vulnerabilities are of 
serious consideration due not only to security but also economic implications (Amilevičius, 
2012). Results show that from an initial 13 determinants suggested, two were nil 
(consultancy organisations, laws), with zero answers and another two were absorbed by other 
codes (i.e. practitioners’ recommendations added to Standards/frameworks driven; internal 















Table 6-9 Main determinants in implementing CsM 
 
Consistent with literature, data analysis found that cyber threats velocity and complexity 
(16.33%) is among the highest determinant in implementing CsM; secondly, organisation 
own initiative (14.29%); thirdly, regulatory pressure (14.29%); fourthly, 
standards/frameworks driven (12.24%) and; fifthly, risk oversight culture (10.20%). In 
regard to main determinant factors to implement CsM, Respondent [15] assert that: 
“The biggest [challenge] one is the velocity and complexity of cyber threats. Keeping 
up with pressure is challenging and daunting but also technology enhancements. 
There’s a lot of technology change that is happening within the company and each 
of those technology changes brings on their own share of cyber threats.”  
Respondent [5] sees a people-centric strategy as a main pillar, recommending an optimised 
training granting that: 
“You have to train the people on multiple layers. You know, it’s not like you have 
one training, like phishing training and some sort of training that is very general 
training for computer security. For developers, you need to have secure development, 
secure-coding training. For other managers, they need to have a different training. 
So, training would be more versatile in cybersecurity.” 
Moving on from people-centric strategy, Respondent [10] adds another line of thought by 
stating that:  
“The things you do to mitigate people risks this year are very similar to the ones that 
we did 20 years ago. As the approach to cybersecurity is moving all the time, (the 
systems are changing; the Internet nature is changing), online trading means people 
can be in different jurisdictions.” 





Initiative Organisation own initiative 7 14.29% 
Appetite Risk appetite for cyber 2 4.08% 
Culture Risk oversight culture/internal norms 5 10.20% 
Awareness Cyber awareness/education 3 6.12% 






Threat Cyber threats velocity and complexity 8 16.33% 
Regulation Regulatory pressure 7 14.29% 
Technology Technology advancement 3 6.12% 
Competition Competition driven 3 6.12% 
Reputation Reputation driven 2 4.08% 
Standards Standards/frameworks driven 6 12.24% 








In addition to having cyber resiliency and cyber awareness, Respondent [14] emphasises risk 
appetite for cyber because in the respondent’s view, it is a key determinant for how much 
people, money, and technology is utilised. Supporting the view of Respondent [14], 
Respondent [4] articulates that making sure that risk appetite is accepted and understood 
enterprise-wide is a cornerstone in organisational culture. 
The finding above demonstrates that what CsM represents varies among respondents. While 
five main determinants have been identified (threat, initiative, regulation, standards, and 
culture), some other respondents (such as Respondents [18] and [25]) argue that 
dependency/collaboration with a third party and clients demands certain elements of risk 
oversight to be in place and thus represents an additional element to be considered. Other 
responses to this question included factors such as mass media (Respondent [1]), risk 
governance (Respondent [16]), value creation/ business value (Respondent [2]), insurance 
pre-requisites (Respondent [25]), risk profile (Respondents [26]), and loss of money 
(Respondent [8]). Nonetheless, these issues were not particularly prominent in interview 
data.  
6.2.3.3 Main barriers to hinder successful implementation of CsM (Q19) 
As previously mentioned, cyber risk puts pressure on financial institutions. Owing to cyber 
exposure and the increased surface of attack (i.e. increased number of devices, increased 
number of users, variety of networks), financial institutions chose various strategies for 
dealing with risks. As there are problems in defining the discipline, accordingly inhibitors 
vary. Referred to as a computerisation-informatisation-cyberisation paradigm shift 
(Althonayan and Andronache, 2018), cybersecurity has become an integrative discipline that 
places information security under its umbrella. Despite a trend towards advancement of 
cyber resiliency, however, antecedents of the discipline remain and sustain fragmented 
practices ingrained on IT and IS. When challenging respondents to define the main inhibitors 







Figure 6-12 Main inhibitors in implementing CsM 
Figure 6-12 shows an amalgamation of results, which at certain points connect and 
interrelate with each other. A number of six key criteria resulted in inhibiting CsM:  
(1) Awareness, 17.91% of respondents agreed that a lack of awareness among employees 
is affecting deployment of implementation; Respondent [5] finds that: 
“Awareness, it’s [a] critical thing here because even though people who know IT, 
they might know computers very well, but still they might not know a lot about 
cybersecurity a lot. So, there’s a lot of awareness that is necessary.” 
 
Respondent [10] added that:  
“Not learning lessons from other people experiences and not staying up to date, I 
think those would a be two key inhibitors in my view.” 
This concluded that value of risk awareness and education is acknowledged by some as being 
a significant inhibitor for CsM. 
(2) Cost, 11.94% agreed that cost of implementation impeded CsM proper implementation. 
When considering costs, Respondent [11] refers to the cost of strategies. Whilst 
Respondent [15] affirms that cost and quality of implementation is the biggest challenge: 
“I think the biggest challenge is the cost; the cost of implementation. And the other 
is quality. [If] you develop something that doesn’t quite effectively meet the 
challenge, for example, you develop a new tool and that really is not effective to meet 
the challenge or the velocity or complexity demanded by the situation… that is one 
































Likewise, Respondent [20] reasons that costs of implementation for cybersecurity require 
lots of tools and lots of people who have experience and sufficient resources. Whilst 
Respondent [4] refers to cost for both implementation and cost of compliance, indicating 
that benefits are lesser than the cost. 
(3) Skills, 10.45% of respondents believe that a lack of employees’ competencies affects 
ERM. For instance, the view of Respondent [18] reasons that: 
“The biggest challenge is ourselves, including myself. Sometimes as a person, as a 
human, it’s a very serious risk. Awareness is a big component of any type of risk. 
Particularly [in] cyber we fail a lot. It’s a very dynamic and you know, [it’s a] 
knowledge driven industry, [and] we don’t have enough qualified resources 
internally in the region.”  
(4) Silos, 10.45% of respondents mention silo approaches and silo strategies (two initial 
sub-themes merged). 
(5) Misalignment, 8.96% of respondents point towards misalignment with organisational 
goals;  
(6) Culture, 7.46% of respondents blame lack of enterprise-wide risk culture. 
In addition, a small number of respondents indicated that communication (5.97%), and the 
cost of compliance (4.48%) adds an additional burden for organisations. These findings 
indicate some of the problems encountered in the extant of literature research remain valid 
(See Section 4.4.1, Chapter 4). Little attention has been devoted to the impact of a lack of 
strategic direction, weak support of management (organisational dysfunctions), and late risk 
identification. Of much concern is that respondents disregarded a lack of collaboration. 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, collaboration is defined by respondents through lenses of 
silos (e.g. Respondent [1]).  
An important issue that emerged from data was that respondents who reported low levels for 
some inhibitors also reported lower levels for four additional new categories that were 
omitted to be stated in the questionnaire: 
• Tendency to over control (1.49%); 
• Reactive mode (1.49%); 
• Unknown emerging risk (5.97%); 





The majority of respondents disregarded time-constraint. Thus far, Respondents [8] and [9] 
believe that security cannot move fast enough, and often the expected speed is unlikely to 
reflect the capability of getting the right security.  
From interviews with respondents, findings entail two streams: 1) six key inhibitors are 
significant in deployment of CsM implementation; 2) additional low value might be 
significant if all compounded together (e.g. lack of strategic direction (2.99%); weak support 
from management (1.49%), and tendency to over-control (1.49%)). All of the latter are 
strategically related. 
6.2.3.4 Cyber incident handling (Q20) 
With regard to departments/units and the practical side of risks, this question aims to appraise 
how an employee from any department would handle a cyber incident. In analysing the 
interview data, the significance of cyber awareness emerged as an important aspect in 
maintaining an organisation’s resiliency. Henceforth a potential attack represents a risk of 
which organisations are aware. The security practice endorses a view that eventually any 
organisation will be targeted (Deloitte, n.d.; International Monetary Fund, 2017) and thus it 
is necessary to have a proactive strategy of preparedness or worst-case scenario, an efficient 
recovery. Regrettably, for the financial industry, most incidents end with financial losses 
(International Monetary Fund, 2017). Referring to a cyber incident as a predefined control 
the role of this question was to understand the maturity of control and enforcement of 
policies. Baskerville (2014) portrays incident handling through the lenses of the prevention 
paradigm (proactive) and response paradigm (reactive, defensive). The prevention paradigm 
assumes that risks are predictable, measurable, and persistent. In other words, predefined 
controls can be applied. However, when risks are unknown, it transposes into a response 
paradigm, which is a defensive control that is assumed to be ‘unpredictable, non-measurable 
and transient’ (Baskerville, 2014). Findings show that there is satisfactory data that 
recognises the human-element as an integrative part of cyber resiliency. This is in line with 






Figure 6-13 Cyber incident handling key aspects 
The above findings suggest the respondent’s views on what constitutes the key success 
factors in deploying good security practice is to have i) a security-incident team (24.14%), 
ii) a dedicated channel of communication (24.14%), and iii) preliminary awareness of 
detection and reporting (17.24%). In this regard, Respondent [2] stresses the importance of 
a defined team whilst Respondent [18] discusses preliminary awareness of detection and 
reporting by declaring that:  
“The biggest preparation tool is to have basic awareness to know what are the types 
of treats. We do a continuous employee awareness campaign to help prevent fishing 
and social attacks, and the first thing they need to do is to think twice before they do 
mitigation. And if there is anything suspicious, [they] usually call our IT help desk 
to guide them on what the next course of action needs to be. So that’s another kind 
of practice we are trying to develop.” 
These comments provide evidence that awareness is important in practice, and secondly, that 
interconnectedness exists within organisational culture and its perception of security. When 
discussing awareness value, Respondent [24] stresses that: 
“We have a very solid awareness programme because for us, the employee is the first 
line of defence, so it’s very much…if something happens, this is what you do, you 
tell someone, whether you think it looks stupid or your overreacting…you will never 
get in trouble for raising alarm, even if it’s false alarm.” 
The notion of notification and communication of an incident (24.14%) is equal to having a 
security incident team (24.14%) and is described by Respondent [15], a principle to be 
followed by each employee. Accordingly, processes and procedures may vary depending on 
the type of incident, comments Respondent [20]. Confirming that culture plays a significant 
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role, Respondent [21] recommends the adoption of a “no-blame culture.” This would involve 
employees being encouraged to indicate issues without facing potential disciplinary action 
afterwards. This recommendation by Respondent [21] pertains to the training-driven theme 
(10.34%) in building cyber resiliency capabilities. A related view is also supported by 
Respondent [16], who understands that regular training is a key control. 
The results provide reasonable evidence that frequently most organisations have incident 
plans in place, owned either by the IT department or centralised cybersecurity team. Thus, 
there is an incident response plan that dictates the responses of individuals. In this regard, 
Respondent [5] recommends that procedure and function standardisation is imperative. 
Moreover, it reiterates the people-centric value and its educational and awareness 
preparedness in the process of cyber resilience and sets skill proficiency. 
6.2.3.5 Side effects of poor cyber risk oversight (Q21) 
Considering the broad spectrum of risks and cyber threats, respondents were asked what the 
most unwanted effects of poor risk oversight within their organisation are. This allows the 
Researcher to comprehend what they value more. Henceforth a side effect is considered 
when an action or lack of action has a partial or total impact on an organisation’s objectives 
(Dobson et al., 2011); it can have direct or indirect effects regarding losses. Direct impact 
means that there has been a direct loss that can be quantified in monetary terms. Opposing 
this, the indirect side effects mean that effect is hard to be quantified or predicted (e.g. 
damage to reputation, trust, goodwill, source allocation, expenditure) Iyengar (2007). It 
represents an unanticipated loss that aims to cover the cost recovery of related operational 
capabilities (Yvengar, 2007). Figure 6-14 below illustrates the proportion of indirect and 






Figure 6-14 Key side effects of poor risk oversight 
As Figure 6-14 shows, there is no significant difference among the top adverse effects. Three 
main side effects have been identified: reputational loss (24%), regulatory consequences 
(17.33%), and financial loss (16%). 24% of respondents reported strong evidence of side 
effects on reputation. Consequently, all side effects are interlinked, losing reputation might 
mean that regulatory consequences are generated. 17.33% of respondents confirmed the 
regulatory impact. Intertwined, financial loss (16%) is the third side effect articulated. 
Business interruption (12%) or loss of sensitive data (1.67%) relate to losing customer trust 
(9.33%). This leads to the conclusion that that poor management can damage or erode an 
organisation’s reputation. ERM has a cross-functional role that aims to protect brand name 
equity. Reputation is an intangible asset and a key element that supports the achievement of 
objectives (as stated by Gatzer and Schmit, 2016). Considering the reputational risk and its 
layered effect constitutes the baseline for approaching the risk strategically, respectively 
ERM downsising risks. Respondent [13] propounds the view that: 
“For us as a financial service, reputation loss is absolutely so critical. In that we work 
so hard to build a brand and build trust with our customers, with our partners that to 
me, [it] is the most paramount. Regulatory consequences and fines and those types 
of things could come out of that, but, in [the] financial services, reputation loss is 
very difficult to regain.” 
This argument is further delineated in the quotation of Respondent [24]: 
“So, your reputation is tied to your revenue, your reputation is tied to how you 
regulate. So I’d have reputational risk right at the top of the areas of concern. Stuff 
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your reputation. So there are all kinds of side effects of that top tier, and your 
reputation is anchored by what you promise your customers. They could choose. 
Reputation: it’s got so many cascade effects. And you can’t get it back; you can spend 
one hundred and fifty years building it up and lose it in fifty minutes.” 
A similar view was identified by Lowe, cited in Wakefield (2014, p. 235), which stated that 
“it takes twenty years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it”. Addressing the 
problems of reputational loss, similarities with loss of customer trust (10.67) have been 
detected. Trust and reputation are found to be linked through lens of trustworthiness (Jøsang 
et al., 2007). Despite being two different terms, reputation refers to how an organisation is 
overall perceived while trust refers to reliability. While much attention has been centred on 
defining reputation, Jøsang et al. (2007) state that it is a ‘measure of trustworthiness’. 
Altogether, an indication of this relationship is stated by Respondent [14]: 
“What we are selling is trust and expertise. Failure of risk oversight can lose customer 
trust. Customer trust is difficult to build up. [It] can be lost in a day. Number one, 
loss of customer trust.” 
Financial loss (16%) is the third unwanted side effect for an organisation. A closer look at 
the data indicates that they are intertwined with one another as stated by Respondents [13], 
[15], [19], and [21]. Additionally, Respondent [21] substantiates that: 
“If you lose customer trust, they start leaving your bank, and that will lead to a 
financial loss. Reputational impact [is] the same. If you’re on the front cover of the 
Telegraph saying that there was cyber-attack and we didn’t do anything about it, that 
will lead to a lack of customer trust and again lead to financial loss.” 
What is interesting about this research finding is that it corroborates various side effects and 
highlights a domino effect. Literature defines this effect between variables as ‘systemic risk’ 
(Smage, 2014; Armenia et al., 2018; Marotta and McShane, 2018). Surprisingly, respondents 
disregarded effects such as loss of resiliency, probability on investment on risk oversight 
(0%), and a potential increase on premium insurance charges (0%). The value of insurance 
(0%) may suggest that the sampled organisations have not encountered incidents that 
affected premium fees. 
6.2.3.6 Utilisation of industry frameworks (Q22) 
In managing cybersecurity strategy, organisations rely on various frameworks, security 
management programmes and/or standards in order to cope with their exposure to a wide 
range of cyber risks. In particular, the scope of this question was to determine which are 






Figure 6-15 Key industry standards/frameworks used by sampled organisations 
Findings indicated that a considerable amount of organisations use a blended approach 
(31%). This means that 31% of the sampled organisations preferred either to use a mix of 
standards and frameworks and/or create their own frameworks that warrant security 
baselines. Findings showing conjunction with many frameworks are reported, for instance, 
by Respondents [11] and [22] as a positive correlation in using the good practices of the ISO 
27000 series, COBIT, and NIST cyber security frameworks. Equally, Respondent [18] uses 
the same frameworks as a point of reference and refers to them as being ‘customised’. 
Nonetheless, Respondent [13] argues that: 
“I think we certainly are connected with many of the industry standards but really we 
have created our own. Our business is unique, our platforms is unique, and you can’t 
just take it off the shelf. We certainly pay attention and learn and look at those, our 
industry standards for certifications around things that we have to comply with.” 
This is in agreement with Respondent [9]: 
“My organisation needs to adhere to many types of frameworks and standards, and 
so on, so my organisation has pulled all this material together from various different 
frameworks, and developed an internal system that we follow internally.” 
 
Additional research findings outline the second interpretation of security baselines; 23% of 
sampled organisations abide by NIST cyber security framework (without considering cases 
where organisations use a blended approach). Respondent [24] refers to the current 
approach: 
“So, we do have a core reference to NIST, we do recognise other frameworks where 
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have to pivot and talk their language. The good thing is you can translate roughly 
across all the frameworks. We anchor quite firmly on NIST, but we flex where we 
need to.” 
The third category of response signalled use of the ISO 27000 series (15%). Respondent [5] 
justifies the use of the ISO standard, stating that: 
“I think [that] ISO [standard] is good from and internet perspective because NIST is 
much more in the USA. If you want to sell a product on the Internet market, probably 
you want to think of ISO.” 
Although the standard partially denotes consideration of the boundaries of standards, it 
chiefly refers to multiple jurisdictions under which organisations activate. These findings 
show that respondents have a clear preference for optimised frameworks that are internally 
built yet compatible so as to produce proof and adherence to a number of external 
frameworks and feasible for multiple controls. In conclusion, although these findings are 
consistent with previous research, they differ slightly because previous results reported in 
the literature indicate many other frameworks and standards (e.g. OCTAVE series, ICAS 
Information Security standard, PAS 555 standard, IASME framework) that have been 
omitted by respondents (see Subsection 3.4.2, Chapter 3 and Subsection 4.3.2.2, Chapter 4). 
Additionally, another drawback to the findings is that calculating the use of the frameworks 
remains limited due to using a blended approach. Consequently, NIST and ISO standard 
usage is assumed to have higher values. 
Furthermore, from an initial number of seven framework series related to CsM identified in 
the literature, only three have been confirmed by empirical findings (e.g. ISO series, NIST 
cyber security framework, Information Security Forum Good Practice Guide). As, some 
mentioned standards were either IT-centric, technical-related, or operational-related (COBIT 
standard, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI), Cyber Essentials), the 
Researcher disregarded them hence are being out of scope for research. 
6.2.3.7 Benefits of cyber risk oversight/CsM (Q23) 
Regarding implementation benefits of cyber risk oversight (terminology used by Researcher 
because CsM was not applicable to all respondents), respondents were asked to comment 
on which return on investment (ROI) their organisation focuses more; specifically, ROI 
terminology was used on the assumption of benefits metrics. Generally, ROI is a quantifiable 
metric (2009)—the difference between investment and return. Showing effects of risks, ROI 
is measured by the ratio of savings as saving cost is a central value (Hall, 1999). Leaving 





security investment (ROSI):  ROSI= (Risk exposure *% Risk mitigated)-Solution costs, that 
leads to the conclusion that cyber risk oversight is a loss prevention approach. Another 
possible explanation for ROI and benefits is reported by Respondent [24]: 
“I wouldn’t say investment; it’s more [about] of revenue protection because the ROI 
we would look at from my perspective is (again they are all relevant) …but we would 
look at just pure business growth. If we are delivering what we’ve committed to, to 
our clients and our regulators, we automatically see that business growth, and that’s 
the ROI measure, so [that’s] when the business is making money. 
Thus, the findings of this question address a controversial belief among practitioners that 
ROI should be quantifiable. The Researcher propounds the view of a speculative assumption 
of unquantifiable ROI, respectively benefits. The proposed ‘unquantifiable’ ROI is outlined 
below in Figure 6-16. 
 
Figure 6-16 Benefits of cyber risk oversight  
Five main benefits emerged as key drivers: compliance (24.00%), competitive advantage 
(20.00%), resilience (20.00%), organisational effectiveness (14.00%), and sustainability 
(10.00%). Among many others, compliance seems to be the principal justification of 
implementing cyber risk oversight/CsM; with small differences, competitive advantage 
(20%) and resilience (20%) being two other benefits of deploying security practices.  
In this context, data shows that organisational effectiveness (14%) is another benefit to 
consider; as exemplified by Respondent [15]: 
“It’s organisational effectiveness. I mean if you had asked this question a few years 
ago, it would have been answered differently. Probably [I] would have said 


















just be ticking the box and following laws. You have to do that, but ultimately you 
have to know how to use risk in a smart way. So, the whole purpose is to make the 
organisation more effective, more sustainable.” 
Respondent [15] puts forward the view that organisational effectiveness is well understood 
and ensuring effectiveness, in turn, leads to sustainability and compliance. This is in line 
with views of Armenia et al. (2018), hence mature cybersecurity implying proactive 
compliance. Respondent [24] considers that each aspect has an impact on the next one and 
vice-versa:  
“Competitive advantage is gleaned from the promise we make to our clients and 
customers that “we going to keep your stuff secure”, that gives us a competitive edge, 
that also boosts our reputation. It has a cascade effect I think to all the other ones.” 
The aftermath of cyber risk oversight is considered by Respondent [18]: 
“The biggest benefit is to make sure that everything is maintained and the other 
biggest benefits are to avoid unnecessary costs, unnecessarily losses from poor 
Information Security over time because as a bank we are simply regulated. We have 
a lot of fines for not compiling with customer-related privacy protection or, maybe, 
not ending a proper report that shows our level of information security and overall 
enterprise risk posture [position].” 
Likewise, Respondents [6] and [21] share a similar view, looking at the competitive 
advantage in terms of revenue and profits and ensuring that the organisation meets targets. 
Part of this pertains to its operational effectiveness — achieved targets with optimised costs. 
The causal link between organisational effectiveness and competitive advantage leads to 
sustainable practices. As Respondent [11] says: “…organisation effectiveness and 
competitive advantage, the two are inexplicable in joint.” Sustainability was reported by 
10% of respondents as being a result of implementing CsM. To clarify, organisational 
sustainability refers to more than business expansion and economic development and is 
therefore an interlink between strategic business and cultural dimensions. Either it refers to 
a group of actors and organisational structure, technology, or governance; sustainability in 
the context of ROI is efficient and effective financially, socially, environmentally, 
strategically, and culturally (Ilmaz and Flouris, 2010). 
When discussing benefits with respondents, four additional subthemes emerged: (1) bring 
risk down, prevent loss, (2) improve your profitability of risk oversight, (3) potential to save, 
and (4) financial security. In short, these findings suggest that achieving organisational 





compliance.  All of the options are interrelated and even though they serve as loss 
prevention, a potential to save and comply can be calculated for the remaining non-metric. 
6.2.3.8 Executive board expectations regarding enterprise risks and cyber risk 
governance (Q24) 
Championing good practices for risk oversights has been long employed as a practice that 
‘sets tone from the top’ (Society of Actuaries, 2018). Direction from a company’s Board 
matters because it is a governing body with the ultimate goal of overseeing risk and ensuring 
the alignment of objectives with its organisations’ missions, visions, core values, and 
strategies (COSO, 2017). In other words, the board of directors represents the interest of 
shareholders and aims to ensure that sound risk conduct is applied in conformance with 
external pressures (e.g. shareholders, regulators, customers, competition, rating agencies). 
Due to increased external pressure to protect an organisation’s value, the involvement of a 
board of directors becomes more dynamic (EY, 2015; COSO, 2017; AICPA, 2018; Society 
of Actuaries, 2018). The aftermath of such pressure is passed on to executive managers. 
Essentially, the role of the board becomes twofold: to respond to external pressure for 
transparent oversight and ensure internal applicability and measurement for both protection 
and value creation. 
Thus, the board’s expectations emphasise whether key elements are in place, whether 
departments are engaged with each other, and whether the organisation manages risk 
oversight appropriately (Beasley et al., 2015). This prompts a hierarchy of responsibilities 
to ensure effectiveness and accountability of risk exposure (AICPA, 2018). Moreover, 
knowing the board’s expectation helps to understand if there are any deviations. Figure 6-17 






Figure 6-17 Executive board expectations regarding risk oversight 
There is evidence that the board’s expectations have a positive effect on risk oversight of 
both enterprise and cyber risk. Firstly, managing risk (24.14%) and stating the organisation’s 
position regarding readiness (24.14%) are of the utmost importance for respondents. This 
interrelates with assurance (13.79%), which show that expected controls are in place. The 
overall response to other compounds was low value (expertise and advice, 3.45%; 100% 
compliant, 3.45%; accurate audit, 3.45%; proactive, encompass and capture all aspects of 
risk, 3.45%; provide awareness to employees, 3.45%; value for money, 3.45%). In this 
context, it should be considered that a board’s expectation is related to a high-level approach: 
on how well the department is managing the risk within risk appetite and what the current 
position is (risk profile and tolerance) in terms of readiness. Lastly, it expects an assurance 
that everything is in place in order to lower risks. Assurance, (reasonable of taking care, 
handle risk) in the view of Respondent [18] is:  
“The main expectation of what needs to be done. Also, I make sure they are aware 
of what is happening in the risk industry in the region specific to, you know, financial 
institutions…what are the risks, what are the things we need to watch and specifically 
where are we as a bank, where is our status, how do we look inside, what is our 
posture in terms of readiness, how ready we are and what needs to be done? Also, 
what’s the expectation from inside, what’s the competition from outside? Those are 
the main concerns from it…, visibility, whether we have the right tool to monitor and 
control, if we have the preparedness inside and if we have identified critical business 



















These findings demonstrate the multifaceted responsibilities of risk oversight, which are 
expected to make the correlation between external variables and internal readiness. 
Managing risks effectively is among the main two expectations. Respondent [17] draws an 
interesting line saying that: “They would only want to know exceptions in risk that were in 
the range of being high.” In spite of that, Respondent [23] believes that an executive board 
expects to provide ample support: 
“I think that they expect that the risks are properly managed, in the sense that risks 
are identified, and prepared actions are taken to manage risks, to manage or to assess 
them or to transfer them.” 
This asserts the view of Respondent [4]: “absolutely zero breaches”. Respondent [24] echoes 
a much milder expectation:  
“Keep it under control. Keep risks as low as possible, we don’t want risks that’s the 
reality of things. It’s no different to…they don’t want incidents or risk exposure. We 
are no different to all the other risk types. So, keep it within tolerance, keep it within 
appetite, and that’s it. What it translates to is a whole different ball game.” 
However, practitioners’ literature asserts that such expectations in current market context 
are an ‘illusion’ and an unreasonable expectation to have given the increase of emerging 
risks (Oliver Wyman, 2018b). Further analysis shows that position regarding readiness 
(24.14%) is central. Respondent [20] offers a descriptive account of three paths: past 
incidents, current exposure, and solution in order to lower risks. While others such as 
Respondent [9] indicate expectations for proactively and consistently identify vulnerabilities 
to mitigate what those are, respectively to ensure controls/oversight. 
Another outcome was value for money (3.45%). Respondent [26] highlights that the 
executive board would want to make sure that there is value for money and what the 
department is providing is worth the money being spent (metrics). All captured data 
represents the view that validates interest for resilience and assurance of governing boards. 
In contrast with the literature that discussed the hard task of the board in assuring internal 
control (see Section, 2.4, Chapter 2 and Subsection 4.3.1.3, Chapter 4), the empirical 
findings show another side of the board, one that delegates and sets expectations by way of 
setting the roadmap for good practices. 
6.2.4 Theme Four: Strategic Alignment 
The objective of this section is to underline the value of variables in the context of strategic 
alignment that conditions the theoretical assertion of the need for a strategic alignment 





6.2.4.1 Departments communication (Q25) 
Communication between departments is identified by way of alignment measurement 
(Hosseinbeig et al., 2011). Communication results in being the link between strategy and 
implementation, and an enabling tool that connects silos (Althonayan, Keith and Killackey 
2012; Volk and Zerfass, 2018). An excellent strategic communication creates departments’ 
connection and engagement with organisational strategy, pertaining to common vocabulary 
and mutual understanding that provide knowledge sharing and alignment (Chen, 2010; 
FINRA, 2015). The results in Figure 6-18 show that communication is acknowledged by 
respondents segmented in five strands of maturity. 
 
Figure 6-18 Departments communication maturity 
When discussing departments’ communication, respondents were required to describe 
current maturity. This involved a description of how risk is communicated and dealt with 
across the respondent’s organisation. Determining effectiveness, nearly half of the 
respondents (44%) describe their practices to be somewhat effective. Analysing the options 
available, Respondent [11] ascertains that: 
“I would say that most [of the] time, it is very effective. I’ve seen a couple of 
incidents which’ve been somewhat effective. In my humble opinion, I thought that it 
could be faster. And perhaps more [communication] across the enterprise as opposed 
to segmented communication. But most times, [it’s] very effective. Sometimes, not 
always…I would go to four, ‘somewhat effective’.” 
With particular reference to long-term improvements, Respondents [14] and [15] enunciate 
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escalate and what to escalate. Ascertaining that communication effectiveness varies, 
Respondent [18] evaluates ineffective communication: 
“It’s on a basic level. There is some awareness, but as a culture, we need to improve 
our transparency, we need to open our open communication. There is no way to 
improve on its own; our challenge is on working on the culture at an enterprise level, 
being more transparent and openly, talk[ing] about it. It’s very low. ‘Two’.” 
Only 12% declared having very ineffective communication. Respondent [20] shares a 
negative view, asserting that: 
“They [departments] are [have] very different systems as well, so they wouldn’t 
communicate unless they are crossing each other in some way.” 
Overall, these findings suggest that the maturity and effectiveness of strategic 
communication are other determinants of alignment. The existence of these effects implies 
that despite broader research, the relationship of communication and alignment has yet to 
reach maturity. 
6.2.4.2 Risk ownership for managing cyber risks (Q26) 
This issue of how cyber risks (cybersecurity risks) are dealt with by an organisation are 
explored with a twofold scope. Firstly, the purpose is to identify the respondent’s opinion 
based on observation and experience, and whether it is appropriate to manage each cyber 
risk or incident at a departmental level rather than at an enterprise level. The second part of 
this issue is later addressed in Q27, which seeks confirmatory statements regarding how 
things actually happen. It is based upon an accepted responsibility among all parties. Risk 
ownership is a critical administrative aspect that enforces accountability within an 
organisation (COSO, 2016), and it is, therefore, difficult to address the question without 
understanding the grounds of responses (what resources and preventative controls are in 
place at all levels). Thus, ownership is a delegated responsibility, based upon an accepted 
responsibility among all parties. The risk owner is accountable for managing risk (Olson 
and Wu, 2007). In this particular case, the cyber risk owner is the organisation, respectively 
delegated managers. They can, therefore, decide whether to retain, mitigate, increase, or 
avoid a risk, or, lessen its exposure or lesser consequence (Olson and Wu, 2007). To this 
end, this question should determine if cascading accountability for risk is a common 
approach at the departmental level is (EY, 2015) or if it is dealt with at an enterprise level. 






Figure 6-19 Accountability in managing cyber risks 
 
Seeking to discover how risks are dealt with at an enterprise-level, four categories have been 
generated, some demonstrate interdependencies across risks while others demonstrate 
disconnection between parts of an organisation. The context of exploring the accountability 
and responsibility in managing risks was investigated mainly through an alignment paradigm 
lenses. From four themes that offer a potential option for dealing with risk oversight, two 
reach more significant values. A majority of respondents (57.69%) described the 
management of risk deployed at both department and enterprise levels. How an organisation 
implements risk governance, at both a departmental and enterprise-level, is exemplified by 
Respondent [1]: 
“I think it should be a system at the enterprise level, I mean you may find some stuff 
that needs to be also looked at a departmental level, but I think that encouraging 
things to be looked at the enterprise level. I think that yes that company stood view 
of how stuff fit together. Sometimes if things are looked at the department level, that 
angle it’s kind of missed.” 
While Respondent [13] outlines an operational perspective: 
“I think it is. From our perspective, if there are specific HR issues, it should be 
managed at the HR level with a governance component around that.[It] ties enterprise 
risks and that’s how we manage and think about our own audit functions We’re 
identifying these risks, we’re thinking about the management at the department level, 
but our audit and our governance level is coming in at an enterprise risk level.” 
Respondents [15] and [17] outline a dual-responsibility: one that is local with a low level 
and does not require senior management input, and a second that is a centralised approach 




















As evidenced in the interview data, the second category of respondents describes risk 
ownership remaining at department level (26.92%). Respondent [10] identifies that the 
management of risks and mitigation usually takes place at a department level. According to 
Respondent [11], some risks are particular to departments and are usually managed and 
owned by that department, with automatic complications happening at an organisation level. 
The idea of escalating only significant risk is also acknowledged by Respondent [4]: 
“Quantitative is great but not all risk can be quantified, so you really want a low risk 
to manage an absolute department and never get communicated to senior level. Only 
your significant risks should be communicated to senior levels; the senior level do 
not want to see 300-500,000 risks, they want to see what the critical risk is. So, I 
think risk management has to be where your subject matter experts.”  
Respondent [7] believes that depends on the type of incident, impacts and lastly upwards 
triage of risk. Respondent [8] refrains from commenting on this issue by providing a cautious 
statement:  
“I’m going to give a risk person answer: ‘it depends’. Because it depends on the 
situation. If a risk is identified and it is even at departmental level, it needs specific 
controls. However, that risk and how it was acted on must be communicated at 
enterprise-wide [level].” 
The problem of how risks are managed also received impartial answers (7.69%). In some 
ways, despite having impartial statements, it describes an isolated approach; respectively, 
risk shall be dealt with by chance, and this thus shows dissonance with ERM principles (e.g. 
Respondent [20]). 
6.2.4.3 Department cross-functional responsibilities for cyber risks (Q27) 
Investigating how organisations deal with cyber risks, this question is a continuation of the 
previous question. Q26 delimitates the context, whereas Q27 generates a statement 
describing sampled organisations’ maturity in dealing with risks. Concerns have been 
expressed about how organisations deal with risks internally, and how business objectives 
are strategically supported. Controlling risk strategically and holistically has been of interest 
for many scholars (aspects discussed in Section 2.7, Chapter Two and Section 3.1 and 3.5, 
Chapter Three). However, overcoming difficulties in successfully implementing strategic 
alignment remains a challenge (McShane, 2018). To comprehend in what way cyber risks 







Figure 6-20 Department cross-functional cyber responsibilities categorised 
These findings reflect previous research, which outlined immature alignment (objectives and 
strategies) and a lack of operational flow within organisational departments. 
Risks are treated through both silo and enterprise-wide approach (57.69%) 
Respondent [11] states: 
“In terms of the process where risk is identified, each department deals with that risk 
because the owner has a line of business. But, as it applies the ERM philosophy, I 
think that in that way, there is a holistic approach to it. However, [we] haft to have 
the enterprise-wide awareness of additional impact down [into] other lines of 
business. So, they own that risk. There is mandatory enterprise awareness.” 
Previous respondents emphasised how risks are delegated, while Respondent [23] describes 
a different approach of ‘once a year assessment’ that., it may be assumed, aligns annually:  
“We have a top-down and bottom-up approach and that it’s more holistic [view] in 
the sense that every year we identify, we map all the risks within the organisation 
with the support of the business unit and the head of the business unit, so we have 
the complete mapping. So yes, departments are responsible of implementation of 
actions that are defined by the board. We normally do training once a year.” 
This approach of delegating risks through a top-down and bottom-up approach is also 
confirmed by Respondent [8], who describes the holistic alignment by the use of a central 
repository for all risk types, so it would be aligned across the enterprise. 
Risks treated holistically received fewer considerations from respondents (23.08%). 
Respondent [10] argues that: 
“[It] depends on what risks are you talking about because manag[ing] risk dictates 
how you approach it. Because [of] that, for instance, we would need subject matter 






























Each department deals with its own risks (15.38%) represents in plain senses that the risk 
owner is the department itself. As many others say (Respondents [2], [6], [12], and [18]):  
“There is a bit of miscommunication. That is one of the biggest challenges, if you 
ask maybe two/three departments, they will give you different information. So that’s 
one of the reasons we are trying to have an enterprise level corporate-wide [approach] 
that is ultimately responsible for having single source of trust for all of us. That’s the 
strategy, that’s what we are working on.” 
This broadly explains that the organisation acknowledges the gaps and value of ERM in 
alignment risk oversight, creating a bridge between departments and leveraging the 
principles of wholeness, strengthening the governance of risks. If referring to how literature 
is categorised (Section 2.7, Chapter Two, the three-dimensional perspective of the alignment 
literature, adoption-implementation-assessment), these findings are asserting maturity 
assessment. In short, the antecedent of alignment is in line with empirical findings. Thus, it 
is not surprising that the empirical evidence points towards the idea that there is scarce 
consideration for the integration of CsM. A final finding illustrated in Table 6-10 supports 
the above. 
Table 6-10 Organisation alignment maturity 
Question 27 Question 26 
Organisation alignment maturity Respondents’ view 
Each department deals with its own risks 15.38% Department level 26.92% 
Risks are treated holistically  23.08% Enterprise-level  7.69% 
Risks are treated through both silo and 
enterprise-wide approach 
57.69% Both departmental and enterprise level 57.69% 
Other  3.85% Impartial  7.69% 
Surprisingly, identical results were identified for both questions 27 and 28, echoing a double 
confirmation that risks are managed through a mix of approaches. This is in line with what 
was reported by so-called level two – structured and implemented alignment, some form of 
risk approach is addressed through basic policies, processes, procedures but mainly on a 
silo basis (see Subsection 4.4.2.4, Chapter 4). A slight contradiction has been identified 
regarding how departments deal with their own risks (15.38% versus 26.92%). This suggests 
that respondents lean towards silo views, meaning that the value of ERM in those specific 
organisations might be less in terms of value and benefits. 
6.2.4.4 Credence for aligned strategies of CsM with ERM (Q28) 
Literature that focused on CsM alignment with ERM is scarce, yet for the literature there is, 





Section 2.7, Chapter Two). Understanding the relationship of CsM and ERM is pinpointed 
through the lenses of both paradigms’ advancement and assessment of the adequacy of 
current risk strategies in the view of respondents. To identify the effect of implementing 
aligned strategies, respondents were asked their opinions. The results of the analysis are 
shown below in Figure 6-21. 
 
Figure 6-21 Acceptability of CsM and ERM 
Figure 6-21 summarises the results of the analysis, which revealed significant acceptability 
of CsM and ERM alignment (85%). When looking at findings, there is a disparity between 
previous outcomes (maturity of alignment) and an acceptability of alignment. 
Nevertheless, achieving holistic risk oversight and control is a well understood concept 
among respondents. The first concept refers to holistic management of risks and the latter 
refers to controlling/modifying specific risks (BSI, 2018). The remaining respondents share 
an identical result (3.85%). None of the respondents remain neutral. Under these conditions, 
the feedback about the proposed approach was perceived by Respondent [10] positively:  
“I think if people have got the resources, to have that kind of specialisation, I would 
say yes. The reason we have it in the same places is partly because of our resources.” 
Additionally, Respondent [11] explained: 
“I think that it would be very positive. We want cybersecurity risk to be baked in 
everything we do. We don’t want to be overly preoccupied with.” 
Respondent [12] added: 
“I think that it is part of the ERM, it is a more interesting element and makes sense. 
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Often overlooked, integration of all risks plays an essential role in holistically managed risks. 
Respondent [4] considers that: 
“The ‘unified strategy’ absolutely; one of the fundamental principles of risk 
management is to have a common approach to how you deal with it.” 
Respondent [6] expresses opinion by saying that:  
“Often you see IT risk and cyber risk as a subset of operational risks, if you know 
what I mean. At the enterprise level, risk and cyber form one of those. Because of 
the growth of cybersecurity nature of IT security, I think probably has a positive 
effect.” 
Indeed, there were several respondents who had very negative views (4%). For example, 
Respondent [25]: 
“I’ve kind of gone somewhat negative here. I guess I’m not…could be swayed but I 
guess the strategy at the moment of cyber is completely different to the strategy we 
have for risk management and governance. I think the two are very different but also 
share a lot of similarities. So, we’ll use risk management as a framework in cyber, so 
we would want to make sure that whatever the businesses framework for risk 
management was, it was aligned to how we were doing things.” 
Despite such a negative view, Respondent [25] seems to understand that 
‘compartmentalised’ strategies may lead to impairment of achieving organisation objectives. 
When things are in a state of mature alignment, it becomes a ‘business enabler’ (Mean, 
2014). 
6.2.4.5 Mechanisms in place for alignment (Q29) 
A problem that emerged during the initial stages of the systematic literature was the lack of 
literature referring to a unified mechanism by which an organisation identifies, assesses and 
mitigates both cyber and enterprise risks across its organisation. Strategic alignment has been 
identified as a mechanism of performance. This cross-examination therefore evaluates 







Figure 6-22 Mechanisms in place for alignment 
23.08% stated that there are no mechanisms in place and 19.23% said that risk framework is 
supporting the process of alignment. Another 19.23% rely on risk control assessment to 
ensure alignment. A further category attributes alignment to the use of an online tool 
(11.54%). It is important to highlight that the highest percentage of respondents stated that 
no mechanism is in place. It was recognised by Respondent [23] that: 
“Structurally we are a bit behind in terms of cyber risk, the idea is to have a unified 
strategy, but we are not there … we are not still there. Actually, the implementing it 
is our goal, but we still have to work on it.” 
Likewise, Respondents [5] and [6] stated that their organisations are trying to build that, 
however no unified mechanism is in place at the moment. This is where departments manage 
their own risks, and they might escalate the risk that they have identified. Moreover, some 
others, for instance, Respondent [10], explain another type of approach:  
“We take Nike’s approach: ‘we just do it’. Don’t get a picture of complex structure 
around that. We don’t have complex services. That cuts a lot of the risks.”  
In light of the above statement, it can be recognised that alignment is still immature and, in 
some cases, misunderstood. Several respondents stated that alignment is considered, but 
drawbacks exist and delay implementation. Others, such as Respondents [12] and [15], 
describe the mechanism of alignment as being the mechanism influenced by RM framework, 
a top-down and a bottom-up approach where risk is identified concerning their business 
processes and pushed down to business areas. The role of the RM framework, according to 
Respondent [20], is to set out risk appetite for operational risk and cybersecurity, and 
additionally manage all risk from risk identification, risk escalation, and risk continuation 
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“All I’ve been focusing on is perhaps using the mechanisms (methodology) within 
enterprise risk management to help support cybersecurity management but not 
necessarily alignment because our enterprise risk management includes a number of 
different and varied operational risks as well as business risks to the firm. And if 
you’re aligning one, there’d be questions to ask why you’re not aligning others. I’m 
not aware of organisations that would have dealt with that.” 
Apart from using ERM principles to meet alignment, some other respondents endorsed risk 
control assessment (19.23%) while a few other respondents reported the use of online tools 
(11.54%). Respondent [19] justifies the approach by explaining:  
“It’s easier just to outsource and go out in the internet and procure a tool because it’s 
easier, it’s more agile then you need to be and if you’ll be running into risks, normally 
the [outsourced] IT organisation will take care of.” 
At this stage, it was not possible to investigate which tools Respondent [16] was referring 
to. The Researcher can only assume that they were referring to performance tools (e.g. 
strategy map, balanced scorecard, and/or strategy alignment matrix, applications). Likewise, 
the analysis of alignment literature, which referred to mechanisms and tools, was 
problematic. Furthermore, Respondent [24] explains that despite technology advancement, 
ERM has been around for a long time to ensure alignment, However, people are realising 
that it is valuable when organisations globalise. Such view is additionally articulated by 
Respondent [16], when explaining the role of a governance forum (a mechanism). The 
security risk is articulated, monitored, and tracked by technology and risk management for 
visibility regarding what the issues are and how they are being reported and escalated. 
The above risk control assessment relates to the literature that links the main contributors of 
Strategic Alignment Maturity Model alignment (SAMM alignment—composed by 
Henderson and Venkatraman 1993 and discussed in Subsection 4.3.3.1, Chapter Four). Per 
total alignment condition refers to an organisation’s willingness to achieve its strategic goals 
and objectives. Gregor et al. (2007) refer to the mechanism of alignment as being a strategic 
planning mechanism, a governance arrangement, and lastly a communication mechanism. 
Whilst Luftman’s strategic alignment model (SAM) describes a mechanism through the 
lenses of value, governance, partnership, scope, and architecture, and skills, Wu et al. (2015) 
complement this with three primary governance mechanisms:  decision-making structure, 
formal processes, and communication approaches. Moreover, more recently Jevtić et al. 
(2018) proposed a model that comprises seven elements known as (7S): strategy, structure, 





governance by means of a mechanism that drives structures, processes, and relational 
mechanisms, either intellectual (strategic), operational, structural, or social (see Subsection 
4.3.3, Chapter 4).  
6.2.4.6 Defining strategic alignment purpose, responsible and how it can be achieved 
(Q30) 
As one interviewee said: “Alignment is a process of creating a roadmap to achieve the 
organisational purpose” (Respondent [13]). Early discussion about how organisations 
achieve strategic alignment is a cadence about how risk is acceptable in respondents’ views, 
and how different parts of an organisation coordinate/integrate. These results raise intriguing 
questions regarding the nature and extent of alignment purpose, responsibilities and duty of 
achievement. 






















































Data is extracted from 24 respondents, and two respondents (7.69%) conclude that alignment 
does not apply to their organisation.  Thus, this data is based on 92.31% frequency of 
answers. Respondents [20] and [22] preferred to be impartial/neutral in their answers. 
Mentioning the alignment purpose, the themes identified in these responses were to ensure 
internal control (20%), to fulfil the achievement of organisation objectives (40%), and to 
attain business strategy (40%). Concerning the second part of the question (responsibility), 
it was found that the Chair of the Board (32.14%) was consistently indicated by respondents. 
Respondent [18] believes: 
“Ultimately the Board is responsible for making sure that all the business’ initiatives 
are aligned with the business’ objectives at the end of the day. At least it starts with 
the Board, at least it is championed by the Board or it will never make headway. So 
that’s the biggest gap - getting the Board committed to making sure that all these 
initiatives are aligned with the business objectives.” 
A second view of Respondent [16] exemplifies the role of senior management responsibility 
(10.71%) for translating the strategy into priorities for each function (department or 
function). This is interpolated into key objectives for specific teams, tracked through 
performance reviews at the end of each year. Consequently, departments have specific 
deliverables and measures of deliverables. Such an approach would be typically aligned with 
the strategy of the firm. Moreover, Shao (2018) suggested that senior executives’ 
backgrounds and behaviours influence alignment. Other responses to this question included 
Chief Risk Officer (14.29%), Chief Operations Officer (7.14%), Chief Compliance Officer 
(3.57%) and Departments managers (3.57%). 
Consistent with the literature, Respondents [1] and [21] point towards the CEO’s 
responsibility for transferring communication downwards, making everyone ultimately 
responsible. This pinpoint shared responsibility. Shared responsibility (14.29%) is 
evidenced by Respondents’ [5] [11] and [24] responsibility for alignment, a joined exercise 
hence each team and business unit being responsible for their own programme. 
Lastly, the third part of the question (alignment achievement) pertains to how alignment can 
actually be achieved. It has been suggested that translating priorities for each function 
(20.83%) and defined strategy (16.67%) are of utmost importance. Together these results 
provide valuable insight into the necessity of a holistic risk oversight function in order to 
proactively align all functions. Even so, prior research argues that function integration 





6.2.4.7 Benefits of alignment (Q31) 
Systematic literature evaluation (Chapter Three) evinces the benefits of CsM alignment with 
ERM by extrapolating several research mainstreams of  IT, IS, and RM, and by looking at 
their joint effects through lenses of alignments antecedents (e.g. neutral alignment, IT: 
Business alignment, IS: RM alignment, IS: ERM alignment) because of trends in the 
literature of alignment (discussed in Subsection 3.5.2, Chapter Three) and scarcity of 
literature on CsM and ERM alignment. Furthermore, data from Figure 6-24 (below) is 
thematically in line with systematic literature findings, which show typology trends of 
alignment (Subsection 3.5.2, Chapter Three) while Quadrant 1 (Adoption) refers to the 
motivation of alignment. 
 
 
Figure 6-24 Key alignment benefits 
Among the main key benefits identified are avoidance of duplication (18.75%), strategic 
alignment (18.75%), and enterprise-wide risk measurement (16.67%). Granting low values, 
three themes emerged: speed up processes (6.25%), give value to the investment (2.08%), 
and ensure regulation alignment (2.08%). 
Respondent [11] argues value of alignment stating that: 
“I think that there’re multiple benefits. It has to be an enterprise-wide accounting of 
risk, enterprise-wide measurement, I think is critical. I think that [the alignment] it 
does better; in terms of duplication, I think that the is mission is critical where it is a 
particular line of business mitigating a certain type of risk, and they then go in a 
fourth database. Then, resources can be combined, avoiding duplication. I think it is 
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Respondent [8] adds more arguments, asserting that: 
“The biggest benefit I have seen it is the allocation of resources. And resources being 
people, as well as money, as well as technology and so on. So, if you don’t align, the 
business is at highest risk (e.g. the ‘crown jewels’ of the organisation: data, the 
information). Then you will waste your resources. That is why it is important to align 
your cybersecurity strategy with the business strategy.” 
Respondent [18] supports the view that alignment gives value to the investment while others 
such as Respondent [21] believe that alignment, apart from meeting business objectives, also 
ensures regulation alignment. This is in line with literature findings, respectively Section 
4.4, Chapter Four. 
6.2.4.8 Consideration for CsM alignment with ERM (Q32) 
Building on the idea that alignment of CsM with ERM literature is scarce, Q31 explores if 
respondents have considered the alignment or whether their organisation applies or is 
interested in applying the alignment paradigm principles. Figure 6-25 shows the distribution 
of answers per categories. 
 
Figure 6-25 Considerations for CsM alignment with ERM 
Figure 6-25 above shows that almost 70% of respondents considered CsM alignment with 
ERM. Respondents [6] and [21] believe that cybersecurity strategy is a subset of enterprise 
risk. It seems that there is a general agreement regarding CsM and ERM alignment benefits. 
Additionally, Respondent [18] supports this finding and justifies it: 
“Yes, we have considered that one we are working on it. We have underlined if we 
have a disconnection between the cyber risk and enterprise risk. Because cyber risk 
is everywhere it needs to be in every process it’s every branch responsibility, it’s not, 
obviously the cyber risk department or risk department … [that] might be the face of 
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it but the Board is accountable, everybody is also responsible at a level to make sure 
that the realignment of cyber risk and enterprise risk.” 
Another line of thought on implementation is introduced by Respondent [1]: 
“[We’re] currently in the process of aligning all the risk frameworks more internally 
together. Focus from current way of working to a new way of working, so that makes 
it a little bit difficult, but we see the benefits of it.” 
However, not all findings show that role of alignment is valuable. Some evidence agrees that 
CsM should not align with ERM (19.23%).  
6.2.4.9 Sustainability of CsM and ERM alignment on long-term (Q33)  
Question 33 is a double confirmatory statement. Initially, Q32 questioned if the alignment 
of CsM with ERM has been considered, while at this phase it explores a sustainable approach 
in terms of long-term organisational risk governance. Sustainable alignment is viewed as a 
mechanism that ensures a correlation between strategies and processes (Morrison et al., 
2011).  
 
Figure 6-26 Respondents’ view on CsM and ERM alignment sustainability 
As reflected in Figure 6-26, a double contrasting agreement was identified; 38.46% of 
respondents strongly disagree with the alignment feasibility while another 38.46% agree 
with implementing alignment. A potential explanation of respondent’s resistance to 
alignment might be explained by immature practices regarding ERM and CsM alignment, a 
lack of executive support (Papp et al., 1996), a lack of mutual understanding (Johnson and 
Lederer, 2007) and/or a lack of understanding the alignments’ benefits (Althonayan, Matin 
and Andronache, 2018). Factors thought to be influencing the decision to implement 
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Do you think that a strategic alignment of CsM with ERM is a feasible 





term impact of senior executives on strategic alignment, suggesting continuous enforcement 
and leadership guidance. 
Furthermore, Respondent [25] asserts that they neither agree or disagree: 
“I’d agree with that in the long-term. But it will also be with the fact that there are 
other operational disciplines or legal disciplines of which risk management and 
enterprise risk management sort of strategy need to align as well. So, it’s not just one 
and done. There needs to be other considerations, conduct risks, legal risks, 
operational risks etc.” 
In contrast, to be successful in alignment, Respondent [26] said:  
“Yes, I think from what I’ve seen in the way that various groups interact, there’re a 
lot of positives [signs], there’s a lot of. I suppose cross-fertilisation between groups 
making sure that at the end of the day, that the risk is addressed in the most efficient 
and best way for the organisation.” 
The arguments of Respondent [26] are in line with Respondent [9], who similarly 
emphasises agreement with CsM and ERM alignment.  
6.2.4.10 Overall status of CsM alignment with ERM (Q34) 
The maturity of alignment refers to the degree of implementation, as a result of the 
measurement and value of adoption. ERM is, therefore, objective-centric (Hopkin, 2014) as 
it considers aspects of fostering performance and alignment with an organisation’s 
objectives, respectively their achievement (metric). Table 6-11 examines maturity 
concentration of the sampled organisations. 









Immature Considered but 




19.23% 34.62% 19.23% 11.54% 3.85% 11.54% 
Frequency 
5 9 5 3 1 3 
Table 6-11 provides an overview of sampled organisations. 34.62% of respondents score 
maturity as being somewhat mature, optimised to organisational needs. Interestingly, only 
19.23% score maturity as reaching full maturity (fully optimised). In contrast 19.23% rate 
their organisations as being slightly mature, implemented but not fully integrated. 
Respondent [12] explains maturity in more depth: 
“Very mature in our case. Because any incident that happens on the cyber front or 





Respondent [20] considers their organisation to be mature because risk appetite statement 
comprises cyber risk appetite statements as well as other areas of operational risk. Instead, 
Respondents [8] and [11] describe their organisations’ alignment as being somewhat mature, 
optimised to organisational needs yet not completely optimised to the organisations’ needs. 
In this manner, Respondent [24] states:  
“We are somewhat mature. We’re on a journey because of trying to split that into 
two. It’s the maturity in relation of integration of IS and ERM, yes. Holistically, 
given the domino effect, everyone’s starting to change as this as IS comes into ERM 
and you start connecting the dots. So, everyone’s needs to recalibrate.” 
 
Immature implementation initiation phase is admitted by Respondent [23]: 
“I would say it is still immature. We are in a transitional phase, but I’m not 
completely satisfied with our level of implementation.” 
Respondent [25] explains:  
“We are using some enterprise risk management methodology within our 
cybersecurity approach. I guess we haven’t really considered it, it’s not really been 
attainable yet so… Yes, we [are] neither here nor there.” 
Each of these respondent’s positions make an essential contribution to the appreciation of 
current practices in financial institutions. By the same token, literature emphasises gaps in 
managing their exposure to risks in a more strategic manner (employing all efforts in one 
single scope). 
6.2.4.11 Barriers in implementing CsM and ERM alignment (Q35) 
Undoubtedly misalignment between strategic objectives and business alignment was 
researched by many scholars. The strategic alignment advanced to become a more 
challenging task due to increased impediments (Reynolds and Yetton, 2015). Prior studies 
have noted the importance of alignment through various research mainstreams but research 
regarding CsM and ERM alignment remains scarce. Concerns have been raised as outlined 






Figure 6-27 Inhibitors that hinders alignment of CsM with ERM 
Regarding the question of what hinders alignment, this examination found a key limitation 
of people-centric association meaning that 24.63% of respondents reported concerns related 
to skills, culture or lack of coordination. A higher percentage, governance was mentioned by 
31.87% of respondents, being the second thematic category to influence misalignment. From 
Figure 6-27 key themes were further extracted to confirm the association between the role 
of governance and employees. 
Table 6-12 Key themes acknowledged  
    
Theme Inhibitors   
Governance Organisation cultural deficiencies 
Inappropriate governance 






Employees Employees skills deficiencies 






The main themes identified are related to governance and employees. In view of El-Telbanya 
and Elragalb (2014), any inhibitors can interrelate with each other and are expected to have 
a domino effect towards alignment (mentioned previously as ‘systemic’) (El-Telbanya and 
Elragalb, 2014; Marotta and McShane, 2018). Thus, El-Telbanya and Elragalb stress caution 






















Silo approach /overlap of functions
Heightened regulatory expectations
Unclear policy and risk statements
Organisational cultural deficiencies
Uncorrelated theory with applicability
Inappropriate alignment/low maturity
Preparedness to overcome deficiencies
Uncoordinated efforts of staff involved
Overconfidence in systems and procedures
Inconsistent regulations (national specific vs. global)
The cost of doing it





Despite various research mainstreams (aligning business strategy, IT strategy, IS strategy, 
ERM strategies, operational alignment, infrastructure and process align), commonalities of 
inhibitors and drivers have been identified and are in line with literature.  
For instance, employees’ skills deficiencies (13.04%) is alluded for all workstreams 
(13.04%). Commenting on employees’ skills deficiencies, Respondent [1] argues that: 
“I’ll say lack of understanding the regulations and how it applies. Because it is often 
confusion around what is policy, procedure [and] what is the risk of those elements.” 
As specified in Subsection 4.4.2.2, Chapter Four, a policy is a written statement that 
illustrates how strategic planning is going to be implemented. It is a set of rules that states 
the alignment of purpose, objectives, and guidelines to organisational philosophy, strategy, 
and enabling controls (Chapman, 2011; CESG, 2012). Given the critical role of a policy, it 
is understandable why it can create confusion. 
Another respondent shows consideration for capabilities and performance: 
“Skills, if they don’t have the right people trying to implement and align both things 
then it will never grow. Silo’s approach [is] when people work independently, and 
no one has seen the overall picture and haven’t a clear risk appetite statement.” 
(Respondent [21]). 
The statement of Respondent [21] corresponds with the beliefs that risk appetite is difficult 
to be set (Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017; PwC, 2018). In addition, Respondent [20] 
suggests that employees skills, capabilities, and lastly a shortage of employees all hinder 
alignment: 
“Our biggest challenge, [is] resources…finding the right resource to do the job. 
Personal skills deficiencies is a big thing.” 
These findings are in line with Chan and Reich (2007) and Gerow et al. (2016), among many 
others. Initially focused on reimbursements of benefits, the alignment paradigm advanced 
towards a need of understanding its weaknesses. Luftman (2000) and Henderson and 
Venkatraman (1990, 1993, 1999) were among a few researchers who proposed to identify 
factors of misalignment experienced by organisations. Section 3.5 in Chapter Three and 
Subsection 4.3.3, Chapter Four thoroughly discusses initial research and maturity. Despite 
extensive research in IT-business alignment, IS-business alignment authors such as El-
Telbanya and Elragalb (2014) stress that alignment remains an “unsolved problem”. 
It should be noted that the vast majority of respondents highlighted various components 
(dependable of mainstreams) that may hinder proper alignment. Although in some cases 





and RM Respondent [10], or IS and ERM Respondent [2]), none of them addressed what 
misalignment means. Such various paths for alignment caused current solutions to be 
inconsistent and the empirical findings of this research confirm that executives acknowledge 
some of the inhibitors. 
Additionally, unclear policy and risk statements (disconnected policies) is another factor 
that hinders alignment that applies to all workstreams. Respondent [15] illustrates just how 
vital clarity is:  
“We’re fortunate we don’t have that lack of clarity, but if we didn’t have clarity and 
also strong management commitment to that, then nobody would want to do this 
[alignment]. You just see it as it’s an overhead – ‘I have to do’ – and obviously 
together with that need the right culture. So if the organisational culture is deficient 
and does not have appreciation for risk, then that will not allow risk management 
activities to be effectively carried out.” 
Overall, Respondent [15] provides converging evidence for the relationship (i.e. 
organisational cultural deficiencies with unclear policy and risk statements and strong 
management commitment). Preparedness to overcome deficiencies in implementing CsM 
and ERM alignment depends on the organisation’s vision, interpretation, governance 
engagement, sponsorship/leadership and prioritisation, and the people responsible for the 
alignment. Some participants express the belief that resistance to change or non-acceptance 
of ERM (parallel views with Prioteasa and Ciocoiu, 2017; Merhi and Ahluwalia, 2018), and 
the cost of doing so are among inhibiting factors, (Respondent [9], Respondent [11], and 
Respondent [14]).  
6.2.4.12 Fulfilment of strategic alignment (Q36)  
Deconstructing previous research findings that corroborate alignment purpose, cross-
functional responsibilities, benefits, inhibitors, current maturity, credence, mechanisms in 
place, translation, and alignment theoretical antecedents support the conceptual premises 
that fulfilment of strategic alignment is achievable. Translating strategic objectives into 
practice and the avoidance of parallel activities (duplication) are among many factors that 







Figure 6-28 Key drivers for achieving alignment of CsM with ERM 
Figure 6-28 above presents five main key drivers for achieving alignment. Findings suggest 
continually evaluating/assessing alignment (25.00%) is the main driver, followed by 
recognition for strategy contribution (10.71%), education at every level (10.71%), and 
executive-level support (10.71%). However, 17.86% of respondents’ state that alignment 
does not apply (17.86%). 
Continually evaluating/assessing alignment is recommended by Respondents [7] and [21], 
who encourage the use of policies as metrics and measurements accordingly. Audit challenge 
against objectives and baseline and strategic requirements, self-assessment, direct and 
control verification, and perhaps framework can all be used as a metrics. This view was 
echoed by Respondent [3], who suggested that: 
“I think you need to identify a quantifiable baseline to defined certain risks. I think 
you start with predefining the risk taxonomy and you work up to strategic risk from 
that between risk taxonomy and you work down the operational risks. That scale that 
measurable layer of risk.” 
Moving from assessment, strategy (10.71%) was another key factor mentioned by 
respondents. Respondent [23] thinks that effective alignment is tied by centralising strategy 
and communicating it at the level of the board of directors. In this view, Respondent [8] 
states: 
“Well…, we don’t just write the strategy document and have a lovely cheese and 
wine reception. We actually follow up. We take our cybersecurity strategy that has 
been aligned and we would develop the programme that would deliver that strategy 
for us. And then we reassess every six months to verify if it is still aligned with the 
business strategy.” 
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%






















This needs executive level support. It was felt that executive level support is the only way 
strategic alignment can be achieved (believed by Respondent [4]), while Respondent [18] 
considered that: 
“The first and the most important thing is to work on need and try to show the value 
by having a very close engagement with the executives. The IT leaders have to work 
very closely with the business leaders for each critical business process functions and 
the board has to also champion it.” 
A variety of perspectives was expressed regarding what helps achieve alignment. Four broad 
themes emerged from the analysis: strategy, executive-level support, assessment, and 
education. The four dimensions of alignment are dependable, respectively intellectual 
(strategic), structural, operational, and social. These findings advocate a similar view 
discussed in Subsection 4.4.3, Chapter Four. The majority of prior research has advocated 
the use of one or two dimensions, or a mixture of them. Evidence shows that all four 
dimensions are interrelated, influencing effectiveness of alignment. In the light of reported 
linkage of alignment dimensions, it is conceivable that implementation prescribes the use of 
intellectual (strategic), structural, operational and social approaches, hence them all being 
interrelated. Thus, empirical findings shed new light on industry practices. 
6.2.4.13 Assessment of alignment (Q37) 
Notwithstanding, assessment of alignment comprises in measurement against risk appetite, 
policies, and risk and control assessment as comparable baselines between current 
capabilities, performance, and objectives (Salaheddine and Ilias, 2017). Looking at intrinsic 
risks across organisations and at-risk resiliency, the need to continuously optimise alignment 
is substantiated. 
Table 6-13 Alignment assessment key elements 
Response Relative frequency Frequency 
RM methodology 7.69% 2 
Framework 3.85% 1 
Annual questionnaire 3.85% 1 
Reduction in the number of incidents 3.85% 1 
Capability maturity model 3.85% 1 
Audit  19.23% 5 
Metrics (KRI, KPI) 15.38% 4 
Measured against risk appetite  3.85% 1 
Risk and control assessment 11.54% 3 
Not considered 11.54% 3 
Do not apply 15.38% 4 





Among key drivers reported to support alignment, audit was the highest value (19.23%). An 
emphasis on audit was further advocated by Respondent [9]: 
“I think that if you really want to get a clear picture [of] how well is your risk 
governance, your information security is mapped together, [then] and the only way 
to do that would be to hire an external auditor.” 
However, in contrast with empirical findings, the literature reflect mainly a research 
mainstream of IS and RM alignment. If referring to Deming’s PDCA cycle method (plan-
do-check-act) in assessing alignment, ‘check’ is a general characteristic of available 
theoretical maturity frameworks (Salaheddine and Ilias, 2017). The PDCA cycle is a 
continuous effort to re-align risk oversight. Respondent [11] indicates that: 
“Every time [there] is a re-alignment. There is always an ongoing monitoring and 
full assessment to make sure that it works. So, in that regard, they use performance 
as the base level and do the re-alignment and then remeasure the business efficiency, 
compares with the baseline of what we were doing at the beginning and then see if 
the alignment has optimised the effect of line to the business.” 
Thus, re-alignment depends on metrics. 15.38% indicated that metrics are a scoring 
performance mechanism against the various targets. For instance, Respondent [12] describes 
examples of the scoring mechanism on a scale of one to ten, with traffic light methods, or 
questionnaires. On the other hand, Respondent [24] suggests that a scoring 
mechanism/metric could be anything. 
One unanticipated finding was an endorsement for a specific model for monitoring the 
effectiveness of internal control for the financial industry. Respondents [2], [19], [21], [22], 
and [24] endorsed the Three Lines of Defence Model (referred to as the 8th EU Company 
Law Directive). Similarly, within Section 3.2, Chapter Three, maturity assessment has been 
referred to as measuring maturity of both implementation performance and compliance. 
Conversely, 15.38% of respondents say that they do not apply, and other respondents do not 
even consider such a thing (11.54%); suggesting a lack of alignment enforcement and once 
again emphasising the research gap. 
6.2.4.14 Experts recommendations in implementing CsM alignment with ERM (Q38) 
Returning to the scope of this research, Question 38 is to formulate a link between the initial 
views of respondents and current research in order to facilitate a general reiteration of the 







Table 6-14 Overall recommendations for CsM alignment with ERM 
Themes Words relative 
frequency 
Frequency 
Set robust governance 2.63% 1 
Clear strategy and objective 2.63% 1 
Talking with stakeholders 2.63% 1 
Risk assessment 7.89% 3 
Risk ownership 2.63% 1 
Communication 18.42% 7 
Prioritisation of risks 18.42% 7 
Organisational culture value 7.89% 3 
Education and awareness  7.89% 3 
Understand RM 7.89% 3 
Having the right skills set 2.63% 1 
Budget 2.63% 1 
No company does well 2.63% 1 
Reviewing frameworks 7.89% 3 
Standardisation of risk management  2.63% 1 
Incident scenario 2.63% 1 
Themes=16 =100% T=38 
Among the main recommendations, communication (18.42%) and prioritisation of risks 
(18.42%) received the most consideration. To accomplish these objectives, education and 
awareness are understood to be significant factors for enhancing alignment. The additional 
views of Respondents [5] and [20] provide evidence that senior managers understand the 
implication of the human-element factor that eventually requires education and training. 
Moreover, the results confirm that this is a good choice when combined with clear strategic 
goals, as evoked by Respondent [17]: 
 “Determine the framework and methodology to be used. Train the organisation in a 
way so that it will establish a common language. Set up a structure of risk 
management meetings. Risk manager to run/facilitate periodic meetings. Path to 
escalate risk.” 
Respondent [2] further recommends: 
“I would say to instil risk culture in everyone from their organisation, every single 
employee, everyone should be made a risk manager. Risk shouldn’t be limited to RM 
functions, but we have to create these cultures of risk awareness across all staff.” 
Returning to RM applicability, reviewing frameworks was said to be essential by 
Respondents [3], [25] and [16]. Respondent [16] advocates that: 
“So, I would say framework is number one, appropriate standards and policies in 





are identified for the businesses. Communication and appropriate governance [in 
place], and what I mean by that is adequately reporting and escalating issues, so they 
come up to appropriate levels for senior management attention.” 
Ensuring the support of board and executive management (Respondents [9] and [38]), having 
a strong tone from the top and having a mapping mechanism both support business 
resilience, championing communication and strategic prioritisation of risks. 
6.2.4.15 Risk governance predictions/forecasts (Q39) 
Lastly, Question 39 challenges respondents’ views on risk governance forecasts within their 
organisation over the next five years. A few main themes have been identified, as illustrated 
below in Figure 6-29. 
Figure 6-29 Risk governance predictions main themes  
Some organisations have a much more mature programme, yet alignment is predicted as 
being mature, thus further helping organisations control and mitigate risks. Integration of 
CsM with ERM is predicted to become more integrated and efficient as stated by 
Respondents [11], [15], [19], and [2]. This entails the prediction of increasing awareness 
among both users and organisations, as advocated by Respondents [20] and [24]. Positive 
prediction in changing and improving risk oversight culture is emphasised by Respondent 
[7]: 
“Perhaps in terms of culture shift, we plan to make some changes to ensure 
enterprise-wide awareness and embed it at all levels. Also, automation of functions 
that quantifies the risks to ensure a faster deployment of resources to protect the 
organisation.” 
A further question is whether increased regulatory pressure will entail advancement in risk 


























Another promising line was associated with standards/frameworks driven initiatives 
Respondent [4] believes that: 
“Within my organisation,I think we’ll see more and more departments brought from 
the Board to the usual corporate risk management framework. So, we have this 
management risk function within the company that sets the direction for the whole 
company. Each department has its own local implementation of that corporate 
framework, but we haven’t completed the role out for all departments. So what we 
would do over time is to have more departments for fixing that framework. And they 
will be adopting, hopefully, the same framework that has been set by the top.” 
Respondent [24] claims that more and more automation and machine learning will fill the 
gaps in security, making organisations more agile. In support, Respondent [5] states: 
“I think most companies will continue to invest more in security, in people, in 
infrastructure, in automation.”  
However, in contrast, Respondent [2] believes it will not be always possible to automate 
everything. In leveraging innovation through automation, Respondent [21] argues that: 
“Artificial intelligence (AI) - they are going to be able to do a lot of the basic jobs 
that a risk manager does right now. I see that the role of a risk manager as a human 
will be to collate [by] all those conclusions that the AI is getting. It will change the 
risk management industry I think.” 
No doubt proliferation of various technologies may lead to even more threats, which preside 
an advancement of adversarial sophistication that could trigger further risk oversight 
maturity, thus connecting business capabilities and fostering the development of in-house 
capabilities.  
6.3 Conclusion  
This chapter was designed to determine the rationale of CsM with ERM alignment within 
the financial industry in the context of empirical findings. Grounded in the research question 
“What are the key issues that impede the alignment process in the financial industry 
regarding CsM and ERM”, this chapter collected and analysed empirical data to inquire 
about current maturity and likely solutions. A questionnaire was designed to unfold data of 
ERM, CsM and Alignment understandings from senior executives to ascertain research 
validation. Firstly, an analysis was conducted, focusing on respondents’ and organisations’ 
profiles and aiming to comprehend in much detail the nature of challenges faced by the 
financial industry in which the respondents operate. Secondly, this chapter delved into 





substantiate the research rationale. Thirdly, it researched the cyber risk oversight maturity. 
Lastly and above all, it analysed the strategic alignment of CsM with ERM. 
Qualitative data analysed in this chapter indicates that CsM, ERM and strategic alignment 
have key determinants/drivers as well as inhibitors specific to the financial industry. The 
format of the questions explores positions regarding preparation against risks, the velocity 
of risks, accountability for risk oversight, governance maturity, and willingness to accept 
alignment. Research findings determine that each mainstream (ERM, CsM and Alignment) 
encounters various types of challenges and stages of in implementation.  
In this regard, systematic steps were taken to explore the three paradigms to ensure 
appropriate valuation. Initially, from a total of 39 questions, the first nine appraised 
respondents and organisation profiles, while further themes explored ERM (7 questions), 
CsM (8 questions), and strategic alignment of CsM and ERM (15 questions). Through the 
content of the chapter, respondents report an interest in CsM and ERM alignment. 
Furthermore, an essential finding of the chapter was that respondent’s responses voiced clear 
views that support implementation of alignment for CsM and ERM. Nevertheless, 
respondents seemed concerned that organisations lack a unified mechanism by which they 
can identify, assess, and mitigate both cyber and enterprise risks. On the other hand, the 
overall status of CsM alignment with ERM has been identified as being immature; hence 
existing practices relying on antecedents of alignment (business strategy, IT, IS, RM). 
Findings of this chapter evidence agreement between the interviews’ findings and existing 
research identified in Chapters Two and Three. Overall, it can be concluded, based on 
empirical evidence, that the results of this chapter support the aims of this research. 
Furthermore, findings actively support the research aim of developing a Strategic ERM 
Alignment Framework for addressing key shortcomings. Heightening the arguments of 
literature with empirical evidence, it has been found that the role of RM can no longer act as 
a separate and reactive function. Besides, due to the value proposition, respondents reported 
an interest in CsM and ERM alignment; a fact which reinforces the CsM—ERM Strategic 
Alignment Framework value proposition of effective and holistic risk control. 
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, “What are the key issues 
that impede the alignment process in the financial industry regarding CsM and ERM”, it is 
now possible to attain the relationship between variables: dependables and derivations 





ERM and key organisational dimensions. Drawing on these findings, this chapter streamlines 
a base for the next two chapters and an extension for the research framework. Furthermore, 
the next chapter offers foresight into research value and the findings implication in terms of 
the research framework. This will be followed by an additional chapter (Conclusions) that 




7. Chapter Seven: Discussion  
7.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter reported findings by using the content analysis technique, this 
chapter thematically explores how the perceptions of industry practitioners revolve around 
aggregating answers to the research questions. The research findings identified in Chapter 
Six are further analysed using thematic analysis. Additionally, the findings are compared to 
the existing bodies of literature. Accordingly, the focus of discussion moves from 
‘description’ to ‘interpretation’ of the research findings (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). The 
chapter explores the phenomenon antecedents, determinants, barriers, readiness and capacity 
to sustain risk governance as a core competency for sustainability and efficiency and 
avoiding ripple effects. It uses thematic analysis to explore patterns, themes, uncertainties 
and discrepancies and is focussed on the research questions: 
• Research Question 1: Why does a strategic alignment of CsM and ERM sustain a 
financial business in the long term? 
• Research Question 2: What are the key issues that impede the alignment process in the 
financial industry regarding CsM and ERM? 
• Research Question 3: How are theory, practice and regulation direction applied regarding 
the current alignment of CsM and ERM within the financial industry? 
• Research Question 4: What effects have the implementation of the new framework? 
Following the research questions, this chapter discusses the empirical findings and is 
structured as follows. The first section offers a brief review of thematic analysis implications 
(Section 7.1). Section 7.2, analyses themes that identify main threads across the whole set of 
interviews (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Section 7.3 presents the research findings’ implications 
and Section 7.4 outlines a revised version of the conceptual framework, distilled to leverage 
a new governance framework (both risk control and oversight) that aligns CsM with ERM. 
Lastly, limitations (Subsection 7.4.2) and conclusion (Section 7.5) provide a synthesis of 
findings, demonstrating how the questions of this research were fulfilled. 
7.2 Thematic analysis of research findings 
Relying on the initial findings of content analysis from Chapter Six (descriptive), further, 
the thematic approach develops by systematically and methodologically expanding the 





thematic analysis implies careful consideration for identification of words frequency, 
themes, trends, ideas (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2011). Moving to an interpretative 
phase, such analysis looks beyond word counting, and it aims to understand the focus of 
groups ideas (codes) in themes (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
initial codes that emerged from the interview questions (39 questions = 39 codes) were 
grouped into four main themes. However, a reconsideration for reframing the initially 
identified themes was undertaken and so the first theme, respondent and organisation profile, 
was deemed irrelevant at this phase and therefore remains to be used as an indication. As a 
result, the remaining three themes were decompounded in other sub-themes, apprehended in 
a level two thematic analysis. Henceforth content analysis represented Level One of coding 
research findings, the initial synthesises was undertaken with NVivo, a qualitative software. 
NVivo provided support in the first phase to organise systematic views, shown in a mind-
map (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2011; Ciesielska and Jemielniak, 2017). Accordingly, 
the Researcher conveyed core patterns and identifying patterns, similarities, differences, and 
connections in the context of the research questions (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017). However 
as indicated by Clarke and Brown (2013), as thematic analysis means more than coding, and 
thus extracting themes from previous interview questions seemed insufficient. The format 
may only lead to summarised data (descriptive coding) instead of synthesised and examined 
data. Therefore, the Researcher also applied her own judgement in organising the themes 
while considering any significance outlined by respondents. For clarity, thematic analysis is 
a general and abstract concept while a code is specific and related to a specific issue 
(Williamson and Whittaker, 2017); thus, a theme contains at least two codes. Therefore, 
initial coding themes (Level One) were distinguished and revised accordingly. Table 7-1 
captures synthesised interview findings corroborated in codes respectively and a codebook 
from which further sub-themes are extracted (Level Two). Such an approach is defined by 
Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2011) as an ‘applied thematic analysis’ technique. 
Table 7-1 Level One (content analysis) versus Level Two (thematic analysis) 
 Level One (Chapter Six) 
Initial codes encoded from interview 
questions (Codebook) 
Level Two (Chapter Seven) 
Sub-themes and categories generated 
Theme 1 Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity  
Q10 Preparation against risks Sub-theme 1: ERM Baseline expectations 
Category One: ERM determinants  
• Strategic governance 
• Differentiation-centric 
• Risk resiliency 
Q11 Velocity of risks 
Q12 Department responsible 
Q13 Risk governance maturity 
Q14 Risk governance role 





Q16 Main inhibitors Category Two: ERM reimbursement 
• Internally 
• Externally 





Category Three: ERM readiness 
• Risk Oversight  
Theme 2 Cyber Risk Oversight Maturity  
Q17 Department responsible Sub-theme 2:  CsM Baseline expectations 
Category One: CsM determinants 
• Internal 
• External 
Category Two: CsM Reimbursement 
• Performance 
Category Three: CsM Inhibitors 
• People-centric 
• Strategic-centric 
Category Four: CsM Readiness 
Q18 Main determinants 
Q19 Main inhibitors 
Q20 Cyber incident handling 
Q21 Unwanted effects 
Q22 Industry framework 
Q23 ROI 
Q24 Board expectations 
Theme 3 Strategic Alignment  
Q25 Department communication Sub-theme 3: Establishment of strategic 
directions  
Category One: Strategic Alignment 
Reimbursement  
• Determination 
• Benefits  
• Potential reimbursements 
Category Two: Inhibitors  
• Governance 
• Employees 
Category Three: Alignment Readiness 
• Maturity 
Category Four: Prospect 
• Potential 
• Alignment fulfilment 
Q26 Risk handling 
Q27 Practical alignment 
Q28 Aligned strategies 
Q29 Unified strategy mechanism 
Q30 Strategic alignment 
Q31 Alignment benefits 
Q32 Alignment applicability 
Q33 Alignment feasibility 
Q34 Alignment maturity 
Q35 Alignment inhibitors 
Q36 Alignment achievement 
Q37 Alignment assessment 
Q38 Implementation recommendations 
Q39 Practice forecast 
 
Table 7-1 depicts a thematic map of research findings with main themes initially identified 
in Chapter Six, respectively Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity (1), Cyber Risk Oversight 
Maturity (2), and Strategic Alignment (3). An emphasis of sub-themes and categories are 
further delved into in order to establish implications. Consequently, the sections below 
discuss the research findings in context of additional theoretical contribution of literature.  
7.2.1 Theme 1: Enterprise risk oversight maturity 
This theme partially addresses the research question of why ERM sustains a financial 
business in the long-term (Research Question 1). The sub-themes underpin determinants, 





explore the importance of enterprise risk oversight maturity further. An overview of each 
sub-theme is described below. 
7.2.1.1 Sub-theme 1: ERM baseline expectations 
This sub-theme emphasises what the baseline expectations are, so ERM strengthens the 
value of strategy and objectives across an organisation (Fraser and Simkins, 2016). The 
relevance of each sub-theme is conceived accordingly with the empirical results. 
Category One: ERM determinants 
Research findings conceive that the main determinant factors to implement ERM are 
strategic governance, differentiation-centric, and risk resiliency. Most often, literature refers 
to determinants as the benefits of adopting ERM principles (Zéghal and El Aoun, 2016). 
However, for the purpose of this research, the term ‘determinants’ is used interchangeably 
with ‘benefits’. 






a) Strategic governance (45.16%) 
i. Governance was reported by 17.74% of respondents as being a determinant of 
ERM. These results support the view that the role of governance is essential for 
achieving organisational goals and strategy (Gheorghe, 2011). It has been noted 
that the relevance of governance is supported by current findings and in line with 
both academics’ and practitioners’ views. Evidence of literature argues that the 
role of governance became even more critical after regulator’s intervention post-
effects of GFC of 2008 and corporate scandals. Organisational failures evidenced 
weakness in the risk governance of certain organisations (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2017; McShane, 2018; Rubino, 2018). Failures in 
implementing adequate and sustainable solutions to address risk have demanded 
organisations to change their attitude and behaviour to risks and incorporate RM 
into overall organisational governance planning and thus strengthen their 
Category One: ERM determinants 
a) Strategic governance Governance 
Strategy 
Prioritisation 
b) Differentiation-centric Competitive advantage 
Value 







capability to identify and mitigate risks (McShane, 2018; Viscelli, Hermanson 
and Beasley, 2018). As a result, risk control function became insufficient and 
shifted to governance principle so as to ensure that ERM addresses all portfolios 
of risk, ensuring accountability, delegated responsibility, and well-defined 
structure regarding how decisions are taken (Dabari, Kwaji and Ghazali, 2017; 
McShane, 2018). Likewise, PwC (2018a) brings into focus the role of governance 
as a core concept to link ERM with organisational strategy, governing both risk 
oversight and in-depth management/control of risk, and harnessing governance.  
Another line of thought on governance demonstrates that it incorporates values, 
beliefs, rules, and practices, which represent constructs of Institutional Theory 
(see Subsection 4.2.2, Chapter 4) (Aguilera, Judge and Terjesen, 2018). 
Moreover, Aguilera, Judge, and Terjesen (2018) emphasise that prevailing 
literature focuses more on successful risk governance and less on deviance from 
governance. 
Consequently, governance is a strategic approach that controls and directs an 
organisation towards achieving its strategic goals (Gheorghe, 2011) as well as 
ensuring that the right mechanism is in place (Nason and Fleming, 2018). 
Literature highlights that risk governance is applied through policies and 
procedures that delegate accountability, define overall structure, and allocate 
resources for addressing risks (Gheorghe, 2011). Thus, the strength of such an 
approach is that it sets the ‘tone’; it dictates direction and ensures that risk control 
and oversight are understood and continuously reinforced (COSO, 2017). 
Therefore, governance defines, incorporates, and delegates risk control, risk 
oversight, and strategic risk planning (strategies, objectives, appetite, planning, 
structure, processes, capabilities, competencies, and risk culture) to serve 
organisational mission and vision in a unified manner (Althonayan, Matin and 
Andronache, 2018). This view is also emphasised by Respondents [24] and [25] 
in the initial research findings; and thus, governance is an archway that bridges 
departmental silos into a central risk governance tool (Frigo and Anderson, 
2011). In short, the strength of risk governance is that it translates strategy into 
actions and orchestrate its holistic applicability to cross-functional structures, 
rules, processes, culture, accountability, and necessary control to govern 





ii. Prioritisation of risks refers to effective strategic prioritisation that is driven 
by organisational strategy that states the risk appetite and compiles risk 
assessment of top priorities (Lam, 2017; Iswajuni, Manasikana and Soetedjo, 
2018). With reference to the research findings identified, prioritisation was 
highlighted to be a determinant of ERM in the proportion of 22.58%. Likewise, 
previous studies often suggested that for strategic and operational efficiency, 
prioritisation of risks is expected to be undertaken out of departments’ self-
interest. This means that prioritisation is expected to be made based on severity 
in an enterprise-wide context and in accordance with the organisation’s overall 
risk appetite, rather than in the siloed perception of each department (COSO, 
2017). In short, effective ERM sustains and oversees the management of 
priorities in managing risks (EY, 2017). However, the low levels observed in this 
investigation (22.58%) may be explained by the fact that ERM determinants are 
multiple (previously delineated in Table 2-1, Section 2.4, Chapter Two). 
b) Differentiation-centric (11.28%) 
Overseeing performance constitutes in view of COSO (2017) integration of ERM with 
business strategy. ISO 19011:2018 (BSI, 2018b) presents the view that performance is a 
‘measurable result’. However, the differentiation-centric category comprises of two 
elements, competitive advantage and value creation that demonstrate ERM 
differentiation through performance effects. 
i. Competitive advantage was identified to be a differentiation factor brought about 
by ERM implementation in percentage of 4.84%. This finding is in line with Yang, 
Ishtiaq and Anwar (2018), which confirms that ERM competitive advantage is 
associated with performance. This also agrees with earlier findings of literature 
review (see Section 2.8, Chapter 2), which demonstrate ERM’s influence over the 
long-term. This is consistent with the industry’s view that outlines the capabilities of 
an organisation as being the differentiation factor for gaining the competitive 
advantage (KPMG, 2017b; PwC, 2018). Consistent with prior literature, research 
findings confirm that ERM positively influences the achievement of organisational 
objectives (Roslan et al., 2017; Shad et al., 2018; Farrel and Gallagher, 2019). 
Furthermore, the effect of performance determines a competitive advantage that 
produces value (Farrel and Gallagher, 2019). Additionally, a competitive advantage 
can represent a ‘measurement technique’ of valuating the impact effectiveness of 





ii. Value was identified to be the second factor of ERM differentiation. The empirical 
findings highlight that ERM performance leads to value creation (6.44%). This 
finding broadly supports the view of prior literature which calls into question value 
as one of the roles of ERM, anticipating that impact of ERM performance leads to 
value creation/proposition for an organisation (Lechner and Gatzert, 2017; Shad et 
al., 2018; Silva, da Silva and Chan, 2019; Iswajuni, Manasikana and Soetedjo, 2018; 
Li, 2018). In the recent years, the valuation implications of ERM have been 
recognised as an approach that helps create, preserve, and maximise shareholder 
value (KPMG, 2017b; Majdalawieh and Gammack, 2017; Bohnert et al., 2019; Shad 
et al., 2018; Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018). Moreover, it provides capabilities of 
strategic planning to examine, measure, and deter risks continuously (Bohnert et al., 
2019). ERM’s goal is to unify siloed functions into holistic risk governance 
(Lundqvist and Vilhelmsson, 2016; Farrel and Gallagher, 2019). Hence, governance 
guides organisational behaviour, both internally and externally and maintains 
organisational direction when achieving its objectives (BSI, 2018a). Thus, ERM 
facilitates value creation for an organisation by duplication avoidance, coordination 
of silos, reduced risks, holistic risk portfolio management, creation of risk 
transparency for boards supporting decision-making, risk insight insurance, and 
stronger risk culture and optimisation, and return on investment (ROI), among many 
others (COSO, 2017; Lechner and Gatzert, 2017; Farrel and Gallagher, 2019). Even 
so, organisations struggle to extract the entire value that ERM can deliver (PwC, 
2018). To ensure that potential risks are limited in affecting the strategy execution 
and objectives achievement, ERM manages risk under the setting of strategy (PwC, 
2018; Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017). Thus, the value element is contingent 
with the strategy element. 
To conclude, the research findings assert two main strands: competitive advantage and value 
creation. A possible explanation for these results may be because effective ERM aligns with 
organisational strategy and thus enables performance (COSO, 2017). Likewise, BSI (2018a) 
emphasises value creation and protection. Consequently, it leads to a competitive advantage 
which in the end brings value to the organisation as well as maturity. It can, therefore, be 
assumed that once performance is achieved through ERM, competitive advantage and value 
creation are the projected outcome, determining an effective and sustainable ERM. 





effects: effectiveness ─ resiliency ─ value creation ─ competitive advantage ─ compliance 
─ risk strategy sustainability ─ risk foresight ─ organisational objectives achievement. 
Resiliency (43.56%) 
In addition to benefits as a performance enhancement and strategic governance, ERM is also 
implemented for resiliency achievement. Research findings indicated that resiliency is 
among ERM’s determinants. In addition to the provision of resiliency, literature associates 
the strategic approach with agility (Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018). This means that 
organisations which integrate ERM principles in their overall strategy become more agile in 
dealing with risk. To follow, the category of resilience was identified as having three main 
elements: control, compliance, and knowledge. 
i. Control is the first category of resiliency sub-theme. Risk control function was 
identified as having a frequency of 14.52%. Additionally, the evidence confirmed 
that ERM as a risk control function is expected to be a function with shared 
responsibility. This finding demonstrates that ERM is perceived through the 
lenses of traditional RM, hence ERM comprising of both control and strategic 
risk oversight function.  
ii. Compliance requirement relates to mandatory regulatory guidelines, and 
industry-specific refers to voluntary actions that advocate the adoption of ERM. 
Compliance reimbursement was indicated in percentage of 14.52%. Therefore, 
the GFC of 2008 determines reconsideration of the siloed practice of the 
traditional RM approach. Financial institutions in the USA were required to 
demonstrate higher due diligence (Whitman, 2015; Althonayan, Matin and 
Andronache, 2018). Either regulators, rating agencies, public authorities, or 
industry norms and compliance for implementing ERM pointed towards an 
increased expectation for integrated management of risks (Boromiley et al., 
2015; Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017; Anton, 2018). Due to increased 
expectations for risk governance, ERM is perceived by some as an assurance 
function (Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017) (for further details see Section 
2.4, Chapter Two). 
iii. Knowledge refers to cross-domain risk knowledge within an organisation, 
respectively departments. Similar to the control and compliance category, it 





earlier studies, which articulated the importance of cross-domain risk knowledge 
as a shared knowledge for risk functions/business units (Majdalawieh and 
Gammack, 2017). Additionally, Kerstin, Simone, and Nicole (2014) understand 
that cross-domain knowledge can be open to interpretation, and thus it is expected 
that for an effective ERM, a knowledge should be agreed; things such as risk 
glossary, definitions, risk assessment, RM methodology, and the significance of 
organisational risk shall be under a holistic guideline (Kerstin, Simone and 
Nicole, 2014). 
In short, the control, compliance, and knowledge categories demonstrate that in practice 
there is a tendency towards strategy governance, performance, differentiation centric, and 
risk resiliency hardening. Likewise, COSO’s definition is confirmatory to some degree with 
research findings and compounds many elements altogether:   
“The culture, capabilities, and practices, integrated with strategy-setting and 
performance, that organisations rely on to manage risk in creating, preserving, and 
realising value” (COSO, 2017). 
Furthermore, the next category looks at ERM inhibitors that impede either adoption and/or 
implementation. 
Category Two: ERM reimbursement 
This category compounds the rationale of implementing ERM, respectively the positive 
reimbursement as an effect of implementation. 






a) Internally (42.87%) 
i. Culture (8.57%) was found to be a direct effect on execution of ERM due to 
potential positive effect in shaping the organisational risk behaviours as well as 
positively impacting decisions (Selamat and Ibrahim, 2018). In the same vein, 
COSO 2016 defines ERM as being dependent on “culture, capabilities, and 
practices” (COSO, 2016; Bohnert et al., 2019). Additionally, the risk awareness 
Category Two: ERM reimbursement 
 










was found as an additional indirect component of culture being influential on 
organisational effectiveness (Braumann, 2018). 
ii. Shareholders’ requirements is indicated by 7.14% o respondents as being an 
ERM effect that fulfils shareholders requirements, ensuring capture and 
enhancement of shareholder value (Majdalawieh and Gammack, 2017; Saedi et 
al., 2018).  
b) Externally (57.15%) 
i. Regulatory requirements were found to be a significant reimbursement (30.00%) 
when organisations discern proper practice for risk oversight. Moreover, thus, 
this finding is in line with prior research that articulate that ERM seems ‘induced’ 
by regulations because it is assumed that governance failures can have ripple 
effects on other industries (Kauspadiene et al., 2017; Sax and Andersen, 2018). 
ii. Competition (10.00%) was identified to be a second external reimbursement for 
organisations. Apart from driving good practices, the financial landscape 
complexity dynamic drives implementing ERM which creates assurance for due 
diligence. 
Category Three: ERM inhibitors  
This category implies factors that inhibit or undermine the achievement of organisational 
strategy, organisational robustness, and the sustainability of ERM (EY, 2017). The main 
categories identified are referring to internal inhibitors (resources, direction, capability) and 
external pressure. Internal and external inhibitors can determine alterations in how an 
organisation manages risks.  
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Internal pressure (42.87%) 
a) Recourses 
In the expectation of resiliency, performance, and competitive advantage, most 
organisations are driven to invest tangible and intangible resources (Yang, Ishtiaq and 
Anwar, 2018). However, a limitation or lack of resources is an inhibitor of ERM. 
i. Cost was evidenced by findings and relates to the implied costs of implementing 
and maintaining ERM. Respondents have stated that cost can inhibit risk 
practices. Underpinning a cost-effective investment for security was a general 
agreement among respondents, even though some respondents argued that 
receiving the expected investment was not always in balance with organisational 
needs. Comparing with prior research, literature has referred to additional aspects 
of cost, for example, an interest in gaining more return by lowering compliance 
costs and an opportunity to have the right risk oversight strategy in place (Mensah 
and Gottwald, 2016). Hereafter ERM plays an important role in business 
decisions, because it aims to avoid loss as well as optimise and even reduce cost. 
Protiviti’s (2018) survey has similar findings when referring to the cost of 
implementing risk control, and it additionally referred to cost regarding 
compliance, marginal cost, and maintenance cost. In contrast, this research found 
limited evidence for compliance costs, converging mainly to the cost of 
implementation. 
ii. Data and Information refers to the quality of data as well as communicating 
information are challenging when department lack of collaboration and sharing 
information (Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 2014). The impact of data/information 
quality is an outcome enunciated by research findings (7.04%). Commenting on 
poor, incorrect, or incomplete data as inhibitors of ERM, several authors 
(Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017) articulate that such drawback can affect 
decision-making. Even so, the role of ERM is to deliver enhanced and improved 
information for strategic decisions due to its capability to view risks holistically 
(Hopkins, 2018).  Another finding that emerged from the research findings is 
reporting. Likewise, the guide of ISO 31000: 2018 emphasises the importance of 
quality in reporting as a pillar in placing oversight and controls (BSI, 2018a). For 





inclusive communication may suggest that value creation of information is 
unreachable and is incompletely addressed (BSI, 2018a).  
iii. People represent another key element in deploying decisions related to risks 
(Craig, 2018) and have been reported by respondents as being an inhibitor in 
deploying ERM. Regardless of preparation, training, or background, it has been 
reported that often failures are dependable on people. These findings are in line 
with literature, which specifies that people-related risks are intentionally or 
intentionally related to people’s actions (Craig, 2018). Accordingly, people-
related risk covers lines of responsibility, accountability, and risk knowledge; all 
of which are required for synchronising various elements such as people with 
processes and processes and tools (Majdalawieh and Gammack, 2017). People-
related risks are a common challenge for organisations. Firstly, a risk is when 
allocating people as a resource (ISO 31000: 2018) and secondly, when the risk 
of loss is due to the way individuals perceive severity of risks as well as how 
decisions or non-decisions are made by individuals (Blacker and McConnell, 
2015). Therefore, people as a factor can inhibit the effectiveness of ERM, either 
by an unlawful, unscrupulous, inappropriate, or unsuitable line of actions in their 
daily activities. This makes reference again to well-known cases of GFC of 2008 
when decisions were influenced by cognitive biases, over-confidence, or 
negligence, and lead to substantial losses (Blacker and McConnell, 2015). Given 
this example, risk perception is demonstrated to be different for most individuals; 
and thus, decisions related to risks are often based on individual’s judgement and 
understanding of risks, respectively perceived level of risk (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2017). 
iv. Skills refer to a lack of in-house skills or limited skills sufficient for fulfilling 
requirements of risk functions. The evidence demonstrated that 23.94% of 
inhibitors are people-centric in terms of capabilities (skills set, lack of education, 
communication, culture). Briefly, the respondents outlined that a lack of skills 
set affects the ability to understand what risks are and their consequences, thus 
affecting the deployment of a suitable solution. Given this orientation, a lack of 
skilled employees adds additional difficulties for organisations in deploying 
appropriate security risk control and risk oversight and consequently leads to 







i. Strategy was reported by respondents as being another inhibitor (4.23%). 
Evidence shows that a lack of appropriate strategy influences the overall direction 
of an organisation. Strategy is a concept that refers to a business strategy, and it 
delimitates the purpose and intent of what an organisation intends to reach 
(Hopkin, 2018). It is a written statement of intent and how that intention shall be 
reached through planning (Kaplan and Norton, 2003). ERM plays an essential 
role in strategy achievement hence its principles being governed by enterprise-
wide alignment ensuring achievement of objectives in pursuit of strategy, thus 
being strategy-execution focused (COSO, 2017; Viscelli, Hermanson and 
Beasley, 2018; Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018). 
ii. Leadership refers to senior management support for coordinating and 
integrating arrangements to manage risks (BSI, 2018a). To accomplish 
leadership, levels of direction, control, and guidance for managing risks are 
deployed through authority, responsibility, and accountability (BSI, 2018a). By 
this means leadership also emphasises the commitment of executives in 
supporting ERM (Selamat and Ibrahim, 2018). Consequently, a lack of 
leadership is seen as a mismanagement and was reported by respondents as being 
an inhibitor in achieving ERM. There is still a lot to learn about why traditional 
RM is characterised by its lack of leadership, minimal oversight, and thus isolated 
silos practices (Slagmulder and Devoldere, 2018). The answer is that leadership 
support is identified as being a performance driver. In this respect, findings are 
in agreement with literature, which shows that the top-down approach supports 
ERM. The leadership element is interrelated with the communication element 
being communicated through a top-down approach. 
c) Capability 
i. Maturity concerns were raised by Respondents when referred to RM/ERM 
maturity function. A closer look at research findings indicated that handling and 
implementing risk controls is more challenging when an organisation’s functions 
are immature and decentralised. Respondents also emphasised an understanding 
of alignment in the context of business strategy. A similar view was also 
emphasised by literature, indicating ERM immaturity (Kerstin, Simone and 





maturing ERM practice, thus considered a developmental phase (Agarwal and 
Ansell, 2016). 
ii. Culture  
ERM culture is a category related to both organisational governance capability, 
an element that can be influenced by leadership and commitment of executives 
and also ethical values, rules behaviour, and understanding (COSO, 2017; BSI, 
2018a). In addition to external risk, internal issues are another aspect of 
uncertainty (Firsova and Vaghely, 2018). A lot of the current literature refers to 
culture as being a risk that implies cultural issues related to formal and informal 
constraints in an organisational context (Firsova and Vaghely, 2018) defined by 
some as institutional (see Subsection 4.2.2, Chapter 4). In fact, tackling risk 
culture was found to be a significant barrier because it implies a cultural change 
brought by ERM and in context of organisational culture (Kimbrough and 
Componation, 2009; Viscelli, Hermanson and Beasley, 2017; Prioteasa. and 
Ciocoiu; 2017) The human aspect and cultural elements (e.g. language, beliefs, 
behaviour, values, communication, informal norms, and ethics) can inhibit 
effective implementation of ERM if resilience to change exists (Kimbrough and 
Componation, 2009). On the other hand, some authors outline that risk culture 
should be part of the overall strategic planning (Firsova and Vaghely, 2018; 
Selamat and Ibrahim, 2018). Another point to consider is that respondents 
indicated that one aspect of internal culture is when employees speak the 
language of the business unit and make critical decisions and are successful in 
managing risk. 
Lack of education and awareness is another issue part of ERM culture that 
influences the effectiveness of ERM implementation. Evidence outlines that the 
role of education is interlinked with the risk culture and thus goes beyond a 
descriptive meaning because it interrelates with other factors that influence the 
effectiveness of ERM. In particular, skills and knowledge are seen by 
practitioners as a way of embedding ERM (Tower Watson, 2010; PwC, 2015). 
Education is therefore considered essential for implementing and instilling ERM. 
Youngberg (2010) explains that education starts from the top, so both 
management executives and employees must be knowledgeable. 





i. Risks and Threats refers to emerging risks and their velocity that concern 
respondents. The notion of risks and threats are described as increased in 
complexity and type. Practitioners also mention this, with the perception that 
managing risks is becoming more challenging (AICPA, 2018). To this end, 
organisations encounter various indeterminate conditions which relate to 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) (Deloitte, 2017; 
Iswajuni, Manasikana and Soetedjo, 2018). As evidenced in the interview data, 
61.54% self-diagnosticated velocity of risk as medium—within an acceptable 
tolerance. Much has been written about the vital importance of managing risk 
with acceptable risk appetite and tolerance. In contrast, prior findings states that 
the rise in emerging risks means that risk continually changes and organisations 
struggle (see Practitioners’ viewpoint, Section 2.4, Chapter 2). 
ii. Standardised practice was suggested as a benchmark for being a pressure for 
following good risk practice. Either in the form of standards or frameworks, 
respondents indicated that bureaucratic implications represent an additional 
burden (5.63%). 
iii. Regulations category refers to mandatory compliance (pressure) on 
organisations. While industry requirements are voluntary to some degree, 
regulations in their nature are mandatory demands/expectations of conformity. 
Evidence found by empirical data shows that for some organisations it is difficult 
to attain complete compliance. Evidence has demonstrated that it is becoming 
difficult to reach compliance, and thus, some respondents even indicated 
regulatory fatigue in reaching compliance. Likewise, a lot of academic literature 
expresses concern that ERM is being seen as merely demonstrating compliance 
(Youngberg, 2010). Nevertheless, global expansion has brought a higher 
necessity to both international regulations and local regulation (Khan, Hussain 
and Mehmood, 2016). Noticeably, this finding relates to Institutional Theory, 
respectively with the coercive isomorphism that outlines the effects of regulatory 
pressure on organisations (see Subsection 4.2.2, Chapter 4). 
Category Four: ERM readiness (maturity) 
On the whole, this category refers to the level of ERM risk oversight maturity.  
a) Risk Oversight 





Evidence shows that most respondents ponder whether security maturity is 
proactive. The findings shed an optimistic light regarding proactive risk 
oversight. However, RM (Interview question 12) remains one of the most 
significant names among managerial components/departments (declared by 
34.62% of respondents), while ERM is preferred by 15.38%, and Operational 
Risk Management by 7.69%. In contrast to evidence which presents the view that 
the security maturity curve is high, an alternative perspective of prior research 
illustrates that despite many efforts, ERM remains immature (see Section 3.6, 
Chapter 3). Drawing on a strategic perspective, the findings demonstrate maturity 
implementation regarding sampled organisations (38.46%). As predicted, 
consideration for risk governance evolved but is partially implemented across 
units/departments. The findings prompt a re-thinking of the status quo of risk 
governance maturity. The findings show that siloed practices of RM remain 
embedded in security practices.  
7.2.2 Theme 2: Cyber risk oversight maturity 
Theme 2 is structured in a sub-theme and four additional categories: determinants, 
reimbursement, inhibitors, and readiness. 
7.2.2.1 Sub-theme 2:  CsM baseline expectations 
Category One: CsM determinants 
This section presents main determining factors to implement CsM, with reference to internal 
and, external implications. 






a) Internal pressure (40.81%) 
i. Initiative refers to organisations’ own initiative to proactively initiate CsM adoption. 
Evidence shows that initiative taken by the organisation’s board is a determinant 
(14.29%). 






b)  External 
 







ii. Culture in the context of internal culture was indicated as being the second 
determinant for CsM adoption (10.20%) because of various security human-related 
failures. It is believed that cultivation of risk culture is a way of influencing behaviour 
and attitudes among individuals within an organisation (Nasir et al., 2019). Thus, 
cybersecurity culture aims to change the mindset towards awareness of risks among 
employees as well as adherence to internal policies (ENISA, 2017). In addition to the 
generic research findings, the literature emphasises different dimensions of culture 
that overlap, either behaviour, perception, assumptions, knowledge, commitment, 
accountability, awareness, attitude, communication, norms, responsibilities, or 
values (Korovessis et al., 2017; ENISA, 2017; Nasir et al., 2019). All of the 
aforementioned are believed to be influenced by artefacts (procedures) and exposed 
values (guidelines) (von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013). Previous studies have based 
their criteria on selecting a few elements and have articulated either a top-down 
approach or mid-level approach (operational) while some other studies focused more 
on awareness and emphasised a bottom-up approach. Specifically, for this research, 
culture determinants refer to overall, strategically driven cybersecurity culture. To 
keep pace with cybersecurity challenges some authors contend a need for an 
institutionalised cybersecurity culture that standardises everything (von Solms and 
van Niekerk (2013). This relates to Subsection 4.2.3, Chapter Four, which considers 
the implications of Institutional Theory. 
b) External pressure (59.18%) 
i. Cyber threats’ velocity and complexity are one of the main reasons stipulated by 
respondents. The relative frequency for this determinant was 16.33%. Over the past 
two decades, major advances in cyber threats were reported by the industry as being 
a designated effect. Moreover, it is believed that cyber risk poses significant 
challenges for most organisations (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
ii. Regulatory pressure is a second external determinant identified with a relative 
frequency of 14.29%. Regulation as a driver is described by literature as influencing 
investments for internal control as well as influencing the risk oversight transparency 
and the disclosure of practices (Gordon et al., 2018). This finding overlaps with the 
literature emphasised in Regulators’ viewpoint, Section 2.6, Chapter Two and 
Subsection 3.4.3, Chapter Three. 
iii. Standards were referred by research findings as being a blended approach (31%). 





of standards and frameworks and/or create their own frameworks. Most prevalent 
were ISO 27000 series, COBIT and NIST cybersecurity frameworks. As some 
respondents stated (e.g. Respondent [18]) it uses standards as a point of reference 
and refers to them as main guidance, even though is being ‘customised’. Little 
literature refers to mixed/custom approaches that sustained a tailored oversight for 
organisational needs and capabilities even though it is believed that a customised 
approach is easy to implement (Talabis and Martin, 2012).  
Category Two: CsM reimbursement  
While the previous category referred to what determines CsM, this category refers to the 
benefits of implementation. Thus, reimbursement category is performance-centric and refers 
to key benefits of implementing CsM. Among reimbursements, evidence articulates five 
main benefits, as set below. 





a) Performance (100%) 
i. Compliance (24.00%) is again indicated, however in this case it is reported as a 
benefit/reimbursement. 
ii. Competitive advantage (20.00%) is indicated as being an effect of implementing 
CsM. Competitive advantage is found to be a cascade effect of all the other categories 
(e.g. performance, resilience, compliance). Competitive advantage was seen in terms 
of revenue and profits, the achievement of organisational targets. 
iii. Resilience (20.00%) has an equal value with competitive advantage. In establishing 
resilience, it is well known that leadership plays an important role hence both strategy 
and culture are dependable as well as tactic oriented (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
The findings of this research identified that resilience is among the expected 
reimbursement of implementing CsM. Hence resiliency is driven from the top, 
aligning strategy of cybersecurity with organisational strategy, and is a 
recommended approach that proactively acknowledges of responsibilities, 
integration, risk appetite, resilience planning, or assessment of effectiveness in order 





competitive advantage  
resilience  





to ensure the long-term sustainability of organisational strategy. Within literature, it 
is recognised that apart from being led from the top, resiliency is also a shared 
responsibility within an organisation (World Economic Forum, 2017). The empirical 
findings demonstrate that the benefits of applying effective risk oversight are 
recognised among respondents as being valuable. 
iv. Organisational effectiveness (14.00%) implies mapping results of security 
measures against the overall organisational strategy and objectives achievement 
(Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008). A significant trait of effectiveness is that it 
defines the effectiveness of the relationship between two or more variables. In this 
regard, Contingency Theory identifies prerequisites of effectiveness (see Subsection 
4.2.1, Chapter 4). Additionally, evidence shows that measuring the reimbursement 
of CsM respective effectiveness has a positive effect as it endorses results and 
recommends security needs (e.g. IASME framework, Subsection 4.3.2.2.1, Chapter 
4). 
Category Three: CsM inhibitors  
The below category emphasises main CsM inhibitors in order to understand what issues 
should be addressed in an organisation environment. 






a) People-centric (35.82%) 
i. Culture is a CsM inhibitor that is people-centric. Considering that the culture of 
an organisation emphasises different dimensions that overlap (previously 
discussed in CsM reimbursement Subsection 7.2.2.1), it is clear that it 
encompasses a multitude of components. For instance, the research findings 
identified that only 7.46% appreciated as effecting CsM. However, if based on 
previously discussed dimensions of culture, awareness and skills (knowledge) 
are recognised to be part of cybersecurity culture. Thus, a lack of awareness was 
agreed by 17.91% of respondents. Additionally, 10.45% of respondents believe 
that a lack of employees’ competencies (skills and knowledge) affect 














implementation. To understand the role of culture, this category encompasses 
both a lack of awareness and a lack of skills, and thus it represents subcategories, 
respectively dimensions of cybersecurity culture (Korovessis et al., 2017; 
ENISA, 2017; Nasir et al., 2019), and not disparate concepts as had previously 
been understood by respondents.  
b)     Strategic centric (22.39%) 
i. Cost, 11.94% agreed that the cost of implementation inhibits CsM. Literature 
emphasises that there is a tendency for organisations to underinvest due to the 
latency of results about uncertainty of the likelihood of a cost being associated 
with a breach of security (Gordon et al., 2018). One possible explanation for 
mistrust is because cybersecurity investments generate cost avoidance instead of 
revenue (Gordon et al., 2018). 
ii. Silos, 10.45% of respondents mention silo approaches and silo strategies as 
impeding CsM. Similar findings were signalled by literature in Subsection 3.5.1, 
Chapter Three. 
Category Four: CsM Readiness 
The corresponding results of CsM readiness refers to how well a department is managing 
the risk within risk appetite, and what the current position (risk profile and tolerance) is 
in terms of readiness. A lack of maturity was reported by respondents to have three main 
side effects have been identified: reputational loss (24%), regulatory consequences 
(17.33%), and financial loss (16%). Given the fragmented management related to 
cybersecurity, this category is unable to provide specific data of respondents’ estimations. 
Instead, this aspect is discussed and evaluated further in Subsection 6.2.4, through alignment 
lenses. 
7.2.3 Theme 3: Strategic alignment 
This section describes the main categories identified for strategic alignment. Understanding 
the root of strategic risks and how they can affect business objectives is a key scope of this 
section. Research findings articulate how key risks are being managed and where these key 
controls are located across an organisation. A re-frame/realignment for an effective and 
integrated assurance plan for both risk control and risk oversight was suggested by some 
authors in a bid to reach holistic risk governance (Althonayan, Matin and Andronache, 





strategic alignment sub-theme and five categories deconstructed in reimbursement, 
inhibitors, readiness, potential and alignment fulfilment. 
7.2.3.1 Sub-theme 3: Establishment of strategic directions of alignment 
To tackle establishment of strategic alignment, the research findings of this section are 
aligned with two research objectives (Research Objective 2 and Research Objective 4). 
Category One: Alignment Determinants 
This category underpins main reasons for implementing the strategic alignment. 




a) Determination was revealed as being grounded in two main elements ranked as being 
the highest: strategy and objectives. 
i. Objectives were evidenced by 40% to be a determinant in establishing strategic 
directions. Similar to ERM and CsM the common goal is sustenance of ensuring 
achievement of organisational objectives. Since it confers a clarity and sense of 
expectations, objectives also defines the risk tolerance (Lam, 2017). 
ii. Business strategy attainment was reported to be another determinant factor 
(40%). This determinant is in close relation with effective alignment 
accomplishment and dependant on many elements. 
Category Two: Reimbursement 
Research evidence indicates that establishment of effective alignment reimburses positive 
effects, respectively remuneration of control deployed. This is in the line with much of the 
available literature on alignment (discussed in Section 2.8, Chapter Two). However, the 
literature refrains from specifically referring to CsM and ERM as a compound that aligns 
their strategies.  
Table 7-9 Alignment Reimbursements 
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a) Benefits of alignment 
i. Avoidance of duplication (18.75%) means that alignment of CsM with ERM 
supports the elimination of risk siloed approaches and reduces organisational 
exposure owing to a single, unified mechanism of risk governance that supports 
business strategy and objectives (Deloitte, 2014b). This reimbursement was 
among three main benefits indicated by respondents. 
ii. Strategic alignment was reported by 18.75% of respondents as being an effect 
of alignment. Likewise a extant literature indicated similar benefit (see Section 
2.7, Chapter 2 and Section 3.5, Chapter 3).  
iii. Enterprise-wide risk measurement is the third benefit indicated (16.67%) that 
articulate the need for understanding the long-term effects of ERM once 
implemented. 
b) Potential reimbursements 
Among the main recommendation was communication and prioritisation of risk. 
i. Communication (18.42%) is acknowledged as a potential benefit if effective 
alignment occurs. Communication requires a specific mechanism to sustain inter-
departmental communication and uniform reporting structure among all 
departments within an organisation in order to avoid inadequacy when tackling 
specific problems. Such communication and structure would undeniably lead to 
a more co-operative approach (fusing the departments of an organisation and 
disseminating information) should a formalised process be applied (Rubino, 
2018). 
ii. Prioritisation of risks (18.42%) is an essential requirement for adopting 
alignment. Even though competing priorities between business units are among 
the obstacles of efficient ERM (Gates, 2006), a strategic alignment reimburses 
this capability. 
Category Three: Alignment inhibitors 
This category refers to inhibitors and limitations of CsM with ERM alignment by focusing 
on understanding weaknesses and barriers. Research findings identified two main strands: 
governance and employees centric. 
b) Potential reimbursements communication   












Governance was mentioned by 31.87% of respondents, being the second thematic category 
to influence misalignment. Additional elements of cultural implications and inappropriate 
governance were identified. 
i. Cultural deficiencies (11.59%) in this context refers to risk culture. Bearing in mind 
that risk culture is one of many components of organisational culture (Carretta, 
Farina and Schwizer, 2017), the findings indicated concerns in this regard. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that risk culture implies organisation values, past 
experiences, philosophy, and behaviour prevailed in management style along with 
operational deployment in the form of a pattern of conduct (Carretta, Farina and 
Schwizer, 2017; Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, 2018). Additionally, risk 
culture has been defined as a predictable and repeatable behaviour or else desired 
level of ethical values influenced by internal values, beliefs, knowledge, and 
understanding (IRM, 2012). Therefore, most scholars define risk culture through 
various strands. Previous studies have shown that risk culture implies two main 
strands: (1) organisational attitude, and (2) people’s behaviour under risk pressure 
(IRM, 2012; Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, 2018). Accordingly, risk 
culture has been associated with various key elements of organisational culture as 
leadership, strategy, adaptability, coordination, and relationship (Smit, 2010; Silvius, 
Smit and Driessen, 2010). For instance, COSO 2017 framework (COSO, 2017) refers 
to both sides, the organisation and individuals (the latter is favoured instead of 
group/collective). COSO’s framework refers to integrity, ethical values, 
organisational philosophy, organisational structure, roles, and responsibilities as well 
as employees’ competencies and human resource practices (COSO, 2017). Likewise, 
Power, Ashby and Palermo (2013) provide an account of organisational risk culture 
emphasising culture as being driven by leadership, performance, ideology, and even 
control. When reviewing prior research, there was evidence regarding the challenges 
Category Two: Alignment Inhibitors 
Governance cultural deficiencies 
inappropriate governance  






of risk, often in terms of leadership support (‘tone from the top’), management of 
risk culture, overconfidence in risk controls, pressing ideologies, lack of consistency, 
blame culture, and lack of rewarding ethical behaviour or acceptance of same attitude 
and behaviour across an organisation (Power, Ashby and Palermo, 2013). This 
suggests that culture is a collective ability to manage risk which can affect overall 
organisational culture and a lack of consistent risk culture inadvertently exposes 
organisations to vulnerabilities and predisposes them to risks (IRM, 2012). Risk 
culture is a cornerstone for risk governance and a confirmed inhibitor (both by prior 
literature and current research) for alignment and strategic changes (Power, Ashby 
and Palermo, 2013). In short, the same logic underlies the cultural dimension of 
alignment, which determines the degree of fit between organisational culture and 
strategic alignment strategy. 
ii. Inappropriate governance was pinpointed by 10.14% of respondents as being an 
inhibitor in achieving alignment. As previously discussed in Subsection 6.2.4.11, 
Chapter Six, governance can be hindered by unclear policy, disconnected policies 
among business units, or disconnected risk statements (siloed). Readiness to 
overcome deficiencies of governance depends on the organisation’s acceptance to 
change, the cost involved, and the availability of resources (Prioteasa and Ciocoiu, 
2017; Merhi and Ahluwalia, 2018). Moreover, a lack of management commitment 
for translating strategy and a lack of aligned risk appetite make it challenging to 
prioritise risk. The evidence articulates that inappropriate governance also triggers 
uncoordinated efforts of staff involved (11.59%). Inadvertently, it implies resistance 
to change and/or non-acceptance. 
b) Employees 
The second category that inhibits implementation relates to people-centric rapport, meaning 
that 24.63% of respondents reported concerns related to skills, culture, or a lack of 
coordination.  
i. Skills deficiencies (13.04%) was reported to be another core element that affects the 
effectiveness of alignment. This finding relates to Henderson and Venkatraman’s 
model (main contributor of alignment paradigm, see Subsection 4.3.3.1, Chapter 
Four) and from the early 1990s has underlined the value of correlation between skills, 
process, and business scope (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993). Similar 
considerations were evidenced by Luftman’s model, which pointed to employees’ 





an understanding of concepts and drivers, and lastly a consistent language across the 
organisation (Luftman, 2000). One criticism of respondents is it related to the 
diversity of terminologies that varies between business units. In addition, the 
shortage of employees and unclear accountability (responsibility) sustain 
deficiencies. 
Category Four: Readiness (maturity) 
This section provides an overview of Alignment maturity curve extracted from empirical 
data. 






i. Departmental communication was found to be considered a descriptor element of 
maturity, particularly concerning how risks are communicated and dealt with across 
an organisation to illustrate coordination and coordination among teams. Even so, 
44% of respondents categorised their practices as being somewhat useful. Only 24% 
stated that communication is very effective, declaring it as mature. Consistent with 
theoretical findings (see Section 3.6, Chapter 3), strategic communication has been 
identified as a determinant of alignment, a measure of maturity (demonstrated by 
empirical findings), an inhibitor, and/or enabler factor. The existence of these effects 
implies that despite broader research, the relationship between communication and 
alignment has yet to reach maturity. Attributes revealed by empirical findings are 
readiness, effectiveness, understanding of policies and procedures, culture, 
transparency, support, and common language. Consequently, communication is 
associated with effective decision making, hence it represents support clauses in 
many industry standards (e.g. Clause 7.4, ISO 31000:2018; Clause 7.4, ISO 27001: 
2017). 
ii. Risk ownership in this context refers to the organisation departments, respectively 
those delegated responsibilities for managing risks. It has been found by empirical 
findings that 57.69% of respondents stated that risk control is deployed at both 
Category Three: Alignment Readiness (maturity) 
a) Maturity departmental communication 







department and enterprise levels, like a dual-responsibility. However, findings 
showed that referring to them at both a department and enterprise level might lead to 
periodical reporting, and in some other cases reporting may occur only if a certain 
level of complexity is reached (Respondent [4], [7] and [8]). Departmental cross-
functional responsibilities for risks (ownership) is a critical issue that refers to 
accountability (COSO, 2016). Having both types of approach, being both siloed and 
enterprise-wide is a paradox and an unanticipated finding. The fact that risks are 
managed through a mix of approaches shows that departments deal with their own 
risk and report further enterprise-wide (some sort of alignment) risks. 
iii. Maturity 
Overall status of CsM alignment with ERM denotes the identified maturity of 
alignment governance. With only 34.62% of respondents indicating maturity as 
being somewhat mature and optimised to organisational needs, the lower score of 
19.23% state full maturity (fully optimised) and captures ineffective practices.  
Immature practices are difficult to manage when inconstancies in activities of 
business units appear. Perhaps of more concern, decentralised functions, as well as 
various geographies of business units, arise. 
Category Four: Prospect 
This category focuses on emphasising the prospect of instilling strategic alignment. 







i. Credence refers to some respondents’ referrals for aligning strategies of CsM and 
ERM. Consideration for CsM alignment with ERM was found by 69.23% of 
respondents who considered alignment an enabler and were thus interested in 
applying the alignment paradigm principle. However, despite a significant credence 
for alignment others mention, despite understanding its principles, that in reality, a 
Category Four: Alignment Potential 
a) Potential Credence 
Acceptability 
 
b) Alignment fulfilment Responsibility 
Alignment deliverables 
Alignment drivers 





lack of resources and specialisation impede deployment of alignment (Respondent 
[10]). Part of ERM and an aligned CsM are understood to play an essential role in 
holistically managing and controlling risks. 
ii. Acceptability 
The analysis revealed a significant acceptability among respondents for value 
proposition of CsM and ERM alignment (75%). It shows that value of alignment is 
understood, in detriment of ‘compartmentalised’ approaches.  
Sustainability explores if an approach is sustainable in terms of organisational risk 
governance in the long-term. Evidence showed a paradox of findings and 38.46% of 
respondents strongly disagree with the alignment feasibility, while another 38.46% 
agree with implementing alignment. A potential explanation of respondent’s 
resistance to alignment might be explained by immature practices regarding ERM 
and CsM alignment. 
b) Alignment fulfilment 
i. Responsibility  
Alignment responsibility/accountability was indicated by respondents to be one of 
four recommendations. Support of senior managers is emphasised by respondents. 
Thus, understanding the implication of the human element in deploying security 
practice is another component to consider. The highest responsibility was indicated 
to be the Chair of Board (32.14%), followed by CEO (14.29%), Chief Risk Officer 
(14.29%), and lastly, 14.29% indicated that it is a shared responsibility. 
ii. Alignment deliverables implies translating priorities for each function (20.83%), 
stating deliverable of alignment to create interconnectivity and partnership. 
Additionally, defined strategy (16.67%) is another deliverable expected post-
implementation. 
iii. Alignment drivers refer to elements that motivate implementation. Research 
findings articulate that evaluating/assessing performance of alignment is identified 
by 25.00%. Additionally, recognition of due care for strategy contribution (10.71%), 
followed by education at every level of implementation (10.71%) were identified. In 
addition, executive-level support (10.71%) is indicated to count in implementing 
the strategic alignment. Moreover, within the literature, it is believed that leadership 





iv. Assessment of alignment is key when understanding alignment fulfilment. 
Consistent with literature, this research found that alignment is measured against risk 
appetite, policies, risk and control assessment, and comparable baseline between 
current capabilities, performance, objectives, and desired alignment (Salaheddine 
and Ilias, 2017). Commenting on alignment assessment, respondents indicated that 
alignment assessment is made through three primary methods: metrics (15.38%), 
audit (19.23%), and risk and control assessment (11.54%). Another angle on this 
is that respondents indicated that assessment of alignment can be made against 
objectives, policies, contracts, compliance (regulations), framework, and lessons 
learnt. This result provides further support in understanding implications and the pre-
requisite of alignment assessment. 
Previous studies evaluating assessment observed that a lack of suitable metrics 
creates difficulties in understanding effectiveness (Kerstin, Simone and Nicole, 
2014). In particular, a metric is an indicator of performance, outlining progress 
towards achieving organisational strategy (COSO, 2010; Scarlat, Chirita and Bradea, 
2012). Either as a risk indicator or performance indicator, it represents a form of 
feedback on actions undertaken, and thus the benefit is that it helps to optimise 
actions and resource allocation (Scarlat, Chirita and Bradea, 2012). 
7.3 Key research findings of interviews  
Despite various efforts of securing organisations, the research findings show that managing 
risk holistically remains a challenge for most organisations. In particular, organisations 
struggle in aligning the function of control and risk oversight to tie together all risk functions. 
Variations among the three disciplines (CsM, ERM and Alignment) explain why practices 
remain fragmented.  











Table 7-13 Key research findings of interviews 
ERM 
Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity 
CsM  
Cyber Risk Oversight Maturity 
Alignment 
Strategic Alignment 
Sub-theme 1: ERM Baseline expectations CsM Baseline expectations Sub-theme 3: Establishment of strategic 
directions 
Category One: ERM determinants Category One: CsM determinants Category One: Strategic Alignment 
determinants 
Strategic governance (45.16%) 
• governance (17.74%) 
• strategy (4.84%) 
• prioritisation (22.58%) 
Differentiation-centric (11.28%) 
• competitive advantage (4.84%) 
• value (6.44%) 
Risk resiliency (43.56%) 
• control (14.52%) 
• compliance (14.52%) 
• knowledge (14.52%) 
Internal (40.81%) 
• initiative (14.29%) 
• culture (10.20%) 
External (59.18%) 
• cyber threats velocity and 
complexity (16.33%) 
• regulatory pressure (14.29%) 
• standards (blended approach, 31%). 
Determination 
• objectives (40%) 








Category Two: ERM reimbursement Category Two: CsM reimbursement Category Two: Alignment reimbursement 
Internally (42.87%) 
• culture (8.57%) 
• shareholders’ requirements (7.14%) 
Externally (57.15%) 
• regulatory requirements (30.00%) 
• competition (10.00%) 
Performance (100%) 
• compliance (24.00%) 
• competitive advantage (20.00%) 
• resilience (20.00%) 
• organisational effectiveness 
(14.00%) 
Benefits  
• avoidance of duplication (18.75%) 
• strategic alignment (18.75%) 
• enterprise-wide risk measurement 
(16.67%) 
Potential reimbursements 
• communication (18.42%) 
• prioritisation of risks (18.42%) 
Category Three: ERM inhibitors Category Three: CsM inhibitors Category Three: Alignment inhibitors 
Resources (32.39%) 
• cost (7.04%) 
• data and information (7.04%) 
• people (5.63%) 
• skills (5.63%) 
Direction (9.86%) 
• strategy (4.23%) 
• leadership (5.63%) 
Capability (43.66%) 
• maturity (9.86%) 
• culture (8.45%) 
• lack of education and awareness 
(7.04%) 
Pressure (16.90%) 
• risks and Threats (7.04%) 
• standardised practice (5.63%) 
• regulations (2.82%) 
People-centric (35.82%) 
• culture (7.46%) (e.g. lack of 
awareness, 17.91%; lack of 
employees’ competencies, 10.45%) 
 
Strategic-centric (22.39%) 
• silos (10.45%0 
• cost (11.94%) 
 
Governance (31.87%) 
• cultural deficiencies (11.59%) 
• inappropriate governance (10.14%) 
Employees (24.63%) 
• skills deficiencies (13.04%) 
Category Four: ERM readiness Category Four: CsM readiness Category Four: alignment readiness  
Risk Oversight 
• implementation maturity (38.46%) 
Side effects 
• reputational loss (24%) 
• regulatory consequences (17.33%) 
• financial loss (16%). 
Maturity 
• departments communication (44% of 
respondents categorise their practices 
somewhat effectively) 
• risk ownership (57.69, by both 
department and enterprise level, no 
mechanism) 
• maturity (only 19.23% stated to have 
full maturity; 34.62% of respondents 
indicating maturity as being somewhat 
mature) 
Category Five: Alignment Prospect 
 
Enterprise-wide Risk Governance 
Alignment credence (69.23%) ─ agreed with alignment 
Alignment fulfilment, acceptability (75%) 





Through the research questions, the empirical results have revealed determinants of ERM 
associated with strategic governance (45.16%) and determined by external pressure for risk 
resiliency (43.56%) whilst CsM is due to be implemented because of another type of external 
pressure (59.18%) related to the nature of cyber threats velocity and complexity (16.33%). 
Additionally, the regulatory pressure (14.29%) and industry standards influence good 
practices even though organisations prefer blended approaches of standards (31%). On the 
other hand, alignment seems to be a business decision being more lead by an organisation’s 
own initiative, respectively being strong-minded by objectives (40%) and business strategy 
(40%). Given these findings of determinants, it was found that reimbursement is another 
dependable of the end goal. On this basis, ERM was found to be encouraged by external 
recognition (57.15%) of regulatory requirements fulfilment (30.00%) and by keeping pace 
with competition (10.00%). This aspect of reimbursement is, for CsM, a performance-centric 
orientation, focused on compliance (24.00%) as a way of achieving a competitive advantage 
(20.00%) and resilience (20.00%). More generally, alignment was benefits-driven by ROI, 
capable of duplication avoidance (18.75%), strategic alignment achievement (18.75%), 
enterprise-wide communication (18.42%), and prioritisation of risks (18.42%). 
Nevertheless, present findings also confirm that inhibitors are being consistent with the 
findings of prior research. ERM is indicated to be inhibited by capability (43.66%) and lack 
of resources (32.39%) while CsM indicates similar impediments, emphasising people-
centric inhibitors (35.82%) and related strategic consequences (22.39%). Likewise, the 
alignment indicates enterprise-wide issues related to governance (31.87%), either in terms 
of inappropriate governance or being culturally related. Accordingly, outline people-centric 
issues registered 24.63%.  
Broadly translated the findings indicate that readiness of alignment maturity of CsM and 
ERM is yet to be achieved. Despite significant consideration of ERM, it was indicated to be 
implemented in the proportion of 38.46%. In the case of CsM, an estimation of maturity was 
unachievable because of various types of departments and fragmented management controls 
in dealing with cyber risks (i.e. some of the sampled organisations have IT-related 
functions). Data gathered it suggests that security functions are in place to ensure avoidance 
of security flaws’ side effects such as reputational loss (24%), regulatory consequences 
(17.33%), and/or financial loss (16%). Readiness, in cases of alignment, registers low values, 





Moreover, communication in the process of alignment was indicated by 44% of respondents 
to be somewhat effective. Of more concern, risk ownership (57.69%) was indicated to be 
segregated in both department and enterprise level (no mechanism in place). On the whole, 
these results demonstrate what effects implementation has in the context of various 
determinants, reimbursement, inhibitors, and readiness among all three domains. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the alignment acceptability (75%) and credence (69.23%) for CsM - ERM 
Strategic Alignment Framework confirm the strength of the proposed solution. On these 











Figure 7-1 Thematic map of empirical findings (interviews) 
Source: The Researcher 
Evidence demonstrates that four dimensions of overlapping alignment exist: respectively 
intellectual (strategic), structural, cultural, and operational. It is conceivable that 
implementation prescribes the use of all dimensions because all interrelate. One of the 
aspects that emerges from these findings is related to the alignment paradigm. With reference 
to initial discussion from Section 4.2.3, Chapter Four, the research findings advocate that 
contingency and institutional alignment are both related to alignment (cultural and 
institutional dimensions). 
For instance, the culture may act under specific context as a rule of law (i.e. some behaviours 
and practice can be standardised later on as official rules, bare expectation). In addition, 
moral and social norms can act as standards of behaviour of certain groups of people. 
Contingency Theory correlates with findings of RM, performance, and value delivery. On 






















































the other hand, Institutional Theory correlates with empirical findings regarding aspects of 
cultural alignment, communication, and awareness. Institutional Theory relates to the 
purpose of employing good practices (e.g. standards, frameworks); respectively, external 
legitimacy (Cavusoglu et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, Institutional Theory provides support for exploring the external pressure of 
mimetic pressure that refers to imitating practices (Cavusoglu et al., 2015) as well as 
understanding the coercive pressure that refers to external pressure as a conformity 
influencer driver (Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Moreover, normative pressure refers to norms of 
security practice driven by the industry (Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Henceforth, an organisation 
strategy should calibrate with internal and external pressures (Kaplan and Norton, 2003; 
KPMG, 2017b) as it is essential to understand both institutional (e.g. strategy, structure, 
culture, organisational design, processes, leadership, technology, and structural alignment) 
and Contingency Theory implications (value, normative rules, legitimacy, beliefs, 
principles, behaviour, ethics, social systems).  
What emerged from the empirical research findings is that all dimensions of alignment need 
to be included because they interrelate (cultural, intellectual, structural, operational). Even 
though literature defined the cultural dimension of alignment as ‘social alignment’ (see 
Section 4.3.3, Chapter 4). The empirical finding demonstrated that when theory refers to 
social dimension it refers to interdepartmental communication and social interaction. Which 
in fact relate to institutional theory and cultural dimension. Henceforth, cultural dimension 
of alignment incorporates communication, education, awareness and much more 
(Braumann, 2018). Thus, the social dimension emphasised by literature (e.g. Reich and 
Benbasat, 2000; Kay and Avison, 2005; Volk and Zerfass, 2018) submerge to the theory of 
cultural alignment; thus, this research emphasise that social dimension is in fact part of 
cultural dimension and was erroneously defined by prior literature. 
It is clear that each domain contributes to risk governance and thus, when aligned together, 
they affect higher results. In short, findings suggest that despite separate efforts of each 
domain to maintain performance, addressing them individually remains a challenge. 
Therefore, the research findings point towards the potential value of pursuing integrated 
efforts that sustain enterprise-wide holistic governance. Once again reconfirm that the 
advantages of adopting the research Framework is that it ensures conformance, performance, 





7.4 Revised research framework 
This section incorporates empirical findings that contribute to the research framework. 
Accordingly, the research framework is revised based on compiled evidence. To date, the 
first version of the Framework proposes five derivates (constructs): 
• Literature review (derivate one); 
• Systematic literature evaluation (derivate two); 
• Research gap (derivate three); 
• Supporting theories (derivate four); 
• Supporting frameworks (derivate five). 
Having incorporated the five derivates and a three-dimensional view (academics, 
practitioners and regulators), the first version of the framework represents a baseline for the 
validation phase. Overall, framework elaboration has been driven by Research Aim two, the 
quintessence of which is to determine the development of a framework that assists CsM with 
ERM alignment within the financial industry, supported by practical guidance for the 
implementation of the proposed framework. Consequently, the empirical results extend 
views on the validity of the conceptual framework that was initially presented in Subsection 
4.4.2, Chapter Four.  In this phase, empirical results are challenged against the research 
questions in order to validate necessity and validity. Then, the input of empirical findings 
completes the research with a practical view (derivate six); as a result, gives rise to an 
additional pillar for the framework. 
The practitioner’s view provides further evidence in articulating the issues within the 
financial business context. Accordingly, in view of empirical findings, the CsM - ERM 
Strategic Alignment Framework is revised. 
In this regard, Research Question 1 explored why strategic alignment of CsM and ERM 
sustains a financial business in long-term. It was identified that an alignment of both 
paradigms holistically sustains risk resiliency. Both literature and empirical findings 
enunciate the importance of tying together all risk and oversight functions to ensure 
increased resiliency, and effectiveness. Given the nature of the financial industry, this aspect 
of securing strategically financial organisations has received more impetuous due to the 
increased constraints of the external environment (e.g. compliance, velocity of threats, client 
demand, etc.); something that is of concern when determining good practices. Evidence 





cost, creating visibility of risks (e.g. risk register; risk mapping), prioritising, ensuring 
enterprise-wide risk measurement, compliance and thus effectiveness, and strengthening an 
organisation’s security posture.  
Moreover, the strategic alignment of CsM and ERM represents a risk performance function 
that encourages interconnectivity, communication, and partnership between business 
functions. This portrays the determinants revealed by the empirical findings previously 
reported in Table 7-13. 
Furthermore, Research Question 2 investigated what are the key issues that impede the 
alignment process in the financial industry regarding CsM and ERM. It was found that each 
domain encounters similar challenges yet differs in type. For instance, both ERM and CsM 
were reported to encounter issues related to external pressure (e.g. risk and threats, 
standardised practice, regulations). Resource allocation, lack of direction, and a lack of 
capabilities were also similar to a certain extent. The alignment domain focus, however, 
indicates an inappropriate governance (e.g. cultural inefficiencies; inappropriate 
governance) and employees skills deficiencies as some of the main barriers. 
To understand the research problem further, Research Question 3 assessed: how are theory, 
practice, and regulation direction applied regarding the current alignment of CsM and ERM 
within the financial industry? Although the question was addressed in the literature review, 
when applied to empirical findings it was discovered that the alignment of CsM with ERM 
is scarce (19.23%). However, implementation of ERM was reported to reach 38.46%, whilst 
CsM maturity was difficult to identify due to fragmented practices. 
Lastly, Research Question 4 calls into question: what effects have the implementation of the 
new framework? It was concluded that strategic alignment supports enterprise-wide risk 
governance (75%), and the unified capabilities of strategic governance is beneficial for 
gaining value, resiliency, performance, compliance, sustainability, and competitive 
advantage. Figure 7-2 outline changes determined by the empirical findings’ indications. 


























Figure 7-2 Revised CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
Consistent with the empirical findings, Figure 7-2 outlines changes identified in contrast 
with Figure 4-13 from Chapter Four. Figure 7-2 shows that integration of additional elements 
has influenced the transformation of the initial framework, leading to a more interrelated and 
cyclical framework. The changes appear in the first phase of the deployment of risk control, 
risk oversight, and compliance function. For instance, each domain has specific internal and 
external factors that were considered independently. In addition, to align all towards the goal 
of achieving the overall organisational strategy and objectives, it was deemed that each 
domain has its own determinants and inhibitors that are less applicable than those of the 
other two domains. Ultimately, the empirical findings showed that each domain has its own 
expectations, risk silos, and approaches. A first change is strategic related. Findings 
recommend re-assigning and accepting each domain’s determinants and inhibitors, bridging 
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of putting them all together and prioritising, this task is delegated and tracked in a unified 
process of enterprise-wide alignment. This means that it deploys strategic governance of all 
three domains ─ thriving to address risks systemically while assigning risk ownership and 
roles accountability. A second change is culturally related. Cultural element implications in 
alignment were identified to be a predominant sub-theme in all three domains. Compared to 
the initial framework, the contribution of empirical findings demonstrates that elements such 
as education, awareness, skills set, and communication are interrelated elements of culture. 
For instance, communication was found to be an essential element for achieving unified 
governance. Much more, the research findings reflect the implications of culture in strategy, 
structural alignment, and operational alignment; all impacting performance, resiliency, 
compliance, sustainability, and competitive advantage. Consequently, labelled by the 
Researcher, the performance risk chain has positive ripple effects: effectiveness ─ 
resiliency ─ value creation ─ competitive advantage ─ compliance ─ risk strategy 
sustainability ─ risk foresight ─ organisational objectives achievement. In addition to 
strategic, structural, and operational alignment, the cultural dimension is the fourth 
dimension incorporated in the Framework. A third change is structural and related to risk 
control and oversight. Consideration for structural alignment of risk control and risk 
oversight were made. A fourth change relates to operational and strategic alignment. The 
risk resiliency function was included because it is one of the main drivers of the alignment. 
Respondents identified that risk resiliency underpins risk control and oversight, 
accountability, compliance, and also knowledge. A fifth change was related to the starting 
and ending point of implementation, thus changes were made. It was understood that a 
planned maturity state represents the starting point, followed by identification of current 
maturity state, and lastly after all are implemented, the achievement of a certain maturity 
state shall define further tasks. 
Overall, refinement of the framework evidences a regrouping of few layers of control and 
provides direction to connect all components to organisational mission and vision. It 
facilitated an identification of continuous process, meaning that organisational strategy and 
objectives are used as a main point of reference. However, it is understood that at certain 
points not only ERM and CsM shall align but the strategy itself. As such, the organisation 
itself shall adopt and incorporate principles of holistic risk governance; being a continued 
realignment mechanism to sustain effectiveness, sustainability and resiliency. The 
Framework incorporates four lenses of alignment (strategic, structural, operational, cultural) 





horizontal and vertical approaches (‘top-down and bottom-up’). Having outlined changes 
and answers to the research questions, the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework 
bridges the following deliverables: 
✓ Deliverable 1: Advocates an understanding of organisational goals, objectives, 
strategy, risk appetite, risk tolerance, acceptable residual risk, and alignment 
expectations across the whole organisation. It fosters an effective alignment in 
accordance with organisation goals and objective. 
✓ Deliverable 2: Defines strategic baseline expectations of external environment from 
which principles and context are derives with the determination to establish the 
drivers (purpose, limitation and constraints) and how alignment should be achieved. 
✓ Deliverable 3: Emphasises the internal strategy in alignment, paying consideration 
to external requirements. Sets of internal directions are in balance with identified 
external directions, defining how the appetite, structure, processes, responsibilities, 
and commitment work in a unified manner in order to cope with external 
environment. 
✓ Deliverable 4: Establishes processes and structure for strategic alignment 
implementation between CsM and ERM. It supports considerations of strategic and 
structural alignment enhanced with internal and external factors. 
✓ Deliverable 5: Employs identification of risk owners, measurement (performance), 
improvement (development), transparency, and compliance. It establishes the 
context, identifying current situations (assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and control). 
Recognising the risk owners, location, or source of threats are all prerequisites in 
assuring flexibility of implementation. 
✓ Deliverable 6: Transfers the strategic guidance into an operational and cultural 
dimension that aligns with operations to deploy enterprise-wide alignment. 
✓ Deliverable 7: Includes documentation for further use of the reviewing processes that 
depend on comparisons of practices with the predetermined baselines, prior learned 
lessons, experiences, organisational cultural dimension, observations, and research. 
✓ Deliverable 8: Compares maturity level against industry baselines to determine the 
degree of control function effectiveness. 
✓ Deliverable 9: Entails systematic re-alignment as an enabler for reaching a higher 
level of maturity. 
Overall, CsM-ERM Alignment Framework concentrated on siloed approaches of CsM and 





and comprehensively, and thus contextualised them. Among top findings from empirical 
results are the benefits of implementing the frameworks as value creation, value capture, 
value enhancement, organisational effectiveness ─ instead of performance (initial version of 
framework), and risk foresight. Unified, the framework combines risk control capabilities 
with risk oversight capabilities in order to reach an enterprise-wide risk governance 
capability that enhances overall risk foresight capabilities of financial organisations. 
 [(CsM \ ERM) + rc] + [(CsM \ ERM) + ro] = \E-wRG (rr + oe + orf) 
*\=aligned 
*CsM=Cybersecurity Management 
*ERM =Enterprise Risk Management 
*rc =risk controls 
*ro =risk oversight 
*rr =risk resiliency  
*oe =organisational effectiveness 
*orf =organisational risk foresight 
*E-wRG =Enterprise-wide risk governance 
This propounds the idea of “catalyst for foresight” (Lauder, 2016, p. 3). The essence of this 
concept is being prepared to anticipate an event (known as ‘black swans’) and avoid failure 
(Lauder, 2016). Having foresight rests on the assumption that an organisation is able to 
foresee signals of risks and their impact. Moreover, it can create scenarios on how to manage, 
how to be risk resilient to emerging threat by having the right knowledge, accountability and 
communication, and how to recover successfully if avoidance is not possible; respectively 
adjusting the negative effects (Raban and Hauptman, 2018). 
7.5 Conclusion  
This section concludes the Discussion Chapter by highlighting some of the key implications, 
contributions, and limitations. Overall this chapter has advanced from ‘description’ in 
Chapter Six to ‘interpretation’ to investigate the alignment of CsM with ERM within the 
financial industry. The main aim of this chapter was to explore thematically how industry’s 
views (practitioners) revolve around aggregating answers for attaining answers for research 
questions. Various contributions have been made via prior literature, however sustainable 
and enterprise-wide governance remains a challenge in practice. This renders the most 
obvious contribution of fulfilling the research questions. 
Another significant contribution that has emerged from this chapter is that it has conveyed a 
revised research framework that fulfils the requirements of the second research aim: to 
develop a framework that assists CsM with ERM alignment within the financial industry, 





the contribution of the empirical findings is that indicated determinants, barriers, readiness 
(maturity), and capacity sustain risk governance. Moreover, it determines the regrouping of 
a few layers of control that provide clearer direction for connecting all components of 
organisational mission and vision. It has facilitated an identification of continuous process. 
This means that organisational strategy and objectives are used as a main point of reference 
in order to sustain effectiveness, sustainability, and risk resiliency.  
From the outcome of this investigation, it is possible to finish with final conclusions, 





8. Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a synthesis of the research findings to provide evidence of how the 
aims of this research have been fulfilled. Linking each chapter’s contribution, this final 
chapter restates the implications, contribution, potential impact and limitations of the 
findings. It explores how the research aims were achieved, how the research objectives were 
investigated and how the research questions were answered. Section 8.2 begins by justifying 
the research scope, followed by an explanation of how the research aims were achieved in 
Section 8.3. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 provide a brief overview of how the research objectives 
and research questions were addressed. Section 8.6 outlines limitations while Sections 8.7 
and 8.8 discuss the theoretical and practical contribution of this research. Finally, Section 
8.9 explains the emergent themes influencing risk governance practices and how they might 
be tackled in the future. 
8.2 Research justification 
Interest in organisational risk resiliency has registered significant consideration, but there 
are still unanswered questions as to why organisations are unsuccessful in applying effective 
risk security practices across all levels. Having a robust mechanism to deal with a variety of 
risks efficiently and in alignment with organisational strategy has always been something 
that organisations strive to accomplish. Changes in internal and external pressure have 
required organisations to turn their consideration from silo operational and managerial risk 
control to strategic approaches to ensure optimal achievement of the organisation’s mission, 
strategy and objectives. 
This research was intended to investigate possible approaches for enabling a more enhanced 
strategic approach to respond to the extended exposure to all types of risks; to move towards 
a proactive approach that ensures enterprise-wide risk governance with anticipation. The two 
types of organisational risks cannot be carried out in isolation, and so this research explored 
whether realignment of risk control and risk oversight of CsM and ERM support the 
establishment of enterprise-wide risk governance. This research responds to the need for 
harmonised risk handling, reporting, analysis, mitigation and resiliency across the whole 
organisation. Alignment (interconnectivity and partnership) can place the entire organisation 
in a more enhanced state of security through a unified perspective of control, accountability 





of ERM, CsM and strategic alignment as an effective alternative to sustain organisational 
risk strategy as together they convey all capabilities in an integrated manner as opposed to 
siloed controls. 
Weighing up the evidence, the research findings suggest that CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment 
Framework supports establishment of enterprise-wide risk governance. To reflect on the 
extent to which this was achieved, the sections below outline how the research results were 
identified. 
8.3 Results determined by the research aims 
The aims of a research project broadly state the main goal, scope and intent of the research, 
as well as defining the contribution and limitations of investigation (Thomas and Hodges, 
2010; Stokes and Wall, 2014; Saunders and Lewis, 2018). In order to understand if the 
research aims have been achieved, the following section presents an overview of results. 
Research Aim 1 was to investigate the alignment of CsM with ERM within the financial 
industry. The research proposition was guided by Research Aim 1 in all chapters. The thesis 
conceptually and empirically investigated the alignment of CsM with ERM within the 
financial industry. More specifically, the research aims were achieved through the tactical 
use of research objectives and research questions. As prior literature on the research problem 
was scarce, the investigation considered ERM, CsM and strategic alignment paradigms 
individually. It was found that alignment of CsM with ERM within the financial industry is 
feasible, yet is not common practice amongst the organisations sampled, being applied in 
most cases only partially. Second, it was identified that the empirical results are similar to 
previous studies with slight differences. Respondents confirmed that risk controls and risk 
oversight are immature and fragmented. This suggests that Research Aim 1 was validated 
by both theoretical and practical insights. 
Research Aim 2 was to develop a framework that assists CsM with ERM alignment within 
the financial industry, supported by practical guidance for the implementation of the 
proposed framework. To achieve this the research brought together the literature review 
(derivate one), the systematic literature evaluation (derivate two), the research gap (derivate 
three), supporting theories (derivate four), supporting frameworks (derivate five) and 
empirical findings (derivate six) to generate a framework that supports an integrated 
approach that yields enhanced preparedness. By concentrating ERM capabilities and CsM 





achieving strategic objectives, strategic planning and optimised processes balances the 
alignment of risk appetite with exposure, encourages tolerance, aids communication and 
enables risk prioritisation. All of this can enhance an organisation’s overalls risk resiliency, 
preparedness and effectiveness to respond to risk events. 
8.4 Results determined by the research objectives 
Unlike research aims, research objectives are more specific in explaining the processes of 
how the aims are achieved (Thomas and Hodges, 2010; Stokes and Wall, 2014; Saunders 
and Lewis, 2018). 
Research Objective 1: The first objective of this research was to identify, analyse and 
critically evaluate academic, industry-based and regulatory literature regarding ERM, CsM 
and their alignment, to explore the current state of the subject. Chapter One defined debates 
amongst academics, practitioners and regulators on how the financial industry’s risk 
resiliency depends upon its ability to handle risk holistically. It highlighted the gap and 
necessity of alignment between CsM and ERM to deploy holistic risk governance. Chapter 
Two determined that alignment of CsM with ERM encounters numerous challenges in 
theory and practice. 
The scarceness of literature focusing specifically on the topic led to confusion at some points. 
Exploration of a phenomenon uses key literature to recognise the literature legacy related to 
the research topic and a three-fold analysis based on academics’, practitioners’ and 
regulators’ viewpoints. The second chapter reconfirmed that the organisational risk 
oversight is under-researched and the alignment of CsM with ERM is a joint effort that 
contributes to a holistic internal control of risks. The top eight challenges identified in prior 
research were: (1) the scarceness of strategic alignment literature that focused on CsM and 
ERM; (2) partial understanding of implementation benefits by stakeholders; (3) low level of 
alignment maturity within organisations; (4) lack of bottom-up consideration for alignment; 
(5) lack of coherent terminology and theory, and thus fragmented practices; (6) lack of 
common guidance for implementation; (7) low level of cyber risk awareness inside 
organisations; and (8) resiliency challenges due to siloed approaches. 
Chapter Three further evaluated academic, industry-based and regulatory framework models 
to explore the typology of contributors, categorising prior research into four typologies: 
adoption, implementation, maturity assessment and compliance. This approach further 





and systematically evaluated the literature to explore why alignment is necessary, how it is 
sustained, what the key debates regarding the three domains are, and how theory, practice 
and regulatory framework interrelate. CsM and ERM have been only partially addressed in 
prior studies, with diverse topics, diverse approaches and varied viewpoints. These findings 
demonstrate that recent developments of risk practice are fragmented and focus significantly 
on silo approaches. The analysis of the literature also revealed that alignment of CsM with 
ERM can enhance a superior risk assessment, mitigation and resilience in an organisation 
and thus help towards reducing risk profile. Of much more concern is that transferring the 
whole organisation into an enhanced state of cybersecurity has proved to be a challenging 
task. A lack of integrated approaches amplified the efforts required and the required 
allocation of resources, strategic planning and implied allocation of costs. 
The different types of evidence identified prove that further work needs to be done to manage 
risk strategically and sustain organisations effectively and in the long term. 
Research Objective 2: The second objective of this research was to analyse the financial 
industry’s environment and current practices regarding alignment. To fulfil this objective, 
this research had two approaches: revising prior literature and addressing questions to 
respondents during the semi-structured interviews. 
The first approach showed that trends in literature regarding alignment were segregated in 
layers of neutral alignment, alignment of IT with business alignment, IS with RM alignment 
and IS with ERM alignment. There was little material on the integration of CsM with ERM. 
A lack of literature on alignment that guides implementation was also identified, and a 
significant body of literature remains conceptual, focusing mainly on adoption aspects. It 
has various paths of alignment (e.g. structural, cultural), lacking a multi-dimensional 
approach. Structural alignment shows inadequate structural collaboration and restrained 
organisational change behaviour. Cultural alignment was also immature. Research has 
tended to have been carried by academics rather than practitioners or regulators. Although 
in the case of CsM and ERM some contributors have addressed this problem and over recent 
years’ alignment has received attention, it has unfortunately been applied in isolation (e.g. 
IT-centric, RM business-centric). 
The empirical findings identified similar problems. Much empirical evidence shows that 
organisations struggle to align risk functions. The findings also indicate that alignment 





alignment is immature, hence a small percentage of respondents claimed to have reached 
full maturity. The evidence demonstrated that siloed practices exist and remain constrained 
by determinants, reimbursement, inhibitors and readiness among all three domains. Whilst 
evidence determined the status of alignment in current practice as being immature, the 
surprising result was that alignment acceptability was recognised as being valuable (75%). 
Four dimensions of alignment were identified: strategic, structural, cultural and operational. 
The basic premise for this argument is that previous literature partially addressed the 
alignment dimensions and that empirical evidence suggests beneficial implications of 
alignment. 
Research Objective 3: The third objective of this research was to review and evaluate the 
effectiveness of current CsM and ERM frameworks. Following the assessment of 
frameworks, the result pertaining to this objective were presented in Chapter Four. An in-
depth overview of related CsM and ERM frameworks showed that there is a lack of 
supporting frameworks for CsM and ERM alignment. The available evidence consists of 
models or frameworks that consider the alignment through the perspective of IT alignment 
with business alignment. Additionally, the scope of most frameworks is generic and does 
not address financial industry-specific needs. Even though an array of approaches was 
identified, ERM, CsM and alignment have specific frameworks granulated to each domain. 
It was concluded that prior contributors have tended to adopt a disjointed approach to CsM 
so it addresses the research problem in isolation, stranded in fractional types of alignment: 
IT, IS, IA, with a later influence of RM. Scarce consideration for practised alignment was 
identified because the alignment paradigm was mainly developed by scholars. As an 
example, the assessment of literature on alignment shows that the main influencers are 
Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and Luftman (2000). 
Consequently, alignment fails to address the current needs of organisations. However, 
despite the drawbacks of previous frameworks of CsM, ERM and alignment, taken together 
as a compound they can form examples of good practice, especially as on their own they are 
limited to offering a partial insight into the research problem. Therefore, the implications of 
CsM, ERM and alignment frameworks evaluation provides support for the Research 
Framework (third derivation). Overall, it can be concluded that Research Objective 3 was 





Research Objective 4: The fourth objective of this research was to evaluate the potential 
and the limitations of strategic alignment between CsM and ERM within the financial 
industry, supported by practical guidance. This analysis compounds both theoretical and 
empirical findings. Many current frameworks revolve around IT, IS or RM alignment. The 
literature showed that strategic alignment supports the effects and interdependencies of an 
internal environment within today’s business context. It delegates departmental 
communication to identify wider vulnerabilities in terms of structure and processes 
alignment, and supports acknowledgement of management directions with the driving 
principles of philosophy, appetite and direction. It ensures that implementation is in 
accordance with organisation objectives, capabilities and limitations, identifying current 
situations (assets, threats, vulnerabilities and control) and risk owners, and is accountable 
across business units, the source of threats and leveraging enterprise-wide security. Strategic 
alignment offers beneficial accountability, transparency, self-preservation and response 
preparedness to ensure that negligence is avoided and fewer disruptive actions exist in terms 
of achieving organisational value creation and strategy preservation. Objective 4 is similar 
to the categorisation of research made in Quadrant 1 Adoption (see Chapter 3), which 
referred to adoption. 
Consequently, the value proposition of strategic alignment between CsM and ERM 
incorporates the modern CsM that adopts wider asset protection (not only partially as in IS 
or IT) and the broader principles of ERM. This practice has been found to be scarcely 
considered (see Chapter 4). Thus, the potential of strategic alignment between CsM and 
ERM is that it provides an understanding of how organisational appetite, culture, 
governance, risk oversight, risk profile, maturity, compliance, structure, performance and 
leadership in strategic risk governance. Previously, these aspects have often been 
investigated in isolation. 
Consistent with the literature, the empirical results found that a formalised security 
procedure demonstrates due care for risk oversight. The potential of alignment would expect 
to address the collaborative efforts to support effectiveness of control. Among the top 
benefits considered by respondents were avoidance of duplication, strategic alignment, 
enterprise-wide risk measurement, communication and prioritisation of risks (see Chapters 
6 and 7). To develop a full picture of the strategic alignment components, additional effects 
of ERM and CsM were examined. It was found that CsM performance is due to compliance, 





(see Table 2-1) trigger other benefits of culture enhancement, fulfilment of shareholders’ 
requirements or fulfilment of regulatory requirements. These results further support the idea 
that reframing enterprise-wide risk governance is needed. Research Objective 4 identified 
both benefits and barriers for strategic alignment. 
8.5 Results determined by the research questions 
The research questions address the research gap and what exactly is missing, thus ensuring 
that the research is consistent with the research aims. Therefore, research questions are most 
often seen as a continuation of aims and objectives (Thomas and Hodges, 2010; Stokes and 
Wall, 2014; Saunders and Lewis, 2018). The research questions re-address the objectives to 
emphasise aims. 
Research Question 1: Why does a strategic alignment of CsM and ERM sustain a financial 
business in the long term?  
It was identified that an alignment of both paradigms sustains risk resiliency holistically. 
Both literature and empirical findings indicate the importance of tying together all risk 
controls and oversight functions to ensure increased resiliency and effectiveness. Given the 
nature of the financial industry, this aspect of strategically securing financial organisations 
has been given more impetuous due to the increased constraints of the external environment. 
Evidence shows that strategic alignment sustains risk governance by utilising resources, 
reducing cost, creating visibility of risks, demanding risk prioritisation, ensuring enterprise-
wide risk measurement, and providing compliance and thus effectiveness, to strengthen an 
organisation security posture. 
Research Question 2: What are the key issues that impede the alignment process in the 
financial industry regarding CsM and ERM? 
This question re-addresses Research Objective 4. It was found that the role of RM can no 
longer act as a separate and reactive function. Chapter Six collected and analysed empirical 
data to examine current maturity and likely solutions. It was identified that each domain 
encounters similar challenges, yet slightly different in type. For instance, both ERM and 
CsM were reported to encounter issues related to external pressure (e.g. risk and threats, 
standardised practice, regulations). Additionally, resource allocation and a lack of direction 





indicated inappropriate governance (e.g. cultural inefficiencies resulting in inappropriate 
governance) and employees skills deficiencies. 
The findings confirm inhibitors as being consistent with the findings of prior research. ERM 
is indicated to be inhibited by capability and a lack of research guidance, while CsM shows 
similar impediments, with inhibitors being people-centric and strategic-centric, the 
alignment indicates enterprise-wide issues related to governance, either culturally or in terms 
of inappropriate governance. Similarly, the other two domains outline people-centric issues. 
Research Question 3: How are theory, practice and regulation direction applied regarding 
the current alignment of CsM and ERM within the financial industry? 
Like the literature findings, when applied to industry practice it was discovered that 
alignment of CsM with ERM is scarce and only partially applied. Sections 6.2.4 and 7.2.3 
support this view and show the identified alignment of CsM and ERM alignment. Research 
Objective 2 addressed this matter and was identified an immature approach. 
Research Question 4: What effects have the implementation of the new framework? 
This question links with Objective 4 of this research and the results of Chapter Six. It was 
concluded by empirical findings that strategic alignment supports enterprise-wide risk 
governance. 
8.6 Research limitations 
This research aimed to fill the gap in strategic risk governance in financial organisations. It 
had some limitations that are highlighted in this section. A limitation of research embodies 
the factors that can hinder an investigation under specific rules and methods unsettled by a 
researcher. Such limitation can restrict the investigation and the methodology or results 
(Molina, 2015; Mertler, 2015). Therefore, some possible limitations of the current research 
are related to the literature fieldwork, research design, researcher’s biases and time 
framework. 
8.6.1 Literature research limitations 
Referring to the literature fieldwork, the content of the research is limited to the theories, 
practices and regulations applied to various industries. Thus, the initial data gathering is 





industry. To counteract this limitation, the phenomenon is later analysed within its context 
via the empirical data collected. 
Researcher bias is another possible limitation due to any interpretive analysis bias that might 
appear in the interview process with practitioners. 
Another limitation is time, which is a confined by the cross-sectional analysis due to the time 
constraint of the research timeline. This restriction is acknowledged by the researcher and 
research phenomenology evolution has been evaluated since the early 1990s, even if 
longitudinal research might enhance the results. 
Additionally, to integrate the practitioners’ view, the papers selected were limited to reports, 
white papers and industry standards. The reports selected were the production of consultancy 
organisations well-recognised for their due diligence practices. The standards selected were 
only the ones that focused on strategic approach of RM, ERM, IS and CsM. Despite focusing 
on the financial industry, some standards and literature are generic and thus can be generally 
applied to all industries. Standards with specific reference to alignment are non-existent and 
therefore analysis comprised theoretical models and frameworks. 
8.6.2 Research design limitations 
The research used qualitative methods, which are open to possible subjectivity. A lack of 
quantitative data is a limitation specific to qualitative studies and perhaps the use of mixed 
methods would add additional views on the research problem even if quantitative in their 
nature. Analysis of Chapters Three and Four aimed to address this limitation. 
With regards to primary data collection, another limitation was related to the respondents’ 
profiles. Selection of respondents was made based on a predefined set of expectations related 
to their professional experience and credentials, and thus they were selected based on their 
expertise in the strategic side of risk governance. Conceivably, future research would include 
views of the technical and operational side to be more inclusive. For the purpose of this 
research, no technical views were considered. Instead, operational, structural and cultural 
alignment was considered while the main focus remained strategic. 
Other aspects such as age or gender were intentionally avoided due to the complexity of 
possible results. In this case, perhaps a future comparison of gender and age of respondents 





Another limitation is the number of respondents. The 26 respondents were from 25 
organisations, with only two respondents from the same company. It was not possible to 
select only companies that had both mechanisms in place. Contrasting CsM and ERM within 
the same organisation would also be valuable in widening the understanding of practices. 
Perhaps a higher number of sampled organisations would add an additional contribution. 
Research that applies a questionnaire to subordinates from lower levels of implementation 
may generate a larger number of respondents and reveal differences. Of more interest would 
be longitudinal research to explore the performance of organisations in deploying alignment 
of CsM and ERM or related fields. Another research limitation refers to geographical 
dispersion of respondents. This research was restricted to seven countries and possibly global 
research would add an expanded view across a larger sample of organisations. This research 
was also limited to respondents who spoke English either as a first or second language. The 
problem with this approach was that it limited the pool of respondents and thus the number 
of interviews. 
Another limitation is that the usability of CsM-ERM Strategic Alignment Framework has not 
been empirically tested to comprehend the whole effects of pre- and post-implementation in 
a real-life context. Instead, it has been validated by empirical findings and the other five 
derivates (literature review; systematic literature evaluation; research gap; supporting 
theories; supporting frameworks). 
8.7 Theoretical contribution 
This research has shed light on prior research, adding a contemporary light on the literature 
while suggesting an update to the body of knowledge through a paradigm shift of holistic 
risk governance driven by the alignment theory. By exploring the effects of CsM and ERM 
alignment, it aimed to endorse performance, value enhancement and risk resilience for 
financial organisations. The research findings found a granular theoretical legacy, most often 
stranded on the siloed technical and/or operational side. 
Accordingly, this research contributes to theory with key contributions: 
(1) substantiated prior literature by offering a broader understanding of the extant 
literature with a three-dimensional perspective of academics, practitioners and regulators 
determinants, instead of a mono view. It incorporates what the current theory, best 





(2) explored a theoretical reframing of the problem in the context of strategic 
alignment which highlights the potential usefulness of a holistic approach. While 
previous literature yielded limited empirical studies, addressing only two elements for 
alignment (e.g. IT security with either and/or business strategy or RM), the current 
research recommends the integration of two types of strategies (CsM and ERM), with an 
additional third element co-aligned towards the organisational strategy. To overcome the 
negative effects of siloed approaches, this research contributes to the theory by 
underpinning the homogeneity of the ERM, CsM and Alignment discipline. Thus, it 
contributes altogether and extends the understanding of enterprise-wide governance and 
bridging the theoretical gaps–to ensure the maximisation of the overall organisational 
strategy. The strength of the proposed approach is that it identifies the cause and 
consequences and influences towards an approach that recommends holistic and rapid 
adaptation to evolving risks and challenges to ensure the achievement of an organisation 
strategy. The research does not dismiss previous research and instead uses the findings 
to acquire a thoughtful view of the phenomenon legacy to provide evidence on how all 
three paradigms can have a positive contribution to the research topic. 
(3) contributed by demonstrating knowledge gaps ─ extensively examining how prior 
research adopted disjointed risk governance, thus addressing the research problem in 
isolation. While much attention has been centred on the separate disciplines of ERM, 
CSM and Alignment, the Researcher was constrained to deploy the investigation by 
examining the ERM, CsM and strategic alignment paradigms separately. It was found 
that the alignment of CsM with ERM within the financial industry is scarce and yet viable 
and sustainable. A key aspect of this contribution is that it validates the progress/maturity 
of each paradigm. For instance, it was found that CsM is grounded in prior IT, IS, IA 
literature, with a later influence of RM. Accordingly, the findings concluded that CsM 
theory was found fragmented and most often still perceived as an IT problem and most 
often researched in isolations.  
(4) extended the understanding of the phenomenon through the lenses of alignment 
which revealed useful extension and enhancement within the contingency and 
institutional theory. The Researcher advocates that the contingency and institutional 
theories are two facets of the alignment itself. For example, the institutional theory 
implies coercive pressure (regulations), mimetic pressure (internal pressure) and 
normative pressure (skillset, education, awareness) for achieving an organisation’s 





association illustrates two different insights (institutional norms and variations of 
contingencies) with a commonality based on alignment enhancement. Altogether, 
Contingency and Institutional theories reflect on the contingencies and dependent factors 
that need to align within an internal and external environment along with their causal 
relationship (Sutton and Staw, 1995) and institutional norms. The difference lies in the 
fact that each of them focuses on a distinct perspective or ‘fit’ and offers a different 
outcome. For example, the Contingency Theory concentrates on achieving an internal fit 
with an external environment, whereas the Institutional Theory focuses on making an 
external fit (e.g. recognition of conformity, external support) by adapting its internal 
environment. 
The Institutional Theory refers to the institutional constraints that shape organisations’ 
behaviour. Whilst the Contingency Theory focuses on how organisations can be 
managed and coordinated as a whole, marrying organisational structures, systems, and 
external environments; the association of the two theories is valuable hence both of them 
have roots in the Organisational Theory and are related to organisation design/structure. 
(5) re-contextualised contingency and institutional theory in the risk context and 
compared any intercorrelations in order to determine its suitability within a CsM and 
ERM alignment. Institutional theory addresses what sets the condition of an action to 
understand how and why institutions interact under internal and external environmental 
pressures.  
The merger of both theories helps to explain how mimetic, coercive, and normative 
pressures affect the interdepartmental linkage compliance on daily work practices. As 
organisations are unique, a combination of both Contingency and Institutional Theories 
is advocated by the Researcher with the purpose to explore and explain how a correlation 
between the two can ensure performance, sustainability and effective strategic alignment 
between CsM with ERM and business strategy. It outlines how each element can 
complement the other when striving towards a common goal, extracting the value of each 
and understanding potential inhibitors in implementation. It recommends a paradigm 
shift of risk governance contextualised in the strategic approach that correlates the two 
theories and the research problem grounded on the premises of concepts and principles 
of governance, alignment, communication and coordination of the interdepartmental 
control functions. Henceforth, it is centric for an organisation to fit its organisational 





ERM with organisation strategy and objectives. Secondly, it seeks to respond to external 
pressure and risks. 
The Contingency Theory strategically provides consensus to align the CsM with ERM 
management functions such as strategy alignment, objectives alignment, planning 
alignment, structural and operational organisation with social systems, and leading and 
control—all intended to better cope with external pressure and risks. Thus, this research 
has rejected a prescribed universal approach and in turn, recommended an optimised and 
unique response corresponding to the situation as determined by events and 
circumstance. Contingency shifts to a security perspective, whereas prevention and 
detection help organisations to react and respond.  
Nevertheless, the terminology of alignment registers various similarities in strategic 
management (i.e. both the Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory use the term 
‘fit’). Moreover, contingency and institutional fit approaches are both co-alignment 
approaches that focus on different types of synergy between the organisation and its 
environment (Vorberda et al., 2011, p. 1044). This is relevant when proving the theories’ 
commonality and appropriateness. On this ground, this research positions the theoretical 
dimension of alignment in the context of Contingency Theory and Institutional Theory 
and organisational goals; it combines the fit/integration theoretical lenses along with 
achieving legitimacy and sustainability (Semler, 1997). For example, the Contingency 
Theory has consideration for an organisation’s strategy, structure, culture, organisational 
design, processes, leadership, technology, and structural alignment. Whilst, the 
Institutional Theory considers the value, normative rules, legitimacy, beliefs, principles, 
practices, structures, processes, obligations, behaviour, ethics, and social systems 
establishing command and assigning responsibilities.  
Overall, the re-contextualisation of theories brings together internal variables, external 
variables, strategy and management. The Contingency Theory states that every 
organisation and every organisation’s situation/context is unique, and thus needs to be 
adapted and tailored. Both theories strive to identify and solve organisation issues in an 
optimised manner, ensuring organisational efficiency (i.e. objectives achievement with 
limited resources) rather than general efficiency (merely objectives achievement), and 
with the intention of yielding profitability, competitive advantage (Hatch and Cunliffe, 





(6) determined the main success criteria and interdependencies across prior ERM 
literature. Identified that it varies between value, performance, appetite, culture, and 
governance, most often addressed in isolation. Therefore, this research makes a 
contribution to the ERM criteria of success and compiles them in the context of the 
research problem. 
(7) demonstrated that the literature related to alignment is scarce and thus lacks 
coherent theory when researching the CsM alignment to ERM. Accordingly, this 
research validated that prior research was IT-centric. Henceforth, the alignment literature 
transitioned from a strategic alignment in general, towards IT alignment with business 
strategy. Moreover, the findings demonstrate that there is a scarce industry-specific focus 
– namely the financial industry (ERM has a more significant consideration, while CsM 
and alignment is addressed generically). The literature review outlines that the strategic 
alignment of CsM with ERM is scarce in academic literature.  
(8) identified a multi-dimensional array of alignment approaches in the literature and 
concluded that there are inconsistencies hence prior approaches failed to understand the 
interdependencies between the social, strategic, operational, cultural, social, and 
intellectual dimensions. Identified granular theoretical frameworks ─ prior frameworks 
revealed shortcomings in terms of the completeness of the implementation stages. A 
pattern was identified in the theoretical framework grounded in various phases such as 
planning, implementing, controlling, and assessing risk (also known as by Deming’s 
PDCA cycle method). Accordingly, the systematic analysis identified a pattern in 
adoption, implementation, maturity assessment and compliance. Some of the 
frameworks focused on adoption and implementation whereas a significant number of 
the frameworks analysed predominantly focused on the maturity assessment. In addition, 
it discovered patterns and similarities in both CsM and ERM earlier theoretical 
frameworks. Most often, there are mirroring approaches regarding the framework stages. 
For instance, there is considerable similarity on the number and order of phases. For 
instance, it was found that ERM and CsM are seen as minimum compliance (reactive 
measure rather than proactive controls). On the other hand, previous CsM frameworks 
have incorporated different sub-domains of CsM and have shown variations in 
perspective. Overall, the research has shown that all three domains failed to address the 
alignment of CsM and ERM holistically. The identified evidence supports the key 
argument that prior alignment frameworks have not addressed a complete approach and 





phases (Phase One: ‘baseline expectations’, Phase Two: ‘mandate managerial 
directions’,  Phase Three: ‘establishment of strategic directions’, Phase Four: 
‘implement managerial directions’, Phase Five ‘Monitoring and reviewing practices’) 
and requires an interrelated alignment of CsM and ERM management, strategies, 
planning, structure, processes, skills, competencies, and culture acknowledged at all 
levels, in order to instil communication and mitigation on a common ground throughout 
business units. These theoretical premises can help to reduce over-investment, effort, and 
overlaps, as well as develop organisational awareness and enterprise-wide effectiveness. 
(9) demonstrated the existence of siloed approaches – it compiled evidence from six 
derivates (literature review, systematic literature evaluation, theoretical frameworks 
evaluation, research gap, supporting theories, prior frameworks derivations) to prove that 
prioritisation in security decision is still seen from a silo perspective, resulting in the 
mismanagement of risks and misalignment. Also, the research supplied empirical 
arguments on the challenges of alignment and thus, enriched the growing conceptual 
literature by extending an understanding into how it impacts an organisation. And, so the 
theoretical CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework justifies why  a common 
governance creates a ‘common mechanism’ that would prioritise, enable and  support 
initiatives, unify the overall risk planning, and prioritise risk investments based on 
current organisational needs (i.e. not on subjective departmental needs - IT department 
might have different investment security priorities than organisation security); thus 
alignment shall support the identification of overall necessity on a multi-layered security 
basis. Moreover, the theoretical premises evidenced that the alignment improves the risk 
governance transparency and risk oversight across the whole organisation. 
(10) developed a conceptual framework able to support the alignment of strategies 
through the inclusion of ERM principles and theoretical premises of institutional and 
contingency concepts in order to yield enhanced preparedness in forthcoming risk 
events. By concentrating ERM capabilities and CsM capabilities in the same scope and 
not separating them as done in the past it proposes a shift from the traditional silo 
approach. Potentially, the conceptual framework provides a guide to new studies when 
considering a potential area of improvement with the alignment tenets and organisational 
components. 
To support the validity of the above mentioned, a set of publications were authored as a 






8.8 Practical contribution 
This research is relevant to financial organisations since it proposes an alternative way of 
managing risks holistically and comprehensively, and accordingly recommends co-
alignment in various layers of protection. It contributes by extending the view on how an 
organisation can achieve enterprise-wide resiliency, conformance, performance, 
sustainability, and efficiency utilising the alignment of CsM with ERM. 
The practical research contribution includes: 
• portraying how managing risk holistically has become a factor that influences 
and/or leverage risk control performance. Empirical findings confirmed that 
misalignment has become a growing problem for financial organisations, and it was 
thus acknowledged that both ERM and CsM received heightened demands. Thereby, 
the findings advance an understanding that ERM implementation remains under 
increased external pressure, such as meeting regulatory requirements, recognition of 
compliance, and organisations’ strategic governance. Whilst, for CsM it was 
validated that is being implemented due to increasing threats velocity and 
complexity, industry standards influence, performance-centric goals, compliance, 
competitive advantage and ultimately, resiliency; besides it presents the various 
perceptions of industry practitioners showing that emphasis is placed on aggregating 
answers on how to respond to exposure’ ramifications towards enterprise-wide risks 
and cyber risks altogether and what is needed to sustain a financial business in the 
long term; 
• identifying gaps in how risks are managed. It was found that within many 
organisations, managing cyber risk remained grounded on Information Security 
departments or IT security, whereas ERM is most often applied through traditional 
RM. The empirical findings prove a gap within the practice, showing that 
overcoming this problem remains driven by a silo perspective, across departments 
units, resulting in internal mismanagement. The results also echo positive approaches 
within the industry that recommends the use of modern CsM to ensure wider 
protection;  
• reporting patterns for effective risk foresight (benchmark) across various 
financial organisations and to which an organisation shall abide in order to ensure 





aligning planning, control, measurement, and mitigation is measured in one 
compound mechanism;  
• providing evidence of current ERM immaturity among various financial 
organisations and finding it immature, with an implementation maturity rate of 
38.46%; whilst also providing insights into the main ERM implementation 
drawbacks and showing that despite strong development, the financial organisations 
still struggle with undeveloped practice (immature ERM), lack of capability and lack 
of resources; 
• acknowledging dependency on key determinants for achieving effective ERM 
implementation. Found evidence of the key determinants specific for the financial 
industry: strategic governance, differentiation capabilities and enhanced risk 
resiliency. All of which focus on control, compliance and knowledge; likewise 
identified patterns in barriers, readiness (maturity), and the capacity of organisations 
to sustain holistic risk governance; 
• finding the main ERM inhibitors specific for the financial industry: (1) 
resources-related: - cost, data and information, people and skills; (2) direction-
related: strategy and leadership; (3) capability-related: maturity, culture, lack of 
education and awareness; (4) pressure-related: risks and threats, standardised 
practice and regulations; 
• obtaining important insights into the main factors that impact alignment 
readiness within an organisation’s departments; the results show a positive effect 
among the top three factors: communication, joint risk ownership and maturity;  
• revealing that within practice CsM depends on certain key determinants for 
successfully implementing: (1) internal - initiative and culture; and (2) external - 
cyber threats velocity and complexity; regulatory pressure and standards; on the other 
hand, identified that for CsM, the main inhibitors are people-centric (culture) and 
strategic-centric (silos and cost) factors; the findings offer insights into the fact that 
financial organisations most often fail due to people-centric and strategic-centric 
issues (e.g. lack of resources, direction, capability, and pressure); and so ascertain 
that these factors are essential for achieving successful CsM implementation, instead 





• concluding that within the practice the alignment inhibitors are related to (1) 
governance: (e.g. cultural deficiencies, inappropriate governance) and (2) 
employee’s skills deficiencies;   
• determining the main side effects of misalignment feared by the financial 
organisation. The findings highlight that organisations are concerned with three top 
concerns: reputational loss, regulatory consequences and financial loss. 
• outlining immature risk governance within the financial industry, pointing towards 
challenges and barriers in achieving value and holistic risk resiliency; thus, showing 
that managing risk holistically remains a challenge for most organisations despite 
awareness, considerations and investments; empirical findings indicate that readiness 
of alignment maturity of CsM and ERM is yet to be achieved henceforth 
implementation was reported to be in proportion of 38.46%. The data obtained 
demonstrate that practices remain fragmented in all three domains - CsM, ERM and 
Alignment. Such results highlight the importance of an organisation to understand 
its current risk profile, exposure and capabilities when setting strategic directions as 
well as implementing corrective measures. 
• obtaining empirical evidence which shows an overlap of four dimensions of 
alignment. It is conceivable that implementation prescribes the use of the intellectual 
(strategic), structural, cultural, and operational dimensions of alignment because all 
interrelate and are dependable on each other; it maps the principles of strategic 
alignment and reflects onto the value of multi-dimensional alignment that increases 
risk governance effectiveness; 
• determining the essential factors needed in achieving maturity, risk control and 
risk oversight; provided empirical evidence which reiterates how organisational 
appetite, strategy, culture, governance, risk oversight, risk profile, maturity, 
compliance, structure, performance, leadership and alignment expectations may 
impact a whole organisation. Above all, it was demonstrated that organisational 
strategy and objectives remain the main point of reference when implementing 
alignment; 
• contributed to clarifying the usefulness of alignment, stressing that practitioners 
agree with the alignment’s benefits in a proportion of 69.23% ─ and identifying a 
potential of 75% interest/acceptability to adopt the alignment paradigm. Therefore, 





mechanism that would prioritise risk, support initiatives, unify strategic planning, 
support informed decisions and prioritise investments as a security enabler based on 
current organisational needs rather than on subjective departmental needs. By doing 
so, it explored the overall necessity for multi-layered security driven by the purpose 
of serving the organisational mission and vision in a unified manner; along with the 
preservation of resiliency that advocates the idea of rejecting the ‘organisational 
dissociation’;  
• leveraging a reconsideration of traditional risk governance when aligning CsM 
with ERM and business strategy. It enabled insights into how practitioners employ 
risk governance to optimise the use of resources, lower costs and reduce effort. 
Determined that alignment influences ROI, avoids duplication and strategic 
alignment, reaches enterprise-wide communication and the prioritisation of risks; 
emphasised that misalignment can be mitigated with the collaborative effort of CsM 
and ERM, thus shedding light on a common governance across all three domains ─ 
emphasising the benefits of implementing the frameworks ─ value creation, value 
capture, value enhancement, organisational effectiveness, performance and risk 
foresight; the unified framework combines risk control capabilities with risk 
oversight capabilities in order to reach an enterprise-wide risk governance capability. 
The presented evidence that alignment creates collaboration between departments, 
points towards the view that the cost of risk awareness can be decreased when ERM 
and cybersecurity risks are compiled altogether; 
• proposing a framework capable of acting as an inside service, risk function and 
guideline for an organisation. The framework shows the importance of considering 
all risk controls (physical, technical and procedural) and oversight functions 
pertaining to the main organisational goal. The framework embodies a representation 
of how a strategic organisational statement can achieve its main objective. Therefore, 
through the implementation of the framework, an organisation can reduce over-
investment and the duplication of efforts when adapting to internal and external 
changes (Miles et al., 1978), avoiding the overlapping of functions and the 
duplication of resource allocation. This implies that the framework proposes to 
support organisations’ risk governance strategies and procedures by emphasising 
strategic responsibility, leadership, accountability and enterprise-wide risk 
governance with the intention to seize opportunities, make risk-informed decisions 





risks; respectively reaching risk governance effectiveness and overall risk foresight 
(see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2 and Subsection 4.4.4); emphasises the impact of internal 
strategy in alignment, paying consideration to external requirements. Sets of internal 
directions are in balance with the identified external directions in order to cope with 
the external environment; 
• shedding new light on the ERM contribution when aligning with CsM, helping to 
avoid bias in decisions related to investments or budget allocation. The findings 
highlighted that little is known about the implication of correlating the capabilities 
of CsM with ERM while risk appetite and tolerance is aligned with the organisational 
risk appetite, risk tolerance and acceptable residual risk. The research presented the 
effects and benefits of creating common risk governance for risk control and risk 
oversight to support the achievement of the overall business strategy and enterprise-
wide risk governance capability to enhance overall risk foresight capabilities for 
financial organisations. The insights identified the support considerations of internal 
and external factors that entails systematic re-alignment as an enabler for reaching a 
higher level of maturity; 
• evidencing gaps in existing practitioners’ methodologies, demonstrating that 
compliance is not merely about meeting regulatory expectation/rules. It can help to 
have a unified mechanism to ensure the efficiency of risk oversight and provide 
insight into how due care leads, in turn, to competitive advantages, increasing 
business performance and risk resiliency;  
• expanding an understanding into the implications of the multi-spectrum of 
variables when implementing the strategic alignment (e.g. governance, strategy, risk 
appetite, risk tolerance, structure, culture, organisational design, processes, 
leadership, technology, structural alignment, communication, competence, 
partnerships) that can impact the return on investment and performance; 
• recommending a mindset change, switching from reactive to proactive risk 
strategies to ensure a continuous identification for internal and external challenges; 
accordingly offer insights into the critical importance to integrate shared risk 
oversight (unified capabilities of reporting, analysis and mitigation). Thus, action 
prioritisation is made in alignment with all three components and ensures that it leads 
to an optimised response, based on organisational needs and the risk profile, whereas 





• incorporating the review of industry best practices for both CsM and ERM, 
elaborating how most are often generic and granular instead of specifically 
addressing the financial industry-specific needs (e.g. regulatory compliance). In 
particular, the summarised insights of industry best practices focus attention to 
compare and predetermine a baseline for control function effectiveness; 
• finding evidence to justify the value of a multi-dimensional strategic alignment 
correlated with cultural, operational and structural alignment; for example, providing 
a deeper insight into cultural dimensions as a significant determinant in 
implementation, hence the human aspect is a variable (informal procedures, norms, 
beliefs, behaviour, ethics);  
• demonstrating an insufficient understanding of holistic risk governance within 
financial organisations and drawing attention to the management of financial 
organisations towards the negative effects of the siloed approach and to the 
importance of supporting a coherent alignment across strategy, policy and guidance 
to succeed the achievement of effective risk governance;  
• determining a benchmark towards a new holistic strategic direction in managing 
risks, emphasising an understanding of a real-world problem and proposing an 
alternative solution of CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework to avoid the 
duplication of strategies, policies, guidelines, and procedures; the framework 
advocates a common mechanism of control, monitoring, measuring, and ultimately 
formulating a common solution to increase resiliency; the proposed Framework 
supports the acknowledgement of management directions (driving principles: 
philosophy, appetite, and directions) beforehand and optimises as needed to predict 
strategic requirements; furthermore, the proposed solution supports an informed 
implementation which assesses the organisational risk profile based on a tailored 
maturity model diagnosis extracted from industry standards best practices. The 
proposed approach can be readily used in practice because it articulates the gaps in 
each paradigm (ERM, CsM and strategic alignment) and recommends an approach 
to overcome drawbacks, understanding reimbursement and inhibitors. 
• evidencing the value of employing a comprehensive approach. Demonstrated that 
the CsM - ERM Strategic Alignment Framework improves due care for risk oversight, 
the effectiveness of control, collaboration, communication, co-alignment, risk 





and anticipating potential disruption. The framework provision shared 
communication across an organisation to promote a proactive strategy in achieving 
resiliency with careful consideration to internal and external requirements; thus, it 
contributes towards the improvement of a risk maturity-performance rapport. 
8.9 Recommendations 
Future research should focus on the implementation of the framework. It might be useful to 
focus on correlating both strategic and operational deployment. One avenue for further 
research would be to examine the specific determinants, reimbursement and inhibitors for 
any given industry. Without further research into holistic enterprise-wide risk, it will not be 
possible to sustain effective security practice. Further work is needed to fully understand the 
implications of internal and external determinants and the influence on risk governance. 
Questions that remain unanswered by literature are stranded in a lack of research on 
assessing the post-alignment implementation of CsM and ERM. The extent of the role that 
CsM plays in an organisation is yet to be discovered. How ERM is associated or not 
associated is the underlying cause of security failures. Thus, the possible link between the 
two creates the basis that orchestrates the security posture of an organisation. The underlying 
mechanism is strategic alignment-, resiliency- and effectiveness-centric by engaging 
integration between all three domains. Further research may include organisational 
methodology, attributing more transparent practices. 
Another avenue of research might focus on legislation’s effect on risk governance, gathering 
more information about transparency and better organisational behaviour to risk. If 
necessary, regulatory effects might be explored within the specifics of each country. 
Educational awareness level may be incorporated into research to help organisations mature. 
ERM should become a more integrated part of strategic decisions. The implementation of 
ERM within organisational culture and embedded within daily activities and processes might 
be another avenue of research. Perhaps risk governance practices would consider investing 
more research on how the knowledge and skillset of employees may support effectiveness. 
With regards to agility and optimisation, another avenue of research may address the 
research problem quantitatively.  
The financial industry is using a mix of generic business standards (e.g. ISO family) and 
public sector standards (e.g. NIST), so perhaps another avenue of research would be to 





governance. Alternatively, it may focus on improving the risk mapping mechanism, being 
able to support more integration for risk governance and even collate with the benefits of 
artificial intelligence. Additionally, it would be interesting to research creating appropriate 
technical tools to supplement the research framework in tracking, monitoring, collating and 
managing the risks holistically; a more bottom-up approach would be another advisable 
avenue of research. 
On a practical issue, it depends on where the organisation is when considering implementing 
a strategy; it may focus on educating senior management and furthering an understanding of 
the industry and comprehension of business risks, costs, profiles, to name but a few. Some 
recommendations would be to create open and honest communication and fostering within 
the right culture (instil and plan risk culture), and to have the right talent and establish a 
common language for both the board and the organisation. Having the right people, trained 
and open-minded at the table to tackle these challenges is critical. Lastly, having set the 
foundation of policies, procedures, guidelines, reporting and accountability structural 
hierarchy, it would be prudent to reassess and return all related documents regularly and set 
limits and expectations regarding resiliency and alignment. 
Ultimately, the trade-off of applying the recommended CsM-ERM Alignment Framework is 
to create, deploy, and further foster long-term sustainable risk governance for organisations 
with the financial industry. In summary, the practical orientation for risk governance should 
be maintained and enriched with scholar research to ensure that past lessons are 
acknowledged and to supports an evolution towards an intelligent financial system that 
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Appendix A: Cross-reference table of key research terms and phrases  
RM Risk governance; silo risk management; traditional RM; siloed governance 
of risks.  
 
ERM Enterprise risk management; holistic risk governance; organisational risk 
governance; Governance, Risk Management and Compliance. 
 
CsM Cyber-security; cyber security management; cybersecurity risk management; 
information security governance; computer security; IT security; electronic 
security; digital security; internet security; IT Risk Management; Data 
Security; Information Security Management Systems; Cyber Threat 
Management; Cybersecurity Risk Management; Cybersecurity Management. 
 
Alignment Integration; unification; non-alignment; misalignment; fit; co-aligned; 
linked; congruent; contingent; matched; harmony; fusion; synchronization; 










PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEWS 
Title of Research: Aligning Cybersecurity Management with Enterprise Risk Management in the 
Financial Industry 
 
Researcher: Alina Andronache, PhD Student at Brunel Business School, Brunel University London  
 
Purpose: This research aims to explore the related area to risk governance as Cybersecurity 
Management and Enterprise Risk Management with the purpose to understand risk attention, 
decisions, experiences, behaviours and attitude towards risk oversight. This research investigates 
possible methods for facilitating a more enhanced strategic approach to respond to the extended 
exposure to wide-ranging risks and cyber risks. More specifically, how financial 
organisations manage their exposure to risks and explore what is required to improve risk 
governance. 
Participant selection 
You are being asked to participate in this study because you have been identified as an expert within 
the financial industry. You have been chosen because your valuable expertise within organisational 
risk governance can bring benefits to others. The decision to take part in this research is voluntary 
and a withdrawal at any given point is possible, without justification. If you have decided to 
participate in this research, you will be required to sign a consent form. The estimated number of 
participants for interviews is around 30 interviewees across the globe. 
 
Confidentiality: All your responses are confidential and anonymous so please be assured that under 
no circumstances will any of the collected or retained information contain information about your 
identity. Research records will be kept in a locked file and all electronic information will be coded 
and secured using a password protected file. We will not include any information in any report that 
would render it possible to identify you. Any recordings taken during the interview will be kept secret 
(codified and anonymised) and will be kept in a secure place in accordance to Data Protection Act. 
Withdrawal: You have the right not to answer any single question, as well as to withdraw 
completely from the interview at any point during the process. Additionally, you have the right to 
request the interviewer not use any of the interview material. 
Description of interview procedure: If you agree to participate, a typical interview length is 
approximately about 30-40 minutes. However, it can go up to a maximum of 1 hour, depending on 
how much information you decide to communicate. The interview will be recorded but if required 
this method can be changed at your request and replaced with note taking during the interview. 
What is expected from an interview?  
The interview is expected to take place at a time and location convenient for you. During the 





structured interview), so you can openly answer question as you wish. The expected number of 
questions is 30 and are particularly related to risk governance. In case you may find some questions 
uncomfortable, you are not obliged to answers to questions. With your permission, the interview will 
be audio recorded in order to capture accurately what has been said. 
 
Description of procedure after interview 
The audio recording will be transcribed and labelled with a code number to assure anonymity. If 
requested, a copy of the transcribed interview can be provided. Moreover, if you later wish to make 
changes on your statements, to remove specific information or you want more information on how 
your identity is hidden, your request will be fulfilled. A report of findings will be available to all 
participants a later date. 
 
Indirect benefits: Even though there is no financial gain involved in taking part in this research, the 
potential indirect benefits of your involvement contribute towards recommending to the financial 
industry how risk governance should be dealt with based on findings from various organisations. 
 
Report concerns 
While I do not anticipate any problems during the interview, if there are any problems or concerns 
that occur as a result of your participation, you can communicate them directly to me or should you 
require any further information, you can alternatively contact my supervisor (where relevant). 
Complaints, on the other hand, should be directed, in the first instance, to the relevant Research 
Ethics Committee of Brunel University London. 
Contact details are as follows: 
• Researcher: Alina Andronache, PhD Student at Brunel Business School, Brunel University 
London, contact email: Alina.Andronache@brunel.ac.uk, contact phone number: [removed] 
• Faculty advisor: Dr Abraham Althonayan, Brunel Business School, Brunel University 
London, email contact: Abraham.Althonayan@brunel.ac.uk  
• Faculty ethics committee: College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences: Cbass-
ethics@brunel.ac.uk 
Many thanks for accepting the invitation to take part in this research project and thank you for reading 
this Participant Information Sheet for Interviews. 
This research will be undertaken in accordance with the Brunel University London Ethical 
Framework,  Brunel University London Code of Research Ethics, and Brunel University 








Appendix C: Consent Form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM OF PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY  
 
Title of Research: Aligning Cybersecurity Management with Enterprise Risk Management in the 
Financial Industry 
Researcher: Alina Andronache, PhD Student at Brunel Business School, Brunel University London, 




Please initial box 
 
     Yes   No        
1.   I hereby confirm that I have read and understand the participation information sheet 
for the above-mentioned research and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
                   
2.   I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving reason. 
 
 
3.   I understand that my participation involves one interview session. Only in some 
exceptional cases, the Researcher might contact me for further details or clarifications, but 
in such case, I can decline such request without any obligation. 
 
 
4.   I understand that my confidentially will be accomplished by name anonymization, 
thus the Researcher assumes the responsibility to assure confidentiality and anonymization 
both my name and my organisation. 
 
 
5.   At this phase, I am aware that if there are any problems or questions, I can contact 








7.   I grant my permission for anonymised quotes to be used in publications.  
 
 
8.   A copy of this document has been given to me and I have read the above, and I am 
knowingly confirming my interest for participating voluntarily to the interview. I confirm 
that I read and understood the information provided to me (pre-interview). 
 
 





A verbal agreement can replace the signature on this form if preferable. Your recorded verbal 
agreement indicates that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant for this study, and 





















Appendix D: Interview Questions 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
Title of Research: Aligning Cybersecurity Management with Enterprise Risk Management 
in the Financial Industry 




1. Please specify in which geographical region your current organisation primarily resides 
(headquarter). 
o Please specify………………………………………………………………………………... 
2. In which sector within the financial industry does your organisation primarily operates? 
o Depository institution (e.g. retail bank, commercial bank, private bank, savings bank, 
building society, credit union) 
o Insurance and pension fund institution (e.g. insurance organisations) 
o Brokers and investments institution (e.g. asset management, investments bank, corporate 
finance, mutual funds, hedge funds, mortgage brokers, clearing houses, finance organisation, 
investment organisation) 
o Other (please specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Please specify the size of your organisation in terms of employee numbers.  
o between 100-500 
o between 501-1,000  
o between 1,001-2,000 
o between 2,001-3,000 
o between 3,001-4,000 
o between 4,001-5,000 
o above 5,001 but below 10,000 
o above 10,000 





4. What is your position within the organisation? 
o Please specify………………………………………………………………………………... 
5. On which aspect of risk oversight are you mostly focused? 








o Enterprise-wide risk control 
o Implementation – operational 
o Implementation – strategic 
o Risk control 
o Other (please 
specify)……………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
6. In terms of years’ experience in your current role, how would you define your employment 
status? 
 
o At least 1 year but fewer than 3 years 
o At least 3 years but fewer than 5 years 
o At least 5 years but fewer than 10 years 
o Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Per total, how many years of experience have you acquired in similar roles related to risk 
governance? 
o At least 1 year but fewer than 3 years 
o At least 3 years but fewer than 5 years 
o At least 5 years but fewer than 10 years 
o Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. As a professional, is your current role conditioned by specific industry professional 
certifications?  
 
o Not required 




9. How do you describe your direct experience in terms of your interaction with risk governance 
within your organisation (your job aims)? 
o Please specify ………………………………………………………………………………... 
Research focus questions 
 
10. What can you tell me about your organisation’s position in terms of preparation against risks? 
o Please specify ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
11. In terms of risk level, how would you describe the velocity of risks/attacks encountered by your 
organisation? 
o Low-almost inexistent 
o Medium, within acceptable tolerance 
o High, exceeds the tolerance 
o At critical capacity, above expectations 
o Other (please specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
12. What is the name of the managerial component/department of your organisation carries a duty of 
care/responsibility regarding enterprise risks?  





o Enterprise Risk Management 
o Executive Boards 
o Governance Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) 
o Resilience Management 
o Risk Management 
o Steering Committee 




13. How would you describe the overall status of risk governance maturity (e.g. Risk Management, 
Enterprise Risk Management) within your organisation for protecting the organisation against risks? 
(on a scale of 1-5, 1 representing the low value). 
o Robust (5) 
o Mature risk governance embedded at enterprise level (4) 
o Evolved risk governance but partially implemented across units/departments (3) 
o Developed but not yet applied enterprise-wide (2) 
o Very immature - at its early stages of preparation (1) 




14. In general, how would you describe the role of organisation risk governance (e.g. Risk 
Management (RM) /Enterprise Risk Management (ERM))? 
o Common governance tool 
o Competitive advantages advocate 
o Compliance requirement 
o Cross-domain risk knowledge 
o Effective strategic prioritization (operational efficiency) tool 
o Supportive business strategy and objectives alignment tool 
o Value creation tool 
o Risk control function 




15. In your opinion, what are the three main determinants/drivers (internal and external) on which 
an organisation decides to implement a risk governance (RM/ERM)?  
o Competition 
o Customers’ expectations 
o Consultancy organisations 
o Insurance prerequisites 
o Laws 
o Organisation’s own initiative 
o Organisational risk oversight culture  
o Organizational internal norms 
o Post-financial crisis lessons 
o Practitioners’ recommendations 
o Regulatory requirements 










16. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors (internal and external) that might impede the 
successful implementation of RM/ERM? 
o Please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………….................. 
17. Moving from enterprise protection to cyber-related threats, what is the name of the managerial 
component/department of your organisation that carries a duty of care/responsibility regarding the 
protection of your organisation against cyber risks? 
o Please specify 
…………………………………………………………………………………….................. 
 
18. In your opinion, what are the main determinants that determine the implementation of cyber risk 
oversight? (Please tick as many as you deem appropriate). 
o Competition 
o Consultancy organisations 
o Insurance prerequisites 
o Laws 
o Organisation’s own initiative 
o Organisational risk oversight culture  
o Organizational internal norms 
o Practitioners’ recommendations 
o Regulatory pressure 
o Shareholders’ requirements 
o Standards/Frameworks-driven 
o Technology advancement 
o The velocity and complexity of cyber threats 




19. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors (internal and external) that might impede the 
good practice of cyber risk governance? 
o Communication 
o Cost of compliance 
o Cost of implementation 
o Lack of awareness 
o Lack of collaboration  
o Lack of enterprise-wide risk culture 
o Lack of employees’ competencies 
o Late risk identification. 
o Misalignment to organizational goals 
o Silo approaches 
o Silo strategies (double effort, cost & time consuming), difficulties in integration 
o Strategic directions 









20. Referring to departments/units and the practical side of risks, how would an employee (any 
department) encountering a cyber incident handle such situation? What should do? 




21. Considering the broad spectrum of risks and cyber threats, which are the three most unwanted 
effects of poor risk oversight within your organisation? (Please tick as many as you deem 
appropriate) 
o Biased decisions 
o Business interruption 
o Financial loss 
o Ineffective loss prevention 
o Loss of customer trust 
o Loss of resilience 
o Loss of sensitive data 
o Post-incident premium insurance chargers 
o Regulatory consequences/fines/prejudices 
o Reputational loss 
o Unjustified investments on risk oversight 




22. In terms of security strategy, does your organisation rely on a specific industry framework, 
security management programme or standards in dealing with its exposure to wide-ranging 
protection and cyber risks? 




23. Regarding implementation benefits of risk oversight, on which return on investment (ROI) does 
your organisation focus more specifically? 
o Competitive advantage 
o Compliance 
o Organisational effectiveness 
o Resilience 
o Sustainability 
o Other (please specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
24. In your opinion, what are the executive board expectations regarding your department in terms 









25. In your organisation, how well do departments communicate with others in the case of an incident 
if more types of risks (enterprise and cyber) are involved? (on a scale of 1-5, 1 representing the low 
value). 
o Very effective (5) 
o Somewhat effective (4) 
o Neutral (3) 
o Somewhat ineffective (2) 
o Very ineffective (1) 
26. Based on your personal observations and experiences, do you think that it is a good approach to 
manage each risk or incident at departmental level rather than at an enterprise level? 




27. How does your organisation deal with all type of risks within each department? 
o Each department deals with its own risks 
o Risks are treated holistically 
o Risk are treated through both silo and enterprise-wide approach 
o Other (please specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
28. Do you think the implementation of a unified strategy for cyber and RM governance would have 
a positive or negative effect on an organisation? 
o Very positive 
o Somewhat positive 
o Neutral 
o Somewhat negative 
o Very negative 
 
29. Does your organisation have a unified mechanism by which your organisation identifies, assesses 
and mitigates both cyber and enterprise risks across your organisation? Could you tell me more about 
it? 




30. What is your understanding about strategic alignment; for example, what is the purpose, who is 
responsible, how can be achieved, etc.? 
o Please specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
31. What do you think are the benefits of alignment regarding risk governance and organisation 
objective achievement? 





o Unified departmental communication  
o Unified risk response mechanism 
o Avoidance of duplication 
o Risk mitigation optimisation 
o Strategy alignment 
o Informed prioritisation of decisions 
o Unified resilience 
o Enterprise-wide risk measurement 
o Other (please specify) ……………………………………………………..………………. 
 
32. In dealing with risk governance, have you considered the alignment of Cybersecurity 
Management with Enterprise Risk Management? 
o Yes  
o No 
o I don’t know 
o Other (please specify) …………………………………………………………………… 
 
33. Do you think that a strategic alignment of Cybersecurity Management with Enterprise Risk 
Management is a feasible approach in terms of organisational risk governance in the long-term? 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
o Other (please specify) …………………………………………………..………………… 
 
34. In your opinion, what is the overall status of cybersecurity maturity alignment with ERM within 
your organisation? 
o Mature (fully optimised) 
o Somewhat mature, optimised to organisational needs 
o Slightly mature, implemented but not fully integrated 
o Immature, implementation initiation phase 
o Neutral 
o Considered but not yet applied 
o Not considered 
o Other (please specify) ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
35. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors that might impede a strategic alignment of 
CsM and ERM specifically in the financial industry? 
o Overlap of governances 
o Employees skills deficiencies 
o Inappropriate governance 
o Dispersed compliance settings 
o Plethora of guidance’s/practices 
o Silo approach /overlap of functions 
o Heightened regulatory expectations 
o Unclear policy and risk statements 
o Organisational cultural deficiencies 
o Uncorrelated theory with applicability 
o Inappropriate alignment/low maturity 





o Uncoordinated efforts of staff involved 
o Overconfidence in systems and procedures 
o Inconsistent regulations (national specific vs. global) 
o Other (please specify) ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
If the next 2 questions do not apply, please go to the question 38. 
36. How does your organisation achieve strategic alignment? How it can be established? 
o Do not apply 





37. If applicable, how does your organisation assess the alignment? Are there any mechanisms in 
place? 





38. Which are most worthwhile risk oversight practices that you would recommend to other managers 
facing drawbacks in the implementation of ERM and CsM alignment? 





39. Lastly, how do you think risk governance within your organisation will (if) change over the next 
five years? Any predictions/forecasts of future trends? 





I have no further questions. Is there anything else you would like to bring up or ask before closing 
the interview? 








Appendix E: Frameworks evaluation form 
No. Task Derivations identified 
1. Main focus (CsM, ERM, alignment)  
2 Research gap indicated  
2a How the gap relates to the research problem?  
3 Understanding the external requirements 
(regulatory, stakeholders) and limitation of internal 
and external factors 
 
4 Contrasting the desired state; cost-benefit analysis  
5 How will impact the theory and practice   
6 Main focus (quadrants) 
Quadrant 1 Adoption 
Quadrant 2 Implementation 
Quadrant 3 Maturity assessment 
Quadrant 4 Assesses compliance 
 
7 Continuous self-assessment (regulatory, guidelines, 
standards) 
 







9 Is alignment of CsM and ERM considered?  
10 Prescriptive/descriptive  
11  Industry specific (financial, others)  
12 Strengths and limitations  


















Theme One: Respondent and Organisation Profile 
 
Research Framework themes 






1) To investigate the 
alignment of CsM with ERM 
within the financial industry.  
2) To develop a framework 
that assists CsM with ERM 
alignment within the financial 
industry, supported by practical 
guidance for the implementation of 
the proposed framework. 
1. Please specify in which geographical region your current organisation primarily resides (headquarter). 
2. In which sector within the financial industry does your organisation primarily operates? 
3. Please specify the size of your organisation in terms of employee numbers. 
Research questions 4. What is your position within the organisation? 
5. On which aspect of risk oversight are you mostly focused? 
6. In terms of years’ experience in your current role, how would you define your employment status? 
7. Per total, how many years of experience have you acquired in similar roles related to risk governance? 
8.As a professional, is your current role conditioned by specific industry professional certifications? 
9. How do you describe your direct experience in terms of your interaction with risk governance within your 









1. Why does a strategic 
alignment of CsM and ERM 








Theme Two: Enterprise Risk Oversight Maturity  






✓ Enterprise Risk 
Management 
✓ Strategic alignment/ 
Interconnectivity and 
Partnership 
✓ Context of alignment 
(internal and external) 





• Purpose of alignment 
• Alignment objectives 
• Alignment strategy 
 





• Strategic directions 
Q10. What can you tell me about your organisation’s position in terms of preparation against risks? 
Q11. In terms of risk level, how would you describe the velocity of risks/attacks encountered by your organisation? 
Q12. What is the name of the managerial component/department of your organisation carries a duty of 
care/responsibility regarding enterprise risks? 
Q13. How would you describe the overall status of risk governance maturity (e.g. Risk Management, Enterprise 
Risk Management) within your organisation for protecting the organisation against risks? (on a scale of 1-5, 1 
representing the low value). 
Q14. In general, how would you describe the role of organisation risk governance (e.g. Risk Management (RM) 
/Enterprise Risk Management (ERM))? 
Q15. In your opinion, what are the three main determinants (internal and external) on which an organisation decides 
to implement a risk governance (RM/ERM)? 
Q16. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors (internal and external) that might impede the successful 














2. What are the key issues that 
impede the alignment process 
in the financial industry 





















3 How are theory, practice, 
and regulation direction 
applied regarding the current 
alignment of CsM and ERM 
within the financial industry? 
 
Theme Three: Cyber Risk Oversight Maturity 
Q17. Moving from enterprise protection to cyber-related threats, what is the name of the managerial 
component/department of your organisation that carries a duty of care/responsibility regarding the protection of 
your organisation against cyber risks? 
Q18. In your opinion, what are the main determinants that determine the implementation of cyber risk oversight?  
Q19. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors (internal and external) that might impede the good 
practice of cyber risk governance? 
Q20. Referring to departments/units and the practical side of risks, how would an employee (any department) 











Q21. Considering the broad spectrum of risks and cyber threats, which are the three most unwanted effects of poor 
risk oversight within your organisation?  
Q22. In terms of security strategy, does your organisation rely on a specific framework, security management 
programme, standards, policies, procedures, guidance or regulatory framework compliance in dealing with its 
exposure to enterprise and cyber risks? 
Q23. Regarding implementation benefits of risk oversight, on which return on investment (ROI) does your 
organisation focus more specifically? 
Q24. In your opinion, what are the executive board expectations regarding your department in terms of enterprise 
risks and cyber risk governance? 
• Context of alignment 
 
Phase Three: ‘establishment of 
strategic directions’ 
• Strategic alignment 
• Structural alignment 
 
Phase Four: ‘implement 
managerial directions’ 
• risk profile 
• risk practices 
 
Phase Five: ‘Monitoring and 
reviewing practices’ - 
improvement 
• Monitor, measure, plan, 
re-align 
• Barriers and limitations of 
CsM with ERM alignment 












4. What effects have the 
















Theme Four: Strategic Alignment 
Q25. In your organisation, how well do departments communicate with others in the case of an incident if both 
types of risks (enterprise and cyber) are involved? (on a scale of 1-5, 1 representing the low value). 
Q26. Based on your personal observations and experiences, do you think that it is a good approach to manage each 
risk or incident at departmental level rather than at an enterprise level? 
Q27. How does your organisation deal with all type of risks within each department? 
Q28. Do you think the implementation of a unified strategy for cyber and RM governance would have a positive 
or negative effect on an organisation? 
Q29. Does your organisation have a unified mechanism by which your organisation identifies, assesses and 
mitigates both cyber and enterprise risks across your organisation? Could you tell me more about it? 
Q30. What is your understanding about strategic alignment; for example, what is the purpose, who is responsible, 
how can be achieved, etc.? 
Q31. What do you think are the benefits of alignment regarding risk governance and organisation objective 
achievement? 
Q32. In dealing with risk governance, have you considered the alignment of Cybersecurity Management with 
Enterprise Risk Management? 
Q33. Do you think that a strategic alignment of Cybersecurity Management with Enterprise Risk Management is 
a feasible approach in terms of organisational risk governance in the long-term? 
Q34. In your opinion, what is the overall status of cybersecurity maturity alignment with ERM within your 
organisation? 
Q35. From your experience, what are the main inhibitors that might impede a strategic alignment of CsM and ERM 
specifically in the financial industry? 
Q36. How does your organisation achieve strategic alignment? How it can be established? 
Q37. If applicable, how does your organisation assess the alignment? Are there any mechanisms in place? 
Q38. Which are most worthwhile risk oversight practices that you would recommend to other managers facing 
drawbacks in the implementation of ERM and CsM alignment? 
Q39. Lastly, how do you think risk governance within your organisation will (if) change over the next five years? 
Any predictions/forecast of future trends? 
 
